| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) { |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); |
| ret->x509_method = x509_method; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer_up_ref(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); |
| return buffer; |
| } |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); |
| |
| ret->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(cert->chain, buffer_up_ref, |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| |
| if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey); |
| ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| ret->key_method = cert->key_method; |
| ret->x509_method = cert->x509_method; |
| |
| if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) { |
| ret->sigalgs = |
| BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0])); |
| if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; |
| |
| ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; |
| ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; |
| |
| ret->x509_method->cert_dup(ret, cert); |
| |
| if (cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list = cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->ocsp_response != NULL) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->ocsp_response); |
| ret->ocsp_response = cert->ocsp_response; |
| } |
| |
| ret->sid_ctx_length = cert->sid_ctx_length; |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, cert->sid_ctx, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx)); |
| |
| ret->enable_early_data = cert->enable_early_data; |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| ssl_cert_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ |
| void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) { |
| if (cert == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| cert->x509_method->cert_clear(cert); |
| |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| cert->chain = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); |
| cert->privatekey = NULL; |
| cert->key_method = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); |
| c->x509_method->cert_free(c); |
| OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->ocsp_response); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(c); |
| } |
| |
| static void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| c->cert_cb = cb; |
| c->cert_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t { |
| leaf_cert_and_privkey_error, |
| leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok, |
| leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch, |
| }; |
| |
| /* check_leaf_cert_and_privkey checks whether the certificate in |leaf_buffer| |
| * and the private key in |privkey| are suitable and coherent. It returns |
| * |leaf_cert_and_privkey_error| and pushes to the error queue if a problem is |
| * found. If the certificate and private key are valid, but incoherent, it |
| * returns |leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch|. Otherwise it returns |
| * |leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok|. */ |
| static enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t check_leaf_cert_and_privkey( |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buffer, EVP_PKEY *privkey) { |
| enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_error; |
| |
| CBS cert_cbs; |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf_buffer, &cert_cbs); |
| EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs); |
| if (pubkey == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pubkey->type)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA |
| * certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension. */ |
| if (pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && |
| !ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&cert_cbs)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (privkey != NULL && |
| /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match. */ |
| !ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, privkey)) { |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok; |
| |
| out: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int cert_set_chain_and_key( |
| CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs, |
| EVP_PKEY *privkey, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) { |
| if (num_certs == 0 || |
| (privkey == NULL && privkey_method == NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (privkey != NULL && privkey_method != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(certs[0], privkey)) { |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error: |
| return 0; |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *certs_sk = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); |
| if (certs_sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) { |
| if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(certs_sk, certs[i])) { |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(certs_sk, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(certs[i]); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); |
| cert->privatekey = privkey; |
| if (privkey != NULL) { |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(privkey); |
| } |
| cert->key_method = privkey_method; |
| |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| cert->chain = certs_sk; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_chain_and_key(SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, |
| size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey, |
| const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) { |
| return cert_set_chain_and_key(ssl->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey, |
| privkey_method); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, |
| size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey, |
| const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) { |
| return cert_set_chain_and_key(ctx->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey, |
| privkey_method); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) { |
| switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(buffer, cert->privatekey)) { |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error: |
| return 0; |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch: |
| /* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key |
| * (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should |
| * be used, then |ssl_set_pkey|. */ |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); |
| cert->privatekey = NULL; |
| break; |
| case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| cert->x509_method->cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert); |
| |
| if (cert->chain != NULL) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0)); |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_set(cert->chain, 0, buffer); |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| cert->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); |
| if (cert->chain == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(cert->chain, buffer)) { |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain); |
| cert->chain = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len, |
| const uint8_t *der) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL); |
| if (buffer == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, buffer); |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL); |
| if (buffer == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, buffer); |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->cert->chain != NULL && |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0) != NULL && |
| ssl_has_private_key(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert, |
| EVP_PKEY **out_pubkey, |
| uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, |
| CBS *cbs, |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) { |
| *out_pubkey = NULL; |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ret = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| CBS certificate_list; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| CBS certificate; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) || |
| CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ret) == 0) { |
| *out_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate); |
| if (*out_pubkey == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */ |
| if (out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) { |
| SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf = |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, pool); |
| if (buf == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret, buf)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buf); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(*out_pubkey); |
| *out_pubkey = NULL; |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ret, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { |
| return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0); |
| } |
| |
| CBB certs; |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &certs)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = ssl->cert->chain; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i); |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) || |
| !CBB_flush(&certs)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl_cert_skip_to_spki parses a DER-encoded, X.509 certificate from |in| and |
| * positions |*out_tbs_cert| to cover the TBSCertificate, starting at the |
| * subjectPublicKeyInfo. */ |
| static int ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(const CBS *in, CBS *out_tbs_cert) { |
| /* From RFC 5280, section 4.1 |
| * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING } |
| |
| * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, |
| * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, |
| * signature AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * issuer Name, |
| * validity Validity, |
| * subject Name, |
| * subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, |
| * ... } */ |
| CBS buf = *in; |
| |
| CBS toplevel; |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&buf, &toplevel, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| CBS_len(&buf) != 0 || |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&toplevel, out_tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| /* version */ |
| !CBS_get_optional_asn1( |
| out_tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || |
| /* serialNumber */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) || |
| /* signature algorithm */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| /* issuer */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| /* validity */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| /* subject */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in) { |
| CBS buf = *in, tbs_cert; |
| if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return EVP_parse_public_key(&tbs_cert); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey, |
| const EVP_PKEY *privkey) { |
| if (EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(privkey)) { |
| /* We cannot check an opaque private key and have to trust that it |
| * matches. */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privkey)) { |
| case 1: |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| case 0: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); |
| break; |
| case -1: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); |
| break; |
| case -2: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| default: |
| assert(0); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) { |
| if (privkey == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->chain == NULL || |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cert_cbs; |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0), &cert_cbs); |
| EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs); |
| if (!pubkey) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| const int ok = ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, privkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(const CBS *in) { |
| CBS buf = *in; |
| |
| CBS tbs_cert, outer_extensions; |
| int has_extensions; |
| if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert) || |
| /* subjectPublicKeyInfo */ |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| /* issuerUniqueID */ |
| !CBS_get_optional_asn1( |
| &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1) || |
| /* subjectUniqueID */ |
| !CBS_get_optional_asn1( |
| &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2) || |
| !CBS_get_optional_asn1( |
| &tbs_cert, &outer_extensions, &has_extensions, |
| CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3)) { |
| goto parse_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!has_extensions) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS extensions; |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&outer_extensions, &extensions, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { |
| goto parse_err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { |
| CBS extension, oid, contents; |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&extensions, &extension, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || |
| (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&extension, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) && |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, NULL, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) || |
| !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &contents, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { |
| goto parse_err; |
| } |
| |
| static const uint8_t kKeyUsageOID[3] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f}; |
| if (CBS_len(&oid) != sizeof(kKeyUsageOID) || |
| OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), kKeyUsageOID, sizeof(kKeyUsageOID)) != |
| 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| CBS bit_string; |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &bit_string, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) || |
| CBS_len(&contents) != 0) { |
| goto parse_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* This is the KeyUsage extension. See |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 */ |
| if (!CBS_is_valid_asn1_bitstring(&bit_string)) { |
| goto parse_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(&bit_string, 0)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* No KeyUsage extension found. */ |
| return 1; |
| |
| parse_err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) * |
| ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *const pool = ssl->ctx->pool; |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ret = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| CBS child; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { |
| CBS distinguished_name; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&distinguished_name, pool); |
| if (buffer == NULL || |
| !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret, buffer)) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->check_client_CA_list(ret)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ret, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
| CBB child, name_cbb; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA; |
| if (names == NULL) { |
| names = ssl->ctx->client_CA; |
| } |
| if (names == NULL) { |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names); i++) { |
| const CRYPTO_BUFFER *name = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(names, i); |
| |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&name_cbb, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(name), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(name))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), |
| void *arg) { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL *ssl) { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return session->certs; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs(const SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey, |
| const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION); |
| |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ |
| if (!(hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(pkey))) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check key usages for all key types but RSA. This is needed to distinguish |
| * ECDH certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates. In |
| * principle, we should check RSA key usages based on cipher, but this breaks |
| * buggy antivirus deployments. Other key types are always used for signing. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Get more recent data on RSA key usages. */ |
| if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| CBS leaf_cbs; |
| CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf)); |
| if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&leaf_cbs)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| /* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */ |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); |
| uint16_t group_id; |
| if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id( |
| &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) || |
| !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) || |
| EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_on_certificate_selected(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { |
| SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { |
| /* Nothing to do. */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CBS leaf; |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0), &leaf); |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(hs->local_pubkey); |
| hs->local_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&leaf); |
| return hs->local_pubkey != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *list, |
| size_t list_len) { |
| CBS sct_list; |
| CBS_init(&sct_list, list, list_len); |
| if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct_list)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list); |
| cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list = |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(CBS_data(&sct_list), CBS_len(&sct_list), NULL); |
| return cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list, |
| size_t list_len) { |
| return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ctx->cert, list, list_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *list, |
| size_t list_len) { |
| return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl->cert, list, list_len); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response, |
| size_t response_len) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ctx->cert->ocsp_response); |
| ctx->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL); |
| return ctx->cert->ocsp_response != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *response, |
| size_t response_len) { |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ssl->cert->ocsp_response); |
| ssl->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL); |
| return ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL; |
| } |