diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 13847a8..6b2c969 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 PolarSSL ChangeLog
 
 = Version 1.2.1 released 2012-11-13
+Changes
+   * Depth that the certificate verify callback receives is now numbered
+     bottom-up (Peer cert depth is 0)
+
 Bugfixes
    * Fixes for MSVC6
    * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME
diff --git a/include/polarssl/x509.h b/include/polarssl/x509.h
index 45a8229..87151c9 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/x509.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/x509.h
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
  *                 (void *parameter, x509_cert *crt, int certificate_depth,
  *                 int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for
  *                 that specific certificate and the certificate depth from
- *                 the top (Trust CA depth = 0).
+ *                 the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0).
  *
  *                 All flags left after returning from the callback
  *                 are also returned to the application. The function should
diff --git a/library/x509parse.c b/library/x509parse.c
index c564511..e54e0b7 100644
--- a/library/x509parse.c
+++ b/library/x509parse.c
@@ -3114,12 +3114,12 @@
 
 static int x509parse_verify_top(
                 x509_cert *child, x509_cert *trust_ca,
-                x509_crl *ca_crl, int *path_cnt, int *flags,
+                x509_crl *ca_crl, int path_cnt, int *flags,
                 int (*f_vrfy)(void *, x509_cert *, int, int *),
                 void *p_vrfy )
 {
     int hash_id, ret;
-    int ca_flags = 0;
+    int ca_flags = 0, check_path_cnt = path_cnt + 1;
     unsigned char hash[64];
 
     if( x509parse_time_expired( &child->valid_to ) )
@@ -3141,8 +3141,19 @@
             continue;
         }
 
+        /*
+         * Reduce path_len to check against if top of the chain is
+         * the same as the trusted CA
+         */
+        if( child->subject_raw.len == trust_ca->subject_raw.len &&
+            memcmp( child->subject_raw.p, trust_ca->subject_raw.p,
+                            child->issuer_raw.len ) == 0 ) 
+        {
+            check_path_cnt--;
+        }
+
         if( trust_ca->max_pathlen > 0 &&
-            trust_ca->max_pathlen < *path_cnt )
+            trust_ca->max_pathlen < check_path_cnt )
         {
             trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
             continue;
@@ -3166,7 +3177,13 @@
         break;
     }
 
-    if( trust_ca != NULL )
+    /*
+     * If top of chain is not the same as the trusted CA
+     */
+    if( trust_ca != NULL &&
+        ( child->subject_raw.len != trust_ca->subject_raw.len ||
+          memcmp( child->subject_raw.p, trust_ca->subject_raw.p,
+                            child->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 ) )
     {
         /* Check trusted CA's CRL for then chain's top crt */
         *flags |= x509parse_verifycrl( child, trust_ca, ca_crl );
@@ -3186,7 +3203,7 @@
 
         if( NULL != f_vrfy )
         {
-            if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, trust_ca, 0, &ca_flags ) ) != 0 )
+            if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, trust_ca, path_cnt + 1, &ca_flags ) ) != 0 )
                 return( ret );
         }
     }
@@ -3194,12 +3211,10 @@
     /* Call callback on top cert */
     if( NULL != f_vrfy )
     {
-        if( ( ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, child, 1, flags ) ) != 0 )
+        if( ( ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
             return( ret );
     }
 
-    *path_cnt = 2;
-
     *flags |= ca_flags;
 
     return( 0 );
@@ -3207,7 +3222,7 @@
 
 static int x509parse_verify_child(
                 x509_cert *child, x509_cert *parent, x509_cert *trust_ca,
-                x509_crl *ca_crl, int *path_cnt, int *flags,
+                x509_crl *ca_crl, int path_cnt, int *flags,
                 int (*f_vrfy)(void *, x509_cert *, int, int *),
                 void *p_vrfy )
 {
@@ -3246,28 +3261,26 @@
         break;
     }
 
-    (*path_cnt)++;
     if( grandparent != NULL )
     {
         /*
          * Part of the chain
          */
-        ret = x509parse_verify_child( parent, grandparent, trust_ca, ca_crl, path_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
+        ret = x509parse_verify_child( parent, grandparent, trust_ca, ca_crl, path_cnt + 1, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
         if( ret != 0 )
             return( ret );
     } 
     else
     {
-        ret = x509parse_verify_top( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, path_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
+        ret = x509parse_verify_top( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, path_cnt + 1, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
         if( ret != 0 )
             return( ret );
     }
 
     /* child is verified to be a child of the parent, call verify callback */
     if( NULL != f_vrfy )
-        if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, *path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
+        if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
             return( ret );
-    (*path_cnt)++;
 
     *flags |= parent_flags;
 
@@ -3286,7 +3299,7 @@
 {
     size_t cn_len;
     int ret;
-    int pathlen = 1;
+    int pathlen = 0;
     x509_cert *parent;
     x509_name *name;
     x509_sequence *cur = NULL;
@@ -3368,13 +3381,13 @@
         /*
          * Part of the chain
          */
-        ret = x509parse_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, &pathlen, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
+        ret = x509parse_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, pathlen, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
         if( ret != 0 )
             return( ret );
     } 
     else
     {
-        ret = x509parse_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, &pathlen, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
+        ret = x509parse_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, pathlen, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
         if( ret != 0 )
             return( ret );
     }