| /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| * |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license provided above. |
| * |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| |
| |
| int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { |
| BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
| int ret = -1; |
| int new_state, state, skip = 0; |
| |
| assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); |
| assert(!s->server); |
| assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)); |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->info_callback; |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| s->in_handshake++; |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| state = s->state; |
| |
| switch (s->state) { |
| case SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->init_buf == NULL) { |
| buf = BUF_MEM_new(); |
| if (buf == NULL || |
| !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_buf = buf; |
| buf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ |
| |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(s)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| s->shutdown = 0; |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ |
| if (s->bbio != s->wbio) { |
| s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| /* receive renewed session ticket */ |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: |
| ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain |
| * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: |
| ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s) || |
| !s->enc_method->change_cipher_state( |
| s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: |
| ret = |
| ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, |
| s->enc_method->client_finished_label, |
| s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| } else { |
| /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then |
| * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that |
| * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those |
| * hashes. */ |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && |
| ssl3_can_false_start(s) && |
| /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state |
| * machine). */ |
| !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; |
| } else { |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } else { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
| /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a |
| * ChangeCipherSpec. */ |
| if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: |
| ret = |
| ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: |
| s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1; |
| |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| ret = 1; |
| goto end; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_OK: |
| /* clean a few things up */ |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| s->init_buf = NULL; |
| |
| /* Remove write buffering now. */ |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| |
| const int is_initial_handshake = !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0; |
| s->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; |
| |
| if (is_initial_handshake) { |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| /* s->server=0; */ |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
| } |
| |
| goto end; |
| |
| default: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { |
| if (cb != NULL && s->state != state) { |
| new_state = s->state; |
| s->state = state; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); |
| s->state = new_state; |
| } |
| } |
| skip = 0; |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| s->in_handshake--; |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { |
| uint8_t *buf, *p, *d; |
| int i; |
| unsigned long l; |
| |
| buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { |
| if (!s->s3->have_version) { |
| uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(s); |
| /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ |
| if (max_version == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->version = max_version; |
| s->client_version = max_version; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the configured session was created at a version higher than our |
| * maximum version, drop it. */ |
| if (s->session && |
| (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable || |
| (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version > s->version) || |
| (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version < s->version))) { |
| SSL_set_session(s, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* else use the pre-loaded session */ |
| p = s->s3->client_random; |
| |
| /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't |
| * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ |
| if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !s->d1->send_cookie) && |
| !ssl_fill_hello_random(p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), |
| 0 /* client */)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Do the message type and length last. Note: the final argument to |
| * ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below depends on the size of this prefix. */ |
| d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from an SSLv2/v3 |
| * compatible client hello). The client_version field is the maximum |
| * version we permit and it is also used in RSA encrypted premaster |
| * secrets. Some servers can choke if we initially report a higher version |
| * then renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This didn't |
| * happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it but it can with TLS 1.1 |
| * or later if the server only supports 1.0. |
| * |
| * Possible scenario with previous logic: |
| * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 |
| * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 |
| * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. |
| * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. |
| * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. |
| * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now |
| * know that is maximum server supports. |
| * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret |
| * containing version 1.0. |
| * |
| * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the maximum version |
| * we support in client hello and then rely on the checking of version to |
| * ensure the servers isn't being inconsistent: for example initially |
| * negotiating with TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by |
| * using client_version in client hello and not resetting it to the |
| * negotiated version. */ |
| *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; |
| *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; |
| |
| /* Random stuff */ |
| memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| |
| /* Session ID */ |
| if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete || s->session == NULL) { |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| i = 0; |
| } else { |
| i = s->session->session_id_length; |
| } |
| *(p++) = i; |
| if (i != 0) { |
| if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); |
| p += i; |
| } |
| |
| /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; |
| memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); |
| p += s->d1->cookie_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ciphers supported */ |
| i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]); |
| if (i == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(i, p); |
| p += i; |
| |
| /* COMPRESSION */ |
| *(p++) = 1; |
| *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ |
| |
| /* TLS extensions*/ |
| p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, |
| p - buf); |
| if (p == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| l = p - d; |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| CERT *ct = s->cert; |
| int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; |
| long n; |
| CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; |
| uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; |
| uint8_t compression_method; |
| uint32_t mask_ssl; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, |
| 20000, /* ?? */ |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && |
| ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { |
| /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert |
| * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and |
| * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial |
| * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. |
| * |
| * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); |
| } |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| assert(s->s3->have_version == s->s3->initial_handshake_complete); |
| if (!s->s3->have_version) { |
| if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(s, server_version)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
| s->version = server_version; |
| /* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped |
| * to TLS 1.0. */ |
| s->s3->have_version = 1; |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->version = server_version; |
| s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); |
| assert(s->enc_method != NULL); |
| /* At this point, the connection's version is known and s->version is |
| * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ |
| s->s3->have_version = 1; |
| } else if (server_version != s->version) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy over the server random. */ |
| memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| |
| assert(s->session == NULL || s->session->session_id_length > 0); |
| if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && s->session != NULL && |
| CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, |
| s->session->session_id_length)) { |
| if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || |
| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { |
| /* actually a client application bug */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, |
| SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->hit = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to |
| * fill out. */ |
| s->hit = 0; |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ |
| s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); |
| memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id)); |
| } |
| |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| /* unknown cipher */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* ct->mask_ssl was computed from client capabilities. Now |
| * that the final version is known, compute a new mask_ssl. */ |
| if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) { |
| mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; |
| } else { |
| mask_ssl = 0; |
| } |
| /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if |
| * the server selected it, it's an error. */ |
| if ((c->algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) || |
| (c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || |
| (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { |
| /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| if (s->session->cipher != c) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; |
| |
| /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(s)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client |
| * certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a |
| * different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */ |
| if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || s->hit) { |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ |
| if (compression_method != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS extensions */ |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { |
| /* wrong packet length */ |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hit && |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != s->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| if (s->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| } |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher returns one if |leaf| is a suitable server |
| * certificate type for |cipher|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error |
| * on the error queue. */ |
| static int ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(X509 *leaf, |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { |
| int ret = 0; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); |
| if (pkey == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ |
| int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); |
| assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); |
| if (pkey->type != expected_type) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key usages |
| * be checked in other cases as well? */ |
| if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ |
| X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); |
| if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && |
| !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { |
| int al, ok, ret = -1; |
| unsigned long n; |
| X509 *x = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| CBS cbs, certificate_list; |
| const uint8_t *data; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, (long)s->max_cert_list, |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| sk = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| CBS certificate; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| if (x == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| x = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); |
| if (!ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(leaf, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes |
| * the leaf. */ |
| sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| s->session->cert_chain = sk; |
| sk = NULL; |
| |
| X509_free(s->session->peer); |
| s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf); |
| |
| s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| if (0) { |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| X509_free(x); |
| sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| int al, ok; |
| long n, alg_k, alg_a; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| RSA *rsa = NULL; |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter; |
| |
| /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as |
| * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange may be omitted to send no |
| * identity hint. */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) { |
| /* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the |
| * handshake state. */ |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint); |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ |
| CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n); |
| server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; |
| |
| alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| CBS psk_identity_hint; |
| |
| /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, |
| &psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in |
| * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK |
| * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. |
| * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than |
| * a specific identity. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { |
| CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL)) == NULL || |
| (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL)) == NULL || |
| (dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL)) == |
| NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh); |
| if (s->session->key_exchange_info < 1024) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| DH_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp); |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp = dh; |
| dh = NULL; |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { |
| uint16_t curve_id; |
| int curve_nid = 0; |
| const EC_GROUP *group; |
| CBS point; |
| |
| /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH public |
| * key. Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an |
| * invalid curve. */ |
| if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id); |
| if (curve_nid == 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); |
| s->session->key_exchange_info = curve_id; |
| if (ecdh == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); |
| |
| /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || |
| ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, CBS_data(&point), |
| CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); |
| EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp); |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; |
