blob: 44ade30c53d8822af1751b87903150ab85367eab [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/stack.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../x509/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
// Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
// evaluation.
// #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) {
if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ||
!(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) {
BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
} else {
int i;
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
if (i) {
BIO_puts(err, ", ");
}
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
}
BIO_puts(err, "\n");
}
}
static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) {
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
int i;
BIO *err;
err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (!curr) {
curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
} else {
curr++;
}
BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", plev - tree->levels,
plev->flags);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
}
if (plev->anyPolicy) {
X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
}
}
BIO_free(err);
}
#else
#define tree_print(a, b, c) //
#endif
//-
// Initialize policy tree. Return values:
// 0 Some internal error occurred.
// -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
// 1 Tree initialized OK.
// 2 Policy tree is empty.
// 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
// 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
unsigned int flags) {
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ret = 1;
int i, n;
int explicit_policy;
int any_skip;
int map_skip;
*ptree = NULL;
n = sk_X509_num(certs);
#if 0
// Disable policy mapping for now...
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
#endif
if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) {
explicit_policy = 0;
} else {
explicit_policy = n + 1;
}
if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) {
any_skip = 0;
} else {
any_skip = n + 1;
}
if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
map_skip = 0;
} else {
map_skip = n + 1;
}
// Can't do anything with just a trust anchor
if (n == 1) {
return 1;
}
// First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
// anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
// explicit_policy value at this point.
for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
cache = policy_cache_set(x);
// If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately
if (cache == NULL) {
return 0;
}
// If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) {
ret = -1;
}
// Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
// haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) {
ret = 2;
}
if (explicit_policy > 0) {
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
explicit_policy--;
}
if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) &&
(cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) {
explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
}
}
}
if (ret != 1) {
if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) {
return 6;
}
return ret;
}
// If we get this far initialize the tree
tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
if (!tree) {
return 0;
}
tree->flags = 0;
tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
tree->nlevel = 0;
tree->extra_data = NULL;
tree->auth_policies = NULL;
tree->user_policies = NULL;
if (!tree->levels) {
OPENSSL_free(tree);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
tree->nlevel = n;
level = tree->levels;
// Root data: initialize to anyPolicy
data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) {
goto bad_tree;
}
for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
level++;
x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
cache = policy_cache_set(x);
X509_up_ref(x);
level->cert = x;
if (!cache->anyPolicy) {
level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
}
// Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags
if (any_skip == 0) {
// Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
// last in the chain.
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) {
level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
}
} else {
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
any_skip--;
}
if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) {
any_skip = cache->any_skip;
}
}
if (map_skip == 0) {
level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
} else {
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
map_skip--;
}
if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) {
map_skip = cache->map_skip;
}
}
}
*ptree = tree;
if (explicit_policy) {
return 1;
} else {
return 5;
}
bad_tree:
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
return 0;
}
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data) {
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
int matched = 0;
size_t i;
// Iterate through all in nodes linking matches
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
// This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
// CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) {
size_t i;
X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
// If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
// CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
// be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
// no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
// because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
// it later.
#if 0
if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
&& !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
continue;
#endif
// Look for matching nodes in previous level
if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
// This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
// policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
const ASN1_OBJECT *id, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
if (id == NULL) {
id = node->data->valid_policy;
}
// Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
// node.
data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
if (data == NULL) {
return 0;
}
// Curr may not have anyPolicy
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
size_t i;
if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ||
!(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
// If no policy mapping: matched if one child present
if (node->nchild) {
return 1;
}
if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) {
return 0;
}
// Add it
} else {
// If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) {
return 1;
}
// Locate unmatched nodes
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) {
continue;
}
if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) {
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
size_t i;
// X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) {
return 0;
}
#if 0
// Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
// Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
// may have multiple children
if (node->nchild)
continue;
// Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
// unmatched node.
data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
node_critical(node));
if (data == NULL)
return 0;
// Curr may not have anyPolicy
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
#endif
}
// Finally add link to anyPolicy
if (last->anyPolicy) {
if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
// Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
// then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
// have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) {
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
int i;
nodes = curr->nodes;
if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
// Delete any mapped data: see RFC 3280 XXXX
if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
node->parent->nchild--;
OPENSSL_free(node);
(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
}
}
}
for (;;) {
--curr;
nodes = curr->nodes;
for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
if (node->nchild == 0) {
node->parent->nchild--;
OPENSSL_free(node);
(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
}
}
if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) {
curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
}
OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
}
if (curr == tree->levels) {
// If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty
if (!curr->anyPolicy) {
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
}
}
static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) {
if (!*pnodes) {
*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
if (!*pnodes) {
return 0;
}
} else {
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes);
if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) {
return 1;
}
}
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
// Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
// is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
// set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
// the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
// of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
// value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) {
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
int i;
size_t j;
curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
// If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy
if (curr->anyPolicy) {
if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) {
return 0;
}
addnodes = pnodes;
} else {
// Add policies to authority set
addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
}
curr = tree->levels;
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
// If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
// levels so end search.
if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) {
break;
}
curr++;
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
if ((node->parent == anyptr) && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
return 0;
}
}
}
if (addnodes == pnodes) {
return 2;
}
*pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
return 1;
}
static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) {
size_t i;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
// Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
// will happen if it is a leaf node.
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) {
return 1;
}
anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
return 1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
if (!node) {
if (!anyPolicy) {
continue;
}
// Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
// from anyPolicy.
extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
if (!extra) {
return 0;
}
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
extra->flags =
POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
if (!tree->user_policies) {
return 1;
}
}
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
int ret, i;
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) {
return 0;
}
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) &&
!tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) {
return 0;
}
tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
if (ret != 1) {
return ret;
}
}
return 1;
}
static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) {
if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) {
OPENSSL_free(node);
}
}
void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
if (!tree) {
return;
}
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
for (int i = 0; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = &tree->levels[i];
X509_free(curr->cert);
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
}
sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
OPENSSL_free(tree);
}
//-
// Application policy checking function.
// Return codes:
// 0 Internal Error.
// 1 Successful.
// -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
// -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
unsigned int flags) {
int ret;
int calc_ret;
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
*ptree = NULL;
*pexplicit_policy = 0;
ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
switch (ret) {
// Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK
case 2:
return 1;
// Some internal error
case -1:
return -1;
// Some internal error
case 0:
return 0;
// Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error
case 6:
*pexplicit_policy = 1;
return -2;
// Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue
case 5:
*pexplicit_policy = 1;
break;
// Tree OK: continue
case 1:
if (!tree) {
// tree_init() returns success and a null tree
// if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
// I'm not sure that returning success here is
// correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
// as an internal error which our caller
// interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
return 1;
}
break;
}
if (!tree) {
goto error;
}
ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto error;
}
// Return value 2 means tree empty
if (ret == 2) {
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
if (*pexplicit_policy) {
return -2;
} else {
return 1;
}
}
// Tree is not empty: continue
calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
if (!calc_ret) {
goto error;
}
ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
if (calc_ret == 2) {
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
}
if (!ret) {
goto error;
}
if (tree) {
*ptree = tree;
}
if (*pexplicit_policy) {
if (tree->flags & POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY) {
nodes = tree->auth_policies;
} else {
nodes = tree->user_policies;
}
if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) {
return -2;
}
}
return 1;
error:
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
return 0;
}