| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| /* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by |
| * SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate |
| * that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */ |
| static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0; |
| |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); |
| static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) { |
| return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ |
| return ssl->session; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) { |
| /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ |
| return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { |
| int index; |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func, |
| dup_func, free_func)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return index; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) { |
| SSL_SESSION *ss; |
| |
| ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); |
| if (ss == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); |
| |
| ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ |
| ss->references = 1; |
| ss->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ss, &ss->ex_data); |
| return ss; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { |
| if (len) { |
| *len = s->session_id_length; |
| } |
| return s->session_id; |
| } |
| |
| /* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. |
| * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random |
| * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one |
| * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it |
| * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a |
| * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone |
| * is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our |
| * server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting |
| * question ... */ |
| static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id, |
| unsigned int *id_len) { |
| static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10; |
| unsigned int retry = 0; |
| do { |
| if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && |
| (++retry < kMaxAttempts)); |
| |
| if (retry < kMaxAttempts) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* else - woops a session_id match */ |
| /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a |
| * collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation |
| * of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to |
| * atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a |
| * reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal |
| * cache as well). */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) { |
| /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ |
| |
| unsigned int tmp; |
| SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; |
| GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; |
| |
| if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ss = SSL_SESSION_new(); |
| if (ss == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */ |
| if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) { |
| ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = NULL; |
| |
| if (session) { |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION || |
| s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION || |
| s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| ss->ssl_version = s->version; |
| ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| ss->session_id_length = 0; |
| goto sess_id_done; |
| } |
| |
| /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ |
| if (s->generate_session_id) { |
| cb = s->generate_session_id; |
| } else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) { |
| cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id; |
| } |
| |
| /* Choose a session ID */ |
| tmp = ss->session_id_length; |
| if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { |
| /* The callback failed */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it |
| * higher than it was. */ |
| if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { |
| /* The callback set an illegal length */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| ss->session_id_length = tmp; |
| /* Finally, check for a conflict */ |
| if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| sess_id_done: |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname) { |
| ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
| if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| ss->session_id_length = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); |
| ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; |
| s->session = ss; |
| ss->ssl_version = s->version; |
| ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets |
| * |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found. The caller takes |
| * ownership of the result. */ |
| static enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_lookup_session( |
| SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, const uint8_t *session_id, |
| size_t session_id_len) { |
| *out_session = NULL; |
| |
| if (session_id_len == 0 || session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *session; |
| /* Try the internal cache, if it exists. */ |
| if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { |
| SSL_SESSION data; |
| data.ssl_version = ssl->version; |
| data.session_id_length = session_id_len; |
| memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, session_id_len); |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock); |
| session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->initial_ctx->sessions, &data); |
| if (session != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); |
| } |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock); |
| |
| if (session != NULL) { |
| *out_session = session; |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Fall back to the external cache, if it exists. */ |
| if (ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb == NULL) { |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| int copy = 1; |
| session = ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, (uint8_t *)session_id, |
| session_id_len, ©); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| if (session == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) { |
| return ssl_session_retry; |
| } |
| |
| /* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so |
| * (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared |
| * between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == |
| * 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */ |
| if (copy) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); |
| } |
| |
| /* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary. */ |
| if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session); |
| } |
| |
| *out_session = session; |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| |
| enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_get_prev_session( |
| SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, int *out_send_ticket, |
| const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) { |
| /* This is used only by servers. */ |
| assert(ssl->server); |
| SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; |
| int send_ticket = 0; |
| |
| /* If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present. */ |
| const uint8_t *ticket = NULL; |
| size_t ticket_len = 0; |
| const int tickets_supported = |
| !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) && |
| (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION || ctx->extensions != NULL) && |
| SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, |
| &ticket, &ticket_len); |
| if (tickets_supported) { |
| if (!tls_process_ticket(ssl, &session, &send_ticket, ticket, ticket_len, |
| ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len)) { |
| return ssl_session_error; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* The client does not support session tickets, so the session ID should be |
| * used instead. */ |
| enum ssl_session_result_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session( |
| ssl, &session, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len); |
| if (lookup_ret != ssl_session_success) { |
| return lookup_ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (session == NULL || |
| session->sid_ctx_length != ssl->sid_ctx_length || |
| memcmp(session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) != 0) { |
| goto no_session; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && ssl->sid_ctx_length == 0) { |
| /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is |
| * especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have |
| * used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. |
| * |
| * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event |
| * like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to |
| * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone |
| * noticing). */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); |
| goto fatal_error; |
| } |
| |
| if (session->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - session->time)) { |
| if (!tickets_supported) { |
| /* The session was from the cache, so remove it. */ |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session); |
| } |
| goto no_session; |
| } |
| |
| *out_session = session; |
| *out_send_ticket = send_ticket; |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| |
| fatal_error: |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| return ssl_session_error; |
| |
| no_session: |
| *out_session = NULL; |
| *out_send_ticket = tickets_supported; |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| return ssl_session_success; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| SSL_SESSION *s; |
| |
| /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though it |
| * has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an |
| * lhash */ |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); |
| /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &s, c)) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(c); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given session ID. In this |
| * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify ctx->sessions), or |
| * we're in trouble. */ |
| if (s != NULL && s != c) { |
| /* We *are* in trouble ... */ |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s); |
| /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot |
| * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the same |
| * cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the |
| * same session from an external cache) */ |
| s = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); |
| } |
| |
| if (s != NULL) { |
| /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count |
| * because it already takes into account the cache */ |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ |
| ret = 0; |
| } else { |
| /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { |
| while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { |
| if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { |
| return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); |
| } |
| |
| static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lock) { |
| SSL_SESSION *r; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if (c != NULL && c->session_id_length != 0) { |
| if (lock) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| } |
| r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c); |
| if (r == c) { |
| ret = 1; |
| r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c); |
| } |
| |
| if (lock) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret) { |
| r->not_resumable = 1; |
| if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) { |
| ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r); |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(r); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session) { |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references); |
| } |
| return session; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (session == NULL || |
| !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data); |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id)); |
| ssl_sess_cert_free(session->sess_cert); |
| X509_free(session->peer); |
| OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname); |
| OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick); |
| OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response); |
| OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session)); |
| OPENSSL_free(session); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| if (s->session == session) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = session; |
| if (session != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); |
| s->verify_result = session->verify_result; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->timeout = t; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->timeout; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->time; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->time = t; |
| return t; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_key_exchange_info(SSL_SESSION *session) { |
| return session->key_exchange_info; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const uint8_t *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
| memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { |
| long l; |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| l = s->session_timeout; |
| s->session_timeout = t; |
| return l; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) { |
| if (s == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return s->session_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| typedef struct timeout_param_st { |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| long time; |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; |
| } TIMEOUT_PARAM; |
| |
| static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *sess, void *void_param) { |
| TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param; |
| |
| if (param->time == 0 || |
| param->time > (sess->time + sess->timeout)) { |
| /* timeout */ |
| /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to |
| * save on locking overhead */ |
| (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, sess); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, sess); |
| sess->not_resumable = 1; |
| if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) { |
| param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, sess); |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t) { |
| TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; |
| |
| tp.ctx = ctx; |
| tp.cache = ctx->sessions; |
| if (tp.cache == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| tp.time = t; |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock); |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && |
| !SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { |
| if (s->next == NULL || s->prev == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) { |
| /* last element in list */ |
| if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { |
| /* only one element in list */ |
| ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; |
| } else { |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; |
| s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) { |
| /* first element in list */ |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; |
| s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| } else { /* middle of list */ |
| s->next->prev = s->prev; |
| s->prev->next = s->next; |
| } |
| } |
| s->prev = s->next = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { |
| if (s->next != NULL && s->prev != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = s; |
| s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } else { |
| s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; |
| s->next->prev = s; |
| s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { |
| ctx->new_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| return ctx->new_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { |
| ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| return ctx->remove_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, |
| uint8_t *data, int len, |
| int *copy)) { |
| ctx->get_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data, |
| int len, int *copy) { |
| return ctx->get_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { |
| ctx->info_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type, |
| int val) { |
| return ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, |
| EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { |
| ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, |
| EVP_PKEY **pkey) { |
| return ctx->client_cert_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { |
| ctx->channel_id_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { |
| return ctx->channel_id_cb; |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) |