| # Supply Chain Security (SLSA) | |
| OpenPRoT release firmware is built with signed | |
| [SLSA](https://slsa.dev) build provenance. This page describes what is | |
| attested, how to verify it, and what is not yet covered. | |
| ## Current level | |
| **SLSA Build Level 2** for the release artifacts built by | |
| `.github/workflows/release.yml`: | |
| - The build runs on a GitHub-hosted runner, not on the self-hosted CI runner. | |
| - Provenance is generated by `actions/attest-build-provenance` and signed with | |
| a short-lived Sigstore certificate bound to the workflow identity. The build | |
| steps cannot forge the signing identity, but they run in the same job as the | |
| attestation step, so this is not Build L3. | |
| - The build uses `bazel build --config=release`, which sets | |
| `--lockfile_mode=error`: a stale `MODULE.bazel.lock` fails the build rather | |
| than re-resolving dependencies. Build caches are disabled. A | |
| lockfile freshness check also runs in `./pw presubmit`, and therefore on | |
| every pull request: it regenerates the lockfile and fails if the result | |
| differs from the committed file, so drift is caught before release time. | |
| - The GitHub release is created only after `gh attestation verify` passes for | |
| every artifact, so a failed verification never leaves a published release. | |
| ## What is attested | |
| Each release publishes, together with its provenance: | |
| - the firmware images produced by the release targets, and | |
| - `SHA256SUMS.txt` listing the digest of each image. | |
| The default release target is the AST10x0 eRoT image, | |
| `//target/ast10x0/erot:erot`, built for the `//target/ast10x0` platform. The | |
| workflow accepts other targets and platforms through `workflow_dispatch` | |
| inputs. Earlgrey and VeeR have no production images yet, only test images. | |
| ## Verifying a release artifact | |
| Install the [GitHub CLI](https://cli.github.com/) and run: | |
| ```bash | |
| gh attestation verify <artifact> \ | |
| --repo OpenPRoT/openprot \ | |
| --signer-workflow OpenPRoT/openprot/.github/workflows/release.yml | |
| ``` | |
| A successful run proves the artifact's digest matches an attestation signed by | |
| the release workflow of this repository. The attestation records the source | |
| commit and the workflow run that produced the artifact. Check the digest of | |
| the file you flash against `SHA256SUMS.txt` as well. | |
| ## Workflow hardening | |
| All workflows follow these rules: | |
| - Third-party actions are pinned to a full commit SHA, with the version in a | |
| trailing comment. Dependabot's `github-actions` ecosystem keeps them current. | |
| - Workflows declare least-privilege `permissions:`. Only the release job gets | |
| `id-token: write` and `attestations: write`. | |
| ## Known gaps | |
| - **Not Build L3.** Moving the build into a reusable workflow, so the signing | |
| identity is isolated from the build steps, is the path to L3. | |
| - **Hermeticity.** The release workflow checks that the release target does | |
| not reach the non-hermetic repos (`@nonhermetic` in | |
| `target/earlgrey/tooling/signing/nonhermetic.bzl`, which reads `$HOME`, the | |
| pip repo, the locally built QEMU, or the HSM and Caliptra repos), and builds | |
| with `--incompatible_strict_action_env`. Remaining gaps in the release | |
| closure: | |
| - Toolchains (Rust, clang) are fetched from CIPD by tag, not by content | |
| hash. | |
| - `pigweed` and the `ast1060_pac` crate are fetched from git by commit. | |
| The `ast1060_pac` commit is not recorded in `MODULE.bazel.lock`. | |
| - Some crates in `third_party/crates_io/Cargo.toml` use floating git refs | |
| (pinned only by `Cargo.lock`). | |
| - Bazel itself is downloaded by Bazelisk without a hash check. | |
| - **Reproducibility.** In testing, the AST10x0 eRoT build reproduced | |
| bit-for-bit (`erot.bin` and `erot.elf`) across two checkouts at different | |
| paths and against the published release artifacts. That is one commit, one | |
| platform and one runner image, so it is not a guarantee. | |
| `.github/workflows/reproducibility.yml` re-checks it weekly and on release | |
| tags: it builds the release target twice in checkouts at different paths | |
| and compares the outputs. `.bin` images must be identical; differences in | |
| other outputs (such as the `.elf`, which carries debug info) are reported as | |
| warnings. On a difference it uploads a diffoscope report and runs a | |
| same-path rebuild to tell path dependence from non-determinism. | |
| - **Image signing.** Provenance covers the build, not the Earlgrey ECDSA or | |
| SPHINCS+ image signing step, which needs HSM credentials. | |
| - **Source track.** Branch protection, required reviews and `CODEOWNERS` are | |
| not covered here. No SBOM is generated yet. |