Supply Chain Security (SLSA)

OpenPRoT release firmware is built with signed SLSA build provenance. This page describes what is attested, how to verify it, and what is not yet covered.

Current level

SLSA Build Level 2 for the release artifacts built by .github/workflows/release.yml:

  • The build runs on a GitHub-hosted runner, not on the self-hosted CI runner.
  • Provenance is generated by actions/attest-build-provenance and signed with a short-lived Sigstore certificate bound to the workflow identity. The build steps cannot forge the signing identity, but they run in the same job as the attestation step, so this is not Build L3.
  • The build uses bazel build --config=release, which sets --lockfile_mode=error: a stale MODULE.bazel.lock fails the build rather than re-resolving dependencies. Build caches are disabled. A lockfile freshness check also runs in ./pw presubmit, and therefore on every pull request: it regenerates the lockfile and fails if the result differs from the committed file, so drift is caught before release time.
  • The GitHub release is created only after gh attestation verify passes for every artifact, so a failed verification never leaves a published release.

What is attested

Each release publishes, together with its provenance:

  • the firmware images produced by the release targets, and
  • SHA256SUMS.txt listing the digest of each image.

The default release target is the AST10x0 eRoT image, //target/ast10x0/erot:erot, built for the //target/ast10x0 platform. The workflow accepts other targets and platforms through workflow_dispatch inputs. Earlgrey and VeeR have no production images yet, only test images.

Verifying a release artifact

Install the GitHub CLI and run:

gh attestation verify <artifact> \
    --repo OpenPRoT/openprot \
    --signer-workflow OpenPRoT/openprot/.github/workflows/release.yml

A successful run proves the artifact's digest matches an attestation signed by the release workflow of this repository. The attestation records the source commit and the workflow run that produced the artifact. Check the digest of the file you flash against SHA256SUMS.txt as well.

Workflow hardening

All workflows follow these rules:

  • Third-party actions are pinned to a full commit SHA, with the version in a trailing comment. Dependabot's github-actions ecosystem keeps them current.
  • Workflows declare least-privilege permissions:. Only the release job gets id-token: write and attestations: write.

Known gaps

  • Not Build L3. Moving the build into a reusable workflow, so the signing identity is isolated from the build steps, is the path to L3.
  • Hermeticity. Several repository rules are not fully hermetic: target/earlgrey/tooling/signing/nonhermetic.bzl reads $HOME, the pip configuration passes --trusted-host, and some git_override dependencies are pinned by commit rather than by content hash. The default release target does not use the Earlgrey signing rules, but this has not been verified to be reproducible bit-for-bit.
  • Image signing. Provenance covers the build, not the Earlgrey ECDSA or SPHINCS+ image signing step, which needs HSM credentials.
  • Source track. Branch protection, required reviews and CODEOWNERS are not covered here. No SBOM is generated yet.