| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../crypto/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { |
| /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the |
| * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used. |
| * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data| |
| * works. */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { |
| CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); |
| |
| if (cert->x509 != NULL) { |
| X509_up_ref(cert->x509); |
| ret->x509 = cert->x509; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { |
| EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey); |
| ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| if (cert->chain) { |
| ret->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cert->chain); |
| if (!ret->chain) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret->key_method = cert->key_method; |
| |
| ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; |
| ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; |
| |
| if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { |
| ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); |
| if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; |
| |
| if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) { |
| ret->sigalgs = |
| BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0])); |
| if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; |
| |
| ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; |
| ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; |
| |
| if (cert->verify_store != NULL) { |
| X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); |
| ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| ssl_cert_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ |
| void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) { |
| if (cert == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| X509_free(cert->x509); |
| cert->x509 = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); |
| cert->privatekey = NULL; |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); |
| cert->chain = NULL; |
| cert->key_method = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { |
| if (c == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| DH_free(c->dh_tmp); |
| |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); |
| OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); |
| X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(c); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); |
| cert->chain = chain; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; |
| if (chain == NULL) { |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); |
| if (dchain == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, dchain)) { |
| sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { |
| if (cert->chain == NULL) { |
| cert->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| } |
| if (cert->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(cert->chain, x509)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { |
| if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(cert, x509)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| X509_up_ref(x509); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { |
| c->cert_cb = cb; |
| c->cert_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) { |
| if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store; |
| if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) { |
| verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0); |
| int ret = 0; |
| X509_STORE_CTX ctx; |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), |
| ssl)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the |
| * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice |
| * versa. */ |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); |
| |
| /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param); |
| |
| if (ssl->verify_callback) { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback); |
| } |
| |
| int verify_ret; |
| if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) { |
| verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg); |
| } else { |
| verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); |
| } |
| |
| *out_verify_result = ctx.error; |
| |
| /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */ |
| if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error)); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); |
| *ca_list = name_list; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) { |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) { |
| X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i)); |
| if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { |
| set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { |
| set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return ctx->client_CA; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) { |
| /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration |
| * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether |
| * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with |
| * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an |
| * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */ |
| if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) { |
| if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) { |
| return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) { |
| return ssl->client_CA; |
| } |
| return ssl->ctx->client_CA; |
| } |
| |
| static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) { |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| |
| if (x509 == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (*sk == NULL) { |
| *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); |
| if (*sk == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509)); |
| if (name == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { |
| return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { |
| return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { |
| return ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, |
| uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *x = NULL; |
| CBS certificate_list; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { |
| CBS certificate; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */ |
| if (sk_X509_num(ret) == 0 && out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) { |
| SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256); |
| } |
| |
| /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ |
| const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| if (x == NULL || data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ret, x)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| x = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| X509_free(x); |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ret, X509_free); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { |
| int len = i2d_X509(x509, NULL); |
| if (len < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| uint8_t *buf; |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &buf, len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (buf != NULL && i2d_X509(x509, &buf) < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_add_cert_with_length(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { |
| CBB child; |
| return CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) && |
| ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(&child, x509) && |
| CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
| if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { |
| return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0); |
| } |
| |
| CERT *cert = ssl->cert; |
| X509 *x = cert->x509; |
| |
| CBB child; |
| if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int no_chain = 0; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain = cert->chain; |
| if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || chain != NULL) { |
| no_chain = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (no_chain) { |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; |
| |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); |
| /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { |
| return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * |
| ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) { |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); |
| X509_NAME *name = NULL; |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| CBS child; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { |
| CBS distinguished_name; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); |
| /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ |
| name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); |
| if (name == NULL || |
| ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| name = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| X509_NAME_free(name); |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { |
| CBB child, name_cbb; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
| if (sk == NULL) { |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { |
| X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); |
| int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); |
| if (len < 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| uint8_t *ptr; |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) || |
| !CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) || |
| (len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return CBB_flush(cbb); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int *out_should_retry) { |
| if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *x509 = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
| int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| *out_should_retry = 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || |
| !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) { |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| *out_should_retry = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| X509_free(x509); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) { |
| X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr); |
| *store_ptr = new_store; |
| |
| if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) { |
| X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { |
| return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { |
| return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { |
| return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { |
| return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { |
| return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { |
| return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { |
| return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { |
| return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { |
| return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { |
| return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { |
| return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) { |
| return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { |
| *out_chain = ctx->cert->chain; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { |
| return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { |
| *out_chain = ssl->cert->chain; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) { |
| assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION); |
| |
| int ret = 0; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); |
| if (pkey == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); |
| assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); |
| if (pkey->type != expected_type) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { |
| /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key |
| * usages be checked in other cases as well? */ |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ |
| X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); |
| if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && |
| !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */ |
| uint16_t group_id; |
| if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id( |
| &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) || |
| !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) || |
| EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| return ret; |
| } |