Corrected behaviour for CBC-based suites using the SHA384 MAC and PRF
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 68c06cc..dae98fa 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -1347,8 +1347,8 @@
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224
* in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side.
*/
- if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->cipher ==
- POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM )
+ if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
+ POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 )
{
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA384;
hashlen = 48;
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index bab0aa8..c7c7367 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -1068,8 +1068,8 @@
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 2;
- if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->cipher ==
- POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM )
+ if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
+ POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 )
{
ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg = SSL_HASH_SHA384;
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 60ef3be..2d09c59 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@
handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls;
}
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
- else if( transform->ciphersuite_info->cipher ==
- POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM )
+ else if( transform->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
+ POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 )
{
handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384;
handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384;
@@ -963,10 +963,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
-/*
- * TODO: Use digest version when integrated!
- */
-#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE 32
+#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE 48
static int ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
{
@@ -2161,7 +2158,7 @@
if( ssl->minor_ver < SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
- else if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM )
+ else if( ciphersuite_info->mac == POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 )
{
ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384;
}