Merge pull request #6608 from mprse/ecjpake_password_fix
Make a copy of the password key in operation object while setting j-pake password
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index 4f65398..33e2e77 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, \
- MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \
+ NULL, 0 , \
PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE, {0}, 0, 0, \
{.dummy = 0}}
#else
@@ -1920,7 +1920,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_step);
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_step);
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+ uint8_t* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
psa_pake_role_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role);
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 2ce5e43..8c9deff 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -877,20 +877,7 @@
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
- * and lock it.
- *
- * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
- * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
- * zero, the algorithm is not checked.
- *
- * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
- * into a key slot if not already done.
- *
- * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
- * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
- */
-static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
+psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
psa_key_usage_t usage,
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index 9863848..5cefa27 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -183,6 +183,24 @@
}
#endif
+/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
+ * and lock it.
+ *
+ * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
+ * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
+ * zero, the algorithm is not checked.
+ *
+ * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
+ * into a key slot if not already done.
+ *
+ * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
+ * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
index 870b5b5..659b712 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_key_type_t type;
psa_key_usage_t usage;
+ psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
@@ -273,7 +274,27 @@
if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
- operation->password = password;
+ if( operation->password != NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( password, &slot,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE,
+ PSA_ALG_JPAKE );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ operation->password = mbedtls_calloc( 1, slot->key.bytes );
+ if( operation->password == NULL )
+ {
+ psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+ }
+ memcpy( operation->password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
+ operation->password_len = slot->key.bytes;
+
+ status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
@@ -348,9 +369,7 @@
static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ecjpake_role role;
- psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT )
role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
@@ -359,22 +378,20 @@
else
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- if( psa_is_valid_key_id( operation->password, 1 ) == 0 )
+ if( operation->password_len == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( operation->password, &slot );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
-
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
role,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
- slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
+ operation->password,
+ operation->password_len );
- psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
- slot = NULL;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
+ mbedtls_free( operation->password );
+ operation->password = NULL;
+ operation->password_len = 0;
if( ret != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
@@ -840,7 +857,11 @@
{
operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
- operation->password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ if( operation->password_len > 0 )
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
+ mbedtls_free( operation->password );
+ operation->password = NULL;
+ operation->password_len = 0;
operation->role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
operation->buffer_length = 0;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index cce3fd0..659205d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -6549,11 +6549,16 @@
PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
-ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0
PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds, client input first
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
-ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1:0
+
+# This test case relies on implementation (it may need to be adjusted in the future)
+PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds - key is destroyed after being passed to set_password_key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:1
PSA PAKE: ecjpake no input errors
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 779f594..ca1614b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -31,6 +31,27 @@
#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id != 0 )
#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id == 0 )
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+int ecjpake_operation_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_pake_role_t role,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ size_t key_available )
+{
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( operation ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( operation, cipher_suite ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( operation, role) );
+
+ if( key_available )
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( operation, key ) );
+ return 0;
+exit:
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
/** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */
static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U;
@@ -8740,7 +8761,6 @@
{
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
psa_pake_operation_t operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
- psa_pake_operation_t op_copy = psa_pake_operation_init();
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
psa_pake_primitive_t primitive = primitive_arg;
psa_key_type_t key_type_pw = key_type_pw_arg;
@@ -8839,22 +8859,25 @@
if( input_first )
{
/* Invalid parameters (input) */
- op_copy = operation;
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
NULL, 0 ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid parameters (step) */
- op_copy = operation;
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ) , 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid first step */
- op_copy = operation;
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* Possibly valid */
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
output_buffer, size_key_share ),
expected_status_input_output);
@@ -8875,22 +8898,25 @@
else
{
/* Invalid parameters (output) */
- op_copy = operation;
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
NULL, 0, NULL ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- op_copy = operation;
/* Invalid parameters (step) */
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Invalid first step */
- op_copy = operation;
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* Possibly valid */
+ TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role,
+ key, pw_data->len ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
expected_status_input_output );
@@ -8974,7 +9000,7 @@
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
int derive_alg_arg, data_t *pw_data,
- int client_input_first )
+ int client_input_first, int destroy_key )
{
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init();
@@ -9025,6 +9051,9 @@
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) );
+ if( destroy_key == 1 )
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