| ecdh = NULL; |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| bn_ctx = NULL; |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while |
| * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive |
| * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ |
| CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); |
| |
| /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
| if (pkey == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| md = EVP_md5_sha1(); |
| } else { |
| md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } |
| |
| /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ |
| CBS signature; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) || |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), |
| CBS_len(¶meter)) || |
| !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), |
| CBS_len(&signature))) { |
| /* bad signature */ |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ |
| assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| DH_free(dh); |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { |
| return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { |
| int ok, ret = 0; |
| unsigned long n; |
| X509_NAME *xn = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS certificate_types; |
| CBS certificate_authorities; |
| const uint8_t *data; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing |
| * client auth. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); |
| if (ca_sk == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* get the certificate types */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, |
| &s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || |
| !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* get the CA RDNs */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) { |
| CBS distinguished_name; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, |
| &distinguished_name)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); |
| |
| xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); |
| if (xn == NULL) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name))) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
| s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; |
| ca_sk = NULL; |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { |
| int ok, al; |
| long n; |
| CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message( |
| s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, |
| SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are |
| * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the |
| * existing session. */ |
| uint8_t *bytes; |
| size_t bytes_len; |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(bytes); |
| if (new_session == NULL) { |
| /* This should never happen. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = new_session; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, |
| &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || |
| CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, |
| &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use |
| * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in |
| * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ |
| if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), s->session->session_id, |
| &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { |
| int ok, al; |
| long n; |
| CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; |
| uint8_t status_type; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message( |
| s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, |
| -1, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
| /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change |
| * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n); |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->session->ocsp_response, |
| &s->session->ocsp_response_length)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { |
| int ok; |
| long n; |
| |
| n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, |
| 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| if (n > 0) { |
| /* should contain no data */ |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { |
| uint8_t *p; |
| int n = 0; |
| uint32_t alg_k; |
| uint32_t alg_a; |
| uint8_t *q; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; |
| const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL; |
| int encoded_pt_len = 0; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| unsigned int psk_len = 0; |
| uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| uint8_t *pms = NULL; |
| size_t pms_len = 0; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; |
| size_t identity_len; |
| |
| if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
| psk_len = |
| s->psk_client_callback(s, s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, |
| sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } else if (psk_len == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity)); |
| if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); |
| s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); |
| if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Write out psk_identity. */ |
| s2n(identity_len, p); |
| memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); |
| p += identity_len; |
| n = 2 + identity_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { |
| RSA *rsa; |
| size_t enc_pms_len; |
| |
| pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
| if (pkey == NULL || |
| pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || |
| pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->key_exchange_info = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); |
| rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| |
| pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; |
| pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; |
| if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| |
| q = p; |
| /* In TLS and beyond, reserve space for the length prefix. */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { |
| p += 2; |
| n += 2; |
| } |
| if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, p, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, |
| RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| n += enc_pms_len; |
| |
| /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| if (!ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s->ctx, p, enc_pms_len, pms, |
| pms_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Fill in the length prefix. */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { |
| s2n(enc_pms_len, q); |
| } |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { |
| DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; |
| int dh_len; |
| size_t pub_len; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp; |
| |
| /* generate a new random key */ |
| dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr); |
| if (dh_clnt == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pms_len = DH_size(dh_clnt); |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| dh_len = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); |
| if (dh_len <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| pms_len = dh_len; |
| |
| /* send off the data */ |
| pub_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); |
| s2n(pub_len, p); |
| BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); |
| n += 2 + pub_len; |
| |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { |
| const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *tkey; |
| int field_size = 0, ecdh_len; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| tkey = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp; |
| |
| srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); |
| srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); |
| if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new(); |
| if (clnt_ecdh == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ |
| if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); |
| if (field_size <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pms_len = (field_size + 7) / 8; |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pms_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); |
| if (ecdh_len <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| pms_len = ecdh_len; |
| |
| /* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly. */ |
| encoded_pt_len = |
| EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); |
| |
| encodedPoint = |
| (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(uint8_t)); |
| bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Encode the public key */ |
| encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct( |
| srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); |
| |
| *p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */ |
| /* Encoded point will be copied here */ |
| p += 1; |
| n += 1; |
| /* copy the point */ |
| memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len); |
| /* increment n to account for length field */ |
| n += encoded_pt_len; |
| |
| /* Free allocated memory */ |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| bn_ctx = NULL; |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| encodedPoint = NULL; |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); |
| clnt_ecdh = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); |
| srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { |
| /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as |
| * the pre-shared key. */ |
| pms_len = psk_len; |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(pms, 0, pms_len); |
| } else { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared |
| * key. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| CBB cbb, child; |
| uint8_t *new_pms; |
| size_t new_pms_len; |
| |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| pms = new_pms; |
| pms_len = new_pms_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the |
| * master secret. */ |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret( |
| s, s->session->master_key, pms, pms_len); |
| if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ |
| return s->method->do_write(s); |
| |
| err: |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); |
| if (pms) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *s) { |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A || |
| s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B) { |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; |
| uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| size_t signature_length = 0; |
| unsigned long n = 0; |
| assert(ssl_has_private_key(s)); |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { |
| uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t digest_length; |
| |
| /* Write out the digest type if need be. */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
| md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s); |
| if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, p, md)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| p += 2; |
| n += 2; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the digest. */ |
| const int pkey_type = ssl_private_key_type(s); |
| if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey_type)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); |
| |
| /* Sign the digest. */ |
| signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); |
| if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(s, &p[2], &signature_length, |
| signature_length, md, digest, |
| digest_length); |
| } else { |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
| /* The digest has already been selected and written. */ |
| p += 2; |
| n += 2; |
| } |
| signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); |
| s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign_complete(s, &p[2], &signature_length, |
| signature_length); |
| } |
| |
| if (sign_result == ssl_private_key_retry) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| s2n(signature_length, p); |
| n += signature_length + 2; |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is |
| * configured. */ |
| static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { |
| X509 *x509 = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { |
| /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ |
| if (s->cert->cert_cb) { |
| i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| if (i < 0) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* We need to get a client cert */ |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { |
| /* If we get an error, we need to: |
| * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); |
| * We then get retried later */ |
| i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); |
| if (i < 0) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| if (i == 1 && pkey != NULL && x509 != NULL) { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) { |
| i = 0; |
| } |
| } else if (i == 1) { |
| i = 0; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); |
| } |
| |
| X509_free(x509); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| if (i && !ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { |
| i = 0; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) { |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
| return 1; |
| } else { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; |
| /* There is no client certificate, so the handshake buffer may be |
| * released. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Ok, we have a cert */ |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) { |
| /* Send an empty Certificate message. */ |
| uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| l2n3(0, p); |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, 3)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) { |
| unsigned int len, padding_len; |
| uint8_t *d, *p; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { |
| len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; |
| padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); |
| |
| d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| *(p++) = len; |
| memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); |
| p += len; |
| *(p++) = padding_len; |
| memset(p, 0, padding_len); |
| p += padding_len; |
| |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, p - d)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s) { |
| uint8_t *d; |
| int ret = -1, public_key_len; |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; |
| uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A) { |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb) { |
| EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; |
| s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key); |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| if (EVP_PKEY_id(s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = s->tlsext_channel_id_private->pkey.ec; |
| |
| d = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d); |
| s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d); |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| |
| public_key_len = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL); |
| if (public_key_len <= 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* i2o_ECPublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a |
| * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y |
| * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */ |
| if (public_key_len != 65) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len); |
| if (!public_key) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| derp = public_key; |
| i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &derp); |
| |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t digest_len; |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(s, digest, &digest_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); |
| if (sig == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */ |
| memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64); |
| d += 64; |
| if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(d, 32, sig->r) || |
| !BN_bn2bin_padded(d + 32, 32, sig->s)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; |
| |
| ret = ssl_do_write(s); |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(public_key); |
| OPENSSL_free(der_sig); |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { |
| int i = 0; |
| if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) { |
| i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); |
| } |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *s) { |
| int ret = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->cert_chain); |
| if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && ret <= 0) { |
| int al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| } else { |
| ret = 1; |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |