| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| /* |SSL_R_UKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it |
| * to avoid downstream churn. */ |
| OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, SSL_R_UKNOWN_PROTOCOL) |
| |
| /* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never |
| * regresses this. */ |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == |
| SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET, |
| ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch); |
| |
| /* kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message. */ |
| static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1; |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| |
| int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->method == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl)) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| ssl->session = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->hit = 0; |
| ssl->shutdown = 0; |
| |
| /* SSL_clear may be called before or after the |ssl| is initialized in either |
| * accept or connect state. In the latter case, SSL_clear should preserve the |
| * half and reset |ssl->state| accordingly. */ |
| if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL) { |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); |
| } else { |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); |
| } |
| } else { |
| assert(ssl->state == 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): Some state on |ssl| is reset both in |SSL_new| and |
| * |SSL_clear| because it is per-connection state rather than configuration |
| * state. Per-connection state should be on |ssl->s3| and |ssl->d1| so it is |
| * naturally reset at the right points between |SSL_new|, |SSL_clear|, and |
| * |ssl3_new|. */ |
| |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| ssl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); |
| ssl->init_buf = NULL; |
| |
| ssl->packet = NULL; |
| ssl->packet_length = 0; |
| |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); |
| ssl->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; |
| ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; |
| |
| /* The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across |
| * clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset). |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Avoid this. */ |
| unsigned mtu = 0; |
| if (ssl->d1 != NULL) { |
| mtu = ssl->d1->mtu; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); |
| if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(ssl->version); |
| assert(ssl->enc_method != NULL); |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->client_version = ssl->version; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| SSL *s; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (ctx->method == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL)); |
| |
| s->min_version = ctx->min_version; |
| s->max_version = ctx->max_version; |
| |
| s->options = ctx->options; |
| s->mode = ctx->mode; |
| s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; |
| |
| s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| if (s->cert == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; |
| s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; |
| s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; |
| s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
| assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); |
| memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); |
| s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; |
| s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; |
| |
| s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| if (!s->param) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); |
| s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
| s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; |
| |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); |
| s->ctx = ctx; |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); |
| s->initial_ctx = ctx; |
| |
| if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = |
| BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, |
| ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length * 2); |
| if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| } |
| s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| s->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, |
| s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); |
| if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; |
| } |
| |
| s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
| s->method = ctx->method; |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(s->version); |
| assert(s->enc_method != NULL); |
| |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, s, &s->ex_data); |
| |
| s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) { |
| s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; |
| s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; |
| |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled; |
| if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) { |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_private = |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| } |
| |
| s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = s->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled; |
| s->ocsp_stapling_enabled = s->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled; |
| |
| return s; |
| |
| err: |
| SSL_free(s); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
| memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { |
| ctx->generate_session_id = cb; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { |
| ssl->generate_session_id = cb; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id, |
| unsigned int id_len) { |
| /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how we |
| * can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to find if |
| * there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with any new |
| * session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use by this |
| * SSL. */ |
| SSL_SESSION r, *p; |
| |
| if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| r.ssl_version = ssl->version; |
| r.session_id_length = id_len; |
| memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ssl->ctx->lock); |
| p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ssl->ctx->lock); |
| return p != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); |
| } |
| |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *ssl_cipher_preference_list_dup( |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *ret = NULL; |
| size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); |
| if (!ret) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret->ciphers = NULL; |
| ret->in_group_flags = NULL; |
| ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| if (!ret->ciphers) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->in_group_flags = BUF_memdup(cipher_list->in_group_flags, n); |
| if (!ret->in_group_flags) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers( |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers) { |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *ret = NULL; |
| size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); |
| |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); |
| if (!ret) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->ciphers = NULL; |
| ret->in_group_flags = NULL; |
| ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers); |
| if (!ret->ciphers) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n); |
| if (!ret->in_group_flags) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(ret->in_group_flags, 0, n); |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } |
| |
| void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); } |
| |
| void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data); |
| |
| if (ssl->bbio != NULL) { |
| /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ |
| if (ssl->bbio == ssl->wbio) { |
| ssl->wbio = BIO_pop(ssl->wbio); |
| } |
| BIO_free(ssl->bbio); |
| ssl->bbio = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int free_wbio = ssl->wbio != ssl->rbio; |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); |
| if (free_wbio) { |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); |
| } |
| |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); |
| |
| /* add extra stuff */ |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list); |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ssl->cipher_list_by_id); |
| |
| ssl_clear_bad_session(ssl); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); |
| |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->initial_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles); |
| |
| if (ssl->method != NULL) { |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { |
| /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it. */ |
| if (s->bbio != NULL) { |
| if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { |
| s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; |
| s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->rbio != rbio) { |
| BIO_free_all(s->rbio); |
| } |
| if (s->wbio != wbio && s->rbio != s->wbio) { |
| BIO_free_all(s->wbio); |
| } |
| s->rbio = rbio; |
| s->wbio = wbio; |
| } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return s->rbio; } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return s->wbio; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return SSL_get_rfd(s); } |
| |
| int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { |
| int ret = -1; |
| BIO *b, *r; |
| |
| b = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (r != NULL) { |
| BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { |
| int ret = -1; |
| BIO *b, *r; |
| |
| b = SSL_get_wbio(s); |
| r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (r != NULL) { |
| BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| BIO *bio = NULL; |
| |
| bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| BIO *bio = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD || |
| (int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd) { |
| bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); |
| } else { |
| SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| BIO *bio = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD || |
| (int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd) { |
| bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
| } else { |
| SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ |
| size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { |
| size_t ret = 0; |
| |
| if (s->s3 != NULL) { |
| ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; |
| if (count > ret) { |
| count = ret; |
| } |
| memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ |
| size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { |
| size_t ret = 0; |
| |
| if (s->s3 != NULL) { |
| ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
| if (count > ret) { |
| count = ret; |
| } |
| memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return s->verify_mode; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { |
| return s->verify_callback; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_mode; } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { |
| return ctx->default_verify_callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, |
| int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { |
| s->verify_mode = mode; |
| if (callback != NULL) { |
| s->verify_callback = callback; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return 0; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { } |
| |
| void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { } |
| |
| int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length |
| : 0; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { |
| X509 *r; |
| |
| if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) { |
| r = NULL; |
| } else { |
| r = s->session->peer; |
| } |
| |
| if (r == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return X509_up_ref(r); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *r; |
| |
| if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL || s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { |
| r = NULL; |
| } else { |
| r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if we |
| * are a server, it does not. */ |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ |
| int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx->cert->x509 == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->cert->privatekey == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->x509, ctx->cert->privatekey); |
| } |
| |
| /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ |
| int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->cert->x509 == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->cert->privatekey == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->x509, ssl->cert->privatekey); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ |
| SSL_set_accept_state(s); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func != s->method->ssl_accept) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return s->handshake_func(s); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ |
| SSL_set_connect_state(s); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func != s->method->ssl_connect) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return s->handshake_func(s); |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { |
| return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| return s->method->ssl_read_app_data(s, buf, num, 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| return s->method->ssl_read_app_data(s, buf, num, 1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| return s->method->ssl_write_app_data(s, buf, num); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { |
| /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might expect. |
| * Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but calling it |
| * once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used (see |
| * ssl3_shutdown). */ |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. */ |
| if (s->quiet_shutdown) { |
| s->shutdown = SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); |
| |
| /* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be |
| * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| return -1; /* return WANT_WRITE */ |
| } |
| } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| /* resend it if not sent */ |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (ret == -1) { |
| /* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must have |
| * already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation, return |
| * WANT_WRITE */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { |
| /* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ |
| s->method->ssl_read_close_notify(s); |
| if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { |
| return -1; /* return WANT_READ */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && |
| !s->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| return 1; |
| } else { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { |
| /* Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { |
| ctx->options |= options; |
| return ctx->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { |
| ssl->options |= options; |
| return ssl->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { |
| ctx->options &= ~options; |
| return ctx->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { |
| ssl->options &= ~options; |
| return ssl->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { |
| ctx->mode |= mode; |
| return ctx->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { |
| ssl->mode |= mode; |
| return ssl->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { |
| ctx->mode &= ~mode; |
| return ctx->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { |
| ssl->mode &= ~mode; |
| return ssl->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; } |
| |
| size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) { |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; |
| } |
| ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) { |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; |
| } |
| ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) { |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { |
| max_send_fragment = 512; |
| } |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| } |
| ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) { |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { |
| max_send_fragment = 512; |
| } |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| } |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) { |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->send_connection_binding; |
| } |
| |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } |
| |
| size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) { |
| unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size; |
| ctx->session_cache_size = size; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->session_cache_size; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { |
| int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| ctx->session_cache_mode = mode; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| } |
| |
| /* return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
| * preference */ |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { |
| return s->cipher_list->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION && s->ctx != NULL && |
| s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) { |
| return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL) { |
| return s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
| * algorithm id */ |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { |
| return s->cipher_list_by_id; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { |
| return s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ |
| const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
| if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return c->name; |
| } |
| |
| /* specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, |
| &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str); |
| /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to find |
| * a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule string |
| * specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an error as far |
| * as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence ctx->cipher_list and |
| * ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. */ |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str); |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ |
| int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, |
| &s->cipher_list_by_id, str); |
| |
| /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, uint8_t *p) { |
| size_t i; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| CERT *ct = s->cert; |
| uint8_t *q; |
| /* Set disabled masks for this session */ |
| ssl_set_client_disabled(s); |
| |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| q = p; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
| /* Skip disabled ciphers */ |
| if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || |
| c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || |
| c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| s2n(ssl_cipher_get_value(c), p); |
| } |
| |
| /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ |
| if (p == q) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is |
| * added. */ |
| if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && |
| !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); |
| /* The renegotiation extension is required to be at index zero. */ |
| s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << 0); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { |
| s2n(SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); |
| } |
| |
| return p - q; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) { |
| CBS cipher_suites = *cbs; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| if (s->s3) { |
| s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { |
| uint16_t cipher_suite; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for SCSV. */ |
| if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */ |
| if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV. */ |
| if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_server_version(s); |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (uint16_t)s->version > max_version |
| : (uint16_t)s->version < max_version) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return sk; |
| |
| err: |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. So |
| * far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ |
| const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { |
| if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname |
| : s->tlsext_hostname; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s->session && |
| (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) { |
| return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| *out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list; |
| *out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) { |
| return; |
| } |
| *out = session->ocsp_response; |
| *out_len = session->ocsp_response_length; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response, |
| size_t response_len) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); |
| ctx->ocsp_response_length = 0; |
| |
| ctx->ocsp_response = BUF_memdup(response, response_len); |
| if (ctx->ocsp_response == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->ocsp_response_length = response_len; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is |
| * expected that this function is called from the callback set by |
| * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. |
| * |
| * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte |
| * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte |
| * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. |
| * |
| * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: |
| * |
| * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the |
| * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection |
| * or have a default application level protocol. |
| * |
| * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the |
| * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the |
| * API that this fallback case was enacted. |
| * |
| * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list |
| * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's |
| * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol |
| * a client should use. |
| * |
| * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised |
| * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. |
| * |
| * It returns either |
| * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or |
| * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. |
| */ |
| int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *outlen, const uint8_t *server, |
| unsigned int server_len, const uint8_t *client, |
| unsigned int client_len) { |
| unsigned int i, j; |
| const uint8_t *result; |
| int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; |
| |
| /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { |
| for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { |
| if (server[i] == client[j] && |
| memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { |
| /* We found a match */ |
| result = &server[i]; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; |
| goto found; |
| } |
| j += client[j]; |
| j++; |
| } |
| i += server[i]; |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ |
| result = client; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; |
| |
| found: |
| *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1; |
| *outlen = result[0]; |
| return status; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's |
| * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't |
| * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. |
| * |
| * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned |
| * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols |
| * provided by the callback. */ |
| void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const uint8_t **data, |
| unsigned *len) { |
| *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; |
| if (!*data) { |
| *len = 0; |
| } else { |
| *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a |
| * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol |
| * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned |
| * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will |
| * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to |
| * it. |
| * |
| * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. |
| * Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a |
| * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| |
| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). |
| * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's |
| * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can |
| * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. |
| * |
| * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this |
| * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. |
| */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *s, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *outlen, |
| const uint8_t *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos, |
| unsigned protos_len) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called |
| * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the |
| * client's list of offered protocols. */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| uint8_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in, |
| unsigned int inlen, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. |
| * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not |
| * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with |
| * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **data, |
| unsigned *len) { |
| *data = NULL; |
| if (ssl->s3) { |
| *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; |
| } |
| if (*data == NULL) { |
| *len = 0; |
| } else { |
| *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, |
| const char *label, size_t label_len, |
| const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len, |
| int use_context) { |
| if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return s->enc_method->export_keying_material( |
| s, out, out_len, label, label_len, context, context_len, use_context); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { |
| uint32_t hash = |
| ((uint32_t)a->session_id[0]) || |
| ((uint32_t)a->session_id[1] << 8) || |
| ((uint32_t)a->session_id[2] << 16) || |
| ((uint32_t)a->session_id[3] << 24); |
| |
| return hash; |
| } |
| |
| /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of |
| * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure |
| * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being |
| * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session |
| * with a matching session ID. */ |
| static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { |
| if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) { |
| SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; |
| |
| if (method == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| |
| ret->method = method->method; |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); |
| |
| ret->cert_store = NULL; |
| ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; |
| ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; |
| ret->session_cache_head = NULL; |
| ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; |
| |
| /* We take the system default */ |
| ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| |
| ret->new_session_cb = 0; |
| ret->remove_session_cb = 0; |
| ret->get_session_cb = 0; |
| ret->generate_session_id = 0; |
| |
| ret->references = 1; |
| ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; |
| |
| ret->info_callback = NULL; |
| |
| ret->app_verify_callback = 0; |
| ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; |
| |
| ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; |
| ret->msg_callback = 0; |
| ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; |
| ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; |
| ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; |
| ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(); |
| if (ret->cert == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; |
| ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; |
| ret->client_cert_cb = 0; |
| |
| ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); |
| if (ret->sessions == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); |
| if (ret->cert_store == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, |
| &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); |
| if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| if (!ret->param) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| if (ret->client_CA == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ret, &ret->ex_data); |
| |
| ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| |
| ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; |
| ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; |
| /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ |
| if (!RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) || |
| !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) || |
| !RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16)) { |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| } |
| |
| ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; |
| ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; |
| ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; |
| ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; |
| |
| /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely deployed |
| * might change this. */ |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; |
| |
| /* Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy |
| * uses of SSL_METHOD. */ |
| if (method->version != 0) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_max_version(ret, method->version); |
| SSL_CTX_set_min_version(ret, method->version); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| err2: |
| SSL_CTX_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == NULL || |
| !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
| |
| /* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the |
| * ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the |
| * sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch |
| * the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the |
| * cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket |
| * [openssl.org #212].) */ |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock); |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions); |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list); |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ctx->cipher_list_by_id); |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list_tls11); |
| ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert); |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions, |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions, |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ocsp_response); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; |
| ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, |
| int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { |
| ctx->verify_mode = mode; |
| ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, uint32_t *out_mask_k, |
| uint32_t *out_mask_a) { |
| CERT *c = s->cert; |
| int have_rsa_cert = 0, dh_tmp; |
| uint32_t mask_k, mask_a; |
| int have_ecc_cert = 0, ecdsa_ok; |
| X509 *x; |
| |
| dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); |
| |
| if (s->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(s)) { |
| if (ssl_private_key_type(s) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| have_rsa_cert = 1; |
| } else if (ssl_private_key_type(s) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| have_ecc_cert = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| mask_k = 0; |
| mask_a = 0; |
| |
| if (dh_tmp) { |
| mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; |
| } |
| if (have_rsa_cert) { |
| mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; |
| mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; |
| } |
| |
| /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on the |
| * key usage extension and on the client's curve preferences. */ |
| if (have_ecc_cert) { |
| x = c->x509; |
| /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags). */ |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) |
| : 1; |
| if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(s, x)) { |
| ecdsa_ok = 0; |
| } |
| if (ecdsa_ok) { |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC |
| * key, check it. */ |
| if (tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s)) { |
| mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; |
| } |
| |
| /* PSK requires a server callback. */ |
| if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) { |
| mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; |
| mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; |
| } |
| |
| *out_mask_k = mask_k; |
| *out_mask_a = mask_a; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { |
| /* Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. */ |
| if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| int has_new_session = !s->hit; |
| if (!s->server && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| /* A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server |
| * decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should |
| * be inserted into the cache. */ |
| has_new_session = 1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| if ((ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) == mode && has_new_session && |
| ((ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, s->session)) && |
| ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) { |
| /* Note: |new_session_cb| is called whether the internal session cache is |
| * used or not. */ |
| if (!ctx->new_session_cb(s, SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session))) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR) && |
| !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) && |
| (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) == mode) { |
| /* Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections. */ |
| int flush_cache = 0; |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++; |
| if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) { |
| flush_cache = 1; |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| |
| if (flush_cache) { |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code) { |
| int reason; |
| uint32_t err; |
| BIO *bio; |
| |
| if (ret_code > 0) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_NONE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, |
| * where we do encode the error */ |
| err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| if (err != 0) { |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| return SSL_ERROR_SSL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_code == 0) { |
| if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && |
| (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) { |
| /* The socket was cleanly shut down with a close_notify. */ |
| return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; |
| } |
| /* An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying |
| * transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the |
| * caller. */ |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_session(s)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_certificate(s)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_read(s)) { |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { |
| /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write to the |
| * rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio are separate |
| * couldn't even know what it should wait for. However if we ever set |
| * s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of |
| * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, this test works |
| * around that bug; so it might be safer to keep it. */ |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; |
| } |
| |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_write(s)) { |
| bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { |
| /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; |
| } |
| |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_want_private_key_operation(s)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| ret = s->handshake_func(s); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->server = 1; |
| ssl->shutdown = 0; |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; |
| ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_accept; |
| /* clear the current cipher */ |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->server = 0; |
| ssl->shutdown = 0; |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| ssl->handshake_func = ssl->method->ssl_connect; |
| /* clear the current cipher */ |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) { |
| switch (version) { |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return "TLSv1.2"; |
| |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
| return "TLSv1.1"; |
| |
| case TLS1_VERSION: |
| return "TLSv1"; |
| |
| case SSL3_VERSION: |
| return "SSLv3"; |
| |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: |
| return "DTLSv1"; |
| |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return "DTLSv1.2"; |
| |
| default: |
| return "unknown"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { |
| return ssl_get_version(s->version); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| return ssl_get_version(sess->ssl_version); |
| } |
| |
| const char* SSL_get_curve_name(uint16_t curve_id) { |
| return tls1_ec_curve_id2name(curve_id); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { |
| SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_read_ctx); |
| s->aead_read_ctx = NULL; |
| SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_write_ctx); |
| s->aead_write_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s->cert != NULL) { |
| return s->cert->x509; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s->cert != NULL) { |
| return s->cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) { |
| return ctx->cert->x509; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) { |
| return ctx->cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return s->aead_write_ctx->cipher; |
| } |
| |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } |
| |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } |
| |
| int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { |
| BIO *bbio; |
| |
| if (s->bbio == NULL) { |
| bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); |
| if (bbio == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->bbio = bbio; |
| } else { |
| bbio = s->bbio; |
| if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { |
| s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| BIO_reset(bbio); |
| if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (push) { |
| if (s->wbio != bbio) { |
| s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (s->wbio == bbio) { |
| s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->bbio == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { |
| /* remove buffering */ |
| s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
| } |
| |
| BIO_free(s->bbio); |
| s->bbio = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { |
| ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return s->quiet_shutdown; } |
| |
| void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return s->shutdown; } |
| |
| int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return s->version; } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ssl->ctx == ctx) { |
| return ssl->ctx; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; |
| |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
| assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
| |
| return ssl->ctx; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, |
| const char *CApath) { |
| return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { |
| ssl->info_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/, int /*type*/, |
| int /*val*/) { |
| return ssl->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->state; } |
| |
| void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } |
| |
| long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_result; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp, |
| new_func, dup_func, free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp, |
| new_func, dup_func, free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->cert_store; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); |
| ctx->cert_store = store; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return s->rwstate; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb = callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| EC_KEY *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| ctx->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| EC_KEY *(*callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) { |
| ssl->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = callback; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Clear currently configured hint, if any. */ |
| OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); |
| s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { |
| s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return s->psk_identity_hint; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { |
| if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return s->session->psk_identity; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_client_callback( |
| SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, |
| unsigned int max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, |
| unsigned int max_psk_len)) { |
| s->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, |
| unsigned int max_identity_len, |
| uint8_t *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { |
| ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_server_callback( |
| SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, |
| unsigned int max_psk_len)) { |
| s->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, |
| uint8_t *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { |
| ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_min_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { |
| ctx->min_version = version; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) { |
| ctx->max_version = version; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_min_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { |
| ssl->min_version = version; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_max_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) { |
| ssl->max_version = version; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, |
| size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { |
| ctx->msg_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { |
| ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, |
| const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, |
| void *arg)) { |
| ssl->msg_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *keylog_bio) { |
| BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); |
| ctx->keylog_bio = keylog_bio; |
| } |
| |
| static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { |
| static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t i; |
| |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) { |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4]; |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf]; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, |
| size_t encrypted_premaster_len, |
| const uint8_t *premaster, |
| size_t premaster_len) { |
| BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio; |
| CBB cbb; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t out_len; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len * 2 + 1) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"RSA ", 4) || |
| /* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are |
| * logged. */ |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, premaster, premaster_len) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"\n", 1) || |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(out); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *client_random, |
| size_t client_random_len, const uint8_t *master, |
| size_t master_len) { |
| BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio; |
| CBB cbb; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t out_len; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (client_random_len != 32) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 14 + 64 + 1 + master_len * 2 + 1) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14) || |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, client_random, 32) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, master, master_len) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t *)"\n", 1) || |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &out, &out_len)) { |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| ret = BIO_write(bio, out, out_len) >= 0 && BIO_flush(bio); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(out); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *s) { |
| return s->s3->tmp.in_false_start; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s) { |
| return SSL_in_false_start(s); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size, |
| size_t *ssl_session_size) { |
| *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL); |
| *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX); |
| *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_can_false_start(const SSL *s) { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *const cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); |
| |
| /* False Start only for TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD cipher and ALPN or NPN. */ |
| return !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && |
| SSL_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && |
| (s->s3->alpn_selected || s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) && |
| cipher != NULL && |
| cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHE && |
| (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM || |
| cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM || |
| cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305); |
| } |
| |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD *ssl3_get_enc_method(uint16_t version) { |
| switch (version) { |
| case SSL3_VERSION: |
| return &SSLv3_enc_data; |
| |
| case TLS1_VERSION: |
| return &TLSv1_enc_data; |
| |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
| return &TLSv1_1_enc_data; |
| |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return &TLSv1_2_enc_data; |
| |
| default: |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl3_get_max_server_version(const SSL *s) { |
| uint16_t max_version; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| max_version = (s->max_version != 0) ? s->max_version : DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) && DTLS1_2_VERSION >= max_version) { |
| return DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) && DTLS1_VERSION >= max_version) { |
| return DTLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| max_version = (s->max_version != 0) ? s->max_version : TLS1_2_VERSION; |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version) { |
| return TLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version) { |
| return TLS1_1_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version) { |
| return TLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && SSL3_VERSION <= max_version) { |
| return SSL3_VERSION; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl3_get_mutual_version(SSL *s, uint16_t client_version) { |
| uint16_t version = 0; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| /* Clamp client_version to max_version. */ |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && client_version < s->max_version) { |
| client_version = s->max_version; |
| } |
| |
| if (client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { |
| version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } else if (client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { |
| version = DTLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check against min_version. */ |
| if (version != 0 && s->min_version != 0 && version > s->min_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return version; |
| } else { |
| /* Clamp client_version to max_version. */ |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && client_version > s->max_version) { |
| client_version = s->max_version; |
| } |
| |
| if (client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { |
| version = TLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } else if (client_version >= TLS1_1_VERSION && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { |
| version = TLS1_1_VERSION; |
| } else if (client_version >= TLS1_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { |
| version = TLS1_VERSION; |
| } else if (client_version >= SSL3_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { |
| version = SSL3_VERSION; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check against min_version. */ |
| if (version != 0 && s->min_version != 0 && version < s->min_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return version; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl3_get_max_client_version(SSL *s) { |
| uint32_t options = s->options; |
| uint16_t version = 0; |
| |
| /* OpenSSL's API for controlling versions entails blacklisting individual |
| * protocols. This has two problems. First, on the client, the protocol can |
| * only express a contiguous range of versions. Second, a library consumer |
| * trying to set a maximum version cannot disable protocol versions that get |
| * added in a future version of the library. |
| * |
| * To account for both of these, OpenSSL interprets the client-side bitmask |
| * as a min/max range by picking the lowest contiguous non-empty range of |
| * enabled protocols. Note that this means it is impossible to set a maximum |
| * version of TLS 1.2 in a future-proof way. |
| * |
| * By this scheme, the maximum version is the lowest version V such that V is |
| * enabled and V+1 is disabled or unimplemented. */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { |
| version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) && (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { |
| version = DTLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && version < s->max_version) { |
| version = s->max_version; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { |
| version = TLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { |
| version = TLS1_1_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { |
| version = TLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (!(options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { |
| version = SSL3_VERSION; |
| } |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && version > s->max_version) { |
| version = s->max_version; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return version; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_is_version_enabled(SSL *s, uint16_t version) { |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && version < s->max_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (s->min_version != 0 && version > s->min_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (version) { |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1); |
| |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2); |
| |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (s->max_version != 0 && version > s->max_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (s->min_version != 0 && version < s->min_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (version) { |
| case SSL3_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); |
| |
| case TLS1_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1); |
| |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1); |
| |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: |
| return !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2); |
| |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl3_version_from_wire(SSL *s, uint16_t wire_version) { |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| return wire_version; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t tls_version = ~wire_version; |
| uint16_t version = tls_version + 0x0201; |
| /* If either component overflowed, clamp it so comparisons still work. */ |
| if ((version >> 8) < (tls_version >> 8)) { |
| version = 0xff00 | (version & 0xff); |
| } |
| if ((version & 0xff) < (tls_version & 0xff)) { |
| version = (version & 0xff00) | 0xff; |
| } |
| /* DTLS 1.0 maps to TLS 1.1, not TLS 1.0. */ |
| if (version == TLS1_VERSION) { |
| version = TLS1_1_VERSION; |
| } |
| return version; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } |
| |
| int SSL_is_server(SSL *s) { return s->server; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *)) { |
| ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations(SSL *s, int reject) { |
| s->accept_peer_renegotiations = !reject; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_rc4_state(const SSL *ssl, const RC4_KEY **read_key, |
| const RC4_KEY **write_key) { |
| if (ssl->aead_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->aead_write_ctx == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->aead_read_ctx->ctx, read_key) && |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(&ssl->aead_write_ctx->ctx, write_key); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
| size_t max_out) { |
| /* The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which |
| * is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. */ |
| const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished; |
| size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; |
| if (ssl->hit) { |
| /* tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. */ |
| if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished; |
| finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || |
| ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| *out_len = finished_len; |
| if (finished_len > max_out) { |
| *out_len = max_out; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(out, finished, *out_len); |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| *out_len = 0; |
| memset(out, 0, max_out); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {} |