Merge pull request #2949 from zfields/patch-1
[cmake] Propagate public headers
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c6210d1..e184c96 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,66 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
-= mbed TLS 2.20.0 branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+= mbed TLS X.X.X branch released XXXX-XX-XX
+
+Bugfix
+ * Allow loading symlinked certificates. Fixes #3005. Reported and fixed
+ by Jonathan Bennett <JBennett@incomsystems.biz> via #3008.
+ * Fix an unchecked call to mbedtls_md() in the x509write module.
+
+= mbed TLS 2.20.0 branch released 2020-01-15
+
+Default behavior changes
+ * The initial seeding of a CTR_DRBG instance makes a second call to the
+ entropy function to obtain entropy for a nonce if the entropy size is less
+ than 3/2 times the key size. In case you want to disable the extra call to
+ grab entropy, you can call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() to force the
+ nonce length to 0.
+
+Security
+ * Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func() gathers a total of
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. In the
+ default configuration, on a platform with a single entropy source, the
+ entropy module formerly only grabbed 32 bytes, which is good enough for
+ security if the source is genuinely strong, but less than the expected 64
+ bytes (size of the entropy accumulator).
+ * Zeroize local variables in mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() and
+ mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() before exiting the function. The value of
+ these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best
+ practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like
+ Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function.
+ Issue reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai,
+ Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and
+ Dave Tian (Purdue University).
+ * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA. Our bignum implementation is not
+ constant time/constant trace, so side channel attacks can retrieve the
+ blinded value, factor it (as it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed
+ to have only large prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the
+ key. Reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.
+ * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA key generation. Obtaining precise
+ timings on the comparison in the key generation enabled the attacker to
+ learn leading bits of the ephemeral key used during ECDSA signatures and to
+ recover the private key. Reported by Jeremy Dubeuf.
+ * Catch failure of AES functions in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). Uncaught
+ failures could happen with alternative implementations of AES. Bug
+ reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer Lauri,
+ Sectra.
+
+Features
+ * Key derivation inputs in the PSA API can now either come from a key object
+ or from a buffer regardless of the step type.
+ * The CTR_DRBG module can grab a nonce from the entropy source during the
+ initial seeding. The default nonce length is chosen based on the key size
+ to achieve the security strength defined by NIST SP 800-90A. You can
+ change it with mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len().
+ * Add ENUMERATED tag support to the ASN.1 module. Contributed by
+ msopiha-linaro in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#307.
+
+API changes
+ * In the PSA API, forbid zero-length keys. To pass a zero-length input to a
+ key derivation function, use a buffer instead (this is now always
+ possible).
+ * Rename psa_asymmetric_sign() to psa_sign_hash() and
+ psa_asymmetric_verify() to psa_verify_hash().
Bugfix
* Fix an incorrect size in a debugging message. Reported and fix
@@ -9,6 +69,34 @@
Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2800.
* Remove a useless assignment. Reported and fix submitted by irwir.
Fixes #2801.
+ * Fix a buffer overflow in the PSA HMAC code when using a long key with an
+ unsupported algorithm. Fixes ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#254.
+ * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_int to support any number of leading zeros. Credit
+ to OSS-Fuzz for finding a bug in an intermediate version of the fix.
+ * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null to correctly parse bitstrings of at
+ most 2 bytes.
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() and
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() now work if you call them before
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed().
+ * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings. Fix contributed
+ by apple-ihack-geek in #2663.
+
+Changes
+ * Remove the technical possibility to define custom mbedtls_md_info
+ structures, which was exposed only in an internal header.
+ * psa_close_key(0) and psa_destroy_key(0) now succeed (doing nothing, as
+ before).
+ * Variables containing error codes are now initialized to an error code
+ rather than success, so that coding mistakes or memory corruption tends to
+ cause functions to return this error code rather than a success. There are
+ no known instances where this changes the behavior of the library: this is
+ merely a robustness improvement. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#323
+ * Remove a useless call to mbedtls_ecp_group_free(). Contributed by
+ Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#210.
+ * Speed up PBKDF2 by caching the digest calculation. Contributed by Jack
+ Lloyd and Fortanix Inc in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#277.
+ * Small performance improvement of mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(). Contributed by
+ Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#308.
= mbed TLS 2.19.1 branch released 2019-09-16
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 43065b1..16ba188 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
- GNU Make
- CMake
-- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 or later)
+- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 or later)
The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically.
diff --git a/crypto b/crypto
index 0b3dd8d..1146b4e 160000
--- a/crypto
+++ b/crypto
@@ -1 +1 @@
-Subproject commit 0b3dd8d0249adb54abc7ad46303f3c22e44aefb7
+Subproject commit 1146b4e06011b69a6437e6b728f2af043a06ec19
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index d5ead37..5b5aefb 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
*/
/**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.19.1 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.20.0 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index eb2d96e..47a9740 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
-PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.19.1"
+PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.20.0"
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index 06bb1c9..82b0188 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -52,9 +52,10 @@
* For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd,
* even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors.
*
- * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0003-0x007F)
+ * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F)
*
* Module Nr Codes assigned
+ * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001
* MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010
* GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013
* BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@
* CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055
* POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B
* CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056
- * PLATFORM 1 0x0070-0x0072
+ * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072
*
* High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...)
* Name ID Nr of Errors
@@ -112,6 +113,9 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001 /**< Generic error */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E /**< This is a bug in the library */
+
/**
* \brief Translate a mbed TLS error code into a string representation,
* Result is truncated if necessary and always includes a terminating
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index ae694ee..d4e5d54 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -39,17 +39,17 @@
* Major, Minor, Patchlevel
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 19
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 20
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02130100
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.19.1"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.19.1"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02140000
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.20.0"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.20.0"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 5e36a5b..d990d43 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -174,14 +174,14 @@
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
- set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.19.1 SOVERSION 1)
+ set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.20.0 SOVERSION 1)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
target_include_directories(mbedx509
PUBLIC ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/crypto/include/)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
- set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.19.1 SOVERSION 13)
+ set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.20.0 SOVERSION 13)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
target_include_directories(mbedtls
PUBLIC ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index bc9363d..6fc110c 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
SOEXT_TLS=so.13
SOEXT_X509=so.1
-SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.3
+SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.4
# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept
# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar)
diff --git a/library/debug.c b/library/debug.c
index 0c46c06..ae78a69 100644
--- a/library/debug.c
+++ b/library/debug.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@
{
va_list argp;
char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( NULL == ssl ||
NULL == ssl->conf ||
diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index d8b5780..c451f4d 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
#include <string.h>
#endif
@@ -109,6 +108,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#endif
@@ -754,6 +757,13 @@
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+ if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR) )
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ERROR - Generic error" );
+ if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED) )
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
diff --git a/library/net_sockets.c b/library/net_sockets.c
index c7b358d..dbde510 100644
--- a/library/net_sockets.c
+++ b/library/net_sockets.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@
int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host,
const char *port, int proto )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur;
if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 )
@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@
mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx,
void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int type;
struct sockaddr_storage client_addr;
@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@
int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
struct timeval tv;
fd_set read_fds;
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
if( fd < 0 )
@@ -577,7 +578,7 @@
int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, uint32_t timeout )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
struct timeval tv;
fd_set read_fds;
int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
@@ -620,7 +621,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
if( fd < 0 )
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 57e5d8a..1005bd9 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -35,9 +35,10 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
@@ -402,7 +403,7 @@
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t kkpp_len;
@@ -766,7 +767,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
@@ -858,7 +859,7 @@
static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *q;
@@ -1470,7 +1471,7 @@
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
@@ -2384,7 +2385,7 @@
size_t offset, size_t *olen,
size_t pms_offset )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
@@ -2531,7 +2532,7 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
@@ -2582,7 +2583,7 @@
static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
@@ -2971,7 +2972,7 @@
#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t n = 0;
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
@@ -3135,7 +3136,7 @@
static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
@@ -3174,7 +3175,7 @@
static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t header_len;
size_t content_len;
@@ -3595,7 +3596,7 @@
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
@@ -3790,7 +3791,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
uint32_t lifetime;
size_t ticket_len;
unsigned char *ticket;
diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c
index 56e9bdd..4bf9058 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cookie.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN];
if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, key, sizeof( key ) ) ) != 0 )
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@
unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx;
unsigned long t;
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index b1da073..b0b09cd 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -35,9 +35,10 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len;
const unsigned char *p;
@@ -432,7 +433,7 @@
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
{
@@ -624,7 +625,7 @@
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_session session;
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session );
@@ -2428,7 +2429,7 @@
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t kkpp_len;
@@ -2506,7 +2507,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;
@@ -2580,7 +2581,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
#endif
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
@@ -3007,7 +3008,7 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
@@ -3088,7 +3089,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
@@ -3128,7 +3129,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL )
@@ -3193,7 +3194,7 @@
*/
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL;
const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
/* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
@@ -3251,7 +3252,7 @@
size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed;
size_t hashlen = 0;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
@@ -3424,7 +3425,7 @@
* machine. */
static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t signature_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED)
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
@@ -3521,7 +3522,7 @@
static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) );
@@ -3625,7 +3626,7 @@
size_t *peer_pmslen,
size_t peer_pmssize )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl );
mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk;
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key );
@@ -3714,7 +3715,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
size_t pms_offset )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char ver[2];
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
@@ -3868,7 +3869,7 @@
static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p, *end;
@@ -4385,7 +4386,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t tlen;
uint32_t lifetime;
diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c
index 6dad5d1..8a76b42 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ticket.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@
static int ssl_ticket_gen_key( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
unsigned char index )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES];
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index;
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher,
uint32_t lifetime )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
ctx->f_rng = f_rng;
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@
size_t *tlen,
uint32_t *ticket_lifetime )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = start;
@@ -306,7 +307,7 @@
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = buf;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index e450207..6cf7781 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -43,9 +43,10 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
-#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/version.h"
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@
static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t remaining, expansion;
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
@@ -446,7 +447,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( src->peer_cert != NULL )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) );
if( dst->peer_cert == NULL )
@@ -586,7 +587,7 @@
unsigned char h_i[20];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
@@ -832,7 +833,7 @@
unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
@@ -1683,7 +1684,7 @@
unsigned char *master,
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1:
* "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */
@@ -1810,7 +1811,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
@@ -2140,7 +2141,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
/* Write length only when we know the actual value */
@@ -2162,7 +2163,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t zlen;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen,
@@ -2559,7 +2560,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %d, "
"including %d bytes of padding",
@@ -2590,7 +2591,7 @@
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char iv[12];
size_t explicit_iv_len = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
@@ -2673,7 +2674,7 @@
( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t padlen, i;
size_t olen;
@@ -3462,7 +3463,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg;
ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf;
size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen;
@@ -3509,7 +3510,7 @@
static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg;
ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen;
@@ -3604,7 +3605,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
@@ -3823,7 +3824,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) );
@@ -4022,7 +4023,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
@@ -4251,7 +4252,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4;
const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0];
@@ -4737,7 +4738,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 )
@@ -4881,7 +4882,7 @@
static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *original_in_ctr;
// save original in_ctr
@@ -5107,7 +5108,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ||
@@ -5619,7 +5620,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned update_hs_digest )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) );
@@ -6265,7 +6266,7 @@
static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_record rec;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@@ -6473,7 +6474,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* Handle particular types of records
@@ -6616,7 +6617,7 @@
unsigned char level,
unsigned char message )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -6835,14 +6836,14 @@
if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
return( -1 );
- return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
+ return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *crt_buf,
size_t crt_buf_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest =
ssl->session->peer_cert_digest;
mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type =
@@ -6875,7 +6876,7 @@
static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *chain )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
int crt_cnt=0;
#endif
@@ -7290,7 +7291,7 @@
static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *start, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest =
mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN );
@@ -7322,7 +7323,7 @@
unsigned char *start, size_t len )
{
unsigned char *end = start + len;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */
mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey );
@@ -7492,7 +7493,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
@@ -7515,7 +7516,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) );
@@ -8214,7 +8215,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned int hash_len;
unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN];
@@ -8607,7 +8608,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ssl->conf = conf;
@@ -8674,7 +8675,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
@@ -8922,7 +8923,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL ||
session == NULL ||
@@ -9166,7 +9167,7 @@
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
@@ -9235,7 +9236,7 @@
const unsigned char *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
@@ -9280,7 +9281,7 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
@@ -9298,7 +9299,7 @@
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 )
@@ -9313,7 +9314,7 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 )
@@ -10361,7 +10362,7 @@
if( cert_len != 0 )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -10549,7 +10550,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) );
@@ -10580,7 +10581,7 @@
*/
static int ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) );
@@ -10707,7 +10708,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
@@ -11091,7 +11092,7 @@
static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ||
@@ -11123,7 +11124,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
@@ -11163,7 +11164,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -11746,7 +11747,7 @@
const unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
size_t session_len;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* The context should have been freshly setup or reset.
@@ -12167,7 +12168,7 @@
int endpoint, int transport, int preset )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#endif
/* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests,
diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c
index 2e0b0e8..7f8181b 100644
--- a/library/x509.c
+++ b/library/x509.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -83,7 +84,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *serial )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL +
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret );
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + ret );
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@
*/
static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end;
mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid;
@@ -209,7 +210,7 @@
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md,
int *salt_len )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end, *end2;
size_t len;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_name *cur )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
mbedtls_x509_buf *oid;
mbedtls_x509_buf *val;
@@ -433,7 +434,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_name *cur )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t set_len;
const unsigned char *end_set;
@@ -539,7 +540,7 @@
static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen,
mbedtls_x509_time *tm )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen
@@ -604,7 +605,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_time *tm )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len, year_len;
unsigned char tag;
@@ -633,7 +634,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
int tag_type;
@@ -662,7 +663,7 @@
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg,
void **sig_opts )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( *sig_opts != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -710,7 +711,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
/* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual
@@ -745,7 +746,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, n;
unsigned char c, merge = 0;
const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
@@ -807,7 +808,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, n, nr;
char *p;
@@ -843,7 +844,7 @@
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const void *sig_opts )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
char *p = buf;
size_t n = size;
const char *desc = NULL;
@@ -888,7 +889,7 @@
{
char *p = buf;
size_t n = buf_size;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c
index 546e8fa..7df2f0e 100644
--- a/library/x509_create.c
+++ b/library/x509_create.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -241,7 +242,7 @@
*/
static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p;
size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first;
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t size )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size )
@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@
static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->val.p + 1,
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first;
diff --git a/library/x509_crl.c b/library/x509_crl.c
index 00f8545..d1176fc 100644
--- a/library/x509_crl.c
+++ b/library/x509_crl.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
int *ver )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 )
{
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( *p == end )
return( 0 );
@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
/* OPTIONAL */
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t entry_len;
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry;
@@ -300,7 +301,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
@@ -539,7 +540,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t use_len;
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
int is_pem = 0;
@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
unsigned char *buf;
@@ -630,7 +631,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
char *p;
const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry;
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index 48f244e..ca60011 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
int *ver )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
@@ -427,7 +428,7 @@
mbedtls_x509_time *from,
mbedtls_x509_time *to )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( *p == end )
return( 0 );
@@ -483,7 +484,7 @@
int *ca_istrue,
int *max_pathlen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
/*
@@ -532,7 +533,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *ns_cert_type)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )
@@ -551,7 +552,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned int *key_usage)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i;
mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
@@ -625,7 +626,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len, tag_len;
mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
unsigned char tag;
@@ -887,7 +888,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet;
@@ -1056,7 +1057,7 @@
size_t buflen,
int make_copy )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
@@ -1318,7 +1319,7 @@
size_t buflen,
int make_copy )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
/*
@@ -1415,7 +1416,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
/* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
@@ -1499,7 +1500,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
unsigned char *buf;
@@ -1612,7 +1613,7 @@
goto cleanup;
}
- if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) )
+ if( !( S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) || S_ISLNK( sb.st_mode ) ) )
continue;
// Ignore parse errors
@@ -1737,7 +1738,7 @@
*subject_alt_name,
const char *prefix )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
@@ -1848,7 +1849,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
switch( san_buf->tag &
( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) )
@@ -1909,7 +1910,7 @@
static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size,
unsigned char ns_cert_type )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const char *sep = "";
@@ -1936,7 +1937,7 @@
static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
unsigned int key_usage )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const char *sep = "";
@@ -1960,7 +1961,7 @@
static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const char *desc;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
@@ -1989,7 +1990,7 @@
static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const char *desc;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
@@ -2023,7 +2024,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
char *p;
char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];
@@ -2195,7 +2196,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
uint32_t flags )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur;
char *p = buf;
size_t n = size;
@@ -2535,7 +2536,7 @@
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good;
@@ -2658,7 +2659,7 @@
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
*parent_is_trusted = 1;
@@ -2791,7 +2792,7 @@
{
/* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
* catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
uint32_t *flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
@@ -3020,7 +3021,7 @@
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned i;
uint32_t cur_flags;
const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
@@ -3068,7 +3069,7 @@
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
uint32_t ee_flags;
diff --git a/library/x509_csr.c b/library/x509_csr.c
index c8c08c8..7e2cfba 100644
--- a/library/x509_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509_csr.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@
const unsigned char *end,
int *ver )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 )
{
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end;
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params;
@@ -262,7 +263,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t use_len;
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
#endif
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
unsigned char *buf;
@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
char *p;
char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];
diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c
index 0a2357a..5947e43 100644
--- a/library/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509write_crt.c
@@ -34,10 +34,11 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
-#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *serial )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->serial, serial ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
int is_ca, int max_pathlen )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char buf[9];
unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf);
size_t len = 0;
@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */
unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf);
size_t len = 0;
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */
unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof( buf );
size_t len = 0;
@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@
{
unsigned char buf[5], ku[2];
unsigned char *c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT |
@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@
{
unsigned char buf[4];
unsigned char *c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
c = buf + 4;
@@ -299,7 +300,7 @@
static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *t, size_t size )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
/*
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const char *sig_oid;
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
@@ -526,7 +527,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, buf, size,
diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c
index 23e3f78..7c51798 100644
--- a/library/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509write_csr.c
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@
{
unsigned char buf[4];
unsigned char *c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
c = buf + 4;
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@
{
unsigned char buf[4];
unsigned char *c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
c = buf + 4;
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const char *sig_oid;
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
@@ -213,7 +214,9 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
- mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+ ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
@@ -263,7 +266,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, buf, size,
diff --git a/programs/aes/aescrypt2.c b/programs/aes/aescrypt2.c
index 8242ea7..048028d 100644
--- a/programs/aes/aescrypt2.c
+++ b/programs/aes/aescrypt2.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
unsigned char IV[16];
unsigned char tmp[16];
unsigned char key[512];
- unsigned char digest[32];
+ unsigned char digest[64];
unsigned char buffer[1024];
unsigned char diff;
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 8f0d3b5..c188900 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@
if( fwrite( nss_keylog_line, 1, len, f ) != len )
{
ret = -1;
+ fclose( f );
goto exit;
}
diff --git a/scripts/config.pl b/scripts/config.pl
index 95e3191..c836b37 100755
--- a/scripts/config.pl
+++ b/scripts/config.pl
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
## This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
my $py = $0;
-$py =~ s/\.pl$/.py/;
+$py =~ s/\.pl$/.py/ or die "Unable to determine the name of the Python script";
exec 'python3', $py, @ARGV;
-print STDERR "$0: python3: $!\n";
+print STDERR "$0: python3: $!. Trying python instead.\n";
exec 'python', $py, @ARGV;
print STDERR "$0: python: $!\n";
exit 127;
diff --git a/scripts/data_files/error.fmt b/scripts/data_files/error.fmt
index a08742c..6360705 100644
--- a/scripts/data_files/error.fmt
+++ b/scripts/data_files/error.fmt
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
#include <string.h>
#endif
diff --git a/scripts/generate_errors.pl b/scripts/generate_errors.pl
index 2fe202e..7b66eca 100755
--- a/scripts/generate_errors.pl
+++ b/scripts/generate_errors.pl
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
my @low_level_modules = qw( AES ARC4 ARIA ASN1 BASE64 BIGNUM BLOWFISH
CAMELLIA CCM CHACHA20 CHACHAPOLY CMAC CTR_DRBG DES
- ENTROPY GCM HKDF HMAC_DRBG MD2 MD4 MD5
+ ENTROPY ERROR GCM HKDF HMAC_DRBG MD2 MD4 MD5
NET OID PADLOCK PBKDF2 PLATFORM POLY1305 RIPEMD160
SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 THREADING XTEA );
my @high_level_modules = qw( CIPHER DHM ECP MD
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py b/tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py
index 87a35e4..939ca23 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check-test-cases.py
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
import sys
class Results:
+ """Store file and line information about errors or warnings in test suites."""
def __init__(self):
self.errors = 0
self.warnings = 0
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@
self.warnings += 1
def collect_test_directories():
+ """Get the relative path for the TLS and Crypto test directories."""
if os.path.isdir('tests'):
tests_dir = 'tests'
elif os.path.isdir('suites'):
@@ -55,6 +57,7 @@
return directories
def check_description(results, seen, file_name, line_number, description):
+ """Check test case descriptions for errors."""
if description in seen:
results.error(file_name, line_number,
'Duplicate description (also line {})',
diff --git a/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py b/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py
index 6ac68a4..8f24435 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/mbedtls_test.py
@@ -310,7 +310,10 @@
param_bytes, length = self.test_vector_to_bytes(function_id,
dependencies, args)
- self.send_kv(''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in length), ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in param_bytes))
+ self.send_kv(
+ ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in length),
+ ''.join('{:02x}'.format(x) for x in param_bytes)
+ )
@staticmethod
def get_result(value):
diff --git a/tests/suites/helpers.function b/tests/suites/helpers.function
index 5d0a390..7cc9c09 100644
--- a/tests/suites/helpers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/helpers.function
@@ -230,13 +230,45 @@
#define TEST_VALID_PARAM( TEST ) \
TEST_ASSERT( ( TEST, 1 ) );
-#define TEST_HELPER_ASSERT(a) if( !( a ) ) \
+#define TEST_HELPER_ASSERT(a) if( !( a ) ) \
{ \
- mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Assertion Failed at %s:%d - %s\n", \
+ mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Assertion Failed at %s:%d - %s\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, #a ); \
- mbedtls_exit( 1 ); \
+ mbedtls_exit( 1 ); \
}
+/** Allocate memory dynamically and fail the test case if this fails.
+ *
+ * You must set \p pointer to \c NULL before calling this macro and
+ * put `mbedtls_free( pointer )` in the test's cleanup code.
+ *
+ * If \p length is zero, the resulting \p pointer will be \c NULL.
+ * This is usually what we want in tests since API functions are
+ * supposed to accept null pointers when a buffer size is zero.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
+ * It may jump to the \c exit label.
+ *
+ * \param pointer An lvalue where the address of the allocated buffer
+ * will be stored.
+ * This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ * \param length Number of elements to allocate.
+ * This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
+ *
+ */
+#define ASSERT_ALLOC( pointer, length ) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) == NULL ); \
+ if( ( length ) != 0 ) \
+ { \
+ ( pointer ) = mbedtls_calloc( sizeof( *( pointer ) ), \
+ ( length ) ); \
+ TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) != NULL ); \
+ } \
+ } \
+ while( 0 )
+
/*
* 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian)
*/
diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function
index 9e56ca3..b956c0c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/host_test.function
+++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function
@@ -525,15 +525,6 @@
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof( alloc_buf ) );
#endif
- if( outcome_file_name != NULL )
- {
- outcome_file = fopen( outcome_file_name, "a" );
- if( outcome_file == NULL )
- {
- mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Unable to open outcome file. Continuing anyway.\n" );
- }
- }
-
/*
* The C standard doesn't guarantee that all-bits-0 is the representation
* of a NULL pointer. We do however use that in our code for initializing
@@ -555,6 +546,15 @@
return( 1 );
}
+ if( outcome_file_name != NULL )
+ {
+ outcome_file = fopen( outcome_file_name, "a" );
+ if( outcome_file == NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Unable to open outcome file. Continuing anyway.\n" );
+ }
+ }
+
while( arg_index < argc )
{
next_arg = argv[arg_index];
@@ -607,6 +607,8 @@
{
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to open test file: %s\n",
test_filename );
+ if( outcome_file != NULL )
+ fclose( outcome_file );
return( 1 );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/target_test.function b/tests/suites/target_test.function
index d430d9d..b097589 100644
--- a/tests/suites/target_test.function
+++ b/tests/suites/target_test.function
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
c[1] = greentea_getc();
c[2] = '\0';
- assert( unhexify( &byte, c ) != 2 );
+ TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( unhexify( &byte, c ) != 2 );
return( byte );
}
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
greentea_getc(),
'\0'
};
- assert( unhexify( &value, c ) != 8 );
+ TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( unhexify( &value, c ) != 8 );
return( (uint32_t)value );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index 45765de..59b4769 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -1,3 +1,51 @@
+Test calback buffer sanity
+test_callback_buffer_sanity:
+
+Callback buffer test: Exercise simple write/read
+test_callback_buffer:50:25:25:25:25:0:0:0:0
+
+Callback buffer test: Filling up the buffer
+test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:50:50:0:0:0:0
+
+Callback buffer test: Filling up the buffer in two steps
+test_callback_buffer:50:20:20:0:0:30:30:50:50
+
+Callback buffer test: Reading out the buffer in two steps
+test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:30:30:0:0:20:20
+
+Callback buffer test: Data wraps in buffer
+test_callback_buffer:50:45:45:10:10:10:10:45:45
+
+Callback buffer test: Data starts at the end
+test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:49:49:10:10:11:11
+
+Callback buffer test: Can write less than requested
+test_callback_buffer:50:75:50:30:30:25:25:45:45
+
+Callback buffer test: Can read less than requested
+test_callback_buffer:50:25:25:30:25:5:5:5:5
+
+Callback buffer test: Writing to full buffer
+test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:0:0:10:0:60:50
+
+Callback buffer test: Reading from empty buffer
+test_callback_buffer:50:0:0:10:0:0:0:0:0
+
+Test mock socket sanity
+ssl_mock_sanity:
+
+Test mock blocking TCP connection
+ssl_mock_tcp:1
+
+Test mock non-blocking TCP connection
+ssl_mock_tcp:0
+
+Test mock blocking TCP connection (interleaving)
+ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving:1
+
+Test mock non-blocking TCP connection (interleaving)
+ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving:0
+
SSL DTLS replay: initial state, seqnum 0
ssl_dtls_replay:"":"000000000000":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 2fa716b..a936d83 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -2,6 +2,331 @@
#include <mbedtls/ssl.h>
#include <mbedtls/ssl_internal.h>
+
+/*
+ * Buffer structure for custom I/O callbacks.
+ */
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_test_buffer
+{
+ size_t start;
+ size_t content_length;
+ size_t capacity;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+} mbedtls_test_buffer;
+
+/*
+ * Initialises \p buf. After calling this function it is safe to call
+ * `mbedtls_test_buffer_free()` on \p buf.
+ */
+void mbedtls_test_buffer_init( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf )
+{
+ memset( buf, 0, sizeof( *buf ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets up \p buf. After calling this function it is safe to call
+ * `mbedtls_test_buffer_put()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_get()` on \p buf.
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf, size_t capacity )
+{
+ buf->buffer = (unsigned char*) mbedtls_calloc( capacity,
+ sizeof(unsigned char) );
+ if( NULL == buf->buffer )
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ buf->capacity = capacity;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_test_buffer_free( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf )
+{
+ if( buf->buffer != NULL )
+ mbedtls_free( buf->buffer );
+
+ memset( buf, 0, sizeof( *buf ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Puts \p input_len bytes from the \p input buffer into the ring buffer \p buf.
+ *
+ * \p buf must have been initialized and set up by calling
+ * `mbedtls_test_buffer_init()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_setup()`.
+ *
+ * \retval \p input_len, if the data fits.
+ * \retval 0 <= value < \p input_len, if the data does not fit.
+ * \retval -1, if \p buf is NULL, it hasn't been set up or \p input_len is not
+ * zero and \p input is NULL.
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_buffer_put( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf,
+ const unsigned char* input, size_t input_len )
+{
+ size_t overflow = 0;
+
+ if( ( buf == NULL ) || ( buf->buffer == NULL ) )
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Reduce input_len to a number that fits in the buffer. */
+ if ( ( buf->content_length + input_len ) > buf->capacity )
+ {
+ input_len = buf->capacity - buf->content_length;
+ }
+
+ if( input == NULL )
+ {
+ return ( input_len == 0 ) ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the buffer has not come full circle and free space is not in
+ * the middle */
+ if( buf->start + buf->content_length < buf->capacity )
+ {
+
+ /* Calculate the number of bytes that need to be placed at lower memory
+ * address */
+ if( buf->start + buf->content_length + input_len
+ > buf->capacity )
+ {
+ overflow = ( buf->start + buf->content_length + input_len )
+ % buf->capacity;
+ }
+
+ memcpy( buf->buffer + buf->start + buf->content_length, input,
+ input_len - overflow );
+ memcpy( buf->buffer, input + input_len - overflow, overflow );
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* The buffer has come full circle and free space is in the middle */
+ memcpy( buf->buffer + buf->start + buf->content_length - buf->capacity,
+ input, input_len );
+ }
+
+ buf->content_length += input_len;
+ return input_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets \p output_len bytes from the \p output buffer into the ring buffer
+ * \p buf.
+ *
+ * \p buf must have been initialized and set up by calling
+ * `mbedtls_test_buffer_init()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_setup()`.
+ *
+ * \retval \p output_len, if the data is available.
+ * \retval 0 <= value < \p output_len, if the data is not available.
+ * \retval -1, if \buf is NULL, it hasn't been set up or \p output_len is not
+ * zero and \p output is NULL
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_buffer_get( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf,
+ unsigned char* output, size_t output_len )
+{
+ size_t overflow = 0;
+
+ if( ( buf == NULL ) || ( buf->buffer == NULL ) )
+ return -1;
+
+ if( output == NULL )
+ {
+ return ( output_len == 0 ) ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+
+ if( buf->content_length < output_len )
+ output_len = buf->content_length;
+
+ /* Calculate the number of bytes that need to be drawn from lower memory
+ * address */
+ if( buf->start + output_len > buf->capacity )
+ {
+ overflow = ( buf->start + output_len ) % buf->capacity;
+ }
+
+ memcpy( output, buf->buffer + buf->start, output_len - overflow );
+ memcpy( output + output_len - overflow, buf->buffer, overflow );
+ buf->content_length -= output_len;
+ buf->start = ( buf->start + output_len ) % buf->capacity;
+
+ return output_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Context for the I/O callbacks simulating network connection.
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED 1
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_mock_socket
+{
+ int status;
+ mbedtls_test_buffer *input;
+ mbedtls_test_buffer *output;
+ struct mbedtls_mock_socket *peer;
+} mbedtls_mock_socket;
+
+/*
+ * Setup and teardown functions for mock sockets.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mock_socket_init( mbedtls_mock_socket *socket )
+{
+ memset( socket, 0, sizeof( *socket ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the socket \p socket.
+ *
+ * \p socket must have been previously initialized by calling
+ * mbedtls_mock_socket_init().
+ *
+ * This function frees all allocated resources and both sockets are aware of the
+ * new connection state.
+ *
+ * That is, this function does not simulate half-open TCP connections and the
+ * phenomenon that when closing a UDP connection the peer is not aware of the
+ * connection having been closed.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mock_socket_close( mbedtls_mock_socket* socket )
+{
+ if( socket == NULL )
+ return;
+
+ if( socket->input != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_free( socket->input );
+ mbedtls_free( socket->input );
+ }
+
+ if( socket->output != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_free( socket->output );
+ mbedtls_free( socket->output );
+ }
+
+ if( socket->peer != NULL )
+ memset( socket->peer, 0, sizeof( *socket->peer ) );
+
+ memset( socket, 0, sizeof( *socket ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Establishes a connection between \p peer1 and \p peer2.
+ *
+ * \p peer1 and \p peer2 must have been previously initialized by calling
+ * mbedtls_mock_socket_init().
+ *
+ * The capacites of the internal buffers are set to \p bufsize. Setting this to
+ * the correct value allows for simulation of MTU, sanity testing the mock
+ * implementation and mocking TCP connections with lower memory cost.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( mbedtls_mock_socket* peer1,
+ mbedtls_mock_socket* peer2,
+ size_t bufsize )
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ peer1->output =
+ (mbedtls_test_buffer*) mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_test_buffer) );
+ if( peer1->output == NULL )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_init( peer1->output );
+ if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( peer1->output, bufsize ) ) )
+ {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ peer2->output =
+ (mbedtls_test_buffer*) mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_test_buffer) );
+ if( peer2->output == NULL )
+ {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_init( peer2->output );
+ if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( peer2->output, bufsize ) ) )
+ {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ peer1->peer = peer2;
+ peer2->peer = peer1;
+ peer1->input = peer2->output;
+ peer2->input = peer1->output;
+
+ peer1->status = peer2->status = MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED;
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( peer1 );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( peer2 );
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callbacks for simulating blocking I/O over connection-oriented transport.
