Remove a few more unions.
Bug: 301
Change-Id: Idb558cd2a925e9c762369ec7cead08f7d1cec2eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53093
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c
index 12cabcb..5bb24bc 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/aes_nohw.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SSE2)
#include <emmintrin.h>
@@ -1181,29 +1182,27 @@
aes_nohw_expand_round_keys(&sched, key);
// Make |AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE| copies of |ivec|.
- alignas(AES_NOHW_WORD_SIZE) union {
- uint32_t u32[AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE * 4];
- uint8_t u8[AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE * 16];
- } ivs, enc_ivs;
+ alignas(AES_NOHW_WORD_SIZE) uint8_t ivs[AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE * 16];
+ alignas(AES_NOHW_WORD_SIZE) uint8_t enc_ivs[AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE * 16];
for (size_t i = 0; i < AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE; i++) {
- memcpy(ivs.u8 + 16 * i, ivec, 16);
+ memcpy(ivs + 16 * i, ivec, 16);
}
- uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ivs.u32[3]);
+ uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ivs + 12);
for (;;) {
// Update counters.
for (size_t i = 0; i < AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE; i++) {
- ivs.u32[4 * i + 3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr + i);
+ CRYPTO_store_u32_be(ivs + 16 * i + 12, ctr + i);
}
size_t todo = blocks >= AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE ? AES_NOHW_BATCH_SIZE : blocks;
AES_NOHW_BATCH batch;
- aes_nohw_to_batch(&batch, ivs.u8, todo);
+ aes_nohw_to_batch(&batch, ivs, todo);
aes_nohw_encrypt_batch(&sched, key->rounds, &batch);
- aes_nohw_from_batch(enc_ivs.u8, todo, &batch);
+ aes_nohw_from_batch(enc_ivs, todo, &batch);
for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
- aes_nohw_xor_block(out + 16 * i, in + 16 * i, enc_ivs.u8 + 16 * i);
+ aes_nohw_xor_block(out + 16 * i, in + 16 * i, enc_ivs + 16 * i);
}
blocks -= todo;
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c
index 0ec5f26..95b12d2 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/aes/key_wrap.c
@@ -164,10 +164,8 @@
int AES_wrap_key_padded(const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5649#section-4.1
- const uint32_t in_len32_be = CRYPTO_bswap4(in_len);
const uint64_t in_len64 = in_len;
const size_t padded_len = (in_len + 7) & ~7;
-
*out_len = 0;
if (in_len == 0 || in_len64 > 0xffffffffu || in_len + 7 < in_len ||
padded_len + 8 < padded_len || max_out < padded_len + 8) {
@@ -176,7 +174,7 @@
uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
memcpy(block, kPaddingConstant, sizeof(kPaddingConstant));
- memcpy(block + 4, &in_len32_be, sizeof(in_len32_be));
+ CRYPTO_store_u32_be(block + 4, (uint32_t)in_len);
if (in_len <= 8) {
memset(block + 8, 0, 8);
@@ -226,9 +224,7 @@
crypto_word_t ok = constant_time_eq_int(
CRYPTO_memcmp(iv, kPaddingConstant, sizeof(kPaddingConstant)), 0);
- uint32_t claimed_len32;
- memcpy(&claimed_len32, iv + 4, sizeof(claimed_len32));
- const size_t claimed_len = CRYPTO_bswap4(claimed_len32);
+ const size_t claimed_len = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(iv + 4);
ok &= ~constant_time_is_zero_w(claimed_len);
ok &= constant_time_eq_w((claimed_len - 1) >> 3, (in_len - 9) >> 3);
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
index ad64a39..e94d59a 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
@@ -1297,12 +1297,9 @@
}
// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing.
- uint64_t given_counter;
- OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
- sizeof(given_counter));
- given_counter = CRYPTO_bswap8(given_counter);
- if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX ||
- given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
+ uint64_t given_counter =
+ CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t));
+ if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX || given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1397,10 +1394,8 @@
// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3
// nonce construction.
- uint64_t given_counter;
- OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
- sizeof(given_counter));
- given_counter = CRYPTO_bswap8(given_counter);
+ uint64_t given_counter =
+ CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t));
if (gcm_ctx->first) {
// In the first call the sequence number will be zero and therefore the
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c
index 192580e..ac0cd42 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cbc.c
@@ -116,11 +116,7 @@
assert(inptr >= outptr || inptr + len <= outptr);
size_t n;
- union {
- crypto_word_t t[16 / sizeof(crypto_word_t)];
- uint8_t c[16];
- } tmp;
-
+ alignas(16) uint8_t tmp[16];
if ((inptr >= 32 && outptr <= inptr - 32) || inptr < outptr) {
// If |out| is at least two blocks behind |in| or completely disjoint, there
// is no need to decrypt to a temporary block.
@@ -144,10 +140,10 @@
"block cannot be evenly divided into words");
while (len >= 16) {
- (*block)(in, tmp.c, key);
+ (*block)(in, tmp, key);
for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(crypto_word_t)) {
crypto_word_t c = CRYPTO_load_word_le(in + n);
- CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + n, tmp.t[n / sizeof(crypto_word_t)] ^
+ CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + n, CRYPTO_load_word_le(tmp + n) ^
CRYPTO_load_word_le(ivec + n));
CRYPTO_store_word_le(ivec + n, c);
}
@@ -159,10 +155,10 @@
while (len) {
uint8_t c;
- (*block)(in, tmp.c, key);
+ (*block)(in, tmp, key);
for (n = 0; n < 16 && n < len; ++n) {
c = in[n];
- out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n];
+ out[n] = tmp[n] ^ ivec[n];
ivec[n] = c;
}
if (len <= 16) {
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
index 83e7f5b..3b21d76 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
}
drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
- OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, seed_material + 32, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, seed_material + 32, 16);
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
return 1;
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@
// ctr_inc adds |n| to the last four bytes of |drbg->counter|, treated as a
// big-endian number.
static void ctr32_add(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint32_t n) {
- drbg->counter.words[3] =
- CRYPTO_bswap4(CRYPTO_bswap4(drbg->counter.words[3]) + n);
+ uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12);
+ CRYPTO_store_u32_be(drbg->counter + 12, ctr + n);
}
static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *data,
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
- drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
+ drbg->block(drbg->counter, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
}
drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
- OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + 32, 16);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter, temp + 32, 16);
return 1;
}
@@ -167,12 +167,12 @@
if (drbg->ctr) {
OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, todo);
ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
- drbg->ctr(out, out, num_blocks, &drbg->ks, drbg->counter.bytes);
+ drbg->ctr(out, out, num_blocks, &drbg->ks, drbg->counter);
ctr32_add(drbg, num_blocks - 1);
} else {
for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
- drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, out + i, &drbg->ks);
+ drbg->block(drbg->counter, out + i, &drbg->ks);
}
}
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@
if (out_len > 0) {
uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
- drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, block, &drbg->ks);
+ drbg->block(drbg->counter, block, &drbg->ks);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, block, out_len);
}
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
index eccf047..b0133a8 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
@@ -99,10 +99,7 @@
AES_KEY ks;
block128_f block;
ctr128_f ctr;
- union {
- uint8_t bytes[16];
- uint32_t words[4];
- } counter;
+ uint8_t counter[16];
uint64_t reseed_counter;
} CTR_DRBG_STATE;
