Rename & move ticket functions to ticket module
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 62c520d..5b7cbeb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -50,314 +50,9 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
-static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
- volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Serialize a session in the following format:
- * 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
- * n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate)
- * n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1
- *
- * Assumes ticket is NULL (always true on server side).
- */
-static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
- size_t *olen )
-{
- unsigned char *p = buf;
- size_t left = buf_len;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- size_t cert_len;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
- if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) )
- return( -1 );
-
- memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
- p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
- left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
- cert_len = 0;
- else
- cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
-
- if( left < 3 + cert_len )
- return( -1 );
-
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 16 & 0xFF );
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 8 & 0xFF );
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len & 0xFF );
-
- if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
- memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len );
-
- p += cert_len;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
- *olen = p - buf;
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Unserialise session, see ssl_save_session()
- */
-static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- const unsigned char *p = buf;
- const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- size_t cert_len;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
- if( p + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
- p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
- if( p + 3 > end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
- p += 3;
-
- if( cert_len == 0 )
- {
- session->peer_cert = NULL;
- }
- else
- {
- int ret;
-
- if( p + cert_len > end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- session->peer_cert = mbedtls_malloc( sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
-
- if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
-
- mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert,
- p, cert_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
- mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
- session->peer_cert = NULL;
- return( ret );
- }
-
- p += cert_len;
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
- if( p != end )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Create session ticket, secured as recommended in RFC 5077 section 4:
- *
- * struct {
- * opaque key_name[16];
- * opaque iv[16];
- * opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>;
- * opaque mac[32];
- * } ticket;
- *
- * (the internal state structure differs, however).
- */
-static int ssl_write_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *tlen )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char * const start = ssl->out_msg + 10;
- unsigned char *p = start;
- unsigned char *state;
- unsigned char iv[16];
- size_t clear_len, enc_len, pad_len, i;
-
- *tlen = 0;
-
- if( ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /* Write key name */
- memcpy( p, ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name, 16 );
- p += 16;
-
- /* Generate and write IV (with a copy for aes_crypt) */
- if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 16 ) ) != 0 )
- return( ret );
- memcpy( iv, p, 16 );
- p += 16;
-
- /*
- * Dump session state
- *
- * After the session state itself, we still need room for 16 bytes of
- * padding and 32 bytes of MAC, so there's only so much room left
- */
- state = p + 2;
- if( ssl_save_session( ssl->session_negotiate, state,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ( state - ssl->out_msg ) - 48,
- &clear_len ) != 0 )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE );
- }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session ticket cleartext", state, clear_len );
-
- /* Apply PKCS padding */
- pad_len = 16 - clear_len % 16;
- enc_len = clear_len + pad_len;
- for( i = clear_len; i < enc_len; i++ )
- state[i] = (unsigned char) pad_len;
-
- /* Encrypt */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
- enc_len, iv, state, state ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /* Write length */
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len ) & 0xFF );
- p = state + enc_len;
-
- /* Compute and write MAC( key_name + iv + enc_state_len + enc_state ) */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
- ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
- start, p - start, p ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- p += 32;
-
- *tlen = p - start;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session ticket structure", start, *tlen );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Load session ticket (see ssl_write_ticket for structure)
- */
-static int ssl_parse_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len )
-{
- int ret;
- mbedtls_ssl_session session;
- unsigned char *key_name = buf;
- unsigned char *iv = buf + 16;
- unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 16;
- unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2;
- unsigned char *mac;
- unsigned char computed_mac[32];
- size_t enc_len, clear_len, i;
- unsigned char pad_len, diff;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session ticket structure", buf, len );
-
- if( len < 34 || ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1];
- mac = ticket + enc_len;
-
- if( len != enc_len + 66 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-
- /* Check name, in constant time though it's not a big secret */
- diff = 0;
- for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
- diff |= key_name[i] ^ ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name[i];
- /* don't return yet, check the MAC anyway */
-
- /* Check mac, with constant-time buffer comparison */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
- ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
- buf, len - 32, computed_mac ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ )
- diff |= mac[i] ^ computed_mac[i];
-
- /* Now return if ticket is not authentic, since we want to avoid
- * decrypting arbitrary attacker-chosen data */
- if( diff != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
-
- /* Decrypt */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
- enc_len, iv, ticket, ticket ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
-
- /* Check PKCS padding */
- pad_len = ticket[enc_len - 1];
-
- ret = 0;
- for( i = 2; i < pad_len; i++ )
- if( ticket[enc_len - i] != pad_len )
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
-
- clear_len = enc_len - pad_len;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session ticket cleartext", ticket, clear_len );
-
- /* Actually load session */
- if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( &session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to parse ticket content" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
- return( ret );
- }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
- /* Check if still valid */
- if( (int) ( time( NULL) - session.start ) > ssl->conf->ticket_lifetime )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "session ticket expired" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED );
- }
+#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h"
#endif
- /*
- * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
- * inform him we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
- */
- session.length = ssl->session_negotiate->length;
- memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.length );
-
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
- memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
-
- /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
- mbedtls_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *info,
@@ -734,9 +429,9 @@
/*
* Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
*/
- if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ticket( ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( ssl, buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_parse_ticket", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret );
return( 0 );
}
@@ -3814,9 +3509,9 @@
ssl->out_msg[6] = ( lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
ssl->out_msg[7] = ( lifetime ) & 0xFF;
- if( ( ret = ssl_write_ticket( ssl, &tlen ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( ssl, &tlen ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ticket", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret );
tlen = 0;
}
