| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| * |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license provided above. |
| * |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl); |
| static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl); |
| |
| int ssl3_connect(SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = -1; |
| int state, skip = 0; |
| |
| assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); |
| assert(!ssl->server); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| state = ssl->state; |
| |
| switch (ssl->state) { |
| case SSL_ST_INIT: |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| skip = 1; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); |
| |
| ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(tls13_client_handshake); |
| if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| } else { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
| break; |
| |
| case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: |
| assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl)); |
| ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) { |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| } else { |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(ssl); |
| if (ssl->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) { |
| break; |
| } |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } else { |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->certificate_status_expected) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->cert_request) { |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->cert_request) { |
| ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
| ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: |
| if (ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen) { |
| ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: |
| if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { |
| ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
| |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| } else { |
| /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then |
| * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that |
| * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those |
| * hashes. */ |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && |
| ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) && |
| /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state |
| * machine). */ |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; |
| } else { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| ssl->s3->hs->in_false_start = 1; |
| |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); |
| ret = 1; |
| goto end; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
| ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: |
| ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
| } else { |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: |
| if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| if (ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_TLS13: |
| ret = tls13_handshake(ssl); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_OK: |
| /* Clean a few things up. */ |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl); |
| ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */); |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session); |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session); |
| ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session; |
| } else { |
| /* We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability |
| * of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may |
| * have taken a reference to the temporary session. */ |
| ssl->s3->established_session = |
| SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->s3->new_session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL); |
| if (ssl->s3->established_session == NULL) { |
| /* Do not stay in SSL_ST_OK, to avoid confusing |SSL_in_init| |
| * callers. */ |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_ERROR; |
| skip = 1; |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0; |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->new_session); |
| ssl->s3->new_session = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remove write buffering now. */ |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); |
| |
| ssl_handshake_free(ssl->s3->hs); |
| ssl->s3->hs = NULL; |
| |
| const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; |
| if (is_initial_handshake) { |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
| goto end; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_ERROR: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| |
| default: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && ssl->state != state) { |
| int new_state = ssl->state; |
| ssl->state = state; |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); |
| ssl->state = new_state; |
| } |
| skip = 0; |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) { |
| /* Use the client_random for entropy. This both avoids calling |RAND_bytes| on |
| * a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are deterministic. This |
| * allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the |
| * same group be advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares. */ |
| uint16_t ret = ssl->s3->client_random[index]; |
| /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */ |
| ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a; |
| ret |= ret << 8; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, |
| uint16_t min_version, |
| uint16_t max_version) { |
| /* Prepare disabled cipher masks. */ |
| ssl_set_client_disabled(ssl); |
| |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */ |
| if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled && |
| !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_cipher))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| |
| int any_enabled = 0; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); |
| /* Skip disabled ciphers */ |
| if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & ssl->cert->mask_k) || |
| (cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl->cert->mask_a)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > max_version || |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < min_version) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| any_enabled = 1; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ |
| if (!any_enabled) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is |
| * added. */ |
| if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_flush(out); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_client_hello_body(SSL *ssl, CBB *body) { |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ |
| int has_session = ssl->session != NULL && |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; |
| |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(body, ssl->client_version) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(body, &child) || |
| (has_session && |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id, |
| ssl->session->session_id_length))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { |
| if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(body, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| size_t header_len = |
| SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, body, min_version, max_version) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(body, 1 /* one compression method */) || |
| !CBB_add_u8(body, 0 /* null compression */) || |
| !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, body, header_len + CBB_len(body))) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B) { |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we |
| * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBB cbb; |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); |
| |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A); |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| ssl->version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(max_version); |
| /* Only set |ssl->client_version| on the initial handshake. Renegotiations, |
| * although locked to a version, reuse the value. When using the plain RSA |
| * key exchange, the ClientHello version is checked in the premaster secret. |
| * Some servers fail when this value changes. */ |
| ssl->client_version = ssl->version; |
| |
| if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| ssl->client_version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(TLS1_2_VERSION); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled |
| * version, drop it. */ |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| uint16_t session_version; |
| if (!ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version, |
| ssl->session->ssl_version) || |
| (session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION && |
| ssl->session->session_id_length == 0) || |
| ssl->session->not_resumable || |
| !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session) || |
| session_version < min_version || session_version > max_version) { |
| ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't |
| * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ |
| if ((!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) && |
| !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CBB body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || |
| !ssl_add_client_hello_body(ssl, &body) || |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| |
| err: |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl) { |
| int al; |
| CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; |
| uint16_t server_version; |
| |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { |
| ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0; |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) || |
| CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)); |
| ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie); |
| |
| ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl) { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| CERT *ct = ssl->cert; |
| int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; |
| uint16_t server_wire_version, cipher_suite; |
| uint8_t compression_method; |
| |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && |
| ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { |
| /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert |
| * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and |
| * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial |
| * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. |
| * |
| * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO && |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_wire_version)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version, server_version; |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version) || |
| !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&server_version, server_wire_version) || |
| server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { |
| ssl->version = server_wire_version; |
| ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); |
| assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL); |
| /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is |
| * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ |
| ssl->s3->have_version = 1; |
| } else if (server_wire_version != ssl->version) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_TLS13; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_clear_tls13_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy over the server random. */ |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS |
| * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */ |
| |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL && |
| ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 && |
| CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, |
| ssl->session->session_id_length)) { |
| ssl->s3->session_reused = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to |
| * fill out. */ |
| ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL); |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0 /* client */)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ |
| ssl->s3->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), |
| CBS_len(&session_id)); |
| } |
| |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| /* unknown cipher */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if |
| * the server selected it, it's an error. */ |
| if ((c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) || |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(ssl); |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { |
| /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { |
| if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (ssl->session->cipher != c) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) { |
| /* This is actually a client application bug. */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, |
| SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ssl->s3->new_session->cipher = c; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; |
| |
| /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate |
| * which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake |
| * buffer may be released. */ |
| if (ssl->session != NULL || |
| !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ |
| if (compression_method != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS extensions */ |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &server_hello)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { |
| /* wrong packet length */ |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->session != NULL && |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != |
| ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); |
| } |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = |
| ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| uint8_t alert; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = ssl_parse_cert_chain(ssl, &alert, NULL, &cbs); |
| if (chain == NULL) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (sk_X509_num(chain) == 0 || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); |
| if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(ssl, leaf)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes |
| * the leaf. */ |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain = chain; |
| |
| X509_free(ssl->s3->new_session->peer); |
| X509_up_ref(leaf); |
| ssl->s3->new_session->peer = leaf; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl) { |
| int al; |
| CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; |
| uint8_t status_type; |
| |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
| /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change |
| * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response, |
| &ssl->s3->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (!ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, &ssl->s3->new_session->verify_result, |
| ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| int al; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| DH *dh = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; |
| EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
| /* Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message. */ |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ |
| CBS server_key_exchange; |
| CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; |
| |
| uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| CBS psk_identity_hint; |
| |
| /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, |
| &psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in |
| * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK |
| * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. |
| * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than |
| * a specific identity. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we |
| * treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint |
| * (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell |
| * empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty |
| * and missing as identical. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 && |
| !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_psk_identity_hint)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { |
| CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| dh = DH_new(); |
| if (dh == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL); |
| dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL); |
| if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh); |
| if (ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info < 1024) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); |
| goto err; |
| } else if (ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info > 4096) { |
| /* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit |
| * to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a |
| * computation. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, dh); |
| dh = NULL; |
| |
| /* Save the peer public key for later. */ |
| if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { |
| /* Parse the server parameters. */ |
| uint8_t group_type; |
| uint16_t group_id; |
| CBS point; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) || |
| group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id; |
| |
| /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */ |
| if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */ |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) || |
| !CBS_stow(&point, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) { |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_cecpq1(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx); |
| CBS key; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &key)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&key, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key, &ssl->s3->hs->peer_key_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while |
| * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive |
| * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ |
| CBS parameter; |
| CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); |
| |
| /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->s3->new_session->peer); |
| if (pkey == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0; |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1; |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1; |
| } else { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ |
| CBS signature; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| CBB transcript; |
| uint8_t *transcript_data; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| if (!CBB_init(&transcript, 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(¶meter)) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)) || |
| !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) { |
| CBB_cleanup(&transcript); |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify( |
| ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm, |
| pkey, transcript_data, transcript_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(transcript_data); |
| |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) |
| sig_ok = 1; |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| #endif |
| if (!sig_ok) { |
| /* bad signature */ |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ |
| assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| DH_free(dh); |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) { |
| int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message); |
| if (msg_ret <= 0) { |
| return msg_ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing |
| * client auth. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| |
| /* Get the certificate types. */ |
| CBS certificate_types; |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &ssl->s3->hs->certificate_types, |
| &ssl->s3->hs->num_certificate_types)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || |
| !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t alert; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &cbs); |
| if (ca_sk == NULL) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->s3->hs->cert_request = 1; |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->s3->hs->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
| ssl->s3->hs->ca_names = ca_sk; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, |
| ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* ServerHelloDone is empty. */ |
| if (ssl->init_num > 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { |
| /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */ |
| if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { |
| int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { |
| /* Call client_cert_cb to update the certificate. */ |
| int should_retry; |
| if (!ssl_do_client_cert_cb(ssl, &should_retry)) { |
| if (should_retry) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { |
| ssl->s3->hs->cert_request = 0; |
| /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| /* In SSL 3.0, send no certificate by skipping both messages. */ |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C); |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned), |
| SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED); |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B) { |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A); |
| |
| uint8_t *pms = NULL; |
| size_t pms_len = 0; |
| CBB cbb, body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, |
| SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ |
| unsigned psk_len = 0; |
| uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
| psk_len = ssl->psk_client_callback( |
| ssl, ssl->s3->hs->peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity), |
| psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| if (psk_len == 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->new_session->psk_identity); |
| ssl->s3->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); |
| if (ssl->s3->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Write out psk_identity. */ |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity, |
| OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) || |
| !CBB_flush(&body)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { |
| pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->s3->new_session->peer); |
| if (pkey == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); |
| if (rsa == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| |
| pms[0] = ssl->client_version >> 8; |
| pms[1] = ssl->client_version & 0xff; |
| if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| CBB child, *enc_pms = &body; |
| size_t enc_pms_len; |
| /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */ |
| if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| enc_pms = &child; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) || |
| !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, |
| RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) || |
| /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| !ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(ssl, ptr, enc_pms_len, pms, pms_len) || |
| !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) || |
| !CBB_flush(&body)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE|SSL_kCECPQ1)) { |
| /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */ |
| CBB child; |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, &body, &child)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute the premaster. */ |
| uint8_t alert; |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, |
| &alert, ssl->s3->hs->peer_key, |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_key_len)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!CBB_flush(&body)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->hs->ecdh_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_key); |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_key = NULL; |
| ssl->s3->hs->peer_key_len = 0; |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { |
| /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as |
| * the pre-shared key. */ |
| pms_len = psk_len; |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); |
| if (pms == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(pms, 0, pms_len); |
| } else { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared |
| * key. */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { |
| CBB pms_cbb, child; |
| uint8_t *new_pms; |
| size_t new_pms_len; |
| |
| CBB_zero(&pms_cbb); |
| if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || |
| !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { |
| CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| pms = new_pms; |
| pms_len = new_pms_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the |
| * master secret. */ |
| if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| |
| ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length = |
| tls1_generate_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->master_key, pms, |
| pms_len); |
| if (ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length == 0) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ssl->s3->new_session->extended_master_secret = |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| |
| err: |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| if (pms != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C) { |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl)); |
| |
| CBB cbb, body, child; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm; |
| if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl, &signature_algorithm)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */ |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Set aside space for the signature. */ |
| const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || |
| !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| size_t sig_len = max_sig_len; |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { |
| /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a |
| * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */ |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) { |
| if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t digest_len; |
| if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, &md, digest, &digest_len, |
| signature_algorithm)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_success; |
| |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL); |
| if (pctx == NULL || |
| !EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) || |
| !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) || |
| !EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len)) { |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_failure; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| } else { |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign( |
| ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, |
| (const uint8_t *)ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data, |
| ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length); |
| } |
| |
| /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); |
| } else { |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B); |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); |
| } |
| |
| switch (sign_result) { |
| case ssl_private_key_success: |
| break; |
| case ssl_private_key_failure: |
| goto err; |
| case ssl_private_key_retry: |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| |
| err: |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B) { |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A); |
| |
| static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0}; |
| size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32); |
| |
| CBB cbb, body, child; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) || |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, |
| ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) || |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) || |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B) { |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A); |
| |
| if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| CBB cbb, body; |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) || |
| !tls1_write_channel_id(ssl, &body) || |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) { |
| int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
| ssl_hash_message); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; |
| uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; |
| CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num); |
| if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || |
| CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) { |
| /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after |
| * negotiating the extension. The value of |tlsext_ticket_expected| is |
| * checked in |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary |
| * update. */ |
| ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int session_renewed = ssl->session != NULL; |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->s3->new_session; |
| if (session_renewed) { |
| /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are |
| * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the |
| * existing session. */ |
| session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH); |
| if (session == NULL) { |
| /* This should never happen. */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; |
| |
| /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use |
| * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in |
| * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ |
| if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), |
| session->session_id, &session->session_id_length, |
| EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (session_renewed) { |
| session->not_resumable = 0; |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); |
| ssl->session = session; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| if (session_renewed) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |