Handle DTLS version encoding and fix some checks
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 49ae4a5..0d07b36 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -1129,6 +1129,7 @@
int handshake_failure = 0;
const int *ciphersuites;
const ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+ int major, minor;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) );
@@ -1142,7 +1143,7 @@
buf = ssl->in_hdr;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO)
- if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 )
+ if( ssl->transport == SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM && ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 )
return ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl );
#endif
@@ -1163,13 +1164,19 @@
* 1 . 2 protocol version
* 3 . 4 message length
*/
+ if( buf[0] != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
+ {
+ SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+ }
+
+ ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->transport, buf + 1 );
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
- if( buf[0] != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
- buf[1] < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
+ if( major < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
@@ -1231,8 +1238,8 @@
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
- ssl->major_ver = buf[4];
- ssl->minor_ver = buf[5];
+ ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver,
+ ssl->transport, buf + 4 );
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver;
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver;
@@ -1782,11 +1789,12 @@
buf = ssl->out_msg;
p = buf + 4;
- *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->major_ver;
- *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->minor_ver;
+ ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
+ ssl->transport, p );
+ p += 2;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
- buf[4], buf[5] ) );
+ buf[4], buf[5] ) );
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME)
t = time( NULL );
@@ -2564,6 +2572,7 @@
int ret;
size_t len = pk_get_len( ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
+ unsigned char ver[2];
if( ! pk_can_do( ssl_own_key( ssl ), POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) )
{
@@ -2593,14 +2602,18 @@
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
+ ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
+ ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
+ ssl->transport, ver );
+
ret = pk_decrypt( ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len,
pms, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset,
ssl->f_rng, ssl->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 || ssl->handshake->pmslen != 48 ||
- pms[0] != ssl->handshake->max_major_ver ||
- pms[1] != ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver )
+ pms[0] != ver[0] ||
+ pms[1] != ver[1] )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );