| .. _module-pw_bluetooth_proxy-security: |
| |
| =============================== |
| pw_bluetooth_proxy threat model |
| =============================== |
| This document supplements the |
| :ref:`general threat model <docs-security-threat_model>` to provide a threat |
| model specific to pw_bluetooth_proxy. |
| |
| ----------------------- |
| Environment and context |
| ----------------------- |
| * Handles H4 and HCI Bluetooth (BT) packets containing data from the BT host |
| on the user’s device or from other devices via the BT controller. |
| * Can be configured to intercept traffic coming from the BT controller to the |
| BT host, in order to avoid waking the AP. |
| * Does not apply any security policies to traffic. |
| |
| ---------- |
| Exclusions |
| ---------- |
| * Do not include issues which cause packets to be incorrectly forwarded to the |
| host, rather than intercepted, as the proxy is not a security enforcement |
| point. |
| * Do not include issues where the client’s event or receive callbacks might be |
| called after the client frees memory used by the callbacks. Destroying the |
| client channel object does not mean these callbacks won’t be called again. |
| * Do not include vulnerabilities that require destroying ``ProxyHost`` to |
| cause a use-after-free (UAF). |