blob: 210e57d803c69a660a9ea3540a1966cfa0227f3b [file] [log] [blame]
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <algorithm>
#include <functional>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/pool.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
std::string GetTestData(const char *path);
static const char kCrossSigningRootPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRootCAPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRootCrossSignedPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kIntermediatePEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kLeafPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kForgeryPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kExamplePSSCert is an example RSA-PSS self-signed certificate, signed with
// the default hash functions.
static const char kExamplePSSCert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kBadPSSCertPEM is a self-signed RSA-PSS certificate with bad parameters.
static const char kBadPSSCertPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRSAKey[] = R"(
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
)";
static const char kP256Key[] = R"(
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgBw8IcnrUoEqc3VnJ
TYlodwi1b8ldMHcO6NHJzgqLtGqhRANCAATmK2niv2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4N
Rvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYaHPUdfvGULUvPciLB
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
)";
// kCRLTestRoot is a test root certificate. It has private key:
//
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3BS/dUBpbrzd1aeFzN
// lI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY
// 07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWpuRqO6rctN9qUoMlT
// IAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n8H922qmvPNA9idmX
// 9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbLP2o9orxGx7aCtnnB
// ZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABAoIBAQCJF9MTHfHGkk+/
// DwCXlA0Wg0e6hBuHl10iNobYkMWIl/xXjOknhYiqOqb181py76472SVC5ERprC+r
// Lf0PXzqKuA117mnkwT2bYLCL9Skf8WEhoFLQNbVlloF6wYjqXcYgKYKh8HgQbZl4
// aLg2YQl2NADTNABsUWj/4H2WEelsODVviqfFs725lFg9KHDI8zxAZXLzDt/M9uVL
// GxJiX12tr0AwaeAFZ1oPM/y+LznM3N3+Ht3jHHw3jZ/u8Z1RdAmdpu3bZ6tbwGBr
// 9edsH5rKkm9aBvMrY7eX5VHqaqyRNFyG152ZOJh4XiiFG7EmgTPCpaHo50Y018Re
// grVtk+FBAoGBANY3lY+V8ZOwMxSHes+kTnoimHO5Ob7nxrOC71i27x+4HHsYUeAr
// /zOOghiDIn+oNkuiX5CIOWZKx159Bp65CPpCbTb/fh+HYnSgXFgCw7XptycO7LXM
// 5GwR5jSfpfzBFdYxjxoUzDMFBwTEYRTm0HkUHkH+s+ajjw5wqqbcGLcfAoGBAMM8
// DKW6Tb66xsf708f0jonAjKYTLZ+WOcwsBEWSFHoY8dUjvW5gqx5acHTEsc5ZTeh4
// BCFLa+Mn9cuJWVJNs09k7Xb2PNl92HQ4GN2vbdkJhExbkT6oLDHg1hVD0w8KLfz1
// lTAW6pS+6CdOHMEJpvqx89EgU/1GgIQ1fXYczE75AoGAKeJoXdDFkUjsU+FBhAPu
// TDcjc80Nm2QaF9NMFR5/lsYa236f06MGnQAKM9zADBHJu/Qdl1brUjLg1HrBppsr
// RDNkw1IlSOjhuUf5hkPUHGd8Jijm440SRIcjabqla8wdBupdvo2+d2NOQgJbsQiI
// ToQ+fkzcxAXK3Nnuo/1436UCgYBjLH7UNOZHS8OsVM0I1r8NVKVdu4JCfeJQR8/H
// s2P5ffBir+wLRMnH+nMDreMQiibcPxMCArkERAlE4jlgaJ38Z62E76KLbLTmnJRt
// EC9Bv+bXjvAiHvWMRMUbOj/ddPNVez7Uld+FvdBaHwDWQlvzHzBWfBCOKSEhh7Z6
// qDhUqQKBgQDPMDx2i5rfmQp3imV9xUcCkIRsyYQVf8Eo7NV07IdUy/otmksgn4Zt
// Lbf3v2dvxOpTNTONWjp2c+iUQo8QxJCZr5Sfb21oQ9Ktcrmc/CY7LeBVDibXwxdM
// vRG8kBzvslFWh7REzC3u06GSVhyKDfW93kN2cKVwGoahRlhj7oHuZQ==
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kCRLTestRoot[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kCRLTestLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx
EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ
BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa
MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC
b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA
A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9
8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP
ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx
e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX
+saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu
OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC
MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl
MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3
lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw
XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ
ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh
lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql
ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC
5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG
tjJMFw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kBasicCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
static const char kRevokedCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
static const char kBadIssuerCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kKnownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point
// extension.
static const char kKnownCriticalCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension.
static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution
// point extension followed by an unknown critical extension
static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kBadExtensionCRL is kBasicCRL but with an incorrectly-encoded issuing
// distribution point extension.
static const char kBadExtensionCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kAlgorithmMismatchCRL is kBasicCRL but with mismatched AlgorithmIdentifiers
// in the outer structure and signed portion. The signature reflects the signed
// portion.
static const char kAlgorithmMismatchCRL[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with mismatched AlgorithmIdentifiers
// in the outer structure and signed portion. The signature reflects the outer
// structure.
static const char kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2[] = R"(
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
)";
// kEd25519Cert is a self-signed Ed25519 certificate.
static const char kEd25519Cert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kEd25519CertNull is an invalid self-signed Ed25519 with an explicit NULL in
// the signature algorithm.
static const char kEd25519CertNull[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBlTCCAUWgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAcGAytlcAUAMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFV
MRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRz
IFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYD
VQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQg
V2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPa
piMlrwIaaPcHURqjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAf
BgNVHSMEGDAWgBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAcG
AytlcAUAA0EA70uefNocdJohkKPNROKVyBuBD3LXMyvmdTklsaxSRY3PcZdOohlr
recgVPpVS7B+d9g4EwtZXIh4lodTBDHBBw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kX25519 is the example X25519 certificate from
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.2
static const char kX25519Cert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBLDCB36ADAgECAghWAUdKKo3DMDAFBgMrZXAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOSUVURiBUZX
N0IERlbW8wHhcNMTYwODAxMTIxOTI0WhcNNDAxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQD
DA5JRVRGIFRlc3QgRGVtbzAqMAUGAytlbgMhAIUg8AmJMKdUdIt93LQ+91oNvzoNJj
ga9OukqY6qm05qo0UwQzAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQEAMA4GA1UdDwEBAAQEAwIDCDAg
BgNVHQ4BAQAEFgQUmx9e7e0EM4Xk97xiPFl1uQvIuzswBQYDK2VwA0EAryMB/t3J5v
/BzKc9dNZIpDmAgs3babFOTQbs+BolzlDUwsPrdGxO3YNGhW7Ibz3OGhhlxXrCe1Cg
w1AH9efZBw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kSANTypesLeaf is a leaf certificate (signed by |kSANTypesRoot|) which
// contains SANS for example.com, test@example.com, 127.0.0.1, and
// https://example.com/. (The latter is useless for now since crypto/x509
// doesn't deal with URI SANs directly.)
static const char kSANTypesLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIICWwIBAAKBgQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+
// l3mYQPtPbRT9KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB
// 1NkrKyQjd1scO711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQAB
// AoGACwf7z0i1DxOI2zSwFimLghfyCSp8mgT3fbZ3Wj0SebYu6ZUffjceneM/AVrq
// gGYHYLOVHcWJqfkl7X3hPo9SDhzLx0mM545/q21ZWCwjhswH7WiCEqV2/zeDO9WU
// NIO1VU0VoLm0AQ7ZvwnyB+fpgF9kkkDtbBJW7XWrfNVtlnECQQD97YENpEJ3X1kj
// 3rrkrHWDkKAyoWWY1i8Fm7LnganC9Bv6AVwgn5ZlE/479aWHF8vbOFEA3pFPiNZJ
// t9FTCfpJAkEA3RCXjGI0Y6GALFLwEs+nL/XZAfJaIpJEZVLCVosYQOSaMS4SchfC
// GGYVquT7ZgKk9uvz89Fg87OtBMWS9lrkHwJADGkGLKeBhBoJ3kHtem2fVK3F1pOi
// xoR5SdnhNYVVyaxqjZ5xZTrHe+stOrr3uxGDqhQniVZXXb6/Ul0Egv1y2QJAVg/h
// kAujba4wIhFf2VLyOZ+yjil1ocPj0LZ5Zgvcs1bMGJ1hHP3W2HzVrqRaowoggui1
// HpTC891dXGA2qKYV7QJAFDmT2A7OVvh3y4AEgzVwHrDmCMwMHKjCIntS7fjxrJnF
// YvJUG1zoHwUVrxxbR3DbpTODlktLcl/0b97D0IkH3w==
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kSANTypesRoot[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIICXAIBAAKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/V
// Imi2XeJM2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2
// m8PX+plZw7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQAB
// AoGALEF5daZqc+aEsp8X1yky3nsoheyPL0kqSBWii33IFemZgKcSaRnAoqjPWWLS
// 8dHj0I/4rej2MW8iuezVSpDak9tK5boHORC3w4p/wifkizQkLt1DANxTVbzcKvrt
// aZ7LjVaKkhjRJbLddniowFHkkWVbUccjvzcUd7Y2VuLbAhECQQDq4FE88aHio8zg
// bxSd0PwjEFwLYQTR19u812SoR8PmR6ofIL+pDwOV+fVs+OGcAAOgkhIukOrksQ4A
// 1cKtnyhXAkEA/gRI+u3tZ7UE1twIkBfZ6IvCdRodkPqHAYIxMRLzL+MhyZt4MEGc
// Ngb/F6U9/WOBFnoR/PI7IwE3ejutzKcL+QJBAKh+6eilk7QKPETZi1m3/dmNt+p1
// 3EZJ65pqjwxmB3Rg/vs7vCMk4TarTdSyKu+F1xRPFfoP/mK3Xctdjj6NyhsCQAYF
// 7/0TOzfkUPMPUJyqFB6xgbDpJ55ScnUUsznoqx+NkTWInDb4t02IqO/UmT2y6FKy
// Hk8TJ1fTJY+ebqaVp3ECQApx9gQ+n0zIhx97FMUuiRse73xkcW4+pZ8nF+8DmeQL
// /JKuuFGmzkG+rUbXFmo/Zg2ozVplw71NnQJ4znPsf7A=
// -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
// The following four certificates were generated with this Go program, varying
// |includeNetscapeExtension| and defining rootKeyPEM and rootCertPEM to be
// strings containing the kSANTypesRoot, above.
// package main
// import (
// "crypto/ecdsa"
// "crypto/elliptic"
// "crypto/rand"
// "crypto/x509"
// "crypto/x509/pkix"
// "encoding/asn1"
// "encoding/pem"
// "math/big"
// "os"
// "time"
// )
// const includeNetscapeExtension = true
// func main() {
// block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM))
// rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
// block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM))
// root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
// interTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "No Basic Constraints (Netscape)",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// }
// if includeNetscapeExtension {
// interTemplate.ExtraExtensions = []pkix.Extension{
// pkix.Extension{
// Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 1, 1}),
// Value: []byte{0x03, 0x02, 2, 0x04},
// },
// }
// } else {
// interTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign
// }
// interKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// interDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, interTemplate, root, &interKey.PublicKey, rootPriv)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: interDER})
// inter, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(interDER)
// leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "Leaf from CA with no Basic Constraints",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// BasicConstraintsValid: true,
// }
// leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, inter, &leafKey.PublicKey, interKey)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER})
// }
// kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains
// certSign in the keyUsage.
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBUDCB96ADAgECAgEDMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMB8xHTAbBgNVBAMTFE5vIEJhc2lj
IENvbnN0cmFpbnRzMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAx
MS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNpYyBDb25zdHJhaW50
czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEsYPMwzdJKjB+2gpC90ib2ilHoB
w/arQ6ikUX0CNUDDaKaOu/jF39ogzVlg4lDFrjCKShSfCCcrwgONv70IZGijEDAO
MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIgbV7R99yM+okXSIs6Fp3o
eCOXiDL60IBxaTOcLS44ywcCIQDbn87Gj5cFgHBYAkzdHqDsyGXkxQTHDq9jmX24
Djy3Zw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains
// a Netscape certificate-type extension that asserts a type of "SSL CA".
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBXDCCAQKgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAqMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9ObyBCYXNp
YyBDb25zdHJhaW50cyAoTmV0c2NhcGUpMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkw
MTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNp
YyBDb25zdHJhaW50czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDlJKolDu3R2
tPqSDycr0QJcWhxdBv76V0EEVflcHRxED6vAioTEcnQszt1OfKtBZvjlo0yp6i6Q
DaYit0ZInmWjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAJsh
aZL6BHeEfoUBj1oZ2Ln91qzj3UCVMJ+vrmwAFdYyAiA3wp2JphgchvmoUFuzPXwj
XyPwWPbymSTpzKhB4xB7qQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and a SAN list of *.host2.test and
// foo.host3.test.
static const char kCommonNameWithSANs[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and no SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithoutSANs[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kCommonNameWithEmailSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and the email address test@host2.test in the
// SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithEmailSAN[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kCommonNameWithIPSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// *.host1.test as the common name and the IP address 127.0.0.1 in the
// SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameWithIPSAN[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kConstrainedIntermediate is an intermediate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with
// permitted DNS names of permitted1.test and foo.permitted2.test and an
// excluded DNS name of excluded.permitted1.test. Its private key is:
//
// -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
// MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgTXUM4tJWM7OzATty
// JhNOfIv/d8heWFBeKOfMR+RfaROhRANCAASbbbWYiN6mn+BCpg4XNpibOH0D/DN4
// kZ5C/Ml2YVomC9T83OKk2CzB8fPAabPb4P4Vv+fIabpEfjWS5nzKLY1y
// -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
static const char kConstrainedIntermediate[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kCommonNamePermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is permitted by the name
// constraints.
static const char kCommonNamePermittedLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv
bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw
MTAwMDAwMFowPjEeMBwGA1UEChMVQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgcGVybWl0dGVkMRwwGgYD
VQQDExNmb28ucGVybWl0dGVkMS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD
QgAENX5Ycs8q8MRzPYUz6DqLHhJR3wcmniFRgkiEa7MxE/mRe00y0VGwH7xi7Aoc
emXPrtD4JwN5bssbcxWGAKYYzaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQD
AgNJADBGAiEAtsnWuRQXtw2xbieC78Y8SVEtTjcZUx8uZyQe1GPLfGICIQDR4fNY
yg3PC94ydPNQZVsFxAne32CbonWWsokalTFpUQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kCommonNamePermitted[] = "foo.permitted1.test";
// kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name
// constraints.
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBazCCARCgAwIBAgIBBDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv
bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw
MTAwMDAwMFowQTEiMCAGA1UEChMZQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IHBlcm1pdHRlZDEb
MBkGA1UEAxMSbm90LXBlcm1pdHRlZC50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0D
AQcDQgAEzfghKuWf0JoXb0Drp09C3yXMSQQ1byt+AUaymvsHOWsxQ9v1Q+vkF/IM
HRqGTk2TyxrB2iClVEn/Uu+YtYox1KMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjO
PQQDAgNJADBGAiEAxaUslxmoWL1tIvnDz7gDkto/HcmdU0jHVuUQLXcCG8wCIQCN
5xZjitlCQU8UB5qSu9wH4B+0JcVO3Ss4Az76HEJWMw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kCommonNameNotPermitted[] = "not-permitted.test";
// kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name
// constraints but it has a SAN list.
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs[] = "not-permitted.test";
// kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by
// kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not a DNS name.
static const char kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBYTCCAQagAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv
bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw
MTAwMDAwMFowNzEcMBoGA1UEChMTQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IEROUzEXMBUGA1UE
AxMOTm90IGEgRE5TIG5hbWUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASnueyc
Zxtnw5ke2J2T0/LwAK37auQP/RSFd9mem+BJVbgviawtAlignJmafp7Zw4/GdYEJ
Vm8qlriOJtluvXGcoxAwDjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYC
IQChUAmVNI39VHe0zemRE09VDcSEgOxr1nTvjLcg/Q8pVQIhAJYZnJI0YZAi05QH
RHNlAkTK2TnUaVn3fGSylaLiFS1r
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kCommonNameNotDNS[] = "Not a DNS name";
// The following six certificates are issued by |kSANTypesRoot| and have
// different extended key usage values. They were created with the following
// Go program:
//
// func main() {
// block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM))
// rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
// block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM))
// root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
//
// leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
// SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3),
// Subject: pkix.Name{
// CommonName: "EKU msSGC",
// },
// NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
// BasicConstraintsValid: true,
// ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{FILL IN HERE},
// }
// leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
// leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, root, &leafKey.PublicKey, rootPriv)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER})
// }
static const char kMicrosoftSGCCert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kNetscapeSGCCert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBszCCARygAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp
bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y
MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C
AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE3NbT+TnBfq1DWJCezjaUL52YhDU7cOkI2S2PoWgJ1v7x
kKLwBonUFZjppZs69SyBHeJdti+KoJ3qTW+hCG08EaNDMEEwFAYDVR0lBA0wCwYJ
YIZIAYb4QgQBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQE
J4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBuiyVcfazekHkCWksxdFmjPmMtWCxFjkzc
8VBxFE0CfSHQAfZ8J7tXd1FbAq/eXdZvvo8v0JB4sOM4Ex1ob1fuvDFHdSAHAD7W
dhKIjJyzVojoxjCjyue0XMeEPl7RiqbdxoS/R5HFAqAF0T2OeQAqP9gTpOXoau1M
RQHX6HQJJg==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kServerEKUCert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBvjCCASegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp
bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y
MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C
AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEDO1MYPxq+U4oXMIK8UnsS4C696wpcu4UOmcMJJ5CUd5Z
ZpJShN6kYKnrb3GK/6xEgbUGntmrzSRG5FYqk6QgD6NOMEwwHwYDVR0lBBgwFgYI
KwYBBQUHAwEGCisGAQQBgjcKAwMwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBA
N9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAHOu2IBa4lHzVGS36HxS
SejUE87Ji1ysM6BgkYbfxfS9MuV+J3UnqH57JjbH/3CFl4ZDWceF6SGBSCn8LqKa
KHpwoNFU3zA99iQzVJgbUyN0PbKwHEanLyKDJZyFk71R39ToxhSNQgaQYjZYCy1H
5V9oXd1bodEqVsOZ/mur24Ku
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kAnyEKU[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBrjCCARegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp
bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y
MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C
AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE9nsLABDporlTvx1OBUc4Hd5vxfX+8nS/OhbHmKtFLYNu
1CLLrImbwMQYD2G+PgLO6sQHmASq2jmJKp6ZWsRkTqM+MDwwDwYDVR0lBAgwBgYE
VR0lADAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEw
DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAxgjgn1SAzQ+2GeCicZ5ndvVhKIeFelGCQ989XTVq
uUbAYBW6v8GXNuVzoXYxDgNSanF6U+w+INrJ6daKVrIxAxdk9QFgBXqJoupuRAA3
/OqnmYux0EqOTLbTK1P8DhaiaD0KV6dWGUwzqsgBmPkZ0lgNaPjvb1mKV3jhBkjz
L6A=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kNoEKU[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// CertFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |X509*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> CertFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>(
PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// CRLFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |X509_CRL*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> CRLFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL>(
PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// PrivateKeyFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated pem block and returns an
// |EVP_PKEY*|.
static bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> PrivateKeyFromPEM(const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(
BIO_new_mem_buf(const_cast<char *>(pem), strlen(pem)));
return bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>(
PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
// CertsToStack converts a vector of |X509*| to an OpenSSL STACK_OF(X509),
// bumping the reference counts for each certificate in question.
static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> CertsToStack(
const std::vector<X509 *> &certs) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> stack(sk_X509_new_null());
if (!stack) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto cert : certs) {
if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(cert))) {
return nullptr;
}
}
return stack;
}
// CRLsToStack converts a vector of |X509_CRL*| to an OpenSSL
// STACK_OF(X509_CRL), bumping the reference counts for each CRL in question.
static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> CRLsToStack(
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> stack(sk_X509_CRL_new_null());
if (!stack) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto crl : crls) {
if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(crl))) {
return nullptr;
}
}
return stack;
}
static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots,
const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates,
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls, unsigned long flags,
bool use_additional_untrusted,
std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = nullptr) {
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> roots_stack(CertsToStack(roots));
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> intermediates_stack(
CertsToStack(intermediates));
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> crls_stack(CRLsToStack(crls));
if (!roots_stack ||
!intermediates_stack ||
!crls_stack) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new());
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE> store(X509_STORE_new());
if (!ctx ||
!store) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
if (use_additional_untrusted) {
X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted(store.get(),
intermediates_stack.get());
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(
ctx.get(), store.get(), leaf,
use_additional_untrusted ? nullptr : intermediates_stack.get())) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx.get(), roots_stack.get());
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx.get(), crls_stack.get());
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (param == nullptr) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16);
if (configure_callback) {
configure_callback(param);
}
if (flags) {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(ctx.get(), param);
ERR_clear_error();
if (X509_verify_cert(ctx.get()) != 1) {
return X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx.get());
}
return X509_V_OK;
}
static int Verify(X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots,
const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates,
const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls,
unsigned long flags = 0) {
const int r1 =
Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, false, nullptr);
const int r2 =
Verify(leaf, roots, intermediates, crls, flags, true, nullptr);
if (r1 != r2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Verify with, and without, use_additional_untrusted gave different "
"results: %d vs %d.\n",
r1, r2);
return false;
}
return r1;
}
TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cross_signing_root(CertFromPEM(kCrossSigningRootPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_cross_signed(CertFromPEM(kRootCrossSignedPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(kIntermediatePEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_self_signed(
CertFromPEM(kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_no_key_usage(CertFromPEM(kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> forgery(CertFromPEM(kForgeryPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cross_signing_root);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(root_cross_signed);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_self_signed);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(forgery);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_no_key_usage);
std::vector<X509*> empty;
std::vector<X509_CRL*> empty_crls;
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), empty, empty, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), empty, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get(), root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
/* This is the “altchains” test – we remove the cross-signing CA but include
* the cross-sign in the intermediates. */
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, empty_crls,
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get()}, empty_crls));
/* Test that one cannot skip Basic Constraints checking with a contorted set
* of roots and intermediates. This is a regression test for CVE-2015-1793. */
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(),
{intermediate_self_signed.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get(), intermediate.get()}, empty_crls));
}
static const char kHostname[] = "example.com";
static const char kWrongHostname[] = "example2.com";
static const char kEmail[] = "test@example.com";
static const char kWrongEmail[] = "test2@example.com";
static const uint8_t kIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 1};
static const uint8_t kWrongIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 2};
static const char kIPString[] = "127.0.0.1";
static const char kWrongIPString[] = "127.0.0.2";
TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithX509PARAM) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls;
struct X509Test {
const char *correct_value;
size_t correct_value_len;
const char *incorrect_value;
size_t incorrect_value_len;
int (*func)(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, const char *, size_t);
int mismatch_error;
};
const std::vector<X509Test> kTests = {
{kHostname, strlen(kHostname), kWrongHostname, strlen(kWrongHostname),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH},
{kEmail, strlen(kEmail), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < kTests.size(); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
const X509Test &test = kTests[i];
// The correct value should work.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.correct_value,
test.correct_value_len));
}));
// The wrong value should trigger a verification error.
ASSERT_EQ(test.mismatch_error,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.incorrect_value,
test.incorrect_value_len));
}));
// Passing zero as the length, unlike OpenSSL, should trigger an error and
// should cause verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, 0));
}));
// Passing an empty value should be an error when setting and should cause
// verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, nullptr, 0));
}));
// Passing a value with embedded NULs should also be an error and should
// also cause verification to fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, "a", 2));
}));
}
// IP addresses work slightly differently:
// The correct value should still work.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0,
false, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(
param, kIP, sizeof(kIP)));
}));
// Incorrect values should still fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kWrongIP,
sizeof(kWrongIP)));
}));
// Zero length values should trigger an error when setting and cause
// verification to always fail.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kIP, 0));
}));
// ... and so should NULL values.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, false,
[](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, nullptr, 0));
}));
// Zero bytes in an IP address are, of course, fine. This is tested above
// because |kIP| contains zeros.
}
TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithCheckFunctions) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf));
EXPECT_EQ(
1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, strlen(kHostname), 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname,
strlen(kWrongHostname), 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, strlen(kEmail), 0));
EXPECT_NE(1,
X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), 0));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, sizeof(kIP), 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, sizeof(kWrongIP), 0));
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kIPString, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kWrongIPString, 0));
// OpenSSL supports passing zero as the length for host and email. We do not
// and it should always fail.
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, 0, 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, 0, 0, nullptr));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, 0, 0));
EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, 0, 0));
// Unlike all the other functions, |X509_check_ip_asc| doesn't take a length,
// so it cannot be zero.
}
TEST(X509Test, TestCRL) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestLeaf));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> basic_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> revoked_crl(CRLFromPEM(kRevokedCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> bad_issuer_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBadIssuerCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> known_critical_crl(CRLFromPEM(kKnownCriticalCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl(
CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl2(
CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL2));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> algorithm_mismatch_crl(
CRLFromPEM(kAlgorithmMismatchCRL));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> algorithm_mismatch_crl2(
CRLFromPEM(kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(basic_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(revoked_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_issuer_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(known_critical_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl2);
ASSERT_TRUE(algorithm_mismatch_crl);
ASSERT_TRUE(algorithm_mismatch_crl2);
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{basic_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{basic_crl.get(), revoked_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls;
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, empty_crls,
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{bad_issuer_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{known_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{unknown_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{unknown_critical_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{algorithm_mismatch_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()},
{algorithm_mismatch_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
// Parsing kBadExtensionCRL should fail.
EXPECT_FALSE(CRLFromPEM(kBadExtensionCRL));
}
TEST(X509Test, ManyNamesAndConstraints) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_constraints(CertFromPEM(
GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_constraints.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_constraints);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names1(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names1.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names1);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names2(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names2.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names2);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names3(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names3.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(many_names3);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names1(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names1.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names1);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names2(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names2.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names2);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names3(
CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names3.pem").c_str()));
ASSERT_TRUE(some_names3);
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
Verify(many_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()},
{many_constraints.get()}, {}));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPSS) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kExamplePSSCert));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPSSBadParameters) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kBadPSSCertPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519Cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519BadParameters) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519CertNull));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
ASSERT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(X509Test, TestX25519) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kX25519Cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get()), EVP_PKEY_X25519);
constexpr uint8_t kExpectedPublicValue[] = {
0x85, 0x20, 0xf0, 0x09, 0x89, 0x30, 0xa7, 0x54, 0x74, 0x8b, 0x7d,
0xdc, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x0d, 0x26, 0x38,
0x1a, 0xf4, 0xeb, 0xa4, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x6a,
};
uint8_t public_value[sizeof(kExpectedPublicValue)];
size_t public_value_size = sizeof(public_value);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), public_value,
&public_value_size));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPublicValue),
Bytes(public_value, public_value_size));
}
static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ReencodeCertificate(X509 *cert) {
uint8_t *der = nullptr;
int len = i2d_X509(cert, &der);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der);
if (len <= 0) {
return nullptr;
}
const uint8_t *inp = der;
return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>(d2i_X509(nullptr, &inp, len));
}
static bool SignatureRoundTrips(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
// Make a certificate like signed with |md_ctx|'s settings.'
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
if (!cert || !X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx)) {
return false;
}
// Ensure that |pkey| may still be used to verify the resulting signature. All
// settings in |md_ctx| must have been serialized appropriately.
if (!X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey)) {
return false;
}
// Re-encode the certificate. X509 objects contain a cached TBSCertificate
// encoding and |X509_sign_ctx| should have refreshed that cache.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> copy = ReencodeCertificate(cert.get());
return copy && X509_verify(copy.get(), pkey);
}
TEST(X509Test, RSASign) {
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
// Test PKCS#1 v1.5.
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
// Test RSA-PSS with custom parameters.
md_ctx.Reset();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, EVP_sha512()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
// RSA-PSS with salt length matching hash length should work when passing in
// -1 or the value explicitly.
md_ctx.Reset();
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, -1));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
md_ctx.Reset();
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
pkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, 32));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get()));
}
// Test the APIs for manually signing a certificate.
TEST(X509Test, RSASignManual) {
const int kSignatureNID = NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption;
const EVP_MD *kSignatureHash = EVP_sha384();
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ALGOR> algor(X509_ALGOR_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(algor);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ALGOR_set0(algor.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(kSignatureNID),
V_ASN1_NULL, nullptr));
// Test certificates made both from other certificates and |X509_new|, in case
// there are bugs in filling in fields from different states. (Parsed
// certificate contain a TBSCertificate cache, and |X509_new| initializes
// fields based on complex ASN.1 template logic.)
for (bool new_cert : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(new_cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert;
if (new_cert) {
cert.reset(X509_new());
// Fill in some fields for the certificate arbitrarily.
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_version(cert.get(), X509V3_VERSION));
EXPECT_TRUE(ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(cert.get()), 1));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert.get()), 0));
EXPECT_TRUE(
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert.get()), 60 * 60 * 24));
X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subject, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("Test"), -1,
-1, 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_issuer_name(cert.get(), subject));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_pubkey(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
} else {
// Extract fields from a parsed certificate.
cert = CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
// We should test with a different algorithm from what is already in the
// certificate.
EXPECT_NE(kSignatureNID, X509_get_signature_nid(cert.get()));
}
// Fill in the signature algorithm.
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_set1_signature_algo(cert.get(), algor.get()));
// Extract the TBSCertificiate.
uint8_t *tbs_cert = nullptr;
int tbs_cert_len = i2d_re_X509_tbs(cert.get(), &tbs_cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_tbs_cert(tbs_cert);
ASSERT_GT(tbs_cert_len, 0);
// Generate a signature externally and fill it in.
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, kSignatureHash,
nullptr, pkey.get()));
size_t sig_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, &sig_len, tbs_cert,
tbs_cert_len));
std::vector<uint8_t> sig(sig_len);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), sig.data(), &sig_len, tbs_cert,
tbs_cert_len));
sig.resize(sig_len);
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_set1_signature_value(cert.get(), sig.data(), sig.size()));
// Check the signature.
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
// Re-encode the certificate. X509 objects contain a cached TBSCertificate
// encoding and |i2d_re_X509_tbs| should have refreshed that cache.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> copy = ReencodeCertificate(cert.get());
ASSERT_TRUE(copy);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(copy.get(), pkey.get()));
}
}
TEST(X509Test, Ed25519Sign) {
uint8_t pub_bytes[32], priv_bytes[64];
ED25519_keypair(pub_bytes, priv_bytes);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pub(
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, pub_bytes, 32));
ASSERT_TRUE(pub);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> priv(
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, priv_bytes, 32));
ASSERT_TRUE(priv);
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, priv.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pub.get()));
}
static bool PEMToDER(bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_len,
const char *pem) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem)));
if (!bio) {
return false;
}
char *name, *header;
uint8_t *data;
long data_len;
if (!PEM_read_bio(bio.get(), &name, &header, &data, &data_len)) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to read PEM data.\n");
return false;
}
OPENSSL_free(name);
OPENSSL_free(header);
out->reset(data);
*out_len = data_len;
return true;
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBuffer) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
const uint8_t *enc_pointer = root->cert_info->enc.enc;
const uint8_t *buf_pointer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get());
ASSERT_GE(enc_pointer, buf_pointer);
ASSERT_LT(enc_pointer, buf_pointer + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get()));
buf.reset();
/* This ensures the X509 took a reference to |buf|, otherwise this will be a
* reference to free memory and ASAN should notice. */
ASSERT_EQ(0x30, enc_pointer[0]);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferWithTrailingData) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> trailing_data(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]);
OPENSSL_memcpy(trailing_data.get(), data.get(), data_len);
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_trailing_data(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(trailing_data.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf_trailing_data);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_trailing_data(
X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_trailing_data.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(root_trailing_data);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferModified) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> fourty_two(ASN1_INTEGER_new());
ASN1_INTEGER_set(fourty_two.get(), 42);
X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), fourty_two.get());
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr));
X509_CINF_set_modified(root->cert_info);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr));
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferReused) {
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
size_t data2_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data2;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM));
X509 *x509p = root.get();
const uint8_t *inp = data2.get();
X509 *ret = d2i_X509(&x509p, &inp, data2_len);
ASSERT_EQ(root.get(), ret);
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf);
// Free |data2| and ensure that |root| took its own copy. Otherwise the
// following will trigger a use-after-free.
data2.reset();
uint8_t *i2d = nullptr;
int i2d_len = i2d_X509(root.get(), &i2d);
ASSERT_GE(i2d_len, 0);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> i2d_storage(i2d);
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM));
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data2_len), i2d_len);
ASSERT_EQ(0, OPENSSL_memcmp(data2.get(), i2d, i2d_len));
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->buf);
}
TEST(X509Test, TestFailedParseFromBuffer) {
static const uint8_t kNonsense[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(kNonsense, sizeof(kNonsense), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(cert);
ERR_clear_error();
// Test a buffer with trailing data.
size_t data_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data;
ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM));
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data_with_trailing_byte(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]);
OPENSSL_memcpy(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data.get(), data_len);
data_with_trailing_byte[data_len] = 0;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_with_trailing_byte(
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(buf_with_trailing_byte);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(
X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_with_trailing_byte.get()));
ASSERT_FALSE(root);
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(X509Test, TestPrintUTCTIME) {
static const struct {
const char *val, *want;
} asn1_utctime_tests[] = {
{"", "Bad time value"},
// Correct RFC 5280 form. Test years < 2000 and > 2000.
{"090303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009 GMT"},
{"900303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 1990 GMT"},
{"000303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2000 GMT"},
// Correct form, bad values.
{"000000000000Z", "Bad time value"},
{"999999999999Z", "Bad time value"},
// Missing components. Not legal RFC 5280, but permitted.
{"090303125425", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009"},
{"9003031254", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990"},
{"9003031254Z", "Mar 3 12:54:00 1990 GMT"},
// GENERALIZEDTIME confused for UTCTIME.
{"20090303125425Z", "Bad time value"},
// Legal ASN.1, but not legal RFC 5280.
{"9003031254+0800", "Bad time value"},
{"9003031254-0800", "Bad time value"},
// Trailing garbage.
{"9003031254Z ", "Bad time value"},
};
for (auto t : asn1_utctime_tests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(t.val);
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_UTCTIME> tm(ASN1_UTCTIME_new());
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()));
// Use this instead of ASN1_UTCTIME_set() because some callers get
// type-confused and pass ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME to ASN1_UTCTIME_print().
// ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() is stricter, and would reject the inputs in
// question.
ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(tm.get(), t.val, strlen(t.val)));
const int ok = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio.get(), tm.get());
const uint8_t *contents;
size_t len;
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &contents, &len));
EXPECT_EQ(ok, (strcmp(t.want, "Bad time value") != 0) ? 1 : 0);
EXPECT_EQ(t.want,
std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(contents), len));
}
}
TEST(X509Test, PrettyPrintIntegers) {
static const char *kTests[] = {
// Small numbers are pretty-printed in decimal.
"0",
"-1",
"1",
"42",
"-42",
"256",
"-256",
// Large numbers are pretty-printed in hex to avoid taking quadratic time.
"0x0123456789",
"-0x0123456789",
};
for (const char *in : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(in);
BIGNUM *bn = nullptr;
ASSERT_TRUE(BN_asc2bn(&bn, in));
bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> free_bn(bn);
{
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1);
bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, asn1.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(out.get());
EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get());
}
{
bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_ENUMERATED> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(bn, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1);
bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(nullptr, asn1.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(out.get());
EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get());
}
}
}
TEST(X509Test, X509NameSet) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("US"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("CA"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("UK"),
-1, -1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 3);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(
name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("JP"),
-1, 1, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 4);
// Check that the correct entries get incremented when inserting new entry.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 1)), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 2)), 2);
}
TEST(X509Test, StringDecoding) {
static const struct {
std::vector<uint8_t> in;
int type;
const char *expected;
} kTests[] = {
// Non-minimal, two-byte UTF-8.
{{0xc0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Non-minimal, three-byte UTF-8.
{{0xe0, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Non-minimal, four-byte UTF-8.
{{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Truncated, four-byte UTF-8.
{{0xf0, 0x80, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Low-surrogate value.
{{0xed, 0xa0, 0x80}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// High-surrogate value.
{{0xed, 0xb0, 0x81}, V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, nullptr},
// Initial BOMs should be rejected from UCS-2 and UCS-4.
{{0xfe, 0xff, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff, 0, 0, 0, 88}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// Otherwise, BOMs should pass through.
{{0, 88, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, "X\xef\xbb\xbf"},
{{0, 0, 0, 88, 0, 0, 0xfe, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,
"X\xef\xbb\xbf"},
// The maximum code-point should pass though.
{{0, 16, 0xff, 0xfd}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, "\xf4\x8f\xbf\xbd"},
// Values outside the Unicode space should not.
{{0, 17, 0, 0}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// Non-characters should be rejected.
{{0, 1, 0xff, 0xff}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 1, 0xff, 0xfe}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
{{0, 0, 0xfd, 0xd5}, V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, nullptr},
// BMPString is UCS-2, not UTF-16, so surrogate pairs are invalid.
{{0xd8, 0, 0xdc, 1}, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kTests); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
const auto& test = kTests[i];
ASN1_STRING s;
s.type = test.type;
s.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(test.in.data());
s.length = test.in.size();
uint8_t *utf8;
const int utf8_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8, &s);
EXPECT_EQ(utf8_len < 0, test.expected == nullptr);
if (utf8_len >= 0) {
if (test.expected != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(test.expected), Bytes(utf8, utf8_len));
}
OPENSSL_free(utf8);
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
}
TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsCertSign) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(
CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// The intermediate has keyUsage certSign, but is not marked as a CA in the
// basicConstraints.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0));
}
TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCA) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(
CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate));
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// The intermediate has a Netscape certificate type of "SSL CA", but is not
// marked as a CA in the basicConstraints.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0));
}
TEST(X509Test, MismatchAlgorithms) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, PEMX509Info) {
std::string cert = kRootCAPEM;
auto cert_obj = CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_obj);
std::string rsa = kRSAKey;
auto rsa_obj = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(rsa_obj);
std::string crl = kBasicCRL;
auto crl_obj = CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL);
ASSERT_TRUE(crl_obj);
std::string unknown =
"-----BEGIN UNKNOWN-----\n"
"AAAA\n"
"-----END UNKNOWN-----\n";
std::string invalid =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
"AAAA\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
// Each X509_INFO contains at most one certificate, CRL, etc. The format
// creates a new X509_INFO when a repeated type is seen.
std::string pem =
// The first few entries have one of everything in different orders.
cert + rsa + crl +
rsa + crl + cert +
// Unknown types are ignored.
crl + unknown + cert + rsa +
// Seeing a new certificate starts a new entry, so now we have a bunch of
// certificate-only entries.
cert + cert + cert +
// The key folds into the certificate's entry.
cert + rsa +
// Doubled keys also start new entries.
rsa + rsa + rsa + rsa + crl +
// As do CRLs.
crl + crl;
const struct ExpectedInfo {
const X509 *cert;
const EVP_PKEY *key;
const X509_CRL *crl;
} kExpected[] = {
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr},
{cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr},
{nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()},
{nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()},
{nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()},
};
auto check_info = [](const ExpectedInfo *expected, const X509_INFO *info) {
if (expected->cert != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(expected->cert, info->x509));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x509);
}
if (expected->crl != nullptr) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_CRL_cmp(expected->crl, info->crl));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->crl);
}
if (expected->key != nullptr) {
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, info->x_pkey);
// EVP_PKEY_cmp returns one if the keys are equal.
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_cmp(expected->key, info->x_pkey->dec_pkey));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x_pkey);
}
};
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(infos);
ASSERT_EQ(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i));
}
// Passing an existing stack appends to it.
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
ASSERT_EQ(infos.get(),
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr));
ASSERT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(i);
check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i));
check_info(
&kExpected[i],
sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i + OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected)));
}
// Gracefully handle errors in both the append and fresh cases.
std::string bad_pem = cert + cert + invalid;
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos2(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(infos2);
bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
EXPECT_FALSE(
PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOEmpty) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(nullptr, 0));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
// CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of
// certificates.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) {
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf("\x30", 1));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
// CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of
// certificates. This EOF appeared after some data, however, so we do not wish
// to signal EOF.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, PartialBIOReturn) {
// Create a filter BIO that only reads and writes one byte at a time.
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO_METHOD> method(BIO_meth_new(0, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(method);
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_create(method.get(), [](BIO *b) -> int {
BIO_set_init(b, 1);
return 1;
}));
ASSERT_TRUE(
BIO_meth_set_read(method.get(), [](BIO *b, char *out, int len) -> int {
return BIO_read(BIO_next(b), out, std::min(len, 1));
}));
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_write(
method.get(), [](BIO *b, const char *in, int len) -> int {
return BIO_write(BIO_next(b), in, std::min(len, 1));
}));
bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(method.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio);
BIO *mem_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
ASSERT_TRUE(mem_bio);
BIO_push(bio.get(), mem_bio); // BIO_push takes ownership.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
uint8_t *der = nullptr;
int der_len = i2d_X509(cert.get(), &der);
ASSERT_GT(der_len, 0);
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der);
// Write the certificate into the BIO. Though we only write one byte at a
// time, the write should succeed.
ASSERT_EQ(1, i2d_X509_bio(bio.get(), cert.get()));
const uint8_t *der2;
size_t der2_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(mem_bio, &der2, &der2_len));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(der, static_cast<size_t>(der_len)), Bytes(der2, der2_len));
// Read the certificate back out of the BIO. Though we only read one byte at a
// time, the read should succeed.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert2(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert2);
EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(cert.get(), cert2.get()));
}
TEST(X509Test, CommonNameFallback) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithSANs);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> without_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithoutSANs);
ASSERT_TRUE(without_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_email = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithEmailSAN);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_email);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_ip = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithIPSAN);
ASSERT_TRUE(with_ip);
auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) {
return Verify(
leaf, {root.get()}, {}, {}, 0, false, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host)));
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags);
});
};
// By default, the common name is ignored if the SAN list is present but
// otherwise is checked.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test"));
// X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT is ignored.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(),
X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
// X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT implements the correct behavior: the
// common name is never checked.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host2.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host3.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(without_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT,
"foo.host1.test"));
}
TEST(X509Test, LooksLikeDNSName) {
static const char *kValid[] = {
"example.com",
"eXample123-.com",
"*.example.com",
"exa_mple.com",
"example.com.",
"project-dev:us-central1:main",
};
static const char *kInvalid[] = {
"-eXample123-.com",
"",
".",
"*",
"*.",
"example..com",
".example.com",
"example.com..",
"*foo.example.com",
"foo.*.example.com",
"foo,bar",
};
for (const char *str : kValid) {
SCOPED_TRACE(str);
EXPECT_TRUE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str)));
}
for (const char *str : kInvalid) {
SCOPED_TRACE(str);
EXPECT_FALSE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str)));
}
}
TEST(X509Test, CommonNameAndNameConstraints) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = CertFromPEM(kConstrainedIntermediate);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> permitted = CertFromPEM(kCommonNamePermittedLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(permitted);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted =
CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted_with_sans =
CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted_with_sans);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_dns = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf);
ASSERT_TRUE(not_dns);
auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) {
return Verify(
leaf, {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, false,
[&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host)));
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags);
});
};
// Certificates which would otherwise trigger the common name fallback are
// rejected whenever there are name constraints. We do this whether or not
// the common name matches the constraints.
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
verify_cert(permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNamePermitted));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
verify_cert(not_permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
kCommonNameNotPermitted));
// This occurs even if the built-in name checks aren't used. The caller may
// separately call |X509_check_host|.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS,
Verify(not_permitted.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {},
0 /* no flags */, false, nullptr));
// If the leaf certificate has SANs, the common name fallback is always
// disabled, so the name constraints do not apply.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, false, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */,
kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs));
// If the common name does not look like a DNS name, we apply neither name
// constraints nor common name fallback.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_dns.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()},
{}, 0, false, nullptr));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
verify_cert(not_dns.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNameNotDNS));
}
TEST(X509Test, ServerGatedCryptoEKUs) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot);
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ms_sgc = CertFromPEM(kMicrosoftSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(ms_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ns_sgc = CertFromPEM(kNetscapeSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(ns_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku = CertFromPEM(kServerEKUCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku_plus_ms_sgc =
CertFromPEM(kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert);
ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku_plus_ms_sgc);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> any_eku = CertFromPEM(kAnyEKU);
ASSERT_TRUE(any_eku);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> no_eku = CertFromPEM(kNoEKU);
ASSERT_TRUE(no_eku);
auto verify_cert = [&root](X509 *leaf) {
return Verify(leaf, {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, /*crls=*/{},
/*flags=*/0, /*use_additional_untrusted=*/false,
[&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(
param, X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER));
});
};
// Neither the Microsoft nor Netscape SGC EKU should be sufficient for
// |X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER|. The "any" EKU probably, technically, should be.
// However, we've never accepted it and it's not acceptable in leaf
// certificates by the Baseline, so perhaps we don't need this complexity.
for (X509 *leaf : {ms_sgc.get(), ns_sgc.get(), any_eku.get()}) {
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, verify_cert(leaf));
}
// The server-auth EKU is sufficient, and it doesn't matter if an SGC EKU is
// also included. Lastly, not specifying an EKU is also valid.
for (X509 *leaf : {server_eku.get(), server_eku_plus_ms_sgc.get(),
no_eku.get()}) {
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(leaf));
}
}
// Test that invalid extensions are rejected by, if not the parser, at least the
// verifier.
TEST(X509Test, InvalidExtensions) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root.pem").c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate.pem")
.c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf.pem").c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// Sanity-check that the baseline chain is accepted.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}));
static const char *kExtensions[] = {
"authority_key_identifier",
"basic_constraints",
"ext_key_usage",
"key_usage",
"name_constraints",
"subject_alt_name",
"subject_key_identifier",
};
for (const char *ext : kExtensions) {
SCOPED_TRACE(ext);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_root = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData((std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_") +
ext + ".pem")
.c_str())
.c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_root);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_intermediate = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData(
(std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_") +
ext + ".pem")
.c_str())
.c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_intermediate);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_leaf = CertFromPEM(
GetTestData((std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_") +
ext + ".pem")
.c_str())
.c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_leaf);
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION,
Verify(invalid_leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}));
// If the invalid extension is on an intermediate or root,
// |X509_verify_cert| notices by way of being unable to build a path to
// a valid issuer.
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {invalid_intermediate.get()}, {}));
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {invalid_root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}));
}
}
// kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with the version number
// encoded explicitly, rather than omitted as required by DER.
static const char kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kNegativeVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a negative version number.
static const char kNegativeVersionPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBfTCCASSgAwIB/wIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC
QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp
dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l
dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni
v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa
HPUdfvGULUvPciLBMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb7idQhY5w
BnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYfMlJhXnXJ
FA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kFutureVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a version number value of
// three, which is not defined. (v3 has value two).
static const char kFutureVersionPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kOverflowVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a version field which
// overflows |uint64_t|.
static const char kOverflowVersionPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBoDCCAUegJgIkAP//////////////////////////////////////////////
AgkA2UwE2kl9v+swCQYHKoZIzj0EATBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwK
U29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMB4X
DTE0MDQyMzIzMjE1N1oXDTE0MDUyMzIzMjE1N1owRTELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzAR
BgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5
IEx0ZDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWX
a7epHg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsEw
CQYHKoZIzj0EAQNIADBFAiEA8qA1XlE6NsOCeZvuJ1CFjnAGdJVX0il0APS+FYdd
xAcCIHweeRRqIYPwenRoeV8UmZpotPHLnhVe5h8yUmFedckU
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
/*
Test cases disabled. TODO re-enable in April 2021.
https://crbug.com/boringssl/375
// kV1WithExtensionsPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with extensions.
static const char kV1WithExtensionsPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kV2WithExtensionsPEM is an X.509v2 certificate with extensions.
static const char kV2WithExtensionsPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
*/
// kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with an issuerUniqueID.
static const char kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBgzCCASoCCQDZTATaSX2/6zAJBgcqhkjOPQQBMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMw
EQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0
eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYDVQQG
EwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lk
Z2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+
Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7x
lC1Lz3IiwYEJAAEjRWeJq83vMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb
7idQhY5wBnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYf
MlJhXnXJFA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with an issuerUniqueID.
static const char kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
// Test that the X.509 parser enforces versions are valid and match the fields
// present.
TEST(X509Test, InvalidVersion) {
// kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM is invalid but, for now, we accept it. See
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/364.
EXPECT_TRUE(CertFromPEM(kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM));
EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kNegativeVersionPEM));
EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kFutureVersionPEM));
EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kOverflowVersionPEM));
// Test cases disabled. TODO re-enable in April 2021.
// https://crbug.com/boringssl/375
//EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithExtensionsPEM));
//EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV2WithExtensionsPEM));
EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM));
EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM));
}
// Unlike upstream OpenSSL, we require a non-null store in
// |X509_STORE_CTX_init|.
TEST(X509Test, NullStore) {
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx.get(), nullptr, leaf.get(), nullptr));
}
TEST(X509Test, BasicConstraints) {
const uint32_t kFlagMask = EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS | EXFLAG_INVALID;
static const struct {
const char *file;
uint32_t flags;
int path_len;
} kTests[] = {
{"basic_constraints_none.pem", 0, -1},
{"basic_constraints_ca.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, -1},
{"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_0.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 0},
{"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_1.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 1},
{"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_10.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 10},
{"basic_constraints_leaf.pem", EXFLAG_BCONS, -1},
{"invalid_extension_leaf_basic_constraints.pem", EXFLAG_INVALID, -1},
};
for (const auto &test : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(test.file);
std::string path = "crypto/x509/test/";
path += test.file;
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(GetTestData(path.c_str()).c_str());
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_EQ(test.flags, X509_get_extension_flags(cert.get()) & kFlagMask);
EXPECT_EQ(test.path_len, X509_get_pathlen(cert.get()));
}
}
// The following strings are test certificates signed by kP256Key and kRSAKey,
// with missing, NULL, or invalid algorithm parameters.
static const char kP256NoParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBIDCBxqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX
DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke
DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQMA4w
DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAqdIiF+bN9Cl44oUeICpy
aXd7HqhpVUaglYKw9ChmNUACIQCpMdL0fNkFNDbRww9dSl/y7kBdk/tp16HiqeSy
gGzFYg==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kP256NullParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBJDCByKADAgECAgIE0jAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMA8xDTALBgNVBAMTBFRlc3Qw
IBcNMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMA8xDTALBgNVBAMTBFRl
c3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2niv2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3
qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYaHPUdfvGULUvPciLBoxAw
DjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADSQAwRgIhAKILHmyo+F3Cn/VX
UUeSXOQQKX5aLzsQitwwmNF3ZgH3AiEAsYHcrVj/ftmoQIORARkQ/+PrqntXev8r
t6uPxHrmpUY=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kP256InvalidParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBMTCBz6ADAgECAgIE0jATBggqhkjOPQQDAgQHZ2FyYmFnZTAPMQ0wCwYDVQQD
EwRUZXN0MCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYD
VQQDEwRUZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4N
lIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1L
z3IiwaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zATBggqhkjOPQQDAgQHZ2FyYmFnZQNIADBF
AiAglpDf/YhN89LeJ2WAs/F0SJIrsuhS4uoInIz6WXUiuQIhAIu5Pwhp5E3Pbo8y
fLULTZnynuQUULQkRcF7S7T2WpIL
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRSANoParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBWzCBx6ADAgECAgIE0jALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQswDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAg
Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVz
dDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7ep
Hg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAO
MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCwYJKoZIhvcNAQELA4GBAC1f8W3W0Ao7CPfIBQYDSbPh
brZpbxdBU5x27JOS7iSa+Lc9pEH5VCX9vIypHVHXLPEfZ38yIt11eiyrmZB6w62N
l9kIeZ6FVPmC30d3sXx70Jjs+ZX9yt7kD1gLyNAQQfeYfa4rORAZT1n2YitD74NY
TWUH2ieFP3l+ecj1SeQR
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRSANullParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBXzCByaADAgECAgIE0jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0
MCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRU
ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdr
t6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQ
MA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQAzVcfIv+Rq1KrMXqIL
fPq/cWZjgqFZA1RGaGElNaqp+rkJfamq5tDGzckWpebrK+jjRN7yIlcWDtPpy3Gy
seZfvtBDR0TwJm0S/pQl8prKB4wgALcwe3bmi56Rq85nzY5ZLNcP16LQxL+jAAua
SwmQUz4bRpckRBj+sIyp1We+pg==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
static const char kRSAInvalidParam[] = R"(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBbTCB0KADAgECAgIE0jAUBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsEB2dhcmJhZ2UwDzENMAsGA1UE
AxMEVGVzdDAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsG
A1UEAxMEVGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8e
DZSKTNWXa7epHg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQt
S89yIsGjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wFAYJKoZIhvcNAQELBAdnYXJiYWdlA4GB
AHTJ6cWWjCNrZhqiWWVI3jdK+h5xpRG8jGMXxR4JnjtoYRRusJLOXhmapwCB6fA0
4vc+66O27v36yDmQX+tIc/hDrTpKNJptU8q3n2VagREvoHhkOTYkcCeS8vmnMtn8
5OMNZ/ajVwOssw61GcAlScRqEHkZFBoGp7e+QpgB2tf9
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)";
TEST(X509Test, AlgorithmParameters) {
// P-256 parameters should be omitted, but we accept NULL ones.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key);
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(kP256NoParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
cert = CertFromPEM(kP256NullParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
cert = CertFromPEM(kP256InvalidParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
// RSA parameters should be NULL, but we accept omitted ones.
key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
cert = CertFromPEM(kRSANoParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
cert = CertFromPEM(kRSANullParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
cert = CertFromPEM(kRSAInvalidParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
}
TEST(X509Test, GeneralName) {
const std::vector<uint8_t> kNames[] = {
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// SEQUENCE {}
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// [APPLICATION 0] {}
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x60, 0x00},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 }
// [0] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// UTF8String { "b" }
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// BOOLEAN { TRUE }
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff},
// [0] {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
// [0] {
// BOOLEAN { FALSE }
// }
// }
{0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04,
0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00},
// [1 PRIMITIVE] { "a" }
{0x81, 0x01, 0x61},
// [1 PRIMITIVE] { "b" }
{0x81, 0x01, 0x62},
// [2 PRIMITIVE] { "a" }
{0x82, 0x01, 0x61},
// [2 PRIMITIVE] { "b" }
{0x82, 0x01, 0x62},
// [4] {
// SEQUENCE {
// SET {
// SEQUENCE {
// # commonName
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 }
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
// }
// }
{0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [4] {
// SEQUENCE {
// SET {
// SEQUENCE {
// # commonName
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 }
// UTF8String { "b" }
// }
// }
// }
// }
{0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62},
// [5] {
// [1] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [5] {
// [1] {
// UTF8String { "b" }
// }
// }
{0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62},
// [5] {
// [0] {
// UTF8String {}
// }
// [1] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa5, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [5] {
// [0] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// [1] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [5] {
// [0] {
// UTF8String { "b" }
// }
// [1] {
// UTF8String { "a" }
// }
// }
{0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61},
// [6 PRIMITIVE] { "a" }
{0x86, 0x01, 0x61},
// [6 PRIMITIVE] { "b" }
{0x86, 0x01, 0x62},
// [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111` }
{0x87, 0x04, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
// [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222`}
{0x87, 0x04, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22},
// [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111111111111111111111111111` }
{0x87, 0x10, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11,
0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11},
// [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222222222222222222222222222` }
{0x87, 0x10, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22,
0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22},
// [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 }
{0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7,
0x09, 0x02, 0x01},
// [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 }
{0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7,
0x09, 0x02, 0x02},
};
// Every name should be equal to itself and not equal to any others.
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kNames); i++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(kNames[i]));
const uint8_t *ptr = kNames[i].data();
bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> a(
d2i_GENERAL_NAME(nullptr, &ptr, kNames[i].size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(a);
ASSERT_EQ(ptr, kNames[i].data() + kNames[i].size());
for (size_t j = 0; j < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kNames); j++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(kNames[j]));
ptr = kNames[j].data();
bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> b(
d2i_GENERAL_NAME(nullptr, &ptr, kNames[j].size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(b);
ASSERT_EQ(ptr, kNames[j].data() + kNames[j].size());
if (i == j) {
EXPECT_EQ(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(a.get(), b.get()), 0);
} else {
EXPECT_NE(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(a.get(), b.get()), 0);
}
}
}
}