| /* |
| * TLS 1.3 client-side functions |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may |
| * not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT |
| * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| * |
| * This file is part of mbed TLS ( https://tls.mbed.org ) |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/debug.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| |
| #include "ssl_misc.h" |
| #include "ssl_client.h" |
| #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" |
| |
| /* Write extensions */ |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(): |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; |
| * } SupportedVersions; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *end, |
| size_t *out_len ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| unsigned char versions_len = ( ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 ) ? 4 : 2; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported versions extension" ) ); |
| |
| /* Check if we have space to write the extension: |
| * - extension_type (2 bytes) |
| * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) |
| * - versions_length (1 byte ) |
| * - versions (2 or 4 bytes) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + versions_len ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0 ); |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( versions_len + 1, p, 2 ); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| /* Length of versions */ |
| *p++ = versions_len; |
| |
| /* Write values of supported versions. |
| * They are defined by the configuration. |
| * Currently, we advertise only TLS 1.3 or both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. |
| */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version( p, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "supported version: [3:4]" ) ); |
| |
| |
| if( ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version( p + 2, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "supported version: [3:3]" ) ); |
| } |
| |
| *out_len = 5 + versions_len; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| ((void) ssl); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, 2 ); |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_read_version( buf, ssl->conf->transport ) != |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unexpected version" ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| } |
| |
| if( &buf[2] != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "supported_versions ext data length incorrect" ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t list_len, name_len; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const unsigned char *end = buf + len; |
| |
| /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ |
| if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| /* |
| * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> |
| * } ProtocolNameList; |
| * |
| * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" |
| */ |
| |
| /* Min length is 2 ( list_len ) + 1 ( name_len ) + 1 ( name ) */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 4 ); |
| |
| list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, list_len ); |
| |
| name_len = *p++; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, list_len - 1 ); |
| |
| /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ |
| for ( const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++ ) |
| { |
| if( name_len == strlen( *alpn ) && |
| memcmp( buf + 3, *alpn, name_len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_reset_key_share( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| uint16_t group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; |
| |
| if( group_id == 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group_id ) ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| /* Destroy generated private key. */ |
| status = psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_destroy_key", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ |
| if( 0 /* other KEMs? */ ) |
| { |
| /* Do something */ |
| } |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Functions for writing key_share extension. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| uint16_t *group_id ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) |
| const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl ); |
| /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */ |
| if( group_list == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); |
| |
| for ( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; |
| curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( *group_list ); |
| if( curve_info != NULL && |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( *group_list ) ) |
| { |
| *group_id = *group_list; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| } |
| #else |
| ((void) ssl); |
| ((void) group_id); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Add DHE named groups here. |
| * Pick first available DHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 |
| */ |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext |
| * |
| * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello: |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * NamedGroup group; |
| * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; |
| * } KeyShareEntry; |
| * struct { |
| * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } KeyShareClientHello; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *end, |
| size_t *out_len ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| unsigned char *client_shares; /* Start of client_shares */ |
| size_t client_shares_len; /* Length of client_shares */ |
| uint16_t group_id; |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| |
| /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: |
| * - extension_type (2 bytes) |
| * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) |
| * - client_shares_length (2 bytes) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); |
| p += 6; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello: adding key share extension" ) ); |
| |
| /* HRR could already have requested something else. */ |
| group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; |
| if( !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group_id ) && |
| !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( group_id ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id( ssl, |
| &group_id ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function. |
| * |
| * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction |
| * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per |
| * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And |
| * only one key share entry is allowed. |
| */ |
| client_shares = p; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group_id ) ) |
| { |
| /* Pointer to group */ |
| unsigned char *group = p; |
| /* Length of key_exchange */ |
| size_t key_exchange_len = 0; |
| |
| /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry |
| * - group (2 bytes) |
| * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); |
| p += 4; |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_ecdh_key_exchange( |
| ssl, group_id, p, end, &key_exchange_len ); |
| p += key_exchange_len; |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| /* Write group */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( group_id, group, 0 ); |
| /* Write key_exchange_length */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( key_exchange_len, group, 2 ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ |
| if( 0 /* other KEMs? */ ) |
| { |
| /* Do something */ |
| } |
| else |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| |
| /* Length of client_shares */ |
| client_shares_len = p - client_shares; |
| if( client_shares_len == 0) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No key share defined." ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| /* Write extension_type */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0 ); |
| /* Write extension_data_length */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2 ); |
| /* Write client_shares_length */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( client_shares_len, buf, 4 ); |
| |
| /* Update offered_group_id field */ |
| ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id; |
| |
| /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */ |
| *out_len = p - buf; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *out_len ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext() |
| * Parse key_share extension in Hello Retry Request |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * NamedGroup selected_group; |
| * } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = NULL; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| int selected_group; |
| int found = 0; |
| |
| const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups( ssl ); |
| if( group_list == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "key_share extension", p, end - buf ); |
| |
| /* Read selected_group */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| selected_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected_group ( %d )", selected_group ) ); |
| |
| /* Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client |
| * MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a |
| * group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the |
| * original ClientHello. |
| * The supported_group was based on the info in ssl->conf->group_list. |
| * |
| * If the server provided a key share that was not sent in the ClientHello |
| * then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. |
| */ |
| for( ; *group_list != 0; group_list++ ) |
| { |
| curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( *group_list ); |
| if( curve_info == NULL || curve_info->tls_id != selected_group ) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* We found a match */ |
| found = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Client MUST verify that the selected_group field does not |
| * correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" |
| * extension in the original ClientHello. If the server sent an |
| * HRR message with a key share already provided in the |
| * ClientHello then the client MUST abort the handshake with |
| * an "illegal_parameter" alert. |
| */ |
| if( found == 0 || selected_group == ssl->handshake->offered_group_id ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid key share in HRR" ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Remember server's preference for next ClientHello */ |
| ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = selected_group; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext() |
| * Parse key_share extension in Server Hello |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * KeyShareEntry server_share; |
| * } KeyShareServerHello; |
| * struct { |
| * NamedGroup group; |
| * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; |
| * } KeyShareEntry; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| uint16_t group, offered_group; |
| |
| /* ... |
| * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes) |
| * ... |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */ |
| offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; |
| if( offered_group != group ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, |
| ( "Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u", |
| (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( group ) ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = |
| mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( group ); |
| if( curve_info == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid TLS curve group id" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_ecdhe_share( ssl, p, end - p ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ |
| if( 0 /* other KEMs? */ ) |
| { |
| /* Do something */ |
| } |
| else |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE; |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext() |
| * Parse cookie extension in Hello Retry Request |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; |
| * } Cookie; |
| * |
| * When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie" |
| * extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that |
| * the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the |
| * ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy |
| * the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into |
| * a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello. Clients MUST NOT use |
| * cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| uint16_t cookie_len; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| /* Retrieve length field of cookie */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| cookie_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, cookie_len ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie extension", p, cookie_len ); |
| |
| mbedtls_free( handshake->cookie ); |
| handshake->hrr_cookie_len = 0; |
| handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len ); |
| if( handshake->cookie == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, |
| ( "alloc failed ( %ud bytes )", |
| cookie_len ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| } |
| |
| memcpy( handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len ); |
| handshake->hrr_cookie_len = cookie_len; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *end, |
| size_t *out_len ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| *out_len = 0; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| if( handshake->cookie == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no cookie to send; skip extension" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", |
| handshake->cookie, |
| handshake->hrr_cookie_len ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, handshake->hrr_cookie_len + 6 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding cookie extension" ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, p, 0 ); |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( handshake->hrr_cookie_len + 2, p, 2 ); |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( handshake->hrr_cookie_len, p, 4 ); |
| p += 6; |
| |
| /* Cookie */ |
| memcpy( p, handshake->cookie, handshake->hrr_cookie_len ); |
| |
| *out_len = handshake->hrr_cookie_len + 6; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *end, |
| size_t *out_len ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| size_t ext_len; |
| |
| *out_len = 0; |
| |
| /* Write supported_versions extension |
| * |
| * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3. |
| */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| p += ext_len; |
| |
| /* Echo the cookie if the server provided one in its preceding |
| * HelloRetryRequest message. |
| */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| p += ext_len; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| p += ext_len; |
| } |
| |
| *out_len = p - buf; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello |
| */ |
| |
| /** |
| * \brief Detect if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension |
| * or not. |
| * |
| * \param[in] ssl SSL context |
| * \param[in] buf Buffer containing the ServerHello message |
| * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the ServerHello message |
| * |
| * \return 0 if the ServerHello does not contain a supported_versions extension |
| * \return 1 if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension |
| * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the ServerHello. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( |
| mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; |
| size_t extensions_len; |
| const unsigned char *extensions_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check there is enough data to access the legacy_session_id_echo vector |
| * length: |
| * - legacy_version 2 bytes |
| * - random MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes |
| * - legacy_session_id_echo length 1 byte |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 3 ); |
| p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2; |
| legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Jump to the extensions, jumping over: |
| * - legacy_session_id_echo (legacy_session_id_echo_len + 1) bytes |
| * - cipher_suite 2 bytes |
| * - legacy_compression_method 1 byte |
| */ |
| p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4; |
| |
| /* Case of no extension */ |
| if( p == end ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* ... |
| * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; |
| * ... |
| * struct { |
| * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) |
| * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } Extension; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len ); |
| extensions_end = p + extensions_len; |
| |
| while( p < extensions_end ) |
| { |
| unsigned int extension_type; |
| size_t extension_data_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 ); |
| extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 ); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| if( extension_type == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS ) |
| return( 1 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len ); |
| p += extension_data_len; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise |
| * - 1 if the last eight bytes of the ServerHello random bytes indicate that |
| * the server is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating TLS 1.2 or below. |
| * - 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| /* First seven bytes of the magic downgrade strings, see RFC 8446 4.1.3 */ |
| static const unsigned char magic_downgrade_string[] = |
| { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44 }; |
| const unsigned char *last_eight_bytes_of_random; |
| unsigned char last_byte_of_random; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2 ); |
| last_eight_bytes_of_random = buf + 2 + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - 8; |
| |
| if( memcmp( last_eight_bytes_of_random, |
| magic_downgrade_string, |
| sizeof( magic_downgrade_string ) ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| last_byte_of_random = last_eight_bytes_of_random[7]; |
| return( last_byte_of_random == 0 || |
| last_byte_of_random == 1 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise |
| * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or |
| * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR |
| * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next. |
| */ |
| #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO 0 |
| #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR 1 |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| |
| /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message. |
| * |
| * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the |
| * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest". |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; |
| * Random random; |
| * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; |
| * CipherSuite cipher_suite; |
| * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; |
| * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; |
| * } ServerHello; |
| * |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, |
| 2 + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic ) ); |
| |
| if( memcmp( buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, |
| sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic ) ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR ); |
| } |
| |
| return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Fetch and preprocess |
| * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise |
| * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or |
| * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR or |
| * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 |
| */ |
| #define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 2 |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char **buf, |
| size_t *buf_len ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const unsigned char *end; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, |
| buf, buf_len ) ); |
| end = *buf + *buf_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( |
| ssl, *buf, end ) ); |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( |
| ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation( ssl, *buf, end ) ); |
| |
| /* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and: |
| * . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or |
| * . the server responded it is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating a lower |
| * version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack |
| * abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert. |
| */ |
| if( ssl->handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->keep_current_message = 1; |
| ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; |
| mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, |
| *buf, *buf_len ); |
| |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 ); |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( ssl, *buf, end ); |
| switch( ret ) |
| { |
| case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received ServerHello message" ) ); |
| break; |
| case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received HelloRetryRequest message" ) ); |
| /* If a client receives a second |
| * HelloRetryRequest in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello |
| * was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the |
| * handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert. |
| */ |
| if( ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Multiple HRRs received" ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); |
| } |
| /* |
| * Clients must abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" |
| * alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change |
| * in the ClientHello. |
| * In a PSK only key exchange that what we expect. |
| */ |
| if( ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, |
| ( "Unexpected HRR in pure PSK key exchange." ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count++; |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char **buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = *buf; |
| size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 1 ); |
| legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++ ; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len ); |
| |
| /* legacy_session_id_echo */ |
| if( ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len || |
| memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p , legacy_session_id_echo_len ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Expected Session ID", |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id, |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Received Session ID", p, |
| legacy_session_id_echo_len ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| } |
| |
| p += legacy_session_id_echo_len; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id, |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse ServerHello message and configure context |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 |
| * Random random; |
| * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; |
| * CipherSuite cipher_suite; |
| * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; |
| * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; |
| * } ServerHello; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| int is_hrr ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| size_t extensions_len; |
| const unsigned char *extensions_end; |
| uint16_t cipher_suite; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| int fatal_alert = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check there is space for minimal fields |
| * |
| * - legacy_version ( 2 bytes) |
| * - random (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes) |
| * - legacy_session_id_echo ( 1 byte ), minimum size |
| * - cipher_suite ( 2 bytes) |
| * - legacy_compression_method ( 1 byte ) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "server hello", p, end - p ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", p, 2 ); |
| |
| /* ... |
| * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 |
| * ... |
| * with ProtocolVersion defined as: |
| * uint16 ProtocolVersion; |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_read_version( p, ssl->conf->transport ) != |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Unsupported version of TLS." ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* ... |
| * Random random; |
| * ... |
| * with Random defined as: |
| * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; |
| */ |
| if( !is_hrr ) |
| { |
| memcpy( &handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p, |
| MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", |
| p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN ); |
| } |
| p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; |
| |
| /* ... |
| * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; |
| * ... |
| */ |
| if( ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* ... |
| * CipherSuite cipher_suite; |
| * ... |
| * with CipherSuite defined as: |
| * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| |
| ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( cipher_suite ); |
| /* |
| * Check whether this ciphersuite is valid and offered. |
| */ |
| if( ( mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ssl, ciphersuite_info, |
| ssl->tls_version, |
| ssl->tls_version ) != 0 ) || |
| !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( ssl, cipher_suite ) ) |
| { |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If we received an HRR before and that the proposed selected |
| * ciphersuite in this server hello is not the same as the one |
| * proposed in the HRR, we abort the handshake and send an |
| * "illegal_parameter" alert. |
| */ |
| else if( ( !is_hrr ) && ( handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0 ) && |
| ( cipher_suite != ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) |
| { |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| if( fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid ciphersuite(%04x) parameter", |
| cipher_suite ) ); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* Configure ciphersuites */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ciphersuite_info ); |
| |
| handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s", |
| cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| ssl->session_negotiate->start = time( NULL ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ |
| |
| /* ... |
| * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; |
| * ... |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 1 ); |
| if( p[0] != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad legacy compression method" ) ); |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| p++; |
| |
| /* ... |
| * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; |
| * ... |
| * struct { |
| * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) |
| * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } Extension; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len ); |
| extensions_end = p + extensions_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len ); |
| |
| while( p < extensions_end ) |
| { |
| unsigned int extension_type; |
| size_t extension_data_len; |
| const unsigned char *extension_data_end; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 ); |
| extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 ); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len ); |
| extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; |
| |
| switch( extension_type ) |
| { |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: |
| |
| if( !is_hrr ) |
| { |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext( ssl, |
| p, extension_data_end ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, |
| "ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext", |
| ret ); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext( ssl, |
| p, |
| extension_data_end ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto cleanup; |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found pre_shared_key extension." ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pre_shared_key:Not supported yet" ) ); |
| |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; |
| goto cleanup; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found key_shares extension" ) ); |
| if( ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| if( is_hrr ) |
| ret = ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext( ssl, |
| p, extension_data_end ); |
| else |
| ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext( ssl, |
| p, extension_data_end ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, |
| "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext", |
| ret ); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 3, |
| ( "unknown extension found: %u ( ignoring )", |
| extension_type ) ); |
| |
| fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| p += extension_data_len; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| if( fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| } |
| else if ( fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| /* Determine the key exchange mode: |
| * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received |
| * then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL. |
| * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key |
| * exchange mode is PSK-only. |
| * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key |
| * exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only. |
| */ |
| switch( handshake->extensions_present & |
| ( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ) ) |
| { |
| /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: |
| handshake->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; |
| break; |
| |
| /* Only the key_share extension was received */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE: |
| handshake->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; |
| break; |
| |
| /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */ |
| case ( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ): |
| handshake->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; |
| break; |
| |
| /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */ |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Unknown key exchange." ) ); |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: Set the PSK and derive early secret. |
| * |
| * TODO: We don't have to do this in case we offered 0-RTT and the |
| * server accepted it. In this case, we could skip generating |
| * the early secret. */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", |
| ret ); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, |
| "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", |
| ret ); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( ssl, handshake->transform_handshake ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" ) ); |
| ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; |
| |
| /* |
| * State machine update |
| */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
| } |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) |
| /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record |
| * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before |
| * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. |
| */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| #else |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer( ssl, 0 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * We are going to re-generate a shared secret corresponding to the group |
| * selected by the server, which is different from the group for which we |
| * generated a shared secret in the first client hello. |
| * Thus, reset the shared secret. |
| */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message. |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| size_t buf_len = 0; |
| int is_hrr = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> %s", __func__ ) ); |
| |
| /* Coordination step |
| * - Fetch record |
| * - Make sure it's either a ServerHello or a HRR. |
| * - Switch