| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <assert.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| |
| SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ |
| /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ |
| (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, |
| (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
| (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, |
| (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, |
| 0, /* finish_mac_length */ |
| (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, |
| NULL, /* client_finished_label */ |
| 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ |
| NULL, /* server_finished_label */ |
| 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ |
| (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, |
| (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, |
| size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, |
| int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function, |
| }; |
| |
| /* Some error codes are special. Ensure the make_errors.go script |
| * never regresses this. */ |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT( |
| SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION == |
| SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET, |
| ssl_alert_reason_code_mismatch); |
| |
| int SSL_clear(SSL *s) |
| { |
| |
| if (s->method == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| s->hit=0; |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| |
| #if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not |
| * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ |
| /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep |
| * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ |
| if (s->renegotiate) return(1); |
| #else |
| if (s->renegotiate) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| s->type=0; |
| |
| s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); |
| |
| s->version=s->method->version; |
| s->client_version=s->version; |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| #if 0 |
| s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->init_buf != NULL) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| s->init_buf=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
| |
| s->first_packet=0; |
| |
| #if 1 |
| /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if |
| * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ |
| if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) |
| { |
| s->method->ssl_free(s); |
| s->method=s->ctx->method; |
| if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) |
| return(0); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif |
| s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| ctx->method=meth; |
| |
| sk=ssl_create_cipher_list( |
| ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, |
| meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? |
| "SSLv2" : |
| SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, |
| ctx->cert); |
| |
| if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| SSL *s; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| if (ctx->method == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); |
| if (s == NULL) goto err; |
| memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); |
| |
| s->options=ctx->options; |
| s->mode=ctx->mode; |
| s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; |
| |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) |
| { |
| /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to |
| * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new |
| * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be |
| * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX |
| * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly |
| * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they |
| * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). |
| * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having |
| * duplicated it once. */ |
| |
| s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| if (s->cert == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| else |
| s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ |
| |
| s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; |
| s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; |
| s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; |
| s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; |
| #if 0 |
| s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; |
| #endif |
| s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
| assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); |
| memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); |
| s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; |
| s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; |
| |
| s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| if (!s->param) |
| goto err; |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); |
| #if 0 |
| s->purpose = ctx->purpose; |
| s->trust = ctx->trust; |
| #endif |
| s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; |
| s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; |
| |
| CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| s->ctx=ctx; |
| s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; |
| s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| s->initial_ctx=ctx; |
| if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
| { |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = |
| BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, |
| ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
| goto err; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = |
| ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| } |
| if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| { |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = |
| BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, |
| ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length * 2); |
| if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| goto err; |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = |
| ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| } |
| s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| { |
| s->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup( |
| s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, |
| s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); |
| if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; |
| } |
| |
| s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; |
| |
| s->method=ctx->method; |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| s->references=1; |
| s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; |
| |
| SSL_clear(s); |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); |
| |
| s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint) |
| { |
| s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback; |
| s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback; |
| |
| if (!s->server) |
| { |
| s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = s->ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled; |
| s->ocsp_stapling_enabled = s->ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled; |
| } |
| |
| return(s); |
| err: |
| if (s != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->cert != NULL) |
| ssl_cert_free(s->cert); |
| if (s->ctx != NULL) |
| SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ |
| OPENSSL_free(s); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) |
| { |
| if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; |
| memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) |
| { |
| if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| ctx->generate_session_id = cb; |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
| ssl->generate_session_id = cb; |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, |
| unsigned int id_len) |
| { |
| /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how |
| * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to |
| * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with |
| * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in |
| * use by this SSL. */ |
| SSL_SESSION r, *p; |
| |
| if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) |
| return 0; |
| |
| r.ssl_version = ssl->version; |
| r.session_id_length = id_len; |
| memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); |
| /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a |
| * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it |
| * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be |
| * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ |
| if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && |
| (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) |
| { |
| memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, |
| SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); |
| r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); |
| CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| return (p != NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free( |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) |
| { |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags); |
| OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); |
| } |
| |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_dup( |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list) |
| { |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL; |
| size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); |
| if (!ret) |
| goto err; |
| ret->ciphers = NULL; |
| ret->in_group_flags = NULL; |
| ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list->ciphers); |
| if (!ret->ciphers) |
| goto err; |
| ret->in_group_flags = BUF_memdup(cipher_list->in_group_flags, n); |
| if (!ret->in_group_flags) |
| goto err; |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| if (ret && ret->ciphers) |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers); |
| if (ret) |
| OPENSSL_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers) |
| { |
| struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL; |
| size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); |
| |
| ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st)); |
| if (!ret) |
| goto err; |
| ret->ciphers = NULL; |
| ret->in_group_flags = NULL; |
| ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers); |
| if (!ret->ciphers) |
| goto err; |
| ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n); |
| if (!ret->in_group_flags) |
| goto err; |
| memset(ret->in_group_flags, 0, n); |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| if (ret && ret->ciphers) |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers); |
| if (ret) |
| OPENSSL_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->param; |
| } |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| return ssl->param; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) |
| { |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_free(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if(s == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); |
| #ifdef REF_PRINT |
| REF_PRINT("SSL",s); |
| #endif |
| if (i > 0) return; |
| #ifdef REF_CHECK |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); |
| abort(); /* ok */ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->param) |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); |
| |
| if (s->bbio != NULL) |
| { |
| /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ |
| if (s->bbio == s->wbio) |
| { |
| s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
| } |
| BIO_free(s->bbio); |
| s->bbio=NULL; |
| } |
| if (s->rbio != NULL) |
| BIO_free_all(s->rbio); |
| if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) |
| BIO_free_all(s->wbio); |
| |
| if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| |
| /* add extra stuff */ |
| if (s->cipher_list != NULL) |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list); |
| if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
| |
| /* Make the next call work :-) */ |
| if (s->session != NULL) |
| { |
| ssl_clear_bad_session(s); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| } |
| |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
| |
| if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); |
| /* Free up if allocated */ |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); |
| if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| if (s->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); |
| |
| if (s->client_CA != NULL) |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); |
| |
| if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); |
| |
| if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); |
| |
| if (s->next_proto_negotiated) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); |
| |
| if (s->srtp_profiles) |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(s); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) |
| { |
| /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it |
| */ |
| if (s->bbio != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->wbio == s->bbio) |
| { |
| s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; |
| s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) |
| BIO_free_all(s->rbio); |
| if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) |
| BIO_free_all(s->wbio); |
| s->rbio=rbio; |
| s->wbio=wbio; |
| } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) |
| { return(s->rbio); } |
| |
| BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) |
| { return(s->wbio); } |
| |
| int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret= -1; |
| BIO *b,*r; |
| |
| b=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (r != NULL) |
| BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret= -1; |
| BIO *b,*r; |
| |
| b=SSL_get_wbio(s); |
| r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); |
| if (r != NULL) |
| BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK |
| int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) |
| { |
| int ret=0; |
| BIO *bio=NULL; |
| |
| bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_fd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); |
| ret=1; |
| err: |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) |
| { |
| int ret=0; |
| BIO *bio=NULL; |
| |
| if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD) |
| || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) |
| { |
| bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_wfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); |
| } |
| else |
| SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| ret=1; |
| err: |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) |
| { |
| int ret=0; |
| BIO *bio=NULL; |
| |
| if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD) |
| || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) |
| { |
| bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_rfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
| } |
| else |
| SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
| ret=1; |
| err: |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ |
| size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) |
| { |
| size_t ret = 0; |
| |
| if (s->s3 != NULL) |
| { |
| ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; |
| if (count > ret) |
| count = ret; |
| memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ |
| size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) |
| { |
| size_t ret = 0; |
| |
| if (s->s3 != NULL) |
| { |
| ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
| if (count > ret) |
| count = ret; |
| memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->verify_mode); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) |
| { |
| return(s->verify_callback); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return(ctx->verify_mode); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) |
| { |
| return(ctx->default_verify_callback); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, |
| int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) |
| { |
| s->verify_mode=mode; |
| if (callback != NULL) |
| s->verify_callback=callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) |
| { |
| s->read_ahead=yes; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->read_ahead); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled |
| * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), |
| * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report |
| * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. |
| * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, |
| * so we'd better not return -1.) |
| */ |
| return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| X509 *r; |
| |
| if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) |
| r=NULL; |
| else |
| r=s->session->peer; |
| |
| if (r == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return X509_up_ref(r); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *r; |
| |
| if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) |
| r=NULL; |
| else |
| r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; |
| |
| /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own |
| * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ |
| |
| return(r); |
| } |
| |
| /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ |
| int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if ( (ctx == NULL) || |
| (ctx->cert == NULL) || |
| (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); |
| } |
| |
| /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ |
| int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| if (ssl == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| if (ssl->cert == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, |
| ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_accept(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ |
| SSL_set_accept_state(s); |
| |
| return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_connect(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ |
| SSL_set_connect_state(s); |
| |
| return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_read, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_peek, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| { |
| return(0); |
| } |
| return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) |
| { |
| /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might |
| * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), |
| * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, |
| * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). |
| */ |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_shutdown, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s)) |
| return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); |
| else |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->renegotiate == 0) |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| |
| s->new_session=1; |
| |
| return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->renegotiate == 0) |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| |
| s->new_session=0; |
| |
| return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) |
| { |
| /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; |
| * false again once a handshake has finished */ |
| return (s->renegotiate != 0); |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) |
| { |
| long l; |
| |
| switch (cmd) |
| { |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: |
| return(s->read_ahead); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: |
| l=s->read_ahead; |
| s->read_ahead=larg; |
| return(l); |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: |
| s->msg_callback_arg = parg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: |
| return(s->options|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: |
| return(s->options&=~larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_MODE: |
| return(s->mode|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: |
| return(s->mode &=~larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
| return(s->max_cert_list); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
| l=s->max_cert_list; |
| s->max_cert_list=larg; |
| return(l); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: |
| if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) |
| return 0; |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| s->d1->mtu = larg; |
| return larg; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: |
| if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| return 0; |
| s->max_send_fragment = larg; |
| return 1; |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: |
| if (s->s3) |
| return s->s3->send_connection_binding; |
| else return 0; |
| case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: |
| return(s->cert->cert_flags|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: |
| return(s->cert->cert_flags &=~larg); |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: |
| if (parg) |
| { |
| if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw; |
| return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Passing a NULL |parg| returns the size of a single |
| * cipher suite value. */ |
| return 2; |
| } |
| default: |
| return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) |
| { |
| switch(cmd) |
| { |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: |
| s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->sessions; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) |
| { |
| long l; |
| |
| switch (cmd) |
| { |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: |
| return(ctx->read_ahead); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: |
| l=ctx->read_ahead; |
| ctx->read_ahead=larg; |
| return(l); |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: |
| ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
| return(ctx->max_cert_list); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: |
| l=ctx->max_cert_list; |
| ctx->max_cert_list=larg; |
| return(l); |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: |
| l=ctx->session_cache_size; |
| ctx->session_cache_size=larg; |
| return(l); |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: |
| return(ctx->session_cache_size); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: |
| l=ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; |
| return(l); |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: |
| return(ctx->session_cache_mode); |
| |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: |
| return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: |
| return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); |
| case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: |
| return(ctx->options|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: |
| return(ctx->options&=~larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_MODE: |
| return(ctx->mode|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: |
| return(ctx->mode&=~larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: |
| if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| return 0; |
| ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; |
| return 1; |
| case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: |
| return(ctx->cert->cert_flags|=larg); |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: |
| return(ctx->cert->cert_flags &=~larg); |
| default: |
| return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) |
| { |
| switch(cmd) |
| { |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: |
| ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) |
| { |
| long l; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *a = in_a; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *b = in_b; |
| const long a_id = a->id; |
| const long b_id = b->id; |
| |
| l = a_id - b_id; |
| if (l == 0L) |
| return(0); |
| else |
| return((l > 0)?1:-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER **ap, const SSL_CIPHER **bp) |
| { |
| long l; |
| const long a_id = (*ap)->id; |
| const long b_id = (*bp)->id; |
| |
| l = a_id - b_id; |
| if (l == 0) |
| return(0); |
| else |
| return((l > 0)?1:-1); |
| } |
| |
| /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
| * preference */ |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (s->cipher_list != NULL) |
| { |
| return(s->cipher_list->ciphers); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) |
| { |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) |
| return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers; |
| } |
| |
| if ((s->ctx != NULL) && |
| (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) |
| { |
| return(s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers); |
| } |
| |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of |
| * algorithm id */ |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) |
| { |
| return(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
| } |
| else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && |
| (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) |
| { |
| return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); |
| } |
| } |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ |
| const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) |
| { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
| if (sk == NULL || n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk)) |
| return NULL; |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); |
| if (c == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| return c->name; |
| } |
| |
| /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, |
| &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert); |
| /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it |
| * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string |
| * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which |
| * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as |
| * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence |
| * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been |
| * updated. */ |
| if (sk == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str, ctx->cert); |
| if (sk == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ |
| int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, |
| &s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert); |
| /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ |
| if (sk == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, uint8_t *p) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| CERT *ct = s->cert; |
| uint8_t *q; |
| /* Set disabled masks for this session */ |
| ssl_set_client_disabled(s); |
| |
| if (sk == NULL) return(0); |
| q=p; |
| |
| for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) |
| { |
| c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); |
| /* Skip disabled ciphers */ |
| if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || |
| c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || |
| c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) |
| continue; |
| s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(c), p); |
| } |
| /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ |
| if (p == q) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add SCSVs. */ |
| if (!s->renegotiate) |
| { |
| s2n(SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); |
| } |
| if (s->fallback_scsv) |
| { |
| s2n(SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff, p); |
| } |
| |
| return(p-q); |
| } |
| |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const CBS *cbs) |
| { |
| CBS cipher_suites = *cbs; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| |
| if (s->s3) |
| s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
| |
| if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); |
| if (sk == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&cipher_suites, |
| &s->cert->ciphers_raw, &s->cert->ciphers_rawlen)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) |
| { |
| uint16_t cipher_suite; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for SCSV. */ |
| if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) |
| { |
| /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating. */ |
| if (s->renegotiate) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV. */ |
| if (s->s3 && cipher_suite == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) |
| { |
| if (s->version < ssl_get_max_version(s)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| if (c != NULL) |
| { |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return sk; |
| |
| err: |
| if (sk != NULL) |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. |
| * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). |
| */ |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) |
| { |
| if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? |
| s->session->tlsext_hostname : |
| s->tlsext_hostname; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) |
| return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| ctx->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_enable_signed_cert_timestamps(SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| /* Currently not implemented server-side. */ |
| if (ssl->server) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| ctx->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| /* Currently not implemented server-side. */ |
| if (ssl->server) |
| return 0; |
| ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| if (ssl->server) |
| return; |
| if (!session || !session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list) |
| return; |
| *out = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list; |
| *out_len = session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| *out = NULL; |
| if (ssl->server) |
| return; |
| if (!session || !session->ocsp_response) |
| return; |
| *out = session->ocsp_response; |
| *out_len = session->ocsp_response_length; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is |
| * expected that this function is called from the callback set by |
| * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. |
| * |
| * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte |
| * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte |
| * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. |
| * |
| * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: |
| * |
| * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the |
| * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection |
| * or have a default application level protocol. |
| * |
| * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the |
| * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the |
| * API that this fallback case was enacted. |
| * |
| * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list |
| * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's |
| * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol |
| * a client should use. |
| * |
| * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised |
| * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. |
| * |
| * It returns either |
| * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or |
| * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. |
| */ |
| int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) |
| { |
| unsigned int i, j; |
| const unsigned char *result; |
| int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; |
| |
| /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) |
| { |
| for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) |
| { |
| if (server[i] == client[j] && |
| memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) |
| { |
| /* We found a match */ |
| result = &server[i]; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; |
| goto found; |
| } |
| j += client[j]; |
| j++; |
| } |
| i += server[i]; |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ |
| result = client; |
| status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; |
| |
| found: |
| *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; |
| *outlen = result[0]; |
| return status; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's |
| * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't |
| * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. |
| * |
| * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned |
| * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols |
| * provided by the callback. |
| */ |
| void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const uint8_t **data, unsigned *len) |
| { |
| *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; |
| if (!*data) { |
| *len = 0; |
| } else { |
| *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a |
| * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol |
| * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned |
| * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will |
| * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to |
| * it. |
| * |
| * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no |
| * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) |
| { |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a |
| * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| |
| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). |
| * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's |
| * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can |
| * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. |
| * |
| * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this |
| * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. |
| */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) |
| { |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. |
| * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit |
| * length-prefixed strings). |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success. */ |
| int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos, |
| unsigned protos_len) |
| { |
| if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| return 1; |
| ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. |
| * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit |
| * length-prefixed strings). |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on success. */ |
| int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos, |
| unsigned protos_len) |
| { |
| if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = BUF_memdup(protos, protos_len); |
| if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) |
| return 1; |
| ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called |
| * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the |
| * client's list of offered protocols. */ |
| void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
| const unsigned char **out, |
| unsigned char *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *in, |
| unsigned int inlen, |
| void *arg), |
| void *arg) |
| { |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; |
| ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. |
| * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not |
| * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with |
| * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, |
| unsigned *len) |
| { |
| *data = NULL; |
| if (ssl->s3) |
| *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; |
| if (*data == NULL) |
| *len = 0; |
| else |
| *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, |
| const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, |
| int use_context) |
| { |
| if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) |
| return -1; |
| |
| return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, |
| llen, p, plen, |
| use_context); |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) |
| { |
| uint32_t hash = ((uint32_t) a->session_id[0]) || |
| ((uint32_t) a->session_id[1] << 8) || |
| ((uint32_t) a->session_id[2] << 16) || |
| ((uint32_t) a->session_id[3] << 24); |
| |
| return hash; |
| } |
| |
| /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of |
| * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure |
| * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being |
| * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session |
| * with a matching session ID. */ |
| static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) |
| { |
| if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) |
| return(1); |
| if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) |
| return(1); |
| return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; |
| |
| if (meth == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); |
| |
| ret->method=meth; |
| |
| ret->cert_store=NULL; |
| ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; |
| ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; |
| ret->session_cache_head=NULL; |
| ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; |
| |
| /* We take the system default */ |
| ret->session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT; |
| |
| ret->new_session_cb=0; |
| ret->remove_session_cb=0; |
| ret->get_session_cb=0; |
| ret->generate_session_id=0; |
| |
| memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); |
| |
| ret->references=1; |
| ret->quiet_shutdown=0; |
| |
| ret->info_callback=NULL; |
| |
| ret->app_verify_callback=0; |
| ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; |
| |
| ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; |
| ret->read_ahead=0; |
| ret->msg_callback=0; |
| ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; |
| ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| #if 0 |
| ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ |
| #endif |
| ret->sid_ctx_length=0; |
| ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; |
| if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| ret->default_passwd_callback=0; |
| ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; |
| ret->client_cert_cb=0; |
| ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; |
| ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; |
| |
| ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); |
| if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; |
| ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); |
| if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, |
| &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, |
| meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert); |
| if (ret->cipher_list == NULL |
| || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| if (!ret->param) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); |
| |
| ret->extra_certs=NULL; |
| |
| ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| |
| ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; |
| ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; |
| /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ |
| if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) |
| || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) |
| || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; |
| |
| ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; |
| ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; |
| |
| ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; |
| ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; |
| ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; |
| ret->psk_client_callback=NULL; |
| ret->psk_server_callback=NULL; |
| |
| /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely |
| * deployed might change this. |
| */ |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; |
| |
| return(ret); |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| err2: |
| if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (a == NULL) return; |
| |
| i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| #ifdef REF_PRINT |
| REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); |
| #endif |
| if (i > 0) return; |
| #ifdef REF_CHECK |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); |
| abort(); /* ok */ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (a->param) |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); |
| |
| /* |
| * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference |
| * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed |
| * after the sessions were flushed. |
| * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, |
| * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then |
| * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. |
| * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) |
| */ |
| if (a->sessions != NULL) |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); |
| |
| if (a->sessions != NULL) |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); |
| |
| if (a->cert_store != NULL) |
| X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); |
| if (a->cipher_list != NULL) |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list); |
| if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); |
| if (a->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL) |
| ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list_tls11); |
| if (a->cert != NULL) |
| ssl_cert_free(a->cert); |
| if (a->client_CA != NULL) |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); |
| if (a->extra_certs != NULL) |
| sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); |
| |
| if (a->srtp_profiles) |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); |
| |
| if (a->psk_identity_hint) |
| OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); |
| |
| if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) |
| OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); |
| |
| if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private); |
| |
| if (a->keylog_bio) |
| BIO_free(a->keylog_bio); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(a); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) |
| { |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) |
| { |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) |
| { |
| ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; |
| ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
| { |
| ctx->verify_mode=mode; |
| ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) |
| { |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) |
| { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) |
| { |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) |
| { |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk; |
| int rsa_enc,rsa_sign,dh_tmp; |
| unsigned long mask_k,mask_a; |
| int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; |
| int have_ecdh_tmp; |
| X509 *x = NULL; |
| if (c == NULL) return; |
| |
| dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); |
| |
| have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto); |
| cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); |
| rsa_enc= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; |
| cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); |
| rsa_sign= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; |
| cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); |
| have_ecc_cert= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; |
| mask_k=0; |
| mask_a=0; |
| |
| #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
| printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", |
| rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp, |
| rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (rsa_enc) |
| mask_k|=SSL_kRSA; |
| |
| if (dh_tmp) |
| mask_k|=SSL_kEDH; |
| |
| if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) |
| { |
| mask_a|=SSL_aRSA; |
| } |
| |
| mask_a|=SSL_aNULL; |
| |
| /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on |
| * the key usage extension. */ |
| if (have_ecc_cert) |
| { |
| cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]; |
| x = cpk->x509; |
| /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? |
| (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; |
| if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) |
| ecdsa_ok = 0; |
| if (ecdsa_ok) |
| { |
| mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (have_ecdh_tmp) |
| { |
| mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH; |
| } |
| |
| mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; |
| mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; |
| |
| c->mask_k=mask_k; |
| c->mask_a=mask_a; |
| c->valid=1; |
| } |
| |
| /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ |
| #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) |
| |
| |
| int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| |
| alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) |
| { |
| signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); |
| OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); |
| } |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) |
| { |
| /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; /* all checks are ok */ |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
| if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
| if (idx == -1) |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_server_cert_index, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return idx; |
| } |
| |
| CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| CERT *c; |
| int i; |
| |
| c = s->cert; |
| ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
| |
| i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); |
| |
| /* This may or may not be an error. */ |
| if (i < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* May be NULL. */ |
| return &c->pkeys[i]; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) |
| { |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| CERT *c; |
| int idx = -1; |
| |
| alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| c=s->cert; |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) |
| { |
| if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
| else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; |
| } |
| else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && |
| (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
| if (idx == -1) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_sign_pkey, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| if (pmd) |
| *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; |
| return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, |
| * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ |
| if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; |
| |
| i=s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode; |
| if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) |
| && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) |
| || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx,s->session)) |
| && (s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) |
| { |
| CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); |
| if (!s->initial_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| } |
| |
| /* auto flush every 255 connections */ |
| if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && |
| ((i & mode) == mode)) |
| { |
| if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) |
| ?s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good |
| :s->initial_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->initial_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return ctx->method; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->method); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) |
| { |
| int conn= -1; |
| int ret=1; |
| |
| if (s->method != meth) |
| { |
| if (s->handshake_func != NULL) |
| conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); |
| |
| if (s->method->version == meth->version) |
| s->method=meth; |
| else |
| { |
| s->method->ssl_free(s); |
| s->method=meth; |
| ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); |
| } |
| |
| if (conn == 1) |
| s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; |
| else if (conn == 0) |
| s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; |
| } |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) |
| { |
| int reason; |
| unsigned long l; |
| BIO *bio; |
| |
| if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); |
| |
| /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake |
| * etc, where we do encode the error */ |
| if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) |
| { |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
| else |
| return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); |
| } |
| |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_session(s)) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION); |
| |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_certificate(s)) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE); |
| |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) |
| { |
| bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); |
| else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) |
| /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try |
| * to write to the rbio, and an application program where |
| * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it |
| * should wait for. |
| * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly |
| * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of |
| * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, |
| * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer |
| * to keep it. */ |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); |
| else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) |
| { |
| reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); |
| else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); |
| else |
| return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) |
| { |
| bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); |
| else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) |
| /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); |
| else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) |
| { |
| reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); |
| else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); |
| else |
| return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
| } |
| } |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) |
| { |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); |
| } |
| if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)) |
| { |
| return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP); |
| } |
| |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) |
| { |
| /* assume it is the socket being closed */ |
| return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && |
| (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) |
| return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); |
| } |
| } |
| return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret=1; |
| |
| if (s->handshake_func == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_do_handshake, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); |
| |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) |
| { |
| ret=s->handshake_func(s); |
| } |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so |
| * one of these calls will reset it */ |
| void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) |
| { |
| s->server=1; |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; |
| s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; |
| /* clear the current cipher */ |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) |
| { |
| s->server=0; |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; |
| s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; |
| /* clear the current cipher */ |
| ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); |
| ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_void_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_const_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bad_method, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| static const char *ssl_get_version(int version) |
| { |
| if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| return("TLSv1.2"); |
| else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) |
| return("TLSv1.1"); |
| else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) |
| return("TLSv1"); |
| else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) |
| return("SSLv3"); |
| else if (version == SSL2_VERSION) |
| return("SSLv2"); |
| else |
| return("unknown"); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return ssl_get_version(s->version); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *sess) |
| { |
| return ssl_get_version(sess->ssl_version); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; |
| } |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; |
| } |
| if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(s->aead_read_ctx); |
| s->aead_read_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(s->aead_write_ctx); |
| s->aead_write_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->cert != NULL) |
| return(s->cert->key->x509); |
| else |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->cert != NULL) |
| return(s->cert->key->privatekey); |
| else |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) |
| return ctx->cert->key->x509; |
| else |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) |
| return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; |
| else |
| return NULL ; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
| return(s->session->cipher); |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) |
| { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) |
| { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) |
| { |
| BIO *bbio; |
| |
| if (s->bbio == NULL) |
| { |
| bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); |
| if (bbio == NULL) return(0); |
| s->bbio=bbio; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| bbio=s->bbio; |
| if (s->bbio == s->wbio) |
| s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
| } |
| (void)BIO_reset(bbio); |
| /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ |
| if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| if (push) |
| { |
| if (s->wbio != bbio) |
| s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (s->wbio == bbio) |
| s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->bbio == NULL) return; |
| |
| if (s->bbio == s->wbio) |
| { |
| /* remove buffering */ |
| s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); |
| #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ |
| assert(s->wbio != NULL); |
| #endif |
| } |
| BIO_free(s->bbio); |
| s->bbio=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) |
| { |
| ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) |
| { |
| s->quiet_shutdown=mode; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->quiet_shutdown); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) |
| { |
| s->shutdown=mode; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->shutdown); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_version(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->version); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| return(ssl->ctx); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) |
| { |
| if (ssl->ctx == ctx) |
| return ssl->ctx; |
| if (ctx == NULL) |
| ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; |
| if (ssl->cert != NULL) |
| ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); |
| ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); |
| CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); |
| if (ssl->ctx != NULL) |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; |
| |
| ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; |
| assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
| memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); |
| |
| return(ssl->ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, |
| const char *CApath) |
| { |
| return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) |
| { |
| ssl->info_callback=cb; |
| } |
| |
| /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned |
| function pointer. */ |
| void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) |
| { |
| return ssl->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| return(ssl->state); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) |
| { |
| ssl->state = state; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) |
| { |
| ssl->verify_result=arg; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) |
| { |
| return(ssl->verify_result); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, |
| new_func, dup_func, free_func); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) |
| { |
| return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) |
| { |
| return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, |
| new_func, dup_func, free_func); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) |
| { |
| return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) |
| { |
| return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_ok(SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return(ctx->cert_store); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) |
| { |
| if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); |
| ctx->cert_store=store; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_want(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| return(s->rwstate); |
| } |
| |
| /*! |
| * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. |
| * \param ctx the SSL context. |
| * \param cb the callback |
| */ |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, |
| int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, |
| int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef DOXYGEN |
| /*! |
| * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. |
| * \param ssl the SSL session. |
| * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. |
| * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size |
| * of the required key in bits. |
| * \return the temporary RSA key. |
| * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback |
| */ |
| |
| RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) |
| {} |
| #endif |
| |
| /*! |
| * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. |
| * \param ctx the SSL context. |
| * \param dh the callback |
| */ |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, |
| int keylength)) |
| { |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) |
| { |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) |
| { |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else |
| ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Clear hint in SSL and associated SSL_SESSION (if any). */ |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint); |
| s->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| } |
| if (s->session != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
| s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) |
| { |
| /* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in |
| * SSL_SESSION taking precedence. Thus, if SSL_SESSION is avaiable, |
| * we store the hint there, otherwise we store it in SSL. */ |
| if (s->session != NULL) |
| { |
| s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); |
| if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| /* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in SSL_SESSION |
| * taking precedence. */ |
| if (s->session != NULL) |
| return(s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
| return(s->psk_identity_hint); |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| return(s->session->psk_identity); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, |
| unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, |
| char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, |
| unsigned int max_psk_len)) |
| { |
| s->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, |
| char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, |
| unsigned int max_psk_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, |
| unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, |
| unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) |
| { |
| s->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, |
| unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) |
| { |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); |
| } |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) |
| { |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_bio(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *keylog_bio) |
| { |
| if (ctx->keylog_bio != NULL) |
| BIO_free(ctx->keylog_bio); |
| ctx->keylog_bio = keylog_bio; |
| } |
| |
| static int cbb_add_hex(CBB *cbb, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) |
| { |
| static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t i; |
| |
| if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &out, in_len * 2)) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) |
| { |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] >> 4]; |
| *(out++) = (uint8_t)hextable[in[i] & 0xf]; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, size_t encrypted_premaster_len, |
| const uint8_t *premaster, size_t premaster_len) |
| { |
| BIO *bio = ctx->keylog_bio; |
| CBB cbb; |
| uint8_t *out; |
| size_t out_len; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (bio == NULL) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 4 + 16 + 1 + premaster_len*2 + 1)) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)"RSA ", 4) || |
| /* Only the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster secret are |
| * logged. */ |
| !cbb_add_hex(&cbb, encrypted_premaster, 8) || |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, (const uint8_t*)" ", 1) |