Adapt prototypes of ticket handling functions
This is an intermediate step. The ssl_config argument will be replace by a
ticket context next.
diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c
index 6709c68..5ce7a35 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ticket.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c
@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@
#include <string.h>
-/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
-static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
- volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
-}
-
/*
* Serialize a session in the following format:
* 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
@@ -167,10 +162,13 @@
*
* (the internal state structure differs, however).
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *tlen )
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *tlen )
{
int ret;
- unsigned char * const start = ssl->out_msg + 10;
unsigned char *p = start;
unsigned char *state;
unsigned char iv[16];
@@ -178,32 +176,29 @@
*tlen = 0;
- if( ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
+ if( conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+ /* We need at least 16 bytes for key_name, 16 for IV, 2 for len
+ * 16 for padding, 32 for MAC, in addition to session itself,
+ * that will be checked when writing it. */
+ if( end - start < 16 + 16 + 2 + 16 + 32 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
/* Write key name */
- memcpy( p, ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name, 16 );
+ memcpy( p, conf->ticket_keys->key_name, 16 );
p += 16;
/* Generate and write IV (with a copy for aes_crypt) */
- if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 16 ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = conf->f_rng( conf->p_rng, p, 16 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
memcpy( iv, p, 16 );
p += 16;
- /*
- * Dump session state
- *
- * After the session state itself, we still need room for 16 bytes of
- * padding and 32 bytes of MAC, so there's only so much room left
- */
+ /* Dump session state */
state = p + 2;
- if( ssl_save_session( ssl->session_negotiate, state,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ( state - ssl->out_msg ) - 48,
- &clear_len ) != 0 )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE );
- }
+ if( ssl_save_session( session, state, end - state, &clear_len ) != 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
/* Apply PKCS padding */
pad_len = 16 - clear_len % 16;
@@ -212,7 +207,7 @@
state[i] = (unsigned char) pad_len;
/* Encrypt */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &conf->ticket_keys->enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
enc_len, iv, state, state ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@@ -225,7 +220,7 @@
/* Compute and write MAC( key_name + iv + enc_state_len + enc_state ) */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
- ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
+ conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
start, p - start, p ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@@ -240,12 +235,12 @@
/*
* Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure)
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len )
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len )
{
int ret;
- mbedtls_ssl_session session;
unsigned char *key_name = buf;
unsigned char *iv = buf + 16;
unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 16;
@@ -255,7 +250,7 @@
size_t enc_len, clear_len, i;
unsigned char pad_len, diff;
- if( len < 34 || ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
+ if( len < 34 || conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1];
@@ -267,12 +262,12 @@
/* Check name, in constant time though it's not a big secret */
diff = 0;
for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
- diff |= key_name[i] ^ ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name[i];
+ diff |= key_name[i] ^ conf->ticket_keys->key_name[i];
/* don't return yet, check the MAC anyway */
/* Check mac, with constant-time buffer comparison */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
- ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
+ conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
buf, len - 32, computed_mac ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@@ -287,7 +282,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
/* Decrypt */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &conf->ticket_keys->dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
enc_len, iv, ticket, ticket ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@@ -306,34 +301,15 @@
clear_len = enc_len - pad_len;
/* Actually load session */
- if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( &session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
+ if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
- }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/* Check if still valid */
- if( (int) ( time( NULL) - session.start ) > ssl->conf->ticket_lifetime )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
+ if( (int) ( time( NULL) - session->start ) > conf->ticket_lifetime )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED );
- }
#endif
- /*
- * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
- * inform him we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
- */
- session.length = ssl->session_negotiate->length;
- memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.length );
-
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
- memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
-
- /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
- mbedtls_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
-
return( 0 );
}
