Rewrite X.509 policy tree logic.
This reimplements policy handling using a similar DAG structure as in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4111415. The
main difference is that, being C, we don't have std::set or std::map
easily available. But the algorithm can be implemented purely with
sorted lists, while remaining subquadratic.
This implementation relies on two assumptions:
1. We do not return the policy tree. This was removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/53327
2. We do not return the final set of certificate policies. I.e.,
certificate policy checking is only used for evaluating policy
constraints and X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY.
The second assumption is not very important. It mostly simplifies
has_explicit_policy slightly.
In addition, this new implementation removes the per-certificate policy
cache. Instead, we just process the policy extensions anew on
certificate verification. This avoids a mess of threading complexity,
including a race condition in the old logic. See
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/55762 for a
description of the race condition.
Change-Id: Ifba9037588ecff5eb6ed3c34c8bd7611f60013a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/56036
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/CMakeLists.txt b/crypto/CMakeLists.txt
index 0631971..c83d1e3 100644
--- a/crypto/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/crypto/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@
x509/by_file.c
x509/i2d_pr.c
x509/name_print.c
+ x509/policy.c
x509/rsa_pss.c
x509/t_crl.c
x509/t_req.c
@@ -398,11 +399,6 @@
x509/x_val.c
x509/x_x509.c
x509/x_x509a.c
- x509v3/pcy_cache.c
- x509v3/pcy_data.c
- x509v3/pcy_map.c
- x509v3/pcy_node.c
- x509v3/pcy_tree.c
x509v3/v3_akey.c
x509v3/v3_akeya.c
x509v3/v3_alt.c
diff --git a/crypto/err/x509.errordata b/crypto/err/x509.errordata
index 65181bf..e30d667 100644
--- a/crypto/err/x509.errordata
+++ b/crypto/err/x509.errordata
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
X509,139,INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION
X509,111,INVALID_FIELD_NAME
X509,136,INVALID_PARAMETER
+X509,144,INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
X509,112,INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
X509,113,INVALID_TRUST
X509,140,INVALID_VERSION
diff --git a/crypto/x509/internal.h b/crypto/x509/internal.h
index e102842..7bf14c9 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/internal.h
@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@
// Internal structures.
-typedef struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st X509_POLICY_CACHE;
-typedef struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st X509_POLICY_TREE;
-
typedef struct X509_val_st {
ASN1_TIME *notBefore;
ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
@@ -157,7 +154,6 @@
uint32_t ex_nscert;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid;
AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid;
- X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache;
STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname;
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc;
@@ -350,9 +346,6 @@
int valid; // if 0, rebuild chain
int last_untrusted; // index of last untrusted cert
STACK_OF(X509) *chain; // chain of X509s - built up and trusted
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; // Valid policy tree
-
- int explicit_policy; // Require explicit policy value
// When something goes wrong, this is why
int error_depth;
@@ -410,6 +403,19 @@
EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+// Path-building functions.
+
+// X509_policy_check checks certificate policies in |certs|. |user_policies| is
+// the user-initial-policy-set. |flags| is a set of |X509_V_FLAG_*| values to
+// apply. It returns |X509_V_OK| on success and |X509_V_ERR_*| on error. It
+// additionally sets |*out_current_cert| to the certificate where the error
+// occurred. If the function succeeded, or the error applies to the entire
+// chain, it sets |*out_current_cert| to NULL.
+int X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies,
+ unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert);
+
+
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/policy.c b/crypto/x509/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f9fe9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,797 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, section
+// 6.1. It differs in that:
+//
+// (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
+// output by this implementation.
+//
+// (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given
+// policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for
+// each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with
+// multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph",
+// rather than a "policy tree".
+//
+// (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
+// as part of building the graph.
+//
+// (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
+//
+// (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
+// reachability pass.
+
+// An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
+// from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
+typedef struct x509_policy_node_st {
+ // policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280.
+ ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+
+ // parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values for all
+ // nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry in this list
+ // will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order and may contain
+ // duplicates if the corresponding certificate had duplicate mappings.
+ //
+ // If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then a root
+ // policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it has a path to
+ // a leaf node.
+ //
+ // Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
+ // concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs if
+ // there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a parent
+ // list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies;
+
+ // mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the certificate and
+ // zero otherwise.
+ int mapped;
+
+ // reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in the
+ // end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|.
+ int reachable;
+} X509_POLICY_NODE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
+
+// An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
+// policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
+// "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|.
+typedef struct x509_policy_level_st {
+ // nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy node, if
+ // any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+
+ // has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth, and zero
+ // otherwise.
+ int has_any_policy;
+} X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)
+
+static int is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+ return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy;
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) {
+ if (node != NULL) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(node->policy);
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(node->parent_policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(node);
+ }
+}
+
+static X509_POLICY_NODE *x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+ assert(!is_any_policy(policy));
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
+ if (node == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(node, 0, sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
+ node->policy = OBJ_dup(policy);
+ node->parent_policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+ if (node->policy == NULL || node->parent_policies == NULL) {
+ x509_policy_node_free(node);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return node;
+}
+
+static int x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE **a,
+ const X509_POLICY_NODE **b) {
+ return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy);
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_level_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+ if (level != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(level->nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(level);
+ }
+}
+
+static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *x509_policy_level_new(void) {
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+ if (level == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(level, 0, sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+ level->nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(x509_policy_node_cmp);
+ if (level->nodes == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ x509_policy_level_free(level);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return level;
+}
+
+static int x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+ return !level->has_any_policy && sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes) == 0;
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+ level->has_any_policy = 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+ x509_policy_node_free(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i));
+ }
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes);
+}
+
+// x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|,
+// or NULL if none exists.
+static X509_POLICY_NODE *x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+ assert(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes));
+ X509_POLICY_NODE node;
+ node.policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)policy;
+ size_t idx;
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(level->nodes, &idx, &node)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx);
+}
+
+// x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns
+// one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present
+// in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the
+// caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself.
+//
+// This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting
+// |level| after each addition.
+static int x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(nodes, i, NULL);
+ }
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes);
+
+#if !defined(NDEBUG)
+ // There should be no duplicate nodes.
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+ assert(OBJ_cmp(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i - 1)->policy,
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->policy) != 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO **a, const POLICYINFO **b) {
+ return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid);
+}
+
+static int delete_if_not_in_policies(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) {
+ const CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies = data;
+ assert(sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies));
+ POLICYINFO info;
+ info.policyid = node->policy;
+ if (sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies, NULL, &info)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x509_policy_node_free(node);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+// process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s
+// certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
+// 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's
+// "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
+// the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies
+// whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
+// for self-issued certificates.
+static int process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509,
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ int any_policy_allowed) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ int critical;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
+ CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, NULL);
+ if (policies == NULL) {
+ if (critical != -1) {
+ return 0; // Syntax error in the extension.
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e).
+ x509_policy_level_clear(level);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
+ // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies, policyinfo_cmp);
+ sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies);
+ int cert_has_any_policy = 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
+ const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
+ if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) {
+ cert_has_any_policy = 1;
+ }
+ if (i > 0 && OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid,
+ policy->policyid) == 0) {
+ // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not have duplicates.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), though in
+ // a slighty different order. |level| currently contains "expected_policy_set"
+ // values of the previous level. See |process_policy_mappings| for details.
+ const int previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
+
+ // First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these two steps
+ // is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring anyPolicy if it is
+ // inhibited.
+ if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) {
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, delete_if_not_in_policies,
+ policies);
+ level->has_any_policy = 0;
+ }
+
+ // Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy node.
+ if (previous_level_has_any_policy) {
+ new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+ if (new_nodes == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
+ const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
+ // Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy| is in |level| if
+ // and only if it would have been a match in step (d.1.ii).
+ if (!is_any_policy(policy->policyid) &&
+ x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) == NULL) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = x509_policy_node_new(policy->policyid);
+ if (node == NULL || //
+ !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) {
+ x509_policy_node_free(node);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+ CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free(policies);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
+ const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+ return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+static int compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
+ const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+ return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+static int delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) {
+ const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data;
+ // |mappings| must have been sorted by |compare_issuer_policy|.
+ assert(sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings));
+ POLICY_MAPPING mapping;
+ mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy;
+ if (!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings, /*out_index=*/NULL, &mapping)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x509_policy_node_free(node);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+// process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|,
+// whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies
+// whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
+// |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On
+// error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
+// section 6.1.4.
+//
+// We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|.
+// |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
+// "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
+// P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
+// with P1 in |parent_policies|.
+//
+// This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next
+// certificats contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter
+// this result down to compute the actual level.
+static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ int mapping_allowed) {
+ int ok = 0;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *next = NULL;
+ int critical;
+ POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL);
+ if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) {
+ // Syntax error in the policy mappings extension.
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (mappings != NULL) {
+ // PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
+ // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a).
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+ POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+ if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) ||
+ is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy.
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_issuer_policy);
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
+
+ if (mapping_allowed) {
+ // Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level| which may be needed
+ // as part of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
+ new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+ if (new_nodes == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy = NULL;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+ const POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+ // There may be multiple mappings with the same |issuerDomainPolicy|.
+ if (last_policy != NULL &&
+ OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, last_policy) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy;
+
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node =
+ x509_policy_level_find(level, mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+ if (node == NULL) {
+ if (!level->has_any_policy) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ node = x509_policy_node_new(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+ if (node == NULL || //
+ !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) {
+ x509_policy_node_free(node);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ node->mapped = 1;
+ }
+ if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is inhibited, delete
+ // all mapped nodes.
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, delete_if_mapped, mappings);
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+ mappings = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
+ // value, itself. Add those to |mappings|.
+ if (mappings == NULL) {
+ mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null();
+ if (mappings == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
+ if (!node->mapped) {
+ POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = POLICY_MAPPING_new();
+ if (mapping == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
+ mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
+ if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == NULL ||
+ mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == NULL ||
+ !sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(mappings, mapping)) {
+ POLICY_MAPPING_free(mapping);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy.
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy);
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
+
+ // Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation.
+ next = x509_policy_level_new();
+ if (next == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ next->has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
+
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+ POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+ // Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in the graph.
+ if (!level->has_any_policy &&
+ x509_policy_level_find(level, mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (last_node == NULL ||
+ OBJ_cmp(last_node->policy, mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) != 0) {
+ last_node = x509_policy_node_new(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy);
+ if (last_node == NULL ||
+ !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(next->nodes, last_node)) {
+ x509_policy_node_free(last_node);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(last_node->parent_policies,
+ mapping->issuerDomainPolicy)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL;
+ }
+
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(next->nodes);
+ ok = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ok) {
+ x509_policy_level_free(next);
+ next = NULL;
+ }
+
+ sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+ return next;
+}
+
+// apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum
+// of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if
+// |skip_certs| is negative.
+static int apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value) {
+ if (skip_certs == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+ if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|.
+ uint64_t u64;
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) {
+ *value = (size_t)u64;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+// process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and
+// |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit
+// anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
+// implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
+static int process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
+ size_t *policy_mapping,
+ size_t *inhibit_any_policy) {
+ int critical;
+ POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *constraints =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, NULL);
+ if (constraints == NULL && critical != -1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (constraints != NULL) {
+ if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL &&
+ constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) {
+ // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the fields must be
+ // present.
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int ok =
+ apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy, explicit_policy) &&
+ apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping, inhibit_any_policy);
+ POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
+ if (!ok) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER *inhibit_any_policy_ext =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &critical, NULL);
+ if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == NULL && critical != -1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int ok = apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext, inhibit_any_policy);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(inhibit_any_policy_ext);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+// has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
+// |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero
+// otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
+// function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy
+// evaluation.
+static int has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
+ const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) {
+ assert(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
+
+ // Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty.
+ size_t num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, num_levels - 1);
+ if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single anyPolicy
+ // value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy explicitly.
+ int user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) == 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) {
+ if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) {
+ user_has_any_policy = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set contains
+ // anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
+ if (user_has_any_policy) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
+ // anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection may
+ // synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the policy
+ // list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
+ if (level->has_any_policy) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ // We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent anyPolicy,
+ // step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the bottommost level.
+ // Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+ sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = num_levels - 1; i < num_levels; i--) {
+ level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i);
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); j++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, j);
+ if (!node->reachable) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) {
+ // |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of "valid_policy_node_set".
+ // If it exists in |user_policies|, the intersection is non-empty and we
+ // can return immediately.
+ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies, /*out_index=*/NULL,
+ node->policy)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (i > 0) {
+ // |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark the parents reachable,
+ // to be inspected by the next loop iteration.
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i - 1);
+ for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies); k++) {
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *parent = x509_policy_level_find(
+ prev, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies, k));
+ if (parent != NULL) {
+ parent->reachable = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT **a, const ASN1_OBJECT **b) {
+ return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+int X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies,
+ unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert) {
+ *out_current_cert = NULL;
+ int ret = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL;
+ size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
+
+ // Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor.
+ if (num_certs <= 1) {
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+
+ // See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f).
+ size_t explicit_policy =
+ (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+ size_t inhibit_any_policy =
+ (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+ size_t policy_mapping =
+ (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+
+ levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null();
+ if (levels == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = num_certs - 2; i < num_certs; i--) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ const int is_self_issued = (cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0;
+
+ if (level == NULL) {
+ assert(i == num_certs - 2);
+ level = x509_policy_level_new();
+ if (level == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ level->has_any_policy = 1;
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed| is
+ // computed as in step (d.2).
+ const int any_policy_allowed =
+ inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued);
+ if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level, any_policy_allowed)) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ *out_current_cert = cert;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f).
+ if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Insert into the list.
+ if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level = level;
+ level = NULL;
+
+ // If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. If it
+ // is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
+ if (i != 0) {
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b).
+ level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level, policy_mapping > 0);
+ if (level == NULL) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ *out_current_cert = cert;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and section 6.1.5,
+ // step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, RFC 5280 says only to update
+ // |explicit_policy|, but |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no
+ // longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
+ if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) {
+ if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+ explicit_policy--;
+ }
+ if (policy_mapping > 0) {
+ policy_mapping--;
+ }
+ if (inhibit_any_policy > 0) {
+ inhibit_any_policy--;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy, &policy_mapping,
+ &inhibit_any_policy)) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ *out_current_cert = cert;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, so it
+ // is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set is not empty.
+ if (explicit_policy == 0) {
+ // Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient lookup.
+ user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(user_policies);
+ if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, asn1_object_cmp);
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
+
+ if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = X509_V_OK;
+
+err:
+ x509_policy_level_free(level);
+ // |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so we do
+ // not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|.
+ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted);
+ sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc b/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
index aba608e..e4af13e 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
@@ -5518,6 +5518,90 @@
}));
}
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
+// A similar test to the above, but ensures the various bits of intermediate
+// state are computed safely.
+TEST(X509Test, PolicyThreads) {
+ const size_t kNumThreads = 10;
+
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid1(
+ OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1", /*dont_search_names=*/1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(oid1);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid2(
+ OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2", /*dont_search_names=*/1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(oid2);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid3(
+ OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.3", /*dont_search_names=*/1));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(oid3);
+
+ auto set_policies = [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ std::vector<const ASN1_OBJECT *> oids) {
+ for (const ASN1_OBJECT *oid : oids) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> copy(OBJ_dup(oid));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(copy);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(param, copy.get()));
+ copy.release(); // |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy| takes ownership on
+ // success.
+ }
+ };
+
+ {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(
+ CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(root);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(
+ GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(
+ CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
+
+ std::vector<std::thread> threads;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumThreads; i++) {
+ threads.emplace_back([&] {
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ X509_V_OK,
+ Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{},
+ X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+ set_policies(param, {oid1.get()});
+ }));
+ });
+ }
+ for (auto &thread : threads) {
+ thread.join();
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(
+ CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(root);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(
+ GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_invalid(CertFromPEM(
+ GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_invalid.pem").c_str()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_invalid);
+
+
+ std::vector<std::thread> threads;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumThreads; i++) {
+ threads.emplace_back([&] {
+ EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION,
+ Verify(leaf_invalid.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()},
+ /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY,
+ [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+ set_policies(param, {oid1.get()});
+ }));
+ });
+ }
+ for (auto &thread : threads) {
+ thread.join();
+ }
+ }
+}
+#endif // OPENSSL_THREADS
+
TEST(X509Test, ExtensionFromConf) {
static const char kTestOID[] = "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2";
const struct {
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index ce110e6..7638d0d 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1689,39 +1689,19 @@
}
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
- int ret;
if (ctx->parent) {
return 1;
}
- // TODO(davidben): Historically, outputs of the |X509_policy_check| were saved
- // on |ctx| and accessible via the public API. This has since been removed, so
- // remove the fields from |X509_STORE_CTX|.
- ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
- ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
- if (ret == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
- // Invalid or inconsistent extensions
- if (ret == -1) {
- // Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
- for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) {
- continue;
- }
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
- return 0;
- }
+
+ X509 *current_cert = NULL;
+ int ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
+ ctx->param->flags, ¤t_cert);
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM) {
+ return 0;
}
- return 1;
- }
- if (ret == -2) {
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
@@ -2311,10 +2291,6 @@
}
ctx->param = NULL;
}
- if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
- X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
- ctx->tree = NULL;
- }
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
ctx->chain = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
index c6c48fe..4f23fd6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_x509.c
@@ -89,8 +89,6 @@
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
// X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation
-extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
-
static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg) {
X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
@@ -150,7 +148,6 @@
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
- policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/internal.h b/crypto/x509v3/internal.h
index a7bcb4e..0632f23 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/internal.h
@@ -168,163 +168,6 @@
",value:", (val)->value);
-// Internal structures
-
-// This structure and the field names correspond to the Policy 'node' of
-// RFC 3280. NB this structure contains no pointers to parent or child data:
-// X509_POLICY_NODE contains that. This means that the main policy data can
-// be kept static and cached with the certificate.
-
-typedef struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st X509_POLICY_DATA;
-typedef struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
-typedef struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st X509_POLICY_NODE;
-
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA)
-
-struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st {
- unsigned int flags;
- // Policy OID and qualifiers for this data
- ASN1_OBJECT *valid_policy;
- STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *qualifier_set;
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expected_policy_set;
-};
-
-// X509_POLICY_DATA flags values
-
-// This flag indicates the structure has been mapped using a policy mapping
-// extension. If policy mapping is not active its references get deleted.
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED 0x1
-
-// This flag indicates the data doesn't correspond to a policy in Certificate
-// Policies: it has been mapped to any policy.
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY 0x2
-
-// AND with flags to see if any mapping has occurred
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK 0x3
-
-// qualifiers are shared and shouldn't be freed
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS 0x4
-
-// Parent node is an extra node and should be freed
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE 0x8
-
-// Corresponding CertificatePolicies is critical
-
-#define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x10
-
-// This structure is cached with a certificate
-
-struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st {
- // anyPolicy data or NULL if no anyPolicy
- X509_POLICY_DATA *anyPolicy;
- // other policy data
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *data;
- // If InhibitAnyPolicy present this is its value or -1 if absent.
- long any_skip;
- // If policyConstraints and requireExplicitPolicy present this is its
- // value or -1 if absent.
- long explicit_skip;
- // If policyConstraints and policyMapping present this is its value or -1
- // if absent.
- long map_skip;
-};
-
-// #define POLICY_CACHE_FLAG_CRITICAL POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL
-
-// This structure represents the relationship between nodes
-
-struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st {
- // node data this refers to
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- // Parent node
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent;
- // Number of child nodes
- int nchild;
-};
-
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
-
-struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
- // Cert for this level
- X509 *cert;
- // nodes at this level
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
- // anyPolicy node
- X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
- // Extra data
- //
- // STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data;
- unsigned int flags;
-};
-
-struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
- // This is the tree 'level' data
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
- int nlevel;
- // Extra policy data when additional nodes (not from the certificate) are
- // required.
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data;
- // This is the authority constained policy set
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_policies;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *user_policies;
- unsigned int flags;
-};
-
-// Set if anyPolicy present in user policies
-#define POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY 0x2
-
-// Useful macros
-
-#define node_data_critical(data) ((data)->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL)
-#define node_critical(node) node_data_critical((node)->data)
-
-// Internal functions
-
-void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent);
-
-int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- unsigned int flags);
-
-void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
-
-X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy, const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
- int crit);
-void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data);
-
-X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
-int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps);
-
-STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void);
-
-void policy_cache_init(void);
-
-void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id);
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
-void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
-int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
- const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
-
-const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x);
-
-
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} // extern C
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3a351dc..0000000
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "../x509/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA **a,
- const X509_POLICY_DATA **b);
-static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value);
-
-// Set cache entry according to CertificatePolicies extension. Note: this
-// destroys the passed CERTIFICATEPOLICIES structure.
-
-static int policy_cache_create(X509 *x, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies,
- int crit) {
- size_t i;
- int ret = 0;
- X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
- POLICYINFO *policy;
- if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) {
- goto bad_policy;
- }
- cache->data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new(policy_data_cmp);
- if (!cache->data) {
- goto bad_policy;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
- policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
- data = policy_data_new(policy, NULL, crit);
- if (!data) {
- goto bad_policy;
- }
- // Duplicate policy OIDs are illegal: reject if matches found.
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_sort(cache->data);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
- if (cache->anyPolicy) {
- ret = -1;
- goto bad_policy;
- }
- cache->anyPolicy = data;
- } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, NULL, data)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto bad_policy;
- } else if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data)) {
- goto bad_policy;
- }
- data = NULL;
- }
- ret = 1;
-bad_policy:
- if (ret == -1) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
- }
- if (data) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- }
- sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free);
- cache->data = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void policy_cache_new(X509 *x) {
- X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
- ASN1_INTEGER *ext_any = NULL;
- POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *ext_pcons = NULL;
- CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *ext_cpols = NULL;
- POLICY_MAPPINGS *ext_pmaps = NULL;
- cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_CACHE));
- if (!cache) {
- return;
- }
- cache->anyPolicy = NULL;
- cache->data = NULL;
- cache->any_skip = -1;
- cache->explicit_skip = -1;
- cache->map_skip = -1;
-
- x->policy_cache = cache;
-
- // Handle requireExplicitPolicy *first*. Need to process this even if we
- // don't have any policies.
- int critical;
- ext_pcons = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, NULL);
- if (!ext_pcons) {
- if (critical != -1) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- } else {
- if (!ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy && !ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->explicit_skip,
- ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy)) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->map_skip,
- ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping)) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- }
-
- ext_cpols = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, NULL);
- // If no CertificatePolicies extension or problem decoding then there is
- // no point continuing because the valid policies will be NULL.
- if (!ext_cpols) {
- // If not absent some problem with extension
- if (critical != -1) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- goto done;
- }
-
- // This call frees |ext_cpols|.
- if (policy_cache_create(x, ext_cpols, critical) <= 0) {
- // |policy_cache_create| already sets |EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY|.
- //
- // TODO(davidben): While it does, it's missing some spots. Align this and
- // |policy_cache_set_mapping|.
- goto done;
- }
-
- ext_pmaps = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL);
- if (!ext_pmaps) {
- // If not absent some problem with extension
- if (critical != -1) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- } else {
- // This call frees |ext_pmaps|.
- if (policy_cache_set_mapping(x, ext_pmaps) <= 0) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- }
-
- ext_any = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &critical, NULL);
- if (!ext_any) {
- if (critical != -1) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
- } else if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->any_skip, ext_any)) {
- goto bad_cache;
- }
-
- if (0) {
- bad_cache:
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
- }
-
-done:
- POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(ext_pcons);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(ext_any);
-}
-
-void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) {
- if (!cache) {
- return;
- }
- if (cache->anyPolicy) {
- policy_data_free(cache->anyPolicy);
- }
- if (cache->data) {
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(cache);
-}
-
-// g_x509_policy_cache_lock is used to protect against concurrent calls to
-// |policy_cache_new|. Ideally this would be done with a |CRYPTO_once_t| in
-// the |X509| structure, but |CRYPTO_once_t| isn't public.
-static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_x509_policy_cache_lock =
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
-
-const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x) {
- X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
-
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_x509_policy_cache_lock);
- cache = x->policy_cache;
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_x509_policy_cache_lock);
-
- if (cache != NULL) {
- return cache;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_x509_policy_cache_lock);
- if (x->policy_cache == NULL) {
- policy_cache_new(x);
- }
- cache = x->policy_cache;
- CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_x509_policy_cache_lock);
-
- return cache;
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id) {
- size_t idx;
- X509_POLICY_DATA tmp;
-
- tmp.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id;
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_sort(cache->data);
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, &idx, &tmp)) {
- return NULL;
- }
- return sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, idx);
-}
-
-static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA **a,
- const X509_POLICY_DATA **b) {
- return OBJ_cmp((*a)->valid_policy, (*b)->valid_policy);
-}
-
-static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value) {
- if (value == NULL) {
- return 1;
- }
- if (value->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
- return 0;
- }
- *out = ASN1_INTEGER_get(value);
- return 1;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 91ba714..0000000
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-
-// Policy Node routines
-
-void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data) {
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(data->valid_policy);
- // Don't free qualifiers if shared
- if (!(data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS)) {
- sk_POLICYQUALINFO_pop_free(data->qualifier_set, POLICYQUALINFO_free);
- }
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(data->expected_policy_set, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
- OPENSSL_free(data);
-}
-
-// Create a data based on an existing policy. If 'id' is NULL use the oid in
-// the policy, otherwise use 'id'. This behaviour covers the two types of
-// data in RFC 3280: data with from a CertificatePolcies extension and
-// additional data with just the qualifiers of anyPolicy and ID from another
-// source.
-
-X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy, const ASN1_OBJECT *cid,
- int crit) {
- X509_POLICY_DATA *ret;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id;
- if (!policy && !cid) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (cid) {
- id = OBJ_dup(cid);
- if (!id) {
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- id = NULL;
- }
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_DATA));
- if (!ret) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(id);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret->expected_policy_set = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
- if (!ret->expected_policy_set) {
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(id);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (crit) {
- ret->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL;
- } else {
- ret->flags = 0;
- }
-
- if (id) {
- ret->valid_policy = id;
- } else {
- ret->valid_policy = policy->policyid;
- policy->policyid = NULL;
- }
-
- if (policy) {
- ret->qualifier_set = policy->qualifiers;
- policy->qualifiers = NULL;
- } else {
- ret->qualifier_set = NULL;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 06c70b2..0000000
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../x509/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-// Set policy mapping entries in cache. Note: this modifies the passed
-// POLICY_MAPPINGS structure
-
-int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps) {
- POLICY_MAPPING *map;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache;
- size_t i;
- int ret = 0;
- if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps) == 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto bad_mapping;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps); i++) {
- map = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(maps, i);
- // Reject if map to or from anyPolicy
- if ((OBJ_obj2nid(map->subjectDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy) ||
- (OBJ_obj2nid(map->issuerDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto bad_mapping;
- }
-
- // Attempt to find matching policy data
- data = policy_cache_find_data(cache, map->issuerDomainPolicy);
- // If we don't have anyPolicy can't map
- if (!data && !cache->anyPolicy) {
- continue;
- }
-
- // Create a NODE from anyPolicy
- if (!data) {
- data =
- policy_data_new(NULL, map->issuerDomainPolicy,
- cache->anyPolicy->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL);
- if (!data) {
- goto bad_mapping;
- }
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- // map->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data)) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- goto bad_mapping;
- }
- } else {
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED;
- }
- if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(data->expected_policy_set,
- map->subjectDomainPolicy)) {
- goto bad_mapping;
- }
- map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-bad_mapping:
- if (ret == -1) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY;
- }
- sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(maps, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8966b06..0000000
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-
-static int node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE **a, const X509_POLICY_NODE **b) {
- return OBJ_cmp((*a)->data->valid_policy, (*b)->data->valid_policy);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void) {
- return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(node_cmp);
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id) {
- X509_POLICY_DATA n;
- X509_POLICY_NODE l;
- size_t idx;
-
- n.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id;
- l.data = &n;
-
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(nodes);
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(nodes, &idx, &l)) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, idx);
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id) {
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
- if (node->parent == parent) {
- if (!OBJ_cmp(node->data->valid_policy, id)) {
- return node;
- }
- }
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- node = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
- if (!node) {
- return NULL;
- }
- node->data = data;
- node->parent = parent;
- node->nchild = 0;
- if (level) {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
- if (level->anyPolicy) {
- goto node_error;
- }
- level->anyPolicy = node;
- } else {
- if (!level->nodes) {
- level->nodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
- }
- if (!level->nodes) {
- goto node_error;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) {
- goto node_error;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (tree) {
- if (!tree->extra_data) {
- tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
- }
- if (!tree->extra_data) {
- goto node_error;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(tree->extra_data, data)) {
- goto node_error;
- }
- }
-
- if (parent) {
- parent->nchild++;
- }
-
- return node;
-
-node_error:
- policy_node_free(node);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { OPENSSL_free(node); }
-
-// See if a policy node matches a policy OID. If mapping enabled look through
-// expected policy set otherwise just valid policy.
-
-int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
- const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid) {
- size_t i;
- ASN1_OBJECT *policy_oid;
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *x = node->data;
-
- if ((lvl->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ||
- !(x->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) {
- if (!OBJ_cmp(x->valid_policy, oid)) {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(x->expected_policy_set); i++) {
- policy_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(x->expected_policy_set, i);
- if (!OBJ_cmp(policy_oid, oid)) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7211e01..0000000
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,829 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/stack.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "../x509/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-// Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
-// evaluation.
-
-// #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
-
-static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) {
- if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ||
- !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) {
- BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n");
- } else {
- int i;
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
- BIO_puts(err, " Expected: ");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
- if (i) {
- BIO_puts(err, ", ");
- }
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid);
- }
- BIO_puts(err, "\n");
- }
-}
-
-static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- BIO *err;
- err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (!curr) {
- curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
- } else {
- curr++;
- }
- BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
- BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
- for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", plev - tree->levels,
- plev->flags);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
- X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
- expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
- BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
- }
- if (plev->anyPolicy) {
- X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
- }
- }
-
- BIO_free(err);
-}
-#else
-
-#define tree_print(a, b, c) //
-
-#endif
-
-//-
-// Initialize policy tree. Return values:
-// 0 Some internal error occurred.
-// -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
-// 1 Tree initialized OK.
-// 2 Policy tree is empty.
-// 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
-// 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
-
-static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- unsigned int flags) {
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int ret = 1;
- int i, n;
- int explicit_policy;
- int any_skip;
- int map_skip;
- *ptree = NULL;
- n = sk_X509_num(certs);
-
-#if 0
- // Disable policy mapping for now...
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
-#endif
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) {
- explicit_policy = 0;
- } else {
- explicit_policy = n + 1;
- }
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) {
- any_skip = 0;
- } else {
- any_skip = n + 1;
- }
-
- if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
- map_skip = 0;
- } else {
- map_skip = n + 1;
- }
-
- // Can't do anything with just a trust anchor
- if (n == 1) {
- return 1;
- }
- // First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
- // anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
- // explicit_policy value at this point.
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
- // If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately
- if (cache == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
- // If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) {
- ret = -1;
- }
- // Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
- // haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
- else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) {
- ret = 2;
- }
- if (explicit_policy > 0) {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
- explicit_policy--;
- }
- if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) &&
- (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) {
- explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (ret != 1) {
- if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) {
- return 6;
- }
- return ret;
- }
-
- // If we get this far initialize the tree
-
- tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
-
- if (!tree) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- tree->flags = 0;
- tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
- tree->nlevel = 0;
- tree->extra_data = NULL;
- tree->auth_policies = NULL;
- tree->user_policies = NULL;
-
- if (!tree->levels) {
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
- return 0;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
-
- tree->nlevel = n;
-
- level = tree->levels;
-
- // Root data: initialize to anyPolicy
-
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
-
- if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) {
- goto bad_tree;
- }
-
- for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
- level++;
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- cache = policy_cache_set(x);
- X509_up_ref(x);
- level->cert = x;
-
- if (!cache->anyPolicy) {
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
- }
-
- // Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags
- if (any_skip == 0) {
- // Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
- // last in the chain.
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) {
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
- }
- } else {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
- any_skip--;
- }
- if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) {
- any_skip = cache->any_skip;
- }
- }
-
- if (map_skip == 0) {
- level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
- } else {
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
- map_skip--;
- }
- if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) {
- map_skip = cache->map_skip;
- }
- }
- }
-
- *ptree = tree;
-
- if (explicit_policy) {
- return 1;
- } else {
- return 5;
- }
-
-bad_tree:
-
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int matched = 0;
- size_t i;
- // Iterate through all in nodes linking matches
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
- if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
- matched = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-// This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
-// CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
-
-static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) {
- size_t i;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
- data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
- // If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
- // CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
- // be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
- // no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
- // because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
- // it later.
-#if 0
- if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
- && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
- continue;
-#endif
- // Look for matching nodes in previous level
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-// This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
-// policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
-
-static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- const ASN1_OBJECT *id, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- if (id == NULL) {
- id = node->data->valid_policy;
- }
- // Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
- // node.
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
-
- if (data == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
- // Curr may not have anyPolicy
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
- size_t i;
-
- if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ||
- !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
- // If no policy mapping: matched if one child present
- if (node->nchild) {
- return 1;
- }
- if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) {
- return 0;
- }
- // Add it
- } else {
- // If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
- if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) {
- return 1;
- }
- // Locate unmatched nodes
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
- if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) {
- continue;
- }
- if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- size_t i;
- // X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
-
- if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
-#if 0
-
- // Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
- // Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
- // may have multiple children
- if (node->nchild)
- continue;
-
- // Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
- // unmatched node.
- data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
- node_critical(node));
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return 0;
- // Curr may not have anyPolicy
- data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
- data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
- policy_data_free(data);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- }
- // Finally add link to anyPolicy
- if (last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-// Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
-// then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
-// have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
-
-static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) {
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- nodes = curr->nodes;
- if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
- // Delete any mapped data: see RFC 3280 XXXX
- if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- --curr;
- nodes = curr->nodes;
- for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
- if (node->nchild == 0) {
- node->parent->nchild--;
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
- }
- }
- if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
- if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) {
- curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
- }
- if (curr == tree->levels) {
- // If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty
- if (!curr->anyPolicy) {
- return 2;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
- X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) {
- if (!*pnodes) {
- *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
- if (!*pnodes) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes);
- if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-// Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
-// is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
-// set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
-// the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
-// of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
-// value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
-
-static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
- int i;
- size_t j;
- curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
-
- // If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy
- if (curr->anyPolicy) {
- if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) {
- return 0;
- }
- addnodes = pnodes;
- } else {
- // Add policies to authority set
- addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
- }
-
- curr = tree->levels;
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
- // If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
- // levels so end search.
- if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) {
- break;
- }
- curr++;
- for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
- if ((node->parent == anyptr) && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (addnodes == pnodes) {
- return 2;
- }
-
- *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) {
- size_t i;
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
-
- X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
- X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
-
- // Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
- // will happen if it is a leaf node.
-
- if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
- tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
- oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
- node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
- if (!node) {
- if (!anyPolicy) {
- continue;
- }
- // Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
- // from anyPolicy.
- extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
- if (!extra) {
- return 0;
- }
- extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
- extra->flags =
- POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
- }
- if (!tree->user_policies) {
- tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
- if (!tree->user_policies) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- int ret, i;
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
-
- for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
- cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) &&
- !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) {
- return 0;
- }
- tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
- ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
- if (ret != 1) {
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) {
- if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) {
- OPENSSL_free(node);
- }
-}
-
-void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) {
- if (!tree) {
- return;
- }
-
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
-
- for (int i = 0; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
- X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = &tree->levels[i];
- X509_free(curr->cert);
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
- policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
- }
-
- sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
- OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
- OPENSSL_free(tree);
-}
-
-//-
-// Application policy checking function.
-// Return codes:
-// 0 Internal Error.
-// 1 Successful.
-// -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
-// -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
-
-int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
- unsigned int flags) {
- int ret;
- int calc_ret;
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
- *ptree = NULL;
-
- *pexplicit_policy = 0;
- ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
-
- switch (ret) {
- // Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK
- case 2:
- return 1;
-
- // Some internal error
- case -1:
- return -1;
-
- // Some internal error
- case 0:
- return 0;
-
- // Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error
-
- case 6:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- return -2;
-
- // Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue
- case 5:
- *pexplicit_policy = 1;
- break;
-
- // Tree OK: continue
-
- case 1:
- if (!tree) {
- // tree_init() returns success and a null tree
- // if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
- // I'm not sure that returning success here is
- // correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
- // as an internal error which our caller
- // interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
-
- if (!tree) {
- goto error;
- }
- ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
-
- tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
-
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- // Return value 2 means tree empty
- if (ret == 2) {
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
- if (*pexplicit_policy) {
- return -2;
- } else {
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- // Tree is not empty: continue
-
- calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
-
- if (!calc_ret) {
- goto error;
- }
-
- ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
-
- if (calc_ret == 2) {
- sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
- }
-
- if (!ret) {
- goto error;
- }
-
-
- if (tree) {
- *ptree = tree;
- }
-
- if (*pexplicit_policy) {
- if (tree->flags & POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY) {
- nodes = tree->auth_policies;
- } else {
- nodes = tree->user_policies;
- }
- if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) {
- return -2;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-
-error:
- X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index e723cf3..84d458c 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -484,19 +484,3 @@
notice->exptext->length, notice->exptext->data);
}
}
-
-void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) {
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *dat = node->data;
-
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
-
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, dat->valid_policy);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "",
- node_data_critical(dat) ? "Critical" : "Non Critical");
- if (dat->qualifier_set) {
- print_qualifiers(out, dat->qualifier_set, indent + 2);
- } else {
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Qualifiers\n", indent + 2, "");
- }
-}
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509.h b/include/openssl/x509.h
index ee103ca..ec65cc5 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509.h
@@ -2921,5 +2921,6 @@
#define X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND 141
#define X509_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_OR_CRL_FOUND 142
#define X509_R_NO_CRL_FOUND 143
+#define X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 144
#endif
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
index 25a72d4..530444b 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
@@ -355,7 +355,6 @@
#define EXFLAG_CRITICAL 0x200
#define EXFLAG_PROXY 0x400
-#define EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY 0x800
#define EXFLAG_FRESHEST 0x1000
// Self signed
#define EXFLAG_SS 0x2000
