| commit | ebd8b8965c74ab06bb91f7a00b23822e1f1f26ca | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Wed Jul 27 18:41:51 2022 -0700 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Thu Aug 25 17:35:50 2022 +0000 |
| tree | 4dbafcfc7ac55661d0aee508eaa07328e27844b6 | |
| parent | b2d3c10cdc8fb642a842db2c6061743b4604b0b5 [diff] |
Track SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN explicitly. Most SSL_ERROR_* values are tracked directly with rwstate. SSL_get_error is just reading the extra return value out from the previous call. However, SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN infers close_notify from the SSL's shutdown state and a zero return value (EOF). This works, but if we implement SSL_read_ex and SSL_write_ex, a zero return value is no longer as carefully correlated with EOF. Moreover, it's already possible to get a non-EOF zero return post-close_notify if BIO_write returns an (arguably incorrect) return value. Instead, track SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN in rwstate explicitly. Since rwstate is exposed as SSL_want and SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN was previously never returned there, I've made it map SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN back to SSL_ERROR_NONE. I've also added a test for BIO_write returning zero, though the real purpose is for a subsequent SSL_write_ex implementation to retain all the other tests we've added in here. Update-Note: This is intended to be safe, but if anything breaks around EOFs, this change is a likely culprit. Bug: 507 Change-Id: Ide0807665f2e02ee695c4976dc5e99fb10502cf0 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53946 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: