| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| * |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license provided above. |
| * |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/cipher.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/ec.h> |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| |
| static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) |
| { |
| switch (ver) |
| { |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return TLSv1_2_server_method(); |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
| return TLSv1_1_server_method(); |
| case TLS1_VERSION: |
| return TLSv1_server_method(); |
| case SSL3_VERSION: |
| return SSLv3_server_method(); |
| default: |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_server_method, |
| ssl3_accept, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl3_get_server_method, |
| TLSv1_2_enc_data) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_server_method, |
| ssl3_accept, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl3_get_server_method, |
| TLSv1_1_enc_data) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_server_method, |
| ssl3_accept, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl3_get_server_method, |
| TLSv1_enc_data) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(SSL3_VERSION, SSLv3_server_method, |
| ssl3_accept, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl3_get_server_method, |
| SSLv3_enc_data) |
| |
| int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| int ret= -1; |
| int new_state,state,skip=0; |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| /* init things to blank */ |
| s->in_handshake++; |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); |
| |
| if (s->cert == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| state=s->state; |
| |
| switch (s->state) |
| { |
| case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ |
| |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE: |
| case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| |
| s->server=1; |
| if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); |
| |
| if ((s->version>>8) != 3) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; |
| |
| if (s->init_buf == NULL) |
| { |
| if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_buf=buf; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) |
| { |
| /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that |
| * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) |
| */ |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; |
| } |
| else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| { |
| /* Server attempting to renegotiate with |
| * client that doesn't support secure |
| * renegotiation. |
| */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, |
| * we will just send a HelloRequest */ |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: |
| |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: |
| s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); |
| if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING) |
| { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->renegotiate = 2; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->hit) |
| { |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| } |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| { |
| ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| skip = 1; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if: |
| * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous |
| * Diffie-Hellman. |
| * - There is a PSK identity hint. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated |
| * in d1_srvr.c. Fix this. In the meantime, keep them |
| * in sync. |
| */ |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) || |
| ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->session->psk_identity_hint)) |
| { |
| ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| } |
| else |
| skip=1; |
| |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: |
| if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ |
| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || |
| /* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */ |
| ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) && |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) || |
| /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, |
| * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ |
| ((s->session->peer != NULL) && |
| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || |
| /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites |
| * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts |
| * and in RFC 2246): */ |
| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && |
| /* ... except when the application insists on verification |
| * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ |
| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || |
| /* With normal PSK Certificates and |
| * Certificate Requests are omitted */ |
| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) |
| { |
| /* no cert request */ |
| skip=1; |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; |
| ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| #else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| #endif |
| s->init_num=0; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: |
| |
| /* This code originally checked to see if |
| * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO |
| * and then flushed. This caused problems |
| * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed |
| * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue |
| * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING |
| * still exist. So instead we just flush |
| * unconditionally. |
| */ |
| |
| s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
| if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) |
| { |
| ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: { |
| char next_proto_neg = 0; |
| char channel_id = 0; |
| next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
| channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid; |
| |
| /* At this point, the next message must be entirely |
| * behind a ChangeCipherSpec. */ |
| if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (next_proto_neg) |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| else if (channel_id) |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->hit) |
| s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then |
| * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case |
| * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a |
| * resumption of this session in the future. */ |
| if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) |
| { |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| #if 0 |
| // TODO(davidben): Implement OCSP stapling on the server. |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: |
| |
| s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) |
| { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| |
| ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| if (s->hit) |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE; |
| else |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_OK: |
| /* clean a few things up */ |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| s->init_buf=NULL; |
| |
| /* remove buffering on output */ |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can |
| * discard it now. */ |
| if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) |
| { |
| X509_free(s->session->peer); |
| s->session->peer = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
| { |
| s->renegotiate=0; |
| s->new_session=0; |
| |
| ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
| |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; |
| /* s->server=1; */ |
| s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| |
| default: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) |
| { |
| if (s->debug) |
| { |
| if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| |
| if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) |
| { |
| new_state=s->state; |
| s->state=state; |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); |
| s->state=new_state; |
| } |
| } |
| skip=0; |
| } |
| end: |
| /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ |
| |
| s->in_handshake--; |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) |
| { |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1; |
| long n; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; |
| struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx; |
| CBS client_hello; |
| uint16_t client_version; |
| CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods; |
| |
| /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. |
| * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, |
| * This down switching should be handled by a different method. |
| * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with |
| * TLSv1. |
| */ |
| switch (s->state) { |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| s->first_packet=1; |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| s->first_packet=0; |
| |
| /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't |
| * contain one, just return since we do not want to |
| * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... |
| */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
| { |
| CBS session_id; |
| uint8_t cookie_length; |
| |
| CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n); |
| if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) || |
| !CBS_get_u8(&client_hello, &cookie_length)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (cookie_length == 0) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; |
| /* fallthrough */ |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: |
| /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, |
| * and can't call ssl_get_message again without hashing |
| * the message into the Finished digest again. */ |
| n = s->init_num; |
| |
| memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx)); |
| early_ctx.ssl = s; |
| early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg; |
| early_ctx.client_hello_len = n; |
| if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && |
| s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; |
| ret = s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; |
| else if (ret == -1) |
| { |
| /* Connection rejected. */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; |
| break; |
| default: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n); |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) || |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header |
| * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ |
| s->client_version = client_version; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && |
| s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) |
| : (s->client_version < s->version)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && |
| !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) |
| { |
| /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
| s->version = s->client_version; |
| } |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Load the client random. */ |
| memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| |
| s->hit=0; |
| /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. |
| * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests |
| * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather |
| * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security |
| * won't even compile against older library versions). |
| * |
| * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request |
| * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, |
| * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
| * setting will be ignored. |
| */ |
| if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx); |
| if (i == 1) |
| { /* previous session */ |
| s->hit=1; |
| } |
| else if (i == -1) |
| goto err; |
| else if (i == PENDING_SESSION) |
| { |
| ret = PENDING_SESSION; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| else /* i == 0 */ |
| { |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| CBS cookie; |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): The length check here is off. Per |
| * spec, the maximum cookie length is 32. However, the |
| * DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH check is checking against 256, |
| * not 32 (so it's actually redundant). |
| * 07a9d1a2c2b735cbc327065000b545deb5e136cf from |
| * OpenSSL switched this from 32 to 256. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) || |
| CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ |
| if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && |
| CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) |
| { |
| if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, |
| CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)) == 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
| } |
| else if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) |
| { |
| /* default verification */ |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 and |
| * don't send HelloVerifyRequest. */ |
| ret = -2; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) |
| { |
| /* Select version to use */ |
| if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) |
| { |
| s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); |
| } |
| else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) |
| { |
| s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; |
| s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| s->version = s->client_version; |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->session->ssl_version = s->version; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || |
| CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): Per spec, cipher_suites can never be empty |
| * (specified at the ClientHello structure level). This logic |
| * allows it to be empty if resuming a session. Can we always |
| * require non-empty? If a client sends empty cipher_suites |
| * because it's resuming a session, it could always fail to |
| * resume a session, so it's unlikely to actually work. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) |
| { |
| /* We need a cipher if we are not resuming a session. */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &ciphers) == NULL) |
| { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
| if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) |
| { |
| size_t j; |
| int found_cipher = 0; |
| unsigned long id = s->session->cipher->id; |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) |
| { |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j); |
| if (c->id == id) |
| { |
| found_cipher = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!found_cipher) |
| { |
| /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher |
| * list if we are asked to reuse it */ |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Only null compression is supported. */ |
| if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0, |
| CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS extensions*/ |
| if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) |
| { |
| /* wrong packet length */ |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this |
| * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate |
| * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow |
| * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ |
| { |
| unsigned char *pos; |
| pos=s->s3->server_random; |
| if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) |
| { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
| { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
| if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, |
| ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) |
| { |
| s->hit=1; |
| s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; |
| |
| /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ |
| pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s)); |
| if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; |
| |
| if (s->cipher_list) |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list); |
| |
| if (s->cipher_list_by_id) |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
| |
| s->cipher_list = ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(ciphers); |
| s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ |
| |
| if (!s->hit) |
| { |
| if (ciphers == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
| if (s->cert->cert_cb) |
| { |
| int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| if (rv == 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (rv < 0) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| } |
| c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s)); |
| |
| if (c == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Session-id reuse */ |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* we now have the following setup. |
| * client_random |
| * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers |
| * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers |
| * compression - basically ignored right now |
| * ssl version is set - sslv3 |
| * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. |
| * s->hit - session reuse flag |
| * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. |
| */ |
| |
| if (ret < 0) ret=-ret; |
| if (0) |
| { |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| } |
| err: |
| if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| unsigned char *p,*d; |
| int sl; |
| unsigned long l; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| { |
| /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order |
| * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */ |
| if (s->s3 && |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid && |
| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0) |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| |
| /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't |
| * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original |
| * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with |
| * ChannelIDs. */ |
| if (s->hit && |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new && |
| s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| |
| buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| /* Do the message type and length last */ |
| d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| *(p++)=s->version>>8; |
| *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| |
| /* Random stuff */ |
| memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| |
| /* There are several cases for the session ID to send |
| * back in the server hello: |
| * - For session reuse from the session cache, |
| * we send back the old session ID. |
| * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) |
| * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" |
| * (which doesn't actually identify the session). |
| * - If it is a new session, we send back the new |
| * session ID. |
| * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, |
| * we send back a 0-length session ID. |
| * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, |
| * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed |
| * to send back. |
| */ |
| if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) |
| && !s->hit) |
| s->session->session_id_length=0; |
| |
| sl=s->session->session_id_length; |
| if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| *(p++)=sl; |
| memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); |
| p+=sl; |
| |
| /* put the cipher */ |
| s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p); |
| |
| /* put the compression method */ |
| *(p++)=0; |
| if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| /* do the header */ |
| l=(p-d); |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) |
| { |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) |
| { |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *q; |
| int j,num; |
| unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned int u; |
| DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; |
| EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; |
| unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
| int encodedlen = 0; |
| int curve_id = 0; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| const char* psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| unsigned char *p,*d; |
| int al,i; |
| unsigned long alg_k; |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| int n; |
| CERT *cert; |
| BIGNUM *r[4]; |
| int nr[4],kn; |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) |
| { |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| cert=s->cert; |
| |
| buf=s->init_buf; |
| |
| r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; |
| n=0; |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| /* size for PSK identity hint */ |
| psk_identity_hint = s->session->psk_identity_hint; |
| if (psk_identity_hint) |
| psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint); |
| else |
| psk_identity_hint_len = 0; |
| n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len; |
| } |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) |
| { |
| dhp=cert->dh_tmp; |
| if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) |
| dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); |
| if (dhp == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; |
| if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || |
| dhp->priv_key == NULL || |
| (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) |
| { |
| if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); |
| dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); |
| if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || |
| (dh->priv_key == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| r[0]=dh->p; |
| r[1]=dh->g; |
| r[2]=dh->pub_key; |
| } |
| else |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| { |
| const EC_GROUP *group; |
| |
| ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; |
| if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) |
| { |
| /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
| int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s); |
| if (nid != NID_undef) |
| ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); |
| } |
| else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) |
| { |
| ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); |
| } |
| if (ecdhp == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ |
| if (ecdhp == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) |
| ecdh = ecdhp; |
| else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; |
| if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) |
| { |
| if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH |
| * keys over named (not generic) curves. For |
| * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. |
| */ |
| if ((curve_id = |
| tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) |
| == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Encode the public key. |
| * First check the size of encoding and |
| * allocate memory accordingly. |
| */ |
| encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| NULL, 0, NULL); |
| |
| encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) |
| OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); |
| bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| |
| encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); |
| |
| if (encodedlen == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; |
| |
| /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not |
| * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. |
| * In this situation, we need four additional bytes |
| * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams |
| * structure. |
| */ |
| n += 4 + encodedlen; |
| |
| /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message |
| * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs |
| */ |
| r[0]=NULL; |
| r[1]=NULL; |
| r[2]=NULL; |
| r[3]=NULL; |
| } |
| else |
| if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) |
| { |
| nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); |
| n+=2+nr[i]; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| { |
| if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) |
| == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| pkey=NULL; |
| kn=0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) |
| { |
| s2n(nr[i],p); |
| BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); |
| p+=nr[i]; |
| } |
| |
| /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK. |
| * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both |
| * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */ |
| s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p); |
| if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) |
| { |
| memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len); |
| p+=psk_identity_hint_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| { |
| /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. |
| * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: |
| * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] |
| * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by |
| * the actual encoded point itself |
| */ |
| *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = 0; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = curve_id; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = encodedlen; |
| p += 1; |
| memcpy((unsigned char*)p, |
| (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, |
| encodedlen); |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| encodedPoint = NULL; |
| p += encodedlen; |
| } |
| |
| /* not anonymous */ |
| if (pkey != NULL) |
| { |
| /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) |
| * and p points to the space at the end. */ |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| q=md_buf; |
| j=0; |
| for (num=2; num > 0; num--) |
| { |
| EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, |
| (num == 2) ? EVP_md5() : EVP_sha1(), NULL); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n); |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, |
| (unsigned int *)&i); |
| q+=i; |
| j+=i; |
| } |
| if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, |
| &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(u,p); |
| n+=u+2; |
| } |
| else |
| if (md) |
| { |
| /* send signature algorithm */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) |
| { |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| p+=2; |
| } |
| #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
| fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", |
| EVP_MD_name(md)); |
| #endif |
| EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n); |
| if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), |
| (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(i,p); |
| n+=i+2; |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| n+= 2; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Is this error check actually needed? */ |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p,*d; |
| size_t i; |
| int j,nl,off,n; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) |
| { |
| buf=s->init_buf; |
| |
| d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
| p++; |
| n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); |
| d[0]=n; |
| p+=n; |
| n++; |
| |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *psigs; |
| nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); |
| s2n(nl, p); |
| memcpy(p, psigs, nl); |
| p += nl; |
| n += nl + 2; |
| } |
| |
| off=n; |
| p+=2; |
| n+=2; |
| |
| sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); |
| nl=0; |
| if (sk != NULL) |
| { |
| for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) |
| { |
| name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); |
| j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; |
| s2n(j,p); |
| i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); |
| n+=2+j; |
| nl+=2+j; |
| } |
| } |
| /* else no CA names */ |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; |
| s2n(nl,p); |
| |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); |
| |
| #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; |
| /* do the header */ |
| *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; |
| *(p++)=0; |
| *(p++)=0; |
| *(p++)=0; |
| s->init_num += 4; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int al,ok; |
| long n; |
| CBS client_key_exchange; |
| unsigned long alg_k; |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL; |
| size_t premaster_secret_len = 0; |
| RSA *rsa=NULL; |
| uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| BIGNUM *pub=NULL; |
| DH *dh_srvr; |
| |
| EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| unsigned int psk_len = 0; |
| unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2048, /* ??? */ |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| CBS psk_identity; |
| |
| /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a |
| * psk_identity. If PSK, then this is the only field |
| * in the message. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) || |
| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Look up the key for the identity. */ |
| psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else if (psk_len == 0) |
| { |
| /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and |
| * |premaster_secret_len|. */ |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| { |
| CBS encrypted_premaster_secret; |
| uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| int decrypt_good_mask; |
| uint8_t version_good; |
| size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j; |
| |
| pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; |
| if ( (pkey == NULL) || |
| (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || |
| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; |
| |
| /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| CBS copy = client_key_exchange; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, |
| &encrypted_premaster_secret) || |
| CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) |
| { |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else |
| encrypted_premaster_secret = copy; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange; |
| |
| /* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that |
| * the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size |
| * of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual |
| * expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the bound is |
| * sufficient to be safe. */ |
| rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); |
| if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because |
| * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see |
| * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of |
| * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the |
| * case that the decrypt fails. See |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ |
| if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, |
| sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */ |
| decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); |
| if (decrypt_buf == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as |
| * part of the timing-sensitive code below. */ |
| if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size, |
| CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret), |
| CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret), |
| RSA_NO_PADDING)) |
| { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) |
| { |
| /* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not |
| * read uninitialized memory. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust decrypt_len as |
| * appropriate. decrypt_good_mask will be zero if the premaster |
| * if good and non-zero otherwise. */ |
| decrypt_good_mask = RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2( |
| decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index); |
| decrypt_good_mask--; |
| decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index; |
| |
| /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */ |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| |
| /* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of |
| * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right |
| * length. It is important the memory access pattern be |
| * constant. */ |
| premaster_secret = BUF_memdup( |
| decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH), |
| SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); |
| if (premaster_secret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); |
| decrypt_buf = NULL; |
| |
| /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct |
| * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa |
| * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack |
| * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version |
| * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks |
| * are done in constant time and are treated like any other |
| * decryption error. */ |
| version_good = premaster_secret[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8); |
| version_good |= premaster_secret[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff); |
| |
| /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision |
| * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be |
| * used. */ |
| decrypt_good_mask |= version_good; |
| |
| /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len == |
| * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We |
| * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB |
| * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll |
| * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */ |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16; |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8; |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4; |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2; |
| decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1; |
| /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len == |
| * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then |
| * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all |
| * zeros. */ |
| decrypt_good_mask &= 1; |
| decrypt_good_mask--; |
| |
| /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using |
| * decrypt_good_mask. */ |
| for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) |
| { |
| premaster_secret[j] = (premaster_secret[j] & decrypt_good_mask) | |
| (rand_premaster_secret[j] & ~decrypt_good_mask); |
| } |
| |
| premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); |
| } |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) |
| { |
| CBS dh_Yc; |
| int dh_len; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
| al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; |
| |
| pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL); |
| if (pub == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */ |
| premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr)); |
| if (premaster_secret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr); |
| if (dh_len <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| BN_clear_free(pub); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); |
| s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; |
| BN_clear_free(pub); |
| pub=NULL; |
| |
| premaster_secret_len = dh_len; |
| } |
| |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| { |
| int field_size = 0, ecdh_len; |
| const EC_KEY *tkey; |
| const EC_GROUP *group; |
| const BIGNUM *priv_key; |
| CBS ecdh_Yc; |
| |
| /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ |
| if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the |
| * ServerKeyExchange msg. */ |
| tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; |
| |
| group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); |
| priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); |
| |
| if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || |
| !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Let's get client's public key */ |
| if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Get client's public key from encoded point |
| * in the ClientKeyExchange message. |
| */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) || |
| CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, |
| CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc), CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */ |
| field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); |
| if (field_size <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8; |
| premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len); |
| if (premaster_secret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ |
| ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret, |
| ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); |
| if (ecdh_len <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); |
| EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); |
| EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); |
| s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; |
| |
| premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len; |
| } |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) |
| { |
| /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same |
| * length as the pre-shared key. */ |
| premaster_secret_len = psk_len; |
| premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len); |
| if (premaster_secret == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with |
| * the pre-shared key. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| CBB new_premaster, child; |
| uint8_t *new_data; |
| size_t new_len; |
| |
| if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || |
| !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| premaster_secret = new_data; |
| premaster_secret_len = new_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the master secret */ |
| s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc |
| ->generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| return 1; |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| if (premaster_secret) |
| { |
| if (premaster_secret_len) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret); |
| } |
| if (decrypt_buf) |
| OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); |
| EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); |
| if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int al,ok,ret=0; |
| long n; |
| CBS certificate_verify, signature; |
| X509 *peer = s->session->peer; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t digest_length; |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
| |
| /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a |
| * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a |
| * client certificate. */ |
| if (peer == NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return -1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, |
| SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| return (int)n; |
| |
| /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */ |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); |
| if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) || |
| (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey)) |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the digest. */ |
| if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the |
| * current message.*/ |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| goto err; |
| ssl3_hash_current_message(s); |
| |
| /* Parse and verify the signature. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); |
| if (pctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) || |
| !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) || |
| !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), |
| digest, digest_length)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| if (0) |
| { |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| } |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,ok,al,ret= -1; |
| X509 *x=NULL; |
| unsigned long n; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; |
| SHA256_CTX sha256; |
| CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list; |
| int is_first_certificate = 1; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, |
| -1, |
| s->max_cert_list, |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) |
| { |
| if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ |
| if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) |
| { |
| CBS certificate; |
| const uint8_t *data; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) |
| { |
| /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want |
| * to keep peer certificates in memory, then we hash it |
| * right away. */ |
| SHA256_Init(&sha256); |
| SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256); |
| s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1; |
| } |
| is_first_certificate = 0; |
| data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| if (x == NULL) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!CBS_skip(&certificate, data - CBS_data(&certificate))) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (CBS_len(&certificate) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| x = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) |
| { |
| /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ |
| else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| { |
| al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ |
| X509_free(s->session->peer); |
| s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); |
| s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
| |
| /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL |
| * when we arrive here. */ |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| { |
| s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; |
| /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the |
| * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ |
| |
| sk=NULL; |
| |
| ret=1; |
| if (0) |
| { |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| } |
| err: |
| if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); |
| if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) |
| { |
| cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
| if (cpk == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ |
| int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; |
| const unsigned char *const_p; |
| int len, slen_full, slen; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| unsigned int hlen; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char key_name[16]; |
| |
| /* get session encoding length */ |
| slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); |
| /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is |
| * too long |
| */ |
| if (slen_full > 0xFF00) |
| return -1; |
| senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); |
| if (!senc) |
| return -1; |
| p = senc; |
| i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); |
| |
| /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ |
| const_p = senc; |
| sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); |
| if (sess == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ |
| |
| slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
| if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| p = senc; |
| i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
| |
| /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as |
| * follows handshake_header_length + |
| * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + |
| * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + |
| * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session |
| * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). |
| */ |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, |
| SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + |
| EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) |
| return -1; |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present |
| * it does all the work otherwise use generated values |
| * from parent ctx. |
| */ |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) |
| { |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, |
| &hctx, 1) < 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); |
| EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); |
| HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
| memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); |
| } |
| |
| /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): |
| * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), |
| * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long |
| * as their sessions. */ |
| l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); |
| |
| /* Skip ticket length for now */ |
| p += 2; |
| /* Output key name */ |
| macstart = p; |
| memcpy(p, key_name, 16); |
| p += 16; |
| /* output IV */ |
| memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); |
| p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| /* Encrypt session data */ |
| EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); |
| p += len; |
| EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len); |
| p += len; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); |
| HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| |
| p += hlen; |
| /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ |
| /* Total length */ |
| len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); |
| /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; |
| s2n(len - 6, p); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| #if 0 |
| int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as |
| * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + |
| * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) |
| * + (ocsp response) |
| */ |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| /* do the header */ |
| *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; |
| /* message length */ |
| l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); |
| /* status type */ |
| *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; |
| /* length of OCSP response */ |
| l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); |
| /* actual response */ |
| memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ |
| return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It |
| * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ |
| int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ok; |
| long n; |
| CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding; |
| |
| /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the |
| * extension in their ClientHello */ |
| if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, |
| SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, |
| 514, /* See the payload format below */ |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| return((int)n); |
| |
| /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received |
| * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset |
| * by ssl3_get_finished). |
| * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with |
| * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ |
| if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| /* The payload looks like: |
| * uint8 proto_len; |
| * uint8 proto[proto_len]; |
| * uint8 padding_len; |
| * uint8 padding[padding_len]; |
| */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) || |
| CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, |
| &s->next_proto_negotiated, |
| &s->next_proto_negotiated_len)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ |
| int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret = -1, ok; |
| long n; |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned int channel_id_hash_len; |
| const uint8_t *p; |
| uint16_t extension_type, expected_extension_type; |
| EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL; |
| EC_KEY* key = NULL; |
| EC_POINT* point = NULL; |
| ECDSA_SIG sig; |
| BIGNUM x, y; |
| CBS encrypted_extensions, extension; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B, |
| SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, |
| SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| return((int)n); |
| |
| /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the |
| * handshake hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */ |
| channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) || |
| !tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) || |
| !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| |
| ssl3_hash_current_message(s); |
| |
| /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received |
| * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset |
| * by ssl3_get_finished). |
| * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with |
| * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ |
| if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but |
| * the only extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, |
| * so there can only be one entry. |
| * |
| * The payload looks like: |
| * uint16 extension_type |
| * uint16 extension_len; |
| * uint8 x[32]; |
| * uint8 y[32]; |
| * uint8 r[32]; |
| * uint8 s[32]; |
| */ |
| expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id; |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) |
| expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) || |
| CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 || |
| extension_type != expected_extension_type || |
| CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); |
| if (!p256) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| BN_init(&x); |
| BN_init(&y); |
| sig.r = BN_new(); |
| sig.s = BN_new(); |
| |
| p = CBS_data(&extension); |
| if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || |
| BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| point = EC_POINT_new(p256); |
| if (!point || |
| !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| key = EC_KEY_new(); |
| if (!key || |
| !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || |
| !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time |
| * that we were called. */ |
| if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| BN_free(&x); |
| BN_free(&y); |
| BN_free(sig.r); |
| BN_free(sig.s); |
| if (key) |
| EC_KEY_free(key); |
| if (point) |
| EC_POINT_free(point); |
| if (p256) |
| EC_GROUP_free(p256); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |