| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) |
| #include <sys/timeb.h> |
| #else |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #include <sys/time.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| namespace bssl { |
| |
| // |SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL| is no longer emitted, but continue to define it |
| // to avoid downstream churn. |
| OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL) |
| |
| // The following errors are no longer emitted, but are used in nginx without |
| // #ifdefs. |
| OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG) |
| OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(SSL, NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED) |
| |
| // Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script never |
| // regresses this. |
| static_assert(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == |
| SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET, |
| "alert reason code mismatch"); |
| |
| // kMaxHandshakeSize is the maximum size, in bytes, of a handshake message. |
| static const size_t kMaxHandshakeSize = (1u << 24) - 1; |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| |
| bool CBBFinishArray(CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out) { |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| size_t len; |
| if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &ptr, &len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return false; |
| } |
| out->Reset(ptr, len); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_reset_error_state(SSL *ssl) { |
| // Functions which use |SSL_get_error| must reset I/O and error state on |
| // entry. |
| ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_set_read_error(SSL* ssl) { |
| ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error; |
| ssl->s3->read_error.reset(ERR_save_state()); |
| } |
| |
| static bool check_read_error(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) { |
| ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get()); |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_can_write(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_can_read(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return !SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed, |
| uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) { |
| *out_consumed = 0; |
| if (!check_read_error(ssl)) { |
| *out_alert = 0; |
| return ssl_open_record_error; |
| } |
| auto ret = ssl->method->open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in); |
| if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) { |
| ssl_set_read_error(ssl); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed, |
| uint8_t *out_alert, |
| Span<uint8_t> in) { |
| *out_consumed = 0; |
| if (!check_read_error(ssl)) { |
| *out_alert = 0; |
| return ssl_open_record_error; |
| } |
| auto ret = |
| ssl->method->open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in); |
| if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) { |
| ssl_set_read_error(ssl); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out, |
| size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert, |
| Span<uint8_t> in) { |
| *out_consumed = 0; |
| if (!check_read_error(ssl)) { |
| *out_alert = 0; |
| return ssl_open_record_error; |
| } |
| auto ret = ssl->method->open_app_data(ssl, out, out_consumed, out_alert, in); |
| if (ret == ssl_open_record_error) { |
| ssl_set_read_error(ssl); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) { |
| if (cipher_list == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->session_ctx; |
| // Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. |
| if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 || |
| ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable || |
| (ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) != mode) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Clients never use the internal session cache. |
| int use_internal_cache = ssl->server && !(ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); |
| |
| // A client may see new sessions on abbreviated handshakes if the server |
| // decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be |
| // inserted into the cache. |
| if (ssl->s3->established_session.get() != ssl->session || |
| (!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) { |
| if (use_internal_cache) { |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session.get()); |
| } |
| if (ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->s3->established_session.get()); |
| if (!ctx->new_session_cb(ssl, ssl->s3->established_session.get())) { |
| // |new_session_cb|'s return value signals whether it took ownership. |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session.get()); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (use_internal_cache && |
| !(ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) { |
| // Automatically flush the internal session cache every 255 connections. |
| int flush_cache = 0; |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush++; |
| if (ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush >= 255) { |
| flush_cache = 1; |
| ctx->handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| |
| if (flush_cache) { |
| struct OPENSSL_timeval now; |
| ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now); |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, now.tv_sec); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { |
| static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) { |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4]; |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf]; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret, |
| size_t secret_len) { |
| if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| ScopedCBB cbb; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t out_len; |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), strlen(label) + 1 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 1 + |
| secret_len * 2 + 1) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label)) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || |
| !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), (const uint8_t *)" ", 1) || |
| !cbb_add_hex(cbb.get(), secret, secret_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0 /* NUL */) || |
| !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &out, &out_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out); |
| OPENSSL_free(out); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) { |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; |
| if (ssl->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = ssl->info_callback; |
| } else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| cb(ssl, type, value); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_do_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_write, int content_type, |
| Span<const uint8_t> in) { |
| if (ssl->msg_callback == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // |version| is zero when calling for |SSL3_RT_HEADER| and |SSL2_VERSION| for |
| // a V2ClientHello. |
| int version; |
| switch (content_type) { |
| case 0: |
| // V2ClientHello |
| version = SSL2_VERSION; |
| break; |
| case SSL3_RT_HEADER: |
| version = 0; |
| break; |
| default: |
| version = SSL_version(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->msg_callback(is_write, version, content_type, in.data(), in.size(), ssl, |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) { |
| // TODO(martinkr): Change callers to |ssl_ctx_get_current_time| and drop the |
| // |ssl| arg from |current_time_cb| if possible. |
| ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx, out_clock); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock) { |
| if (ctx->current_time_cb != NULL) { |
| // TODO(davidben): Update current_time_cb to use OPENSSL_timeval. See |
| // https://crbug.com/boringssl/155. |
| struct timeval clock; |
| ctx->current_time_cb(nullptr /* ssl */, &clock); |
| if (clock.tv_sec < 0) { |
| assert(0); |
| out_clock->tv_sec = 0; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = 0; |
| } else { |
| out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec; |
| } |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) |
| out_clock->tv_sec = 1234; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = 1234; |
| #elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) |
| struct _timeb time; |
| _ftime(&time); |
| if (time.time < 0) { |
| assert(0); |
| out_clock->tv_sec = 0; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = 0; |
| } else { |
| out_clock->tv_sec = time.time; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = time.millitm * 1000; |
| } |
| #else |
| struct timeval clock; |
| gettimeofday(&clock, NULL); |
| if (clock.tv_sec < 0) { |
| assert(0); |
| out_clock->tv_sec = 0; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = 0; |
| } else { |
| out_clock->tv_sec = (uint64_t)clock.tv_sec; |
| out_clock->tv_usec = (uint32_t)clock.tv_usec; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_handoff_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, bool on) { |
| ctx->handoff = on; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace bssl |
| |
| using namespace bssl; |
| |
| int SSL_library_init(void) { |
| CRYPTO_library_init(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) { |
| CRYPTO_library_init(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| const uint8_t *session_id = sess->session_id; |
| |
| uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)]; |
| if (sess->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { |
| OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length); |
| session_id = tmp_storage; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t hash = |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) | |
| ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24); |
| |
| return hash; |
| } |
| |
| // NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of |
| // coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure |
| // SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being |
| // able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session |
| // with a matching session ID. |
| static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { |
| if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) { |
| SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; |
| |
| if (method == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| |
| ret->method = method->method; |
| ret->x509_method = method->x509_method; |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); |
| |
| ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; |
| ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; |
| |
| ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| ret->session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT; |
| |
| ret->references = 1; |
| |
| ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; |
| ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(method->x509_method); |
| if (ret->cert == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); |
| if (ret->sessions == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ret->x509_method->ssl_ctx_new(ret)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(ret, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST)) { |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| ret->client_CA = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); |
| if (ret->client_CA == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data); |
| |
| ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| |
| // Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. Once this has stuck without |
| // problems, the feature will be removed entirely. |
| ret->mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN; |
| |
| // Lock the SSL_CTX to the specified version, for compatibility with legacy |
| // uses of SSL_METHOD. |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ret, method->version) || |
| !SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ret, method->version)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| err2: |
| SSL_CTX_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&ctx->references); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == NULL || |
| !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&ctx->references)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference the |
| // ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed after the |
| // sessions were flushed. As the ex_data handling routines might also touch |
| // the session cache, the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the |
| // cache, then free ex_data, then finally free the cache. (See ticket |
| // [openssl.org #212].) |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, 0); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ctx->lock); |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_free(ctx->sessions); |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ctx->cipher_list); |
| ssl_cert_free(ctx->cert); |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->client_custom_extensions, |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); |
| sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_pop_free(ctx->server_custom_extensions, |
| SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free); |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_free(ctx); |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ctx->srtp_profiles); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->supported_group_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->verify_sigalgs); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (ctx->method == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| SSL *ssl = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(SSL)); |
| |
| ssl->conf_min_version = ctx->conf_min_version; |
| ssl->conf_max_version = ctx->conf_max_version; |
| ssl->tls13_variant = ctx->tls13_variant; |
| |
| // RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of |
| // 1 second. |
| ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000; |
| |
| ssl->options = ctx->options; |
| ssl->mode = ctx->mode; |
| ssl->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; |
| |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| if (ssl->cert == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; |
| ssl->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; |
| ssl->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; |
| ssl->custom_verify_callback = ctx->custom_verify_callback; |
| ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = |
| ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs; |
| |
| ssl->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; |
| |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); |
| ssl->session_ctx = ctx; |
| |
| if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_new(ssl)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->supported_group_list) { |
| ssl->supported_group_list = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup( |
| ctx->supported_group_list, ctx->supported_group_list_len * 2); |
| if (!ssl->supported_group_list) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ssl->supported_group_list_len = ctx->supported_group_list_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup( |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); |
| if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->method = ctx->method; |
| |
| if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data); |
| |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) { |
| ssl->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| if (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| ssl->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; |
| ssl->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; |
| |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled; |
| if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private) { |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled; |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled; |
| ssl->handoff = ctx->handoff; |
| |
| return ssl; |
| |
| err: |
| SSL_free(ssl); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_free(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->ctx != NULL) { |
| ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_free(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, ssl, &ssl->ex_data); |
| |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); |
| |
| // add extra stuff |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(ssl->cipher_list); |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->session_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->supported_group_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->token_binding_params); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->quic_transport_params); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->psk_identity_hint); |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(ssl->srtp_profiles); |
| |
| if (ssl->method != NULL) { |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); |
| } |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->server = false; |
| ssl->do_handshake = ssl_client_handshake; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->server = true; |
| ssl->do_handshake = ssl_server_handshake; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio) { |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->rbio); |
| ssl->rbio = rbio; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *ssl, BIO *wbio) { |
| BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio); |
| ssl->wbio = wbio; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { |
| // For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in ownership |
| // handling. |
| |
| // If nothing has changed, do nothing |
| if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // If the two arguments are equal, one fewer reference is granted than |
| // taken. |
| if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) { |
| BIO_up_ref(rbio); |
| } |
| |
| // If only the wbio is changed, adopt only one reference. |
| if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) { |
| SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is |
| // changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only adopt |
| // one reference. |
| if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(ssl) && SSL_get_rbio(ssl) != SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) { |
| SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Otherwise, adopt both references. |
| SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, rbio); |
| SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, wbio); |
| } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->rbio; } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->wbio; } |
| |
| int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl_reset_error_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // Run the handshake. |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); |
| |
| bool early_return = false; |
| int ret = ssl_run_handshake(hs, &early_return); |
| ssl_do_info_callback( |
| ssl, ssl->server ? SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT : SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| // Destroy the handshake object if the handshake has completely finished. |
| if (!early_return) { |
| ssl->s3->hs.reset(); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| // Not properly initialized yet |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| // Not properly initialized yet |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_do_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { |
| if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| return tls13_post_handshake(ssl, msg); |
| } |
| |
| // We do not accept renegotiations as a server or SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 will be |
| // removed entirely in the future and requires retaining more data for |
| // renegotiation_info. |
| if (ssl->server || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| goto no_renegotiation; |
| } |
| |
| if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) { |
| ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) { |
| case ssl_renegotiate_ignore: |
| // Ignore the HelloRequest. |
| return 1; |
| |
| case ssl_renegotiate_once: |
| if (ssl->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) { |
| goto no_renegotiation; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case ssl_renegotiate_never: |
| goto no_renegotiation; |
| |
| case ssl_renegotiate_freely: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| // Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application |
| // protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require |
| // the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake |
| // record while an application_data record is being written. |
| if (!ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty() || |
| ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { |
| goto no_renegotiation; |
| } |
| |
| // Begin a new handshake. |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != nullptr) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(ssl); |
| if (ssl->s3->hs == nullptr) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->total_renegotiations++; |
| return 1; |
| |
| no_renegotiation: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_read_impl(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl_reset_error_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| // Replay post-handshake message errors. |
| if (!check_read_error(ssl)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| while (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) { |
| // Complete the current handshake, if any. False Start will cause |
| // |SSL_do_handshake| to return mid-handshake, so this may require multiple |
| // iterations. |
| while (!ssl_can_read(ssl)) { |
| int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Process any buffered post-handshake messages. |
| SSLMessage msg; |
| if (ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) { |
| // If we received an interrupt in early read (EndOfEarlyData), loop again |
| // for the handshake to process it. |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
| ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read = false; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Handle the post-handshake message and try again. |
| if (!ssl_do_post_handshake(ssl, msg)) { |
| ssl_set_read_error(ssl); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ssl->method->next_message(ssl); |
| continue; // Loop again. We may have begun a new handshake. |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| size_t consumed = 0; |
| auto ret = ssl_open_app_data(ssl, &ssl->s3->pending_app_data, &consumed, |
| &alert, ssl->s3->read_buffer.span()); |
| bool retry; |
| int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert); |
| if (bio_ret <= 0) { |
| return bio_ret; |
| } |
| if (!retry) { |
| assert(!ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()); |
| ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { |
| int ret = SSL_peek(ssl, buf, num); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| // TODO(davidben): In DTLS, should the rest of the record be discarded? DTLS |
| // is not a stream. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/65. |
| ssl->s3->pending_app_data = |
| ssl->s3->pending_app_data.subspan(static_cast<size_t>(ret)); |
| if (ssl->s3->pending_app_data.empty()) { |
| ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed(); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num) { |
| int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| if (num <= 0) { |
| return num; |
| } |
| size_t todo = |
| std::min(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size(), static_cast<size_t>(num)); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, ssl->s3->pending_app_data.data(), todo); |
| return static_cast<int>(todo); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num) { |
| ssl_reset_error_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ret = 0; |
| bool needs_handshake = false; |
| do { |
| // If necessary, complete the handshake implicitly. |
| if (!ssl_can_write(ssl)) { |
| ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl->method->write_app_data(ssl, &needs_handshake, |
| (const uint8_t *)buf, num); |
| } while (needs_handshake); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl_reset_error_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->do_handshake == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| // If we are in the middle of a handshake, silently succeed. Consumers often |
| // call this function before |SSL_free|, whether the handshake succeeded or |
| // not. We assume the caller has already handled failed handshakes. |
| if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->quiet_shutdown) { |
| // Do nothing if configured not to send a close_notify. |
| ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // This function completes in two stages. It sends a close_notify and then it |
| // waits for a close_notify to come in. Perform exactly one action and return |
| // whether or not it succeeds. |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { |
| // Send a close_notify. |
| if (ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) <= 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| // Finish sending the close_notify. |
| if (ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl) <= 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { |
| // Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered |
| // transport. DTLS alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even |
| // time out because the peer never received our close_notify. Report to |
| // the caller that the channel has fully shut down. |
| if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_error) { |
| ERR_restore_state(ssl->s3->read_error.get()); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| } else { |
| // Keep discarding data until we see a close_notify. |
| for (;;) { |
| ssl->s3->pending_app_data = Span<uint8_t>(); |
| int ret = ssl_read_impl(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Return 0 for unidirectional shutdown and 1 for bidirectional shutdown. |
| return ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_send_fatal_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t alert) { |
| if (ssl->s3->alert_dispatch) { |
| if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] != SSL3_AL_FATAL || |
| ssl->s3->send_alert[1] != alert) { |
| // We are already attempting to write a different alert. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| return ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_quic_transport_params(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *params, |
| size_t params_len) { |
| ssl->quic_transport_params = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(params, params_len); |
| if (!ssl->quic_transport_params) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->quic_transport_params_len = params_len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl, |
| const uint8_t **out_params, |
| size_t *out_params_len) { |
| *out_params = ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.data(); |
| *out_params_len = ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.size(); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { |
| ctx->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tls13_variant(SSL_CTX *ctx, enum tls13_variant_t variant) { |
| ctx->tls13_variant = variant; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tls13_variant(SSL *ssl, enum tls13_variant_t variant) { |
| ssl->tls13_variant = variant; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_early_data_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) { |
| ssl->cert->enable_early_data = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_in_early_data(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return ssl->s3->hs->in_early_data; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_early_data_accepted(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->early_data_accepted; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_reset_early_data_reject(SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); |
| if (hs == NULL || |
| hs->wait != ssl_hs_early_data_rejected) { |
| abort(); |
| } |
| |
| hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok; |
| hs->in_early_data = false; |
| hs->early_session.reset(); |
| |
| // Discard any unfinished writes from the perspective of |SSL_write|'s |
| // retry. The handshake will transparently flush out the pending record |
| // (discarded by the server) to keep the framing correct. |
| ssl->s3->wpend_pending = false; |
| } |
| |
| static int bio_retry_reason_to_error(int reason) { |
| switch (reason) { |
| case BIO_RR_CONNECT: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; |
| case BIO_RR_ACCEPT: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; |
| default: |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code) { |
| if (ret_code > 0) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_NONE; |
| } |
| |
| // Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, |
| // where we do encode the error |
| uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| if (err != 0) { |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SYS) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| return SSL_ERROR_SSL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_code == 0) { |
| if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; |
| } |
| // An EOF was observed which violates the protocol, and the underlying |
| // transport does not participate in the error queue. Bubble up to the |
| // caller. |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ssl->s3->rwstate) { |
| case SSL_PENDING_SESSION: |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION; |
| |
| case SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING: |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE; |
| |
| case SSL_HANDOFF: |
| return SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF; |
| |
| case SSL_HANDBACK: |
| return SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK; |
| |
| case SSL_READING: { |
| BIO *bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { |
| // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for writes on the read |
| // BIO. Can this be removed? |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
| return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio)); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case SSL_WRITING: { |
| BIO *bio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) { |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) { |
| // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL historically checked for reads on the write |
| // BIO. Can this be removed? |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; |
| } |
| |
| if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { |
| return bio_retry_reason_to_error(BIO_get_retry_reason(bio)); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case SSL_X509_LOOKUP: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; |
| |
| case SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| |
| case SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| |
| case SSL_PENDING_TICKET: |
| return SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET; |
| |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED: |
| return SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; |
| |
| case SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { |
| ctx->options |= options; |
| return ctx->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t options) { |
| ctx->options &= ~options; |
| return ctx->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { |
| ssl->options |= options; |
| return ssl->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, uint32_t options) { |
| ssl->options &= ~options; |
| return ssl->options; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->options; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { |
| ctx->mode |= mode; |
| return ctx->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_clear_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t mode) { |
| ctx->mode &= ~mode; |
| return ctx->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->mode; } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { |
| ssl->mode |= mode; |
| return ssl->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_clear_mode(SSL *ssl, uint32_t mode) { |
| ssl->mode &= ~mode; |
| return ssl->mode; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_get_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->mode; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) { |
| ctx->pool = pool; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_tls_unique(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
| size_t max_out) { |
| *out_len = 0; |
| OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, max_out); |
| |
| // tls-unique is not defined for SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.3. |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // The tls-unique value is the first Finished message in the handshake, which |
| // is the client's in a full handshake and the server's for a resumption. See |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-3.1. |
| const uint8_t *finished = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished; |
| size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| // tls-unique is broken for resumed sessions unless EMS is used. |
| if (!ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| finished = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished; |
| finished_len = ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; |
| } |
| |
| *out_len = finished_len; |
| if (finished_len > max_out) { |
| *out_len = max_out; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, finished, *out_len); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int set_session_id_context(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| size_t sid_ctx_len) { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(cert->sid_ctx)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static_assert(sizeof(cert->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx too large"); |
| cert->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(cert->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| size_t sid_ctx_len) { |
| return set_session_id_context(ctx->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| size_t sid_ctx_len) { |
| return set_session_id_context(ssl->cert, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *SSL_get0_session_id_context(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_len) { |
| *out_len = ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length; |
| return ssl->cert->sid_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(ssl->cert); } |
| |
| int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl) { return SSL_get_rfd(ssl); } |
| |
| int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = -1; |
| BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (b != NULL) { |
| BIO_get_fd(b, &ret); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = -1; |
| BIO *b = BIO_find_type(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (b != NULL) { |
| BIO_get_fd(b, &ret); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio, bio); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { |
| BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); |
| if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || |
| BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, bio); |
| } else { |
| // Copy the rbio over to the wbio. |
| BIO_up_ref(rbio); |
| SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, rbio); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd) { |
| BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); |
| if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || |
| BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd) { |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); |
| if (bio == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, bio); |
| } else { |
| // Copy the wbio over to the rbio. |
| BIO_up_ref(wbio); |
| SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, wbio); |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static size_t copy_finished(void *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in, |
| size_t in_len) { |
| if (out_len > in_len) { |
| out_len = in_len; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, out_len); |
| return in_len; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) { |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len); |
| } |
| |
| return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len); |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *ssl, void *buf, size_t count) { |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_VERSION || |
| ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, |
| ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len); |
| } |
| |
| return copy_finished(buf, count, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, |
| ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_mode; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_extms_support(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // TLS 1.3 does not require extended master secret and always reports as |
| // supporting it. |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // If the initial handshake completed, query the established session. |
| if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) { |
| return ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret; |
| } |
| |
| // Otherwise, query the in-progress handshake. |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) { |
| return ssl->s3->hs->extended_master_secret; |
| } |
| assert(0); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| |
| int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes) { } |
| |
| void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *ssl, int yes) { } |
| |
| int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return static_cast<int>(ssl->s3->pending_app_data.size()); |
| } |
| |
| // Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options |
| int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->cert->privatekey); |
| } |
| |
| // Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter |
| int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ssl->cert, ssl->cert->privatekey); |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { |
| // Caller-initiated renegotiation is not supported. |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_total_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_cert_list) { |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; |
| } |
| ctx->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_max_cert_list(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, size_t max_cert_list) { |
| if (max_cert_list > kMaxHandshakeSize) { |
| max_cert_list = kMaxHandshakeSize; |
| } |
| ssl->max_cert_list = (uint32_t)max_cert_list; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t max_send_fragment) { |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { |
| max_send_fragment = 512; |
| } |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| } |
| ctx->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, size_t max_send_fragment) { |
| if (max_send_fragment < 512) { |
| max_send_fragment = 512; |
| } |
| if (max_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| } |
| ssl->max_send_fragment = (uint16_t)max_send_fragment; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_mtu(SSL *ssl, unsigned mtu) { |
| if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION || |
| ssl->s3->send_connection_binding; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_CTX_sess_number(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| MutexReadLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX *>(&ctx->lock)); |
| return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions); |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long size) { |
| unsigned long ret = ctx->session_cache_size; |
| ctx->session_cache_size = size; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->session_cache_size; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { |
| int ret = ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| ctx->session_cache_mode = mode; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) { |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| return 48; |
| } |
| if (len != 48) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // The default ticket keys are initialized lazily. Trigger a key |
| // rotation to initialize them. |
| if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *out_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out); |
| MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) { |
| if (in == NULL) { |
| return 48; |
| } |
| if (len != 48) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) { |
| ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current = |
| (tlsext_ticket_key *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key)); |
| if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current, 0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key)); |
| const uint8_t *in_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, in_bytes, 16); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16); |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev); |
| ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr; |
| // Disable automatic key rotation. |
| ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, |
| int encrypt)) { |
| ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_curves(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) { |
| return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->supported_group_list, |
| &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves, |
| curves_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_curves(SSL *ssl, const int *curves, size_t curves_len) { |
| return tls1_set_curves(&ssl->supported_group_list, |
| &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves, |
| curves_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *curves) { |
| return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->supported_group_list, |
| &ctx->supported_group_list_len, curves); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves) { |
| return tls1_set_curves_list(&ssl->supported_group_list, |
| &ssl->supported_group_list_len, curves); |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t SSL_get_curve_id(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation |
| // in progress. |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return session->group_id; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const DH *dh) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, const DH *dh) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->cipher_list->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_cipher_in_group(const SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t i) { |
| if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ctx->cipher_list->ciphers)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return ctx->cipher_list->in_group_flags[i]; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *prefs = |
| ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl); |
| if (prefs == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return prefs->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int n) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return c->name; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { |
| return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { |
| return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) { |
| return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, false /* not strict */); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str) { |
| return ssl_create_cipher_list(&ssl->cipher_list, str, true /* strict */); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *ssl, const int type) { |
| if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| // Historically, |SSL_get_servername| was also the configuration getter |
| // corresponding to |SSL_set_tlsext_host_name|. |
| if (ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { |
| return ssl->tlsext_hostname; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl->s3->hostname.get(); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) == NULL) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, |
| enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) { |
| ctx->verify_mode = mode; |
| ctx->custom_verify_callback = callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_custom_verify( |
| SSL *ssl, int mode, |
| enum ssl_verify_result_t (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert)) { |
| ssl->verify_mode = mode; |
| ssl->custom_verify_callback = callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = true; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) { |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = true; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) { |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| size_t *out_len) { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (ssl->server || !session || !session->ocsp_response) { |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response); |
| *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(SSL *ssl, const char *name) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->tlsext_hostname); |
| ssl->tlsext_hostname = NULL; |
| |
| if (name == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| size_t len = strlen(name); |
| if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(name); |
| if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg)) { |
| ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = callback; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { |
| ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = arg; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *peer, |
| unsigned peer_len, const uint8_t *supported, |
| unsigned supported_len) { |
| const uint8_t *result; |
| int status; |
| |
| // For each protocol in peer preference order, see if we support it. |
| for (unsigned i = 0; i < peer_len;) { |
| for (unsigned j = 0; j < supported_len;) { |
| if (peer[i] == supported[j] && |
| OPENSSL_memcmp(&peer[i + 1], &supported[j + 1], peer[i]) == 0) { |
| // We found a match |
| result = &peer[i]; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; |
| goto found; |
| } |
| j += supported[j]; |
| j++; |
| } |
| i += peer[i]; |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| // There's no overlap between our protocols and the peer's list. |
| result = supported; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; |
| |
| found: |
| *out = (uint8_t *)result + 1; |
| *out_len = result[0]; |
| return status; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, |
| unsigned *out_len) { |
| *out_data = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data(); |
| *out_len = ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size(); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, unsigned *out_len, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len, |
| const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos, |
| unsigned protos_len) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos, unsigned protos_len) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, |
| uint8_t *out_len, const uint8_t *in, |
| unsigned in_len, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_data, |
| unsigned *out_len) { |
| if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) { |
| *out_data = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn; |
| *out_len = ssl->s3->hs->early_session->early_alpn_len; |
| } else { |
| *out_data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data(); |
| *out_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { |
| ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ctx, 1); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled) { |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(ssl, 1); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int is_p256_key(EVP_PKEY *private_key) { |
| const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(private_key); |
| return ec_key != NULL && |
| EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) == |
| NID_X9_62_prime256v1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *private_key) { |
| if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key); |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key; |
| ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key) { |
| if (!is_p256_key(private_key)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(private_key); |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private = private_key; |
| ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = true; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { |
| if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id, |
| (max_out < 64) ? max_out : 64); |
| return 64; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_token_binding_params(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *params, size_t len) { |
| if (len > 256) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->token_binding_params); |
| ssl->token_binding_params = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(params, len); |
| if (!ssl->token_binding_params) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->token_binding_params_len = len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_is_token_binding_negotiated(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->token_binding_negotiated; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t SSL_get_negotiated_token_binding_param(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->negotiated_token_binding_param; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_types) { |
| if (ssl->server || ssl->s3->hs == NULL) { |
| *out_types = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_types = ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.data(); |
| return ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types.size(); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->cert != NULL) { |
| return ssl->cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) { |
| return ctx->cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher(); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->session_reused || SSL_in_early_data(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; } |
| |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *ssl) { return NULL; } |
| |
| int *SSL_get_server_tmp_key(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_key) { return 0; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { |
| ctx->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) { |
| ssl->quiet_shutdown = (mode != 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->quiet_shutdown; } |
| |
| void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode) { |
| // It is an error to clear any bits that have already been set. (We can't try |
| // to get a second close_notify or send two.) |
| assert((SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & mode) == SSL_get_shutdown(ssl)); |
| |
| if (mode & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN && |
| ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) { |
| ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| } |
| |
| if (mode & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN && |
| ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) { |
| ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { |
| // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN| on both close_notify |
| // and fatal alert. |
| ret |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| } |
| if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) { |
| // Historically, OpenSSL set |SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN| on only close_notify. |
| ret |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| if (ssl->ctx == ctx) { |
| return ssl->ctx; |
| } |
| |
| // One cannot change the X.509 callbacks during a connection. |
| if (ssl->ctx->x509_method != ctx->x509_method) { |
| assert(0); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| ctx = ssl->session_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| |
| SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; |
| |
| return ssl->ctx; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) { |
| ssl->info_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl, int type, |
| int value) { |
| return ssl->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_in_init(ssl) ? SSL_ST_INIT : SSL_ST_OK; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { } |
| |
| char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len) { |
| if (len <= 0) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| buf[0] = '\0'; |
| return buf; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl, &index, argl, argp, |
| free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx, data); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ssl->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class_ssl_ctx, &index, argl, argp, |
| free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->rwstate; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) {} |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) {} |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) {} |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, |
| int keylength)) {} |
| |
| static int use_psk_identity_hint(char **out, const char *identity_hint) { |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // Clear currently configured hint, if any. |
| OPENSSL_free(*out); |
| *out = NULL; |
| |
| // Treat the empty hint as not supplying one. Plain PSK makes it possible to |
| // send either no hint (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while |
| // ECDHE_PSK can only spell empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, |
| // so we interpret empty and missing as identical. |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && identity_hint[0] != '\0') { |
| *out = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (*out == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { |
| return use_psk_identity_hint(&ctx->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *identity_hint) { |
| return use_psk_identity_hint(&ssl->psk_identity_hint, identity_hint); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return ssl->psk_identity_hint; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return session->psk_identity; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_client_callback( |
| SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, |
| unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { |
| ssl->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, |
| unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk, |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { |
| ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_server_callback( |
| SSL *ssl, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk, |
| unsigned max_psk_len)) { |
| ssl->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, |
| uint8_t *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)) { |
| ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_dummy_pq_padding_size(SSL *ssl, size_t num_bytes) { |
| if (num_bytes > 0xffff) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->dummy_pq_padding_len = num_bytes; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_dummy_pq_padding_used(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->server) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl->did_dummy_pq_padding; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, |
| int content_type, const void *buf, |
| size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { |
| ctx->msg_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { |
| ctx->msg_callback_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, |
| const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, |
| void *arg)) { |
| ssl->msg_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { |
| ssl->msg_callback_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)) { |
| ctx->keylog_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, |
| const char *line) { |
| return ctx->keylog_callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, |
| struct timeval *out_clock)) { |
| ctx->current_time_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return !SSL_in_init(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_in_init(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // This returns false once all the handshake state has been finalized, to |
| // allow callbacks and getters based on SSL_in_init to return the correct |
| // values. |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); |
| return hs != nullptr && !hs->handshake_finalized; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_in_false_start(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return ssl->s3->hs->in_false_start; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_in_false_start(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t *ssl_size, size_t *ssl_ctx_size, |
| size_t *ssl_session_size) { |
| *ssl_size = sizeof(SSL); |
| *ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX); |
| *ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_is_server(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->server; } |
| |
| int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->method->is_dtls; } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| enum ssl_select_cert_result_t (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) { |
| ctx->select_certificate_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *)) { |
| ctx->dos_protection_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_renegotiate_mode_t mode) { |
| ssl->renegotiate_mode = mode; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv, |
| const uint8_t **out_write_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) { |
| size_t write_iv_len; |
| if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->GetIV(out_read_iv, out_iv_len) || |
| !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->GetIV(out_write_iv, &write_iv_len) || |
| *out_iv_len != write_iv_len) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static uint64_t be_to_u64(const uint8_t in[8]) { |
| return (((uint64_t)in[0]) << 56) | (((uint64_t)in[1]) << 48) | |
| (((uint64_t)in[2]) << 40) | (((uint64_t)in[3]) << 32) | |
| (((uint64_t)in[4]) << 24) | (((uint64_t)in[5]) << 16) | |
| (((uint64_t)in[6]) << 8) | ((uint64_t)in[7]); |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // TODO(davidben): Internally represent sequence numbers as uint64_t. |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { |
| // max_seq_num already includes the epoch. |
| assert(ssl->d1->r_epoch == (ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num >> 48)); |
| return ssl->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num; |
| } |
| return be_to_u64(ssl->s3->read_sequence); |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl) { |
| uint64_t ret = be_to_u64(ssl->s3->write_sequence); |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { |
| assert((ret >> 48) == 0); |
| ret |= ((uint64_t)ssl->d1->w_epoch) << 48; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm(const SSL *ssl) { |
| // TODO(davidben): This checks the wrong session if there is a renegotiation |
| // in progress. |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return session->peer_signature_algorithm; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { |
| if (max_out == 0) { |
| return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); |
| } |
| if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) { |
| max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, max_out); |
| return max_out; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) { |
| if (max_out == 0) { |
| return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); |
| } |
| if (max_out > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) { |
| max_out = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, max_out); |
| return max_out; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get(); |
| if (hs == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return hs->new_cipher; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL *ssl, int enabled) { |
| ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { |
| ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) { |
| ctx->grease_enabled = !!enabled; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t SSL_get_ticket_age_skew(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_false_start_allowed_without_alpn(SSL_CTX *ctx, int allowed) { |
| ctx->false_start_allowed_without_alpn = !!allowed; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_is_draft_downgrade(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->s3->draft_downgrade; } |
| |
| int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl) { |
| // In OpenSSL, reusing a client |SSL| with |SSL_clear| causes the previously |
| // established session to be offered the next time around. wpa_supplicant |
| // depends on this behavior, so emulate it. |
| UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session; |
| if (!ssl->server && ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) { |
| session.reset(ssl->s3->established_session.get()); |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get()); |
| } |
| |
| // The ssl->d1->mtu is simultaneously configuration (preserved across |
| // clear) and connection-specific state (gets reset). |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben): Avoid this. |
| unsigned mtu = 0; |
| if (ssl->d1 != NULL) { |
| mtu = ssl->d1->mtu; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->method->ssl_free(ssl); |
| if (!ssl->method->ssl_new(ssl)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { |
| ssl->d1->mtu = mtu; |
| } |
| |
| if (session != nullptr) { |
| SSL_set_session(ssl, session.get()); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| |
| int SSL_num_renegotiations(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_need_tmp_RSA(const SSL *ssl) { return 0; } |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; } |
| int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa) { return 1; } |
| void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) {} |
| void SSL_load_error_strings(void) {} |
| int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_session_reused(ssl); } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *ec_key) { |
| if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)); |
| return SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, &nid, 1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key) { |
| if (ec_key == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key) == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)); |
| return SSL_set1_curves(ssl, &nid, 1); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method) { |
| ctx->ticket_aead_method = aead_method; |
| } |