Fix bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d097d71..aba50c4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
Bugfix
* ecp_gen_keypair() does more tries to prevent failure because of
statistics
+ * Fix buf in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations
= PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27
Features
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 8ec7aab..f4ff237 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
{
- pad_done |= ( p[i] == 0xFF );
+ pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
index e53967b..a01b217 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function
@@ -160,6 +160,21 @@
TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, result_hex_str ) == 0 );
+ /* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to generate signatures */
+ if( padding_mode == RSA_PKCS_V15 )
+ {
+ memset( output, 0x00, 1000 );
+ memset( output_str, 0x00, 1000 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx,
+ &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, RSA_PRIVATE,
+ hash_len, hash_result, output ) == 0 );
+
+ hexify( output_str, output, ctx.len );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, result_hex_str ) == 0 );
+ }
+
mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
@@ -174,13 +189,15 @@
unsigned char message_str[1000];
unsigned char hash_result[1000];
unsigned char result_str[1000];
+ unsigned char output[1000];
rsa_context ctx;
- size_t hash_len;
+ size_t hash_len, olen;
rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 );
memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( hash_result, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( result_str, 0x00, 1000 );
+ memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
ctx.len = mod / 8;
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 );
@@ -194,6 +211,22 @@
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, POLARSSL_MD_NONE, hash_len, hash_result, result_str ) == correct );
+ /* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to verify signatures */
+ if( padding_mode == RSA_PKCS_V15 )
+ {
+ int ok;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx,
+ NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC,
+ &olen, result_str, output, sizeof( output ) ) == 0 );
+
+ ok = olen == hash_len && memcmp( output, hash_result, olen ) == 0;
+ if( correct == 0 )
+ TEST_ASSERT( ok == 1 );
+ else
+ TEST_ASSERT( ok == 0 );
+ }
+
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