+ */
+
+int mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx;
+
+ if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED )
+ return -1;
+
+ return mbedtls_test_buffer_put( socket->output, buf, len );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx;
+
+ if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED )
+ return -1;
+
+ return mbedtls_test_buffer_get( socket->input, buf, len );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callbacks for simulating non-blocking I/O over connection-oriented transport.
+ */
+
+int mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx;
+
+ if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED )
+ return -1;
+
+ if( socket->output->capacity == socket->output->content_length )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_test_buffer_put( socket->output, buf, len );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+ mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx;
+
+ if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED )
+ return -1;
+
+ if( socket->input->content_length == 0)
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_test_buffer_get( socket->input, buf, len );
+}
+
/*
* Helper function setting up inverse record transformations
* using given cipher, hash, EtM mode, authentication tag length,
@@ -361,6 +686,477 @@
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void test_callback_buffer_sanity()
+{
+ enum { MSGLEN = 10 };
+ mbedtls_test_buffer buf;
+ unsigned char input[MSGLEN];
+ unsigned char output[MSGLEN];
+
+ memset( input, 0, sizeof(input) );
+
+ /* Make sure calling put and get on NULL buffer results in error. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, input, sizeof( input ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, output, sizeof( output ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, NULL, sizeof( output ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, NULL, 0 ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, NULL, 0 ) == -1 );
+
+ /* Make sure calling put and get on a buffer that hasn't been set up results
+ * in eror. */
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_init( &buf );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, output, sizeof( output ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, sizeof( output ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == -1 );
+
+ /* Make sure calling put end get on NULL input and output only results in
+ * error if the length is not zero. */
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( &buf, sizeof( input ) ) == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, sizeof( output ) )
+ == -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Make sure calling put several times in the row is safe */
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, sizeof( input ) )
+ == sizeof( input ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, output, 2 ) == 2 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 1 ) == 1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 2 ) == 1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 2 ) == 0 );
+
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_free( &buf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/*
+ * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_test_buffer` related functions is
+ * correct and works as expected.
+ *
+ * That is
+ * - If we try to put in \p put1 bytes then we can put in \p put1_ret bytes.
+ * - Afterwards if we try to get \p get1 bytes then we can get \get1_ret bytes.
+ * - Next, if we try to put in \p put1 bytes then we can put in \p put1_ret
+ * bytes.
+ * - Afterwards if we try to get \p get1 bytes then we can get \get1_ret bytes.
+ * - All of the bytes we got match the bytes we put in in a FIFO manner.
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void test_callback_buffer( int size, int put1, int put1_ret,
+ int get1, int get1_ret, int put2, int put2_ret,
+ int get2, int get2_ret )
+{
+ enum { ROUNDS = 2 };
+ size_t put[ROUNDS];
+ int put_ret[ROUNDS];
+ size_t get[ROUNDS];
+ int get_ret[ROUNDS];
+ mbedtls_test_buffer buf;
+ unsigned char* input = NULL;
+ size_t input_len;
+ unsigned char* output = NULL;
+ size_t output_len;
+ size_t i, j, written, read;
+
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_init( &buf );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( &buf, size ) == 0 );
+
+ /* Check the sanity of input parameters and initialise local variables. That
+ * is, ensure that the amount of data is not negative and that we are not
+ * expecting more to put or get than we actually asked for. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( put1 >= 0 );
+ put[0] = put1;
+ put_ret[0] = put1_ret;
+ TEST_ASSERT( put1_ret <= put1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( put2 >= 0 );
+ put[1] = put2;
+ put_ret[1] = put2_ret;
+ TEST_ASSERT( put2_ret <= put2 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( get1 >= 0 );
+ get[0] = get1;
+ get_ret[0] = get1_ret;
+ TEST_ASSERT( get1_ret <= get1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( get2 >= 0 );
+ get[1] = get2;
+ get_ret[1] = get2_ret;
+ TEST_ASSERT( get2_ret <= get2 );
+
+ input_len = 0;
+ /* Calculate actual input and output lengths */
+ for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ )
+ {
+ if( put_ret[j] > 0 )
+ {
+ input_len += put_ret[j];
+ }
+ }
+ /* In order to always have a valid pointer we always allocate at least 1
+ * byte. */
+ if( input_len == 0 )
+ input_len = 1;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_len );
+
+ output_len = 0;
+ for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ )
+ {
+ if( get_ret[j] > 0 )
+ {
+ output_len += get_ret[j];
+ }
+ }
+ TEST_ASSERT( output_len <= input_len );
+ /* In order to always have a valid pointer we always allocate at least 1
+ * byte. */
+ if( output_len == 0 )
+ output_len = 1;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_len );
+
+ /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes
+ * can be detected */
+ for( i = 0; i < input_len; i++ )
+ {
+ input[i] = i & 0xFF;
+ }
+
+ written = read = 0;
+ for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( put_ret[j] == mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf,
+ input + written, put[j] ) );
+ written += put_ret[j];
+ TEST_ASSERT( get_ret[j] == mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf,
+ output + read, get[j] ) );
+ read += get_ret[j];
+ TEST_ASSERT( read <= written );
+ if( get_ret[j] > 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output + read - get_ret[j],
+ input + read - get_ret[j], get_ret[j] )
+ == 0 );
+ }
+ }
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_free( input );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_test_buffer_free( &buf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/*
+ * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related I/O functions is
+ * correct and works as expected on unconnected sockets.
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ssl_mock_sanity( )
+{
+ enum { MSGLEN = 105 };
+ unsigned char message[MSGLEN];
+ unsigned char received[MSGLEN];
+ mbedtls_mock_socket socket;
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b( &socket, message, MSGLEN ) < 0 );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( &socket, received, MSGLEN ) < 0 );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket );
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb( &socket, message, MSGLEN ) < 0 );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb( &socket, received, MSGLEN ) < 0 );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket );
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/*
+ * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related functions can
+ * send a single message from the client to the server.
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ssl_mock_tcp( int blocking )
+{
+ enum { MSGLEN = 105 };
+ enum { BUFLEN = MSGLEN / 5 };
+ unsigned char message[MSGLEN];
+ unsigned char received[MSGLEN];
+ mbedtls_mock_socket client;
+ mbedtls_mock_socket server;
+ size_t written, read;
+ int send_ret, recv_ret;
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *send;
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *recv;
+ unsigned i;
+
+ if( blocking == 0 )
+ {
+ send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb;
+ recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b;
+ recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &client );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &server );
+
+ /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes
+ * can be detected */
+ for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ )
+ {
+ message[i] = i & 0xFF;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that sending a message takes a few iterations. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, BUFLEN ) );
+
+ /* Send the message to the server */
+ send_ret = recv_ret = 1;
+ written = read = 0;
+ while( send_ret != 0 || recv_ret != 0 )
+ {
+ send_ret = send( &client, message + written, MSGLEN - written );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( send_ret >= 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( send_ret <= BUFLEN );
+ written += send_ret;
+
+ /* If the buffer is full we can test blocking and non-blocking send */
+ if ( send_ret == BUFLEN )
+ {
+ int blocking_ret = send( &client, message , 1 );
+ if ( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
+ }
+ }
+
+ recv_ret = recv( &server, received + read, MSGLEN - read );
+
+ /* The result depends on whether any data was sent */
+ if ( send_ret > 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret > 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret <= BUFLEN );
+ read += recv_ret;
+ }
+ else if( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
+ recv_ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If the buffer is empty we can test blocking and non-blocking read */
+ if ( recv_ret == BUFLEN )
+ {
+ int blocking_ret = recv( &server, received, 1 );
+ if ( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 );
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &client );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &server );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/*
+ * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related functions can
+ * send messages in both direction at the same time (with the I/O calls
+ * interleaving).
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving( int blocking )
+{
+ enum { ROUNDS = 2 };
+ enum { MSGLEN = 105 };
+ enum { BUFLEN = MSGLEN / 5 };
+ unsigned char message[ROUNDS][MSGLEN];
+ unsigned char received[ROUNDS][MSGLEN];
+ mbedtls_mock_socket client;
+ mbedtls_mock_socket server;
+ size_t written[ROUNDS];
+ size_t read[ROUNDS];
+ int send_ret[ROUNDS];
+ int recv_ret[ROUNDS];
+ unsigned i, j, progress;
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *send;
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *recv;
+
+ if( blocking == 0 )
+ {
+ send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb;
+ recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b;
+ recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &client );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &server );
+
+ /* Fill up the buffers with structured data so that unwanted changes
+ * can be detected */
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ {
+ for( j = 0; j < MSGLEN; j++ )
+ {
+ message[i][j] = ( i * MSGLEN + j ) & 0xFF;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that sending a message takes a few iterations. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, BUFLEN ) );
+
+ /* Send the message from both sides, interleaving. */
+ progress = 1;
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ {
+ written[i] = 0;
+ read[i] = 0;
+ }
+ /* This loop does not stop as long as there was a successful write or read
+ * of at least one byte on either side. */
+ while( progress != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_mock_socket *socket;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ {
+ /* First sending is from the client */
+ socket = ( i % 2 == 0 ) ? ( &client ) : ( &server );
+
+ send_ret[i] = send( socket, message[i] + written[i],
+ MSGLEN - written[i] );
+ TEST_ASSERT( send_ret[i] >= 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( send_ret[i] <= BUFLEN );
+ written[i] += send_ret[i];
+
+ /* If the buffer is full we can test blocking and non-blocking
+ * send */
+ if ( send_ret[i] == BUFLEN )
+ {
+ int blocking_ret = send( socket, message[i] , 1 );
+ if ( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ {
+ /* First receiving is from the server */
+ socket = ( i % 2 == 0 ) ? ( &server ) : ( &client );
+
+ recv_ret[i] = recv( socket, received[i] + read[i],
+ MSGLEN - read[i] );
+
+ /* The result depends on whether any data was sent */
+ if ( send_ret[i] > 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] > 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] <= BUFLEN );
+ read[i] += recv_ret[i];
+ }
+ else if( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
+ recv_ret[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If the buffer is empty we can test blocking and non-blocking
+ * read */
+ if ( recv_ret[i] == BUFLEN )
+ {
+ int blocking_ret = recv( socket, received[i], 1 );
+ if ( blocking )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ progress = 0;
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ {
+ progress += send_ret[i] + recv_ret[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ )
+ TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message[i], received[i], MSGLEN ) == 0 );
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &client );
+ mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &server );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
void ssl_dtls_replay( data_t * prevs, data_t * new, int ret )
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index b6dca23..ff0612b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Check compiletime library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.19.1"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.20.0"
Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.19.1"
+check_runtime_version:"2.20.0"
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0
diff --git a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
index 45ae103..2903363 100644
--- a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
+++ b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\x509_csr.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto_accel_driver.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto_compat.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto_driver_common.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto_entropy_driver.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\crypto\include\psa\crypto_extra.h" />
