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/**
* \file x509_crt.h
*
* \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "x509.h"
#include "x509_crl.h"
/**
* \addtogroup x509_module
* \{
*/
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates
* \{
*/
/**
* Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained.
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
{
int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
* by the structure or not. */
mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */
mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */
mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */
mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw;
mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */
mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */
int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */
unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */
unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */
mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */
}
mbedtls_x509_crt;
/**
* From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
* OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
* type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name
{
/**
* The type_id is an OID as deifned in RFC 5280.
* To check the value of the type id, you should use
* \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
*/
mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */
union
{
/**
* From RFC 4108 section 5:
* HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
* hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
*/
struct
{
mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */
}
hardware_module_name;
}
value;
}
mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
/**
* A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name
{
int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
union {
mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
}
san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
}
mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
/**
* Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp)
* Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) )
/**
* Security profile for certificate verification.
*
* All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG().
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
{
uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */
uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for signatures */
uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */
uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */
}
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile;
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2
#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32
#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15
#if !defined( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN )
#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512
#endif
/**
* Container for writing a certificate (CRT)
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert
{
int version;
mbedtls_mpi serial;
mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key;
mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key;
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject;
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions;
}
mbedtls_x509write_cert;
/**
* Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
*/
typedef struct {
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
uint32_t flags;
} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
/**
* Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
*/
#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
/**
* Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain()
*/
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
unsigned len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from
* the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured.
* We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its
* ownership to the caller. */
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations
*/
typedef struct
{
/* for check_signature() */
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk;
/* for find_parent_in() */
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */
mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent;
int fallback_signature_is_good;
/* for find_parent() */
int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */
/* for verify_chain() */
enum {
x509_crt_rs_none,
x509_crt_rs_find_parent,
} in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */
int self_cnt;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security
* and compatibility with current deployments.
*/
extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
/**
* Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments.
* Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for RSA-2048.
*/
extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next;
/**
* NSA Suite B profile.
*/
extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
/**
* \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
* to the end of the provided chained list.
*
* \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
* When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
* to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
* mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
* \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
* \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
*
* \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer
* \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
* after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT
* buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints),
* use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/**
* \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
* to the end of the provided chained list. This is a
* variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes
* temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT
* is destroyed.
*
* \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
* When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
* to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
* mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
* \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded
* certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be
* retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the
* CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed
* through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free().
* \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
*
* \note This call is functionally equivalent to
* mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a
* copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime
* constraints. This is useful in constrained environments
* where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/**
* \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded
* certificates and add them to the chained list.
*
* For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively:
* if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function
* returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed
* (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully).
* If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns
* the first (negative) error encountered during parsing.
*
* PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data
* such as human readable descriptions of their content, as
* long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific
* '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters.
*
* \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates.
* \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format.
* For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation
* of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must
* comprise exactly one certificate.
* \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte
* in case of PEM encoded data.
*
* \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully.
* \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't
* be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above).
* \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise.
*
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
/**
* \brief Load one or more certificates and add them
* to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
* certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
* of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
* correctly, the first error is returned.
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param path filename to read the certificates from
*
* \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
* if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path );
/**
* \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them
* to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
* certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
* of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
* correctly, the first error is returned.
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from
*
* \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
* if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
/**
* \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
* extension.
*
* \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
* alternative name.
* \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
* of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
*
* \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name
* as defined in RFC 4180 is supported.
*
* \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
* subject alternative name. For example, after successful
* certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
* \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
* this function.
*
* \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
* parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
* lifetime of the certificate.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
* SAN type.
* \return Another negative value for any other failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san );
/**
* \brief Returns an informational string about the
* certificate.
*
* \param buf Buffer to write to
* \param size Maximum size of buffer
* \param prefix A line prefix
* \param crt The X509 certificate to represent
*
* \return The length of the string written (not including the
* terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
/**
* \brief Returns an informational string about the
* verification status of a certificate.
*
* \param buf Buffer to write to
* \param size Maximum size of buffer
* \param prefix A line prefix
* \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()
*
* \return The length of the string written (not including the
* terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
uint32_t flags );
/**
* \brief Verify a chain of certificates.
*
* The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that
* can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set,
* the verification callback is called for each
* certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the
* presented crt). The parameters for the callback are:
* (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth,
* int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for
* that specific certificate and the certificate depth from
* the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0).
*
* All flags left after returning from the callback
* are also returned to the application. The function should
* return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates)
* other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code
* immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal
* errors, a specific error code should be used (different
* from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not
* be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
* can be used if no better code is available.
*
* \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed
* using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info()
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the
* default security profile.
*
* \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for
* all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was
* used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped
* silently, that is *without* setting any flag.
*
* \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates:
* (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates
* chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2)
* self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for
* specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed
* certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set.
*
* \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
* \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
* \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
* \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
* CN need not be verified.
* \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
* If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
* set to (uint32_t) -1.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
* of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
* \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
*
* \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
* passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
* certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
* \c *flags will have one or more
* \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
* flags set.
* \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
* encountered during the verification process.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy );
/**
* \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to
* a configurable security profile.
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit
* security profile.
*
* \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves
* for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root,
* intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate.
*
* \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
* \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
* \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
* \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
* \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
* CN need not be verified.
* \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
* If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
* set to (uint32_t) -1.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
* of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
* \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
*
* \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
* passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
* certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
* \c *flags will have one or more
* \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
* flags set.
* \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
* encountered during the verification process.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy );
/**
* \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
*
* \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
* but can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
* \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
* \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
* \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
* \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
* CN need not be verified.
* \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
* If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
* set to (uint32_t) -1.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
* of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
* \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL
* to disable restartable ECC.
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks.
*
* Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT
* verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()
* when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate.
*
* On success, the callback returns a list of trusted
* certificates to be considered as potential signers
* for the input certificate.
*
* \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
* \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer.
* This will point to a readable certificate.
* \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first
* entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers.
* This will not be \c NULL.
*
* \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a
* fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential
* signer completes without a single candidate, the
* callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas
* to \c NULL.
*
* \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points
* to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of
* ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed
* to the caller.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx,
mbedtls_x509_crt const *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/**
* \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which
* uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA
* certificates.
*
* \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
* \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers
* of a given child certificate. See the documentation of
* ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information.
* \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb.
* \param profile The security profile for the verification.
* \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
* CN need not be verified.
* \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
* If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
* set to (uint32_t) -1.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
* of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
* \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
void *p_ca_cb,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
/**
* \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension.
*
* \param crt Leaf certificate used.
* \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
* before using the certificate to perform an RSA key
* exchange).
*
* \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the
* usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the
* certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means
* that bit MAY be set.
*
* \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension
* is present but does not match the usage argument.
*
* \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on
* (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically
* checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
unsigned int usage );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
/**
* \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage.
*
* \param crt Leaf certificate used.
* \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or
* MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH).
* \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()).
*
* \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not.
*
* \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
const char *usage_oid,
size_t usage_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Verify the certificate revocation status
*
* \param crt a certificate to be verified
* \param crl the CRL to verify against
*
* \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise
*
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
/**
* \brief Initialize a certificate (chain)
*
* \param crt Certificate chain to initialize
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
/**
* \brief Unallocate all certificate data
*
* \param crt Certificate chain to free
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/* \} name */
/* \} addtogroup x509_module */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C)
/**
* \brief Initialize a CRT writing context
*
* \param ctx CRT context to initialize
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
/**
* \brief Set the verion for a Certificate
* Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or
* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3)
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version );
/**
* \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param serial serial number to set
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial );
/**
* \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate
* Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone
* i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss"
* e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013
* at 23:59:59
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param not_before not_before timestamp
* \param not_after not_after timestamp
*
* \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or
* a specific error code
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before,
const char *not_after );
/**
* \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate
* Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list
* of OID types and values:
* e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS CA"
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param issuer_name issuer name to set
*
* \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or
* a specific error code
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const char *issuer_name );
/**
* \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate
* Subject names should contain a comma-separated list
* of OID types and values:
* e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1"
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param subject_name subject name to set
*
* \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or
* a specific error code
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const char *subject_name );
/**
* \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param key public key to include
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key );
/**
* \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param key private key to sign with
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key );
/**
* \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature
* (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param md_alg MD algorithm to use
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
/**
* \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the
* CRT
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param oid OID of the extension
* \param oid_len length of the OID
* \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition)
* \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING
* \param val_len length of the value data
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
int critical,
const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len );
/**
* \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param is_ca is this a CA certificate
* \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this
* certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is
* inlimited)
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
int is_ca, int max_pathlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
/**
* \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
* Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been
* called before
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
/**
* \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
* Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been
* called before
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
/**
* \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags
* (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param key_usage key usage flags to set
*
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
unsigned int key_usage );
/**
* \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags
* (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL)
*
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set
*
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
unsigned char ns_cert_type );
/**
* \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context
*
* \param ctx CRT context to free
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx );
/**
* \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure
* Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
* return value to determine where you should start
* using the buffer
*
* \param ctx certificate to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
* \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
* error code
*
* \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
* signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
* for countermeasures against timing attacks).
* ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
/**
* \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string
*
* \param ctx certificate to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
* \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
*
* \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
* signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
* for countermeasures against timing attacks).
* ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */