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/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2020-2022 Project CHIP Authors
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2017 Nest Labs, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/**
* @file
* This file implements objects for modeling and working with
* CHIP certificates.
*
*/
#ifndef __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#include <credentials/CHIPCert.h>
#include <credentials/CHIPCertificateSet.h>
#include <lib/asn1/ASN1.h>
#include <lib/asn1/ASN1Macros.h>
#include <lib/core/CHIPCore.h>
#include <lib/core/CHIPSafeCasts.h>
#include <lib/core/TLV.h>
#include <lib/support/BytesToHex.h>
#include <lib/support/CHIPMem.h>
#include <lib/support/CodeUtils.h>
#include <lib/support/SafeInt.h>
#include <lib/support/ScopedBuffer.h>
#include <lib/support/TimeUtils.h>
#include <protocols/Protocols.h>
#if CHIP_CRYPTO_HSM
#include <crypto/hsm/CHIPCryptoPALHsm.h>
#endif
namespace chip {
namespace Credentials {
using namespace chip::ASN1;
using namespace chip::TLV;
using namespace chip::Protocols;
using namespace chip::Crypto;
extern CHIP_ERROR DecodeConvertTBSCert(TLVReader & reader, ASN1Writer & writer, ChipCertificateData & certData);
extern CHIP_ERROR DecodeECDSASignature(TLVReader & reader, ChipCertificateData & certData);
ChipCertificateSet::ChipCertificateSet()
{
mCerts = nullptr;
mCertCount = 0;
mMaxCerts = 0;
mMemoryAllocInternal = false;
}
ChipCertificateSet::~ChipCertificateSet()
{
Release();
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::Init(uint8_t maxCertsArraySize)
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
VerifyOrExit(maxCertsArraySize > 0, err = CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
mCerts = reinterpret_cast<ChipCertificateData *>(chip::Platform::MemoryAlloc(sizeof(ChipCertificateData) * maxCertsArraySize));
VerifyOrExit(mCerts != nullptr, err = CHIP_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
mMaxCerts = maxCertsArraySize;
mMemoryAllocInternal = true;
Clear();
exit:
if (err != CHIP_NO_ERROR)
{
Release();
}
return err;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::Init(ChipCertificateData * certsArray, uint8_t certsArraySize)
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
VerifyOrExit(certsArray != nullptr, err = CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
VerifyOrExit(certsArraySize > 0, err = CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
mCerts = certsArray;
mMaxCerts = certsArraySize;
mMemoryAllocInternal = false;
Clear();
exit:
return err;
}
void ChipCertificateSet::Release()
{
if (mMemoryAllocInternal)
{
if (mCerts != nullptr)
{
Clear();
chip::Platform::MemoryFree(mCerts);
mCerts = nullptr;
}
}
}
void ChipCertificateSet::Clear()
{
for (int i = 0; i < mMaxCerts; i++)
{
mCerts[i].Clear();
}
mCertCount = 0;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::LoadCert(const ByteSpan chipCert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags> decodeFlags)
{
TLVReader reader;
reader.Init(chipCert);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.Next(kTLVType_Structure, AnonymousTag()));
return LoadCert(reader, decodeFlags, chipCert);
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::LoadCert(TLVReader & reader, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags> decodeFlags, ByteSpan chipCert)
{
ASN1Writer writer; // ASN1Writer is used to encode TBS portion of the certificate for the purpose of signature
// validation, which should be performed on the TBS data encoded in ASN.1 DER form.
ChipCertificateData cert;
cert.Clear();
// Must be positioned on the structure element representing the certificate.
VerifyOrReturnError(reader.GetType() == kTLVType_Structure, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
cert.mCertificate = chipCert;
{
TLVType containerType;
// Enter the certificate structure...
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.EnterContainer(containerType));
// If requested to generate the TBSHash.
if (decodeFlags.Has(CertDecodeFlags::kGenerateTBSHash))
{
chip::Platform::ScopedMemoryBuffer<uint8_t> asn1TBSBuf;
ReturnErrorCodeIf(!asn1TBSBuf.Alloc(kMaxCHIPCertDecodeBufLength), CHIP_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
// Initialize an ASN1Writer and convert the TBS (to-be-signed) portion of the certificate to ASN.1 DER
// encoding. At the same time, parse various components within the certificate and set the corresponding
// fields in the CertificateData object.
writer.Init(asn1TBSBuf.Get(), kMaxCHIPCertDecodeBufLength);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(DecodeConvertTBSCert(reader, writer, cert));
// Generate a SHA hash of the encoded TBS certificate.
chip::Crypto::Hash_SHA256(asn1TBSBuf.Get(), writer.GetLengthWritten(), cert.mTBSHash);
cert.mCertFlags.Set(CertFlags::kTBSHashPresent);
}
else
{
// Initialize an ASN1Writer as a NullWriter.
writer.InitNullWriter();
ReturnErrorOnFailure(DecodeConvertTBSCert(reader, writer, cert));
}
// Verify the cert has both the Subject Key Id and Authority Key Id extensions present.
// Only certs with both these extensions are supported for the purposes of certificate validation.
VerifyOrReturnError(cert.mCertFlags.HasAll(CertFlags::kExtPresent_SubjectKeyId, CertFlags::kExtPresent_AuthKeyId),
CHIP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_FORMAT);
// Verify the cert was signed with ECDSA-SHA256. This is the only signature algorithm currently supported.
VerifyOrReturnError(cert.mSigAlgoOID == kOID_SigAlgo_ECDSAWithSHA256, CHIP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
// Decode the certificate's signature...
ReturnErrorOnFailure(DecodeECDSASignature(reader, cert));
// Verify no more elements in the certificate.
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.VerifyEndOfContainer());
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.ExitContainer(containerType));
}
// If requested by the caller, mark the certificate as trusted.
if (decodeFlags.Has(CertDecodeFlags::kIsTrustAnchor))
{
cert.mCertFlags.Set(CertFlags::kIsTrustAnchor);
}
// Check if this cert matches any currently loaded certificates
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mCertCount; i++)
{
if (cert.IsEqual(mCerts[i]))
{
// This cert is already loaded. Let's skip adding this cert.
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
}
// Verify we have room for the new certificate.
VerifyOrReturnError(mCertCount < mMaxCerts, CHIP_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
new (&mCerts[mCertCount]) ChipCertificateData(cert);
mCertCount++;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::ReleaseLastCert()
{
ChipCertificateData * lastCert = (mCertCount > 0) ? &mCerts[mCertCount - 1] : nullptr;
VerifyOrReturnError(lastCert != nullptr, CHIP_ERROR_INTERNAL);
lastCert->~ChipCertificateData();
--mCertCount;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
const ChipCertificateData * ChipCertificateSet::FindCert(const CertificateKeyId & subjectKeyId) const
{
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < mCertCount; i++)
{
ChipCertificateData & cert = mCerts[i];
if (cert.mSubjectKeyId.data_equal(subjectKeyId))
{
return &cert;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
bool ChipCertificateSet::IsCertInTheSet(const ChipCertificateData * cert) const
{
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < mCertCount; i++)
{
if (cert == &mCerts[i])
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::ValidateCert(const ChipCertificateData * cert, ValidationContext & context)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsCertInTheSet(cert), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
context.mTrustAnchor = nullptr;
return ValidateCert(cert, context, 0);
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::FindValidCert(const ChipDN & subjectDN, const CertificateKeyId & subjectKeyId,
ValidationContext & context, const ChipCertificateData ** certData)
{
context.mTrustAnchor = nullptr;
return FindValidCert(subjectDN, subjectKeyId, context, 0, certData);
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::VerifySignature(const ChipCertificateData * cert, const ChipCertificateData * caCert)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_HSM_ECDSA_VERIFY
P256PublicKeyHSM caPublicKey;
#else
P256PublicKey caPublicKey;
#endif
P256ECDSASignature signature;
VerifyOrReturnError((cert != nullptr) && (caCert != nullptr), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(signature.SetLength(cert->mSignature.size()));
memcpy(signature.Bytes(), cert->mSignature.data(), cert->mSignature.size());
memcpy(caPublicKey, caCert->mPublicKey.data(), caCert->mPublicKey.size());
ReturnErrorOnFailure(caPublicKey.ECDSA_validate_hash_signature(cert->mTBSHash, chip::Crypto::kSHA256_Hash_Length, signature));
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::ValidateCert(const ChipCertificateData * cert, ValidationContext & context, uint8_t depth)
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
const ChipCertificateData * caCert = nullptr;
uint8_t certType;
err = cert->mSubjectDN.GetCertType(certType);
SuccessOrExit(err);
// Certificate with future-extension marked as "critical" is not allowed.
VerifyOrExit(!cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kExtPresent_FutureIsCritical), err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
// If the depth is greater than 0 then the certificate is required to be a CA certificate...
if (depth > 0)
{
// Verify the isCA flag is present.
VerifyOrExit(cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kIsCA), err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
// Verify the key usage extension is present and contains the 'keyCertSign' flag.
VerifyOrExit(cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kExtPresent_KeyUsage) && cert->mKeyUsageFlags.Has(KeyUsageFlags::kKeyCertSign),
err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
// Verify that the certificate type is set to Root or ICA.
VerifyOrExit(certType == kCertType_ICA || certType == kCertType_Root, err = CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_TYPE);
// If a path length constraint was included, verify the cert depth vs. the specified constraint.
//
// From the RFC, the path length constraint "gives the maximum number of non-self-issued
// intermediate certificates that may follow this certificate in a valid certification path.
// (Note: The last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate certificate,
// and is not included in this limit...)"
//
if (cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kPathLenConstraintPresent))
{
VerifyOrExit((depth - 1) <= cert->mPathLenConstraint, err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_EXCEEDED);
}
}
// Otherwise verify the desired certificate usages/purposes/type given in the validation context...
else
{
// If a set of desired key usages has been specified, verify that the key usage extension exists
// in the certificate and that the corresponding usages are supported.
if (context.mRequiredKeyUsages.HasAny())
{
VerifyOrExit(cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kExtPresent_KeyUsage) &&
cert->mKeyUsageFlags.HasAll(context.mRequiredKeyUsages),
err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
// If a set of desired key purposes has been specified, verify that the extended key usage extension
// exists in the certificate and that the corresponding purposes are supported.
if (context.mRequiredKeyPurposes.HasAny())
{
VerifyOrExit(cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kExtPresent_ExtendedKeyUsage) &&
cert->mKeyPurposeFlags.HasAll(context.mRequiredKeyPurposes),
err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
// If a required certificate type has been specified, verify it against the current certificate's type.
if (context.mRequiredCertType != kCertType_NotSpecified)
{
VerifyOrExit(certType == context.mRequiredCertType, err = CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_TYPE);
}
}
// Verify NotBefore and NotAfter validity of the certificates.
//
// See also ASN1ToChipEpochTime().
//
// X.509/RFC5280 defines the special time 99991231235959Z to mean 'no
// well-defined expiration date'. In CHIP TLV-encoded certificates, this
// special value is represented as a CHIP Epoch time value of 0 sec
// (2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC).
CertificateValidityResult validityResult;
if (context.mEffectiveTime.Is<CurrentChipEpochTime>())
{
if (context.mEffectiveTime.Get<CurrentChipEpochTime>().count() < cert->mNotBeforeTime)
{
ChipLogDetail(SecureChannel, "Certificate's mNotBeforeTime (%" PRIu32 ") is after current time (%" PRIu32 ")",
cert->mNotBeforeTime, context.mEffectiveTime.Get<CurrentChipEpochTime>().count());
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kNotYetValid;
}
else if (cert->mNotAfterTime != kNullCertTime &&
context.mEffectiveTime.Get<CurrentChipEpochTime>().count() > cert->mNotAfterTime)
{
ChipLogDetail(SecureChannel, "Certificate's mNotAfterTime (%" PRIu32 ") is before current time (%" PRIu32 ")",
cert->mNotAfterTime, context.mEffectiveTime.Get<CurrentChipEpochTime>().count());
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kExpired;
}
else
{
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kValid;
}
}
else if (context.mEffectiveTime.Is<LastKnownGoodChipEpochTime>())
{
// Last Known Good Time may not be moved forward except at the time of
// commissioning or firmware update, so we can't use it to validate
// NotBefore. However, so long as firmware build times are properly
// recorded and certificates loaded during commissioning are in fact
// valid at the time of commissioning, observing a NotAfter that falls
// before Last Known Good Time is a reliable indicator that the
// certificate in question is expired. Check for this.
if (cert->mNotAfterTime != 0 && context.mEffectiveTime.Get<LastKnownGoodChipEpochTime>().count() > cert->mNotAfterTime)
{
ChipLogDetail(SecureChannel, "Certificate's mNotAfterTime (%" PRIu32 ") is before last known good time (%" PRIu32 ")",
cert->mNotAfterTime, context.mEffectiveTime.Get<LastKnownGoodChipEpochTime>().count());
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kExpiredAtLastKnownGoodTime;
}
else
{
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kNotExpiredAtLastKnownGoodTime;
}
}
else
{
validityResult = CertificateValidityResult::kTimeUnknown;
}
if (context.mValidityPolicy != nullptr)
{
SuccessOrExit(err = context.mValidityPolicy->ApplyCertificateValidityPolicy(cert, depth, validityResult));
}
else
{
switch (validityResult)
{
case CertificateValidityResult::kValid:
case CertificateValidityResult::kNotExpiredAtLastKnownGoodTime:
// By default, we do not enforce certificate validity based upon a Last
// Known Good Time source. However, implementations may always inject a
// policy that does enforce based upon this.
case CertificateValidityResult::kExpiredAtLastKnownGoodTime:
case CertificateValidityResult::kTimeUnknown:
break;
case CertificateValidityResult::kNotYetValid:
ExitNow(err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET);
break;
case CertificateValidityResult::kExpired:
ExitNow(err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_EXPIRED);
break;
default:
ExitNow(err = CHIP_ERROR_INTERNAL);
break;
}
}
// If the certificate itself is trusted, then it is implicitly valid. Record this certificate as the trust
// anchor and return success.
if (cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kIsTrustAnchor))
{
context.mTrustAnchor = cert;
ExitNow(err = CHIP_NO_ERROR);
}
// Otherwise we must validate the certificate by looking for a chain of valid certificates up to a trusted
// certificate known as the 'trust anchor'.
// Fail validation if the certificate is self-signed. Since we don't trust this certificate (see the check above) and
// it has no path we can follow to a trust anchor, it can't be considered valid.
if (cert->mIssuerDN.IsEqual(cert->mSubjectDN) && cert->mAuthKeyId.data_equal(cert->mSubjectKeyId))
{
ExitNow(err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_NOT_TRUSTED);
}
// Verify that the certificate depth is less than the total number of certificates. It is technically possible to create
// a circular chain of certificates. Limiting the maximum depth of the certificate path prevents infinite
// recursion in such a case.
VerifyOrExit(depth < mCertCount, err = CHIP_ERROR_CERT_PATH_TOO_LONG);
// Verify that a hash of the 'to-be-signed' portion of the certificate has been computed. We will need this to
// verify the cert's signature below.
VerifyOrExit(cert->mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kTBSHashPresent), err = CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
// Search for a valid CA certificate that matches the Issuer DN and Authority Key Id of the current certificate.
// Fail if no acceptable certificate is found.
err = FindValidCert(cert->mIssuerDN, cert->mAuthKeyId, context, static_cast<uint8_t>(depth + 1), &caCert);
if (err != CHIP_NO_ERROR)
{
ExitNow(err = CHIP_ERROR_CA_CERT_NOT_FOUND);
}
// Verify signature of the current certificate against public key of the CA certificate. If signature verification
// succeeds, the current certificate is valid.
err = VerifySignature(cert, caCert);
SuccessOrExit(err);
exit:
return err;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipCertificateSet::FindValidCert(const ChipDN & subjectDN, const CertificateKeyId & subjectKeyId,
ValidationContext & context, uint8_t depth, const ChipCertificateData ** certData)
{
CHIP_ERROR err;
*certData = nullptr;
// Default error if we don't find any matching cert.
err = (depth > 0) ? CHIP_ERROR_CA_CERT_NOT_FOUND : CHIP_ERROR_CERT_NOT_FOUND;
// Fail immediately if neither of the input criteria are specified.
if (subjectDN.IsEmpty() && subjectKeyId.empty())
{
ExitNow();
}
// For each cert in the set...
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < mCertCount; i++)
{
ChipCertificateData * candidateCert = &mCerts[i];
// Skip the certificate if its subject DN and key id do not match the input criteria.
if (!subjectDN.IsEmpty() && !candidateCert->mSubjectDN.IsEqual(subjectDN))
{
continue;
}
if (!subjectKeyId.empty() && !candidateCert->mSubjectKeyId.data_equal(subjectKeyId))
{
continue;
}
// Attempt to validate the cert. If the cert is valid, return it to the caller. Otherwise,
// save the returned error and continue searching. If there are no other matching certs this
// will be the error returned to the caller.
err = ValidateCert(candidateCert, context, depth);
if (err == CHIP_NO_ERROR)
{
*certData = candidateCert;
ExitNow();
}
}
exit:
return err;
}
ChipCertificateData::ChipCertificateData() {}
ChipCertificateData::~ChipCertificateData() {}
void ChipCertificateData::Clear()
{
mSubjectDN.Clear();
mIssuerDN.Clear();
mSubjectKeyId = CertificateKeyId();
mAuthKeyId = CertificateKeyId();
mNotBeforeTime = 0;
mNotAfterTime = 0;
mPublicKey = P256PublicKeySpan();
mPubKeyCurveOID = 0;
mPubKeyAlgoOID = 0;
mSigAlgoOID = 0;
mPathLenConstraint = 0;
mCertFlags.ClearAll();
mKeyUsageFlags.ClearAll();
mKeyPurposeFlags.ClearAll();
mSignature = P256ECDSASignatureSpan();
memset(mTBSHash, 0, sizeof(mTBSHash));
}
bool ChipCertificateData::IsEqual(const ChipCertificateData & other) const
{
// TODO - Add an operator== on BitFlags class.
return mSubjectDN.IsEqual(other.mSubjectDN) && mIssuerDN.IsEqual(other.mIssuerDN) &&
mSubjectKeyId.data_equal(other.mSubjectKeyId) && mAuthKeyId.data_equal(other.mAuthKeyId) &&
(mNotBeforeTime == other.mNotBeforeTime) && (mNotAfterTime == other.mNotAfterTime) &&
mPublicKey.data_equal(other.mPublicKey) && (mPubKeyCurveOID == other.mPubKeyCurveOID) &&
(mPubKeyAlgoOID == other.mPubKeyAlgoOID) && (mSigAlgoOID == other.mSigAlgoOID) &&
(mCertFlags.Raw() == other.mCertFlags.Raw()) && (mKeyUsageFlags.Raw() == other.mKeyUsageFlags.Raw()) &&
(mKeyPurposeFlags.Raw() == other.mKeyPurposeFlags.Raw()) && (mPathLenConstraint == other.mPathLenConstraint) &&
mSignature.data_equal(other.mSignature) && (memcmp(mTBSHash, other.mTBSHash, sizeof(mTBSHash)) == 0);
}
void ValidationContext::Reset()
{
mEffectiveTime = EffectiveTime{};
mTrustAnchor = nullptr;
mValidityPolicy = nullptr;
mRequiredKeyUsages.ClearAll();
mRequiredKeyPurposes.ClearAll();
mRequiredCertType = kCertType_NotSpecified;
}
bool ChipRDN::IsEqual(const ChipRDN & other) const
{
if (mAttrOID == kOID_Unknown || mAttrOID == kOID_NotSpecified || mAttrOID != other.mAttrOID ||
mAttrIsPrintableString != other.mAttrIsPrintableString)
{
return false;
}
if (IsChipDNAttr(mAttrOID))
{
return mChipVal == other.mChipVal;
}
return mString.data_equal(other.mString);
}
ChipDN::ChipDN()
{
Clear();
}
ChipDN::~ChipDN() {}
void ChipDN::Clear()
{
for (auto & dn : rdn)
{
dn.Clear();
}
}
uint8_t ChipDN::RDNCount() const
{
uint8_t count;
for (count = 0; count < CHIP_CONFIG_CERT_MAX_RDN_ATTRIBUTES; count++)
{
if (rdn[count].IsEmpty())
{
break;
}
}
return count;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::AddAttribute(chip::ASN1::OID oid, uint64_t val)
{
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
VerifyOrReturnError(rdnCount < CHIP_CONFIG_CERT_MAX_RDN_ATTRIBUTES, CHIP_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsChipDNAttr(oid), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
if (IsChip32bitDNAttr(oid))
{
VerifyOrReturnError(CanCastTo<uint32_t>(val), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
rdn[rdnCount].mAttrOID = oid;
rdn[rdnCount].mChipVal = val;
rdn[rdnCount].mAttrIsPrintableString = false;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::AddCATs(const chip::CATValues & cats)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(cats.AreValid(), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
for (auto & cat : cats.values)
{
if (cat != kUndefinedCAT)
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute_MatterCASEAuthTag(cat));
}
}
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::AddAttribute(chip::ASN1::OID oid, CharSpan val, bool isPrintableString)
{
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
VerifyOrReturnError(rdnCount < CHIP_CONFIG_CERT_MAX_RDN_ATTRIBUTES, CHIP_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
VerifyOrReturnError(!IsChipDNAttr(oid), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
VerifyOrReturnError(oid != kOID_NotSpecified, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
rdn[rdnCount].mAttrOID = oid;
rdn[rdnCount].mString = val;
rdn[rdnCount].mAttrIsPrintableString = isPrintableString;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::GetCertType(uint8_t & certType) const
{
uint8_t lCertType = kCertType_NotSpecified;
bool fabricIdPresent = false;
bool catsPresent = false;
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
certType = kCertType_NotSpecified;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterRCACId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(lCertType == kCertType_NotSpecified, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
lCertType = kCertType_Root;
}
else if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterICACId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(lCertType == kCertType_NotSpecified, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
lCertType = kCertType_ICA;
}
else if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterNodeId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(lCertType == kCertType_NotSpecified, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsOperationalNodeId(rdn[i].mChipVal), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_NODE_ID);
lCertType = kCertType_Node;
}
else if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterFirmwareSigningId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(lCertType == kCertType_NotSpecified, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
lCertType = kCertType_FirmwareSigning;
}
else if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId)
{
// Only one fabricId attribute is allowed per DN.
VerifyOrReturnError(!fabricIdPresent, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidFabricId(rdn[i].mChipVal), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
fabricIdPresent = true;
}
else if (rdn[i].mAttrOID == kOID_AttributeType_MatterCASEAuthTag)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(CanCastTo<CASEAuthTag>(rdn[i].mChipVal), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidCASEAuthTag(static_cast<CASEAuthTag>(rdn[i].mChipVal)), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
catsPresent = true;
}
}
if (lCertType == kCertType_Node)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(fabricIdPresent, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
}
else
{
VerifyOrReturnError(!catsPresent, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
}
certType = lCertType;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::GetCertChipId(uint64_t & chipId) const
{
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
chipId = 0;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
switch (rdn[i].mAttrOID)
{
case kOID_AttributeType_MatterRCACId:
case kOID_AttributeType_MatterICACId:
case kOID_AttributeType_MatterNodeId:
case kOID_AttributeType_MatterFirmwareSigningId:
VerifyOrReturnError(chipId == 0, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
chipId = rdn[i].mChipVal;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::GetCertFabricId(uint64_t & fabricId) const
{
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
fabricId = kUndefinedFabricId;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
switch (rdn[i].mAttrOID)
{
case kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId:
// Ensure only one FabricID RDN present, since start value is kUndefinedFabricId, which is reserved and never seen.
VerifyOrReturnError(fabricId == kUndefinedFabricId, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidFabricId(rdn[i].mChipVal), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
fabricId = rdn[i].mChipVal;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidFabricId(fabricId), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::EncodeToTLV(TLVWriter & writer, Tag tag) const
{
TLVType outerContainer;
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.StartContainer(tag, kTLVType_List, outerContainer));
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
// Derive the TLV tag number from the enum value assigned to the attribute type OID. For attributes that can be
// either UTF8String or PrintableString, use the high bit in the tag number to distinguish the two.
uint8_t tlvTagNum = GetOIDEnum(rdn[i].mAttrOID);
if (rdn[i].mAttrIsPrintableString)
{
tlvTagNum |= 0x80;
}
if (IsChipDNAttr(rdn[i].mAttrOID))
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.Put(ContextTag(tlvTagNum), rdn[i].mChipVal));
}
else
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.PutString(ContextTag(tlvTagNum), rdn[i].mString));
}
}
return writer.EndContainer(outerContainer);
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::DecodeFromTLV(TLVReader & reader)
{
CHIP_ERROR err;
TLVType outerContainer;
static constexpr uint32_t kOID_AttributeIsPrintableString_Flag = 0x00000080;
static constexpr uint32_t kOID_AttributeType_Mask = 0x0000007F;
VerifyOrReturnError(reader.GetType() == kTLVType_List, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_TLV_TYPE);
// Enter the List TLV element that represents the DN in TLV format.
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.EnterContainer(outerContainer));
// Read the RDN attributes in the List.
while ((err = reader.Next()) == CHIP_NO_ERROR)
{
// Get the TLV tag, make sure it is a context tag and extract the context tag number.
Tag tlvTag = reader.GetTag();
VerifyOrReturnError(IsContextTag(tlvTag), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_TLV_TAG);
uint32_t tlvTagNum = TagNumFromTag(tlvTag);
// Derive the OID of the corresponding ASN.1 attribute from the TLV tag number.
// The numeric value of the OID is encoded in the bottom 7 bits of the TLV tag number.
// This eliminates the need for a translation table/switch statement but has the
// effect of tying the two encodings together.
//
// NOTE: In the event that the computed OID value is not one that we recognize
// (specifically, is not in the table of OIDs defined in ASN1OID.h) then the
// macro call below that encodes the attribute's object id (ASN1_ENCODE_OBJECT_ID)
// will fail for lack of the OID's encoded representation. Given this there's no
// need to test the validity of the OID here.
//
OID attrOID = GetOID(kOIDCategory_AttributeType, static_cast<uint8_t>(tlvTagNum & kOID_AttributeType_Mask));
bool attrIsPrintableString = (tlvTagNum & kOID_AttributeIsPrintableString_Flag) == kOID_AttributeIsPrintableString_Flag;
// For 64-bit CHIP-defined DN attributes.
if (IsChip64bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
uint64_t chipAttr;
VerifyOrReturnError(attrIsPrintableString == false, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_TLV_TAG);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.Get(chipAttr));
if (attrOID == chip::ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterNodeId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsOperationalNodeId(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_NODE_ID);
}
else if (attrOID == chip::ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidFabricId(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID, chipAttr));
}
// For 32-bit CHIP-defined DN attributes.
else if (IsChip32bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
uint32_t chipAttr;
VerifyOrReturnError(attrIsPrintableString == false, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_TLV_TAG);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.Get(chipAttr));
if (attrOID == chip::ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterCASEAuthTag)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidCASEAuthTag(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID, chipAttr));
}
// Otherwise the attribute is one of the supported X.509 attributes
else
{
CharSpan asn1Attr;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.Get(asn1Attr));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID, asn1Attr, attrIsPrintableString));
}
}
VerifyOrReturnError(err == CHIP_END_OF_TLV, err);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(reader.ExitContainer(outerContainer));
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::EncodeToASN1(ASN1Writer & writer) const
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
ASN1_START_SEQUENCE
{
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
ASN1_START_SET
{
char chipAttrStr[kChip64bitAttrUTF8Length];
CharSpan asn1Attr;
uint8_t asn1Tag;
chip::ASN1::OID attrOID = rdn[i].mAttrOID;
if (IsChip64bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(
Encoding::Uint64ToHex(rdn[i].mChipVal, chipAttrStr, sizeof(chipAttrStr), Encoding::HexFlags::kUppercase));
asn1Attr = CharSpan(chipAttrStr, kChip64bitAttrUTF8Length);
asn1Tag = kASN1UniversalTag_UTF8String;
}
else if (IsChip32bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(Encoding::Uint32ToHex(static_cast<uint32_t>(rdn[i].mChipVal), chipAttrStr,
sizeof(chipAttrStr), Encoding::HexFlags::kUppercase));
asn1Attr = CharSpan(chipAttrStr, kChip32bitAttrUTF8Length);
asn1Tag = kASN1UniversalTag_UTF8String;
}
else
{
asn1Attr = rdn[i].mString;
// Determine the appropriate ASN.1 tag for the DN attribute.
// - DomainComponent is always an IA5String.
// - For all other ASN.1 defined attributes, bit 0x80 in the TLV tag value conveys whether the attribute
// is a UTF8String or a PrintableString (in some cases the certificate generator has a choice).
if (attrOID == kOID_AttributeType_DomainComponent)
{
asn1Tag = kASN1UniversalTag_IA5String;
}
else
{
asn1Tag = rdn[i].mAttrIsPrintableString ? kASN1UniversalTag_PrintableString : kASN1UniversalTag_UTF8String;
}
}
// AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE
ASN1_START_SEQUENCE
{
// type AttributeType
// AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
ASN1_ENCODE_OBJECT_ID(attrOID);
VerifyOrReturnError(CanCastTo<uint16_t>(asn1Attr.size()), CHIP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_FORMAT);
// value AttributeValue
// AttributeValue ::= ANY -- DEFINED BY AttributeType
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.PutString(asn1Tag, asn1Attr.data(), static_cast<uint16_t>(asn1Attr.size())));
}
ASN1_END_SEQUENCE;
}
ASN1_END_SET;
}
}
ASN1_END_SEQUENCE;
exit:
return err;
}
CHIP_ERROR ChipDN::DecodeFromASN1(ASN1Reader & reader)
{
CHIP_ERROR err;
// RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
ASN1_PARSE_ENTER_SEQUENCE
{
while ((err = reader.Next()) == CHIP_NO_ERROR)
{
// RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
ASN1_ENTER_SET
{
// AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE
ASN1_PARSE_ENTER_SEQUENCE
{
// type AttributeType
// AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
OID attrOID;
ASN1_PARSE_OBJECT_ID(attrOID);
VerifyOrReturnError(GetOIDCategory(attrOID) == kOIDCategory_AttributeType, ASN1_ERROR_INVALID_ENCODING);
// AttributeValue ::= ANY -- DEFINED BY AttributeType
ASN1_PARSE_ANY;
uint8_t attrTag = reader.GetTag();
// Can only support UTF8String, PrintableString and IA5String.
VerifyOrReturnError(reader.GetClass() == kASN1TagClass_Universal &&
(attrTag == kASN1UniversalTag_PrintableString ||
attrTag == kASN1UniversalTag_UTF8String || attrTag == kASN1UniversalTag_IA5String),
ASN1_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING);
// CHIP attributes must be UTF8Strings.
if (IsChipDNAttr(attrOID))
{
VerifyOrReturnError(attrTag == kASN1UniversalTag_UTF8String, ASN1_ERROR_INVALID_ENCODING);
}
// If 64-bit CHIP attribute.
if (IsChip64bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
uint64_t chipAttr;
VerifyOrReturnError(Encoding::UppercaseHexToUint64(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(reader.GetValue()),
static_cast<size_t>(reader.GetValueLen()),
chipAttr) == sizeof(uint64_t),
ASN1_ERROR_INVALID_ENCODING);
if (attrOID == chip::ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterNodeId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsOperationalNodeId(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_NODE_ID);
}
else if (attrOID == chip::ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidFabricId(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
}
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID, chipAttr));
}
// If 32-bit CHIP attribute.
else if (IsChip32bitDNAttr(attrOID))
{
CASEAuthTag chipAttr;
VerifyOrReturnError(Encoding::UppercaseHexToUint32(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(reader.GetValue()),
reader.GetValueLen(), chipAttr) == sizeof(CASEAuthTag),
ASN1_ERROR_INVALID_ENCODING);
VerifyOrReturnError(IsValidCASEAuthTag(chipAttr), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID, chipAttr));
}
// Otherwise, it is a string.
else
{
ReturnErrorOnFailure(AddAttribute(attrOID,
CharSpan(Uint8::to_const_char(reader.GetValue()), reader.GetValueLen()),
attrTag == kASN1UniversalTag_PrintableString));
}
}
ASN1_EXIT_SEQUENCE;
// Only one AttributeTypeAndValue allowed per RDN.
err = reader.Next();
ReturnErrorCodeIf(err == CHIP_NO_ERROR, ASN1_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING);
VerifyOrReturnError(err == ASN1_END, err);
}
ASN1_EXIT_SET;
}
}
ASN1_EXIT_SEQUENCE;
exit:
return err;
}
bool ChipDN::IsEqual(const ChipDN & other) const
{
bool res = true;
uint8_t rdnCount = RDNCount();
VerifyOrExit(rdnCount > 0, res = false);
VerifyOrExit(rdnCount == other.RDNCount(), res = false);
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rdnCount; i++)
{
VerifyOrExit(rdn[i].IsEqual(other.rdn[i]), res = false);
}
exit:
return res;
}
DLL_EXPORT CHIP_ERROR ASN1ToChipEpochTime(const chip::ASN1::ASN1UniversalTime & asn1Time, uint32_t & epochTime)
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
// X.509/RFC5280 defines the special time 99991231235959Z to mean 'no well-defined expiration date'.
// In CHIP certificate it is represented as a CHIP Epoch time value of 0 sec (2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC).
//
// While it is not conventional to use this special value for NotBefore, for simplicity we convert all
// time values of 99991231235959Z to CHIP epoch zero seconds. ChipEpochToASN1Time performs the inverse
// translation for conversions in the other direction.
//
// If in a conversion from X509 to CHIP TLV format the input X509 certificate encloses 99991231235959Z
// for NotBefore, this will be converted to the CHIP Epoch time value of 0 and consuming code will
// handle this transparently, as logic considering a NotBefore time at the CHIP epoch will evaluate all
// possible unsigned offsets from the CHIP epoch as valid, which is equivalent to ignoring NotBefore.
//
// If in a conversion from X509 to CHIP TLV format the input X509 certificate encloses a NotBefore time
// at the CHIP epoch itself, 2000-01-01 00:00:00, a resultant conversion to CHIP TLV certificate format
// will appear to have an invalid TBS signature when the symmetric ChipEpochToASN1Time produces
// 99991231235959Z for NotBefore during signature validation.
//
// Thus such certificates, when passing through this code, will not appear valid. This should be
// immediately evident at commissioning time.
if ((asn1Time.Year == kX509NoWellDefinedExpirationDateYear) && (asn1Time.Month == kMonthsPerYear) &&
(asn1Time.Day == kMaxDaysPerMonth) && (asn1Time.Hour == kHoursPerDay - 1) && (asn1Time.Minute == kMinutesPerHour - 1) &&
(asn1Time.Second == kSecondsPerMinute - 1))
{
epochTime = kNullCertTime;
}
else
{
if (!CalendarToChipEpochTime(asn1Time.Year, asn1Time.Month, asn1Time.Day, asn1Time.Hour, asn1Time.Minute, asn1Time.Second,
epochTime))
{
ExitNow(err = ASN1_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING);
}
}
exit:
return err;
}
DLL_EXPORT CHIP_ERROR ChipEpochToASN1Time(uint32_t epochTime, chip::ASN1::ASN1UniversalTime & asn1Time)
{
// X.509/RFC5280 defines the special time 99991231235959Z to mean 'no well-defined expiration date'.
// In CHIP certificate it is represented as a CHIP Epoch time value of 0 secs (2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC).
//
// For simplicity and symmetry with ASN1ToChipEpochTime, this method makes this conversion for all
// times, which in consuming code can create a conversion from CHIP epoch 0 seconds to 99991231235959Z
// for NotBefore, which is not conventional.
//
// If an original X509 certificate encloses a NotBefore time that this the CHIP Epoch itself, 2000-01-01
// 00:00:00, the resultant X509 certificate in a conversion back from CHIP TLV format using this time
// conversion method will instead enclose the NotBefore time 99991231235959Z, which will invalidiate the
// TBS signature. Thus, certificates with this specific attribute are not usable with this code.
// Attempted installation of such certficates will fail during commissioning.
if (epochTime == kNullCertTime)
{
asn1Time.Year = kX509NoWellDefinedExpirationDateYear;
asn1Time.Month = kMonthsPerYear;
asn1Time.Day = kMaxDaysPerMonth;
asn1Time.Hour = kHoursPerDay - 1;
asn1Time.Minute = kMinutesPerHour - 1;
asn1Time.Second = kSecondsPerMinute - 1;
}
else
{
ChipEpochToCalendarTime(epochTime, asn1Time.Year, asn1Time.Month, asn1Time.Day, asn1Time.Hour, asn1Time.Minute,
asn1Time.Second);
}
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ValidateChipRCAC(const ByteSpan & rcac)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ValidationContext validContext;
uint8_t certType;
// Note that this function doesn't check RCAC NotBefore / NotAfter time validity.
// It is assumed that RCAC should be valid at the time of installation by definition.
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(rcac, CertDecodeFlags::kGenerateTBSHash));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certData.mSubjectDN.GetCertType(certType));
VerifyOrReturnError(certType == kCertType_Root, CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_TYPE);
VerifyOrReturnError(certData.mSubjectDN.IsEqual(certData.mIssuerDN), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_TYPE);
VerifyOrReturnError(certData.mSubjectKeyId.data_equal(certData.mAuthKeyId), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_TYPE);
VerifyOrReturnError(certData.mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kIsCA), CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
if (certData.mCertFlags.Has(CertFlags::kPathLenConstraintPresent))
{
VerifyOrReturnError(certData.mPathLenConstraint <= 1, CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
VerifyOrReturnError(certData.mKeyUsageFlags.Has(KeyUsageFlags::kKeyCertSign), CHIP_ERROR_CERT_USAGE_NOT_ALLOWED);
return ChipCertificateSet::VerifySignature(&certData, &certData);
}
CHIP_ERROR ConvertIntegerDERToRaw(ByteSpan derInt, uint8_t * rawInt, const uint16_t rawIntLen)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(!derInt.empty(), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
VerifyOrReturnError(rawInt != nullptr, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
const uint8_t * derIntData = derInt.data();
size_t derIntLen = derInt.size();
/* one leading zero is allowed for positive integer in ASN1 DER format */
if (*derIntData == 0)
{
derIntData++;
derIntLen--;
}
VerifyOrReturnError(derIntLen <= rawIntLen, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
if (derIntLen > 0)
{
VerifyOrReturnError(*derIntData != 0, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
memset(rawInt, 0, (rawIntLen - derIntLen));
memcpy(rawInt + (rawIntLen - derIntLen), derIntData, derIntLen);
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ConvertECDSASignatureRawToDER(P256ECDSASignatureSpan rawSig, MutableByteSpan & derSig)
{
ASN1Writer writer;
writer.Init(derSig);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(ConvertECDSASignatureRawToDER(rawSig, writer));
derSig.reduce_size(writer.GetLengthWritten());
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ConvertECDSASignatureRawToDER(P256ECDSASignatureSpan rawSig, ASN1Writer & writer)
{
CHIP_ERROR err = CHIP_NO_ERROR;
uint8_t derInt[kP256_FE_Length + kEmitDerIntegerWithoutTagOverhead];
VerifyOrReturnError(!rawSig.empty(), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
// Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE
ASN1_START_SEQUENCE
{
// r INTEGER
{
MutableByteSpan derIntSpan(derInt, sizeof(derInt));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(ConvertIntegerRawToDerWithoutTag(P256IntegerSpan(rawSig.data()), derIntSpan));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.PutValue(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Integer, false, derIntSpan.data(),
static_cast<uint16_t>(derIntSpan.size())));
}
// s INTEGER
{
MutableByteSpan derIntSpan(derInt, sizeof(derInt));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(ConvertIntegerRawToDerWithoutTag(P256IntegerSpan(rawSig.data() + kP256_FE_Length), derIntSpan));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(writer.PutValue(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Integer, false, derIntSpan.data(),
static_cast<uint16_t>(derIntSpan.size())));
}
}
ASN1_END_SEQUENCE;
exit:
return err;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractNodeIdFabricIdFromOpCert(const ChipCertificateData & opcert, NodeId * outNodeId, FabricId * outFabricId)
{
// Since we assume the cert is pre-validated, we are going to assume that
// its subject in fact has both a node id and a fabric id.
ReturnErrorCodeIf(outNodeId == nullptr || outFabricId == nullptr, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
NodeId nodeId = 0;
FabricId fabricId = kUndefinedFabricId;
bool foundNodeId = false;
bool foundFabricId = false;
const ChipDN & subjectDN = opcert.mSubjectDN;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < subjectDN.RDNCount(); ++i)
{
const auto & rdn = subjectDN.rdn[i];
if (rdn.mAttrOID == ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterNodeId)
{
nodeId = rdn.mChipVal;
foundNodeId = true;
}
else if (rdn.mAttrOID == ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId)
{
fabricId = rdn.mChipVal;
foundFabricId = true;
}
}
if (!foundNodeId || !foundFabricId)
{
return CHIP_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
}
*outNodeId = nodeId;
*outFabricId = fabricId;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractNodeIdFabricIdCompressedFabricIdFromOpCerts(ByteSpan rcac, ByteSpan noc, CompressedFabricId & compressedFabricId,
FabricId & fabricId, NodeId & nodeId)
{
Crypto::P256PublicKey rootPubKey;
Credentials::P256PublicKeySpan rootPubKeySpan;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(ExtractPublicKeyFromChipCert(rcac, rootPubKeySpan));
rootPubKey = Crypto::P256PublicKey(rootPubKeySpan);
ReturnErrorOnFailure(Credentials::ExtractNodeIdFabricIdFromOpCert(noc, &nodeId, &fabricId));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(GenerateCompressedFabricId(rootPubKey, fabricId, compressedFabricId));
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractNodeIdCompressedFabricIdFromOpCerts(ByteSpan rcac, ByteSpan noc, CompressedFabricId & compressedFabricId,
NodeId & nodeId)
{
FabricId fabricId;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(ExtractNodeIdFabricIdCompressedFabricIdFromOpCerts(rcac, noc, compressedFabricId, fabricId, nodeId));
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractFabricIdFromCert(const ChipCertificateData & cert, FabricId * fabricId)
{
const ChipDN & subjectDN = cert.mSubjectDN;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < subjectDN.RDNCount(); ++i)
{
const auto & rdn = subjectDN.rdn[i];
if (rdn.mAttrOID == ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterFabricId)
{
*fabricId = rdn.mChipVal;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
}
return CHIP_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractCATsFromOpCert(const ByteSpan & opcert, CATValues & cats)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(opcert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
return ExtractCATsFromOpCert(certData, cats);
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractCATsFromOpCert(const ChipCertificateData & opcert, CATValues & cats)
{
uint8_t catCount = 0;
uint8_t certType;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(opcert.mSubjectDN.GetCertType(certType));
VerifyOrReturnError(certType == kCertType_Node, CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
const ChipDN & subjectDN = opcert.mSubjectDN;
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < subjectDN.RDNCount(); ++i)
{
const auto & rdn = subjectDN.rdn[i];
if (rdn.mAttrOID == ASN1::kOID_AttributeType_MatterCASEAuthTag)
{
// This error should never happen in practice because valid NOC cannot have more
// than kMaxSubjectCATAttributeCount CATs in its subject. The check that it is
// valid NOC was done above.
ReturnErrorCodeIf(catCount == cats.size(), CHIP_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
VerifyOrReturnError(CanCastTo<CASEAuthTag>(rdn.mChipVal), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
cats.values[catCount++] = static_cast<CASEAuthTag>(rdn.mChipVal);
}
}
for (size_t i = catCount; i < cats.size(); ++i)
{
cats.values[i] = kUndefinedCAT;
}
// Make sure the set contained valid data, otherwise it's an invalid cert
VerifyOrReturnError(cats.AreValid(), CHIP_ERROR_WRONG_CERT_DN);
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractFabricIdFromCert(const ByteSpan & opcert, FabricId * fabricId)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(opcert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
return ExtractFabricIdFromCert(certData, fabricId);
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractNodeIdFabricIdFromOpCert(const ByteSpan & opcert, NodeId * nodeId, FabricId * fabricId)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(opcert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
return ExtractNodeIdFabricIdFromOpCert(certData, nodeId, fabricId);
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractPublicKeyFromChipCert(const ByteSpan & chipCert, P256PublicKeySpan & publicKey)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(chipCert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
publicKey = certData.mPublicKey;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractNotBeforeFromChipCert(const ByteSpan & chipCert, chip::System::Clock::Seconds32 & notBeforeChipEpochTime)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(chipCert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
notBeforeChipEpochTime = chip::System::Clock::Seconds32(certData.mNotBeforeTime);
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractSKIDFromChipCert(const ByteSpan & chipCert, CertificateKeyId & skid)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(chipCert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
skid = certData.mSubjectKeyId;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractSubjectDNFromChipCert(const ByteSpan & chipCert, ChipDN & dn)
{
ChipCertificateSet certSet;
ChipCertificateData certData;
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.Init(&certData, 1));
ReturnErrorOnFailure(certSet.LoadCert(chipCert, BitFlags<CertDecodeFlags>()));
dn = certData.mSubjectDN;
return CHIP_NO_ERROR;
}
CHIP_ERROR ExtractSubjectDNFromX509Cert(const ByteSpan & x509Cert, ChipDN & dn)
{
CHIP_ERROR err;
ASN1Reader reader;
VerifyOrReturnError(CanCastTo<uint32_t>(x509Cert.size()), CHIP_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
reader.Init(x509Cert);
// Certificate ::= SEQUENCE
ASN1_PARSE_ENTER_SEQUENCE
{
// tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
// TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE
ASN1_PARSE_ENTER_SEQUENCE
{
// Skip version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1
ASN1_PARSE_ELEMENT(kASN1TagClass_ContextSpecific, 0);
// Skip serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
ASN1_PARSE_ELEMENT(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Integer);
// Skip signature AlgorithmIdentifier
ASN1_PARSE_ELEMENT(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Sequence);
// Skip issuer Name
ASN1_PARSE_ELEMENT(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Sequence);
// Skip validity Validity,
ASN1_PARSE_ELEMENT(kASN1TagClass_Universal, kASN1UniversalTag_Sequence);
// Decode subject Name,
ReturnErrorOnFailure(dn.DecodeFromASN1(reader));
}
ASN1_SKIP_AND_EXIT_SEQUENCE;
}
ASN1_SKIP_AND_EXIT_SEQUENCE;
exit:
return err;
}
} // namespace Credentials
} // namespace chip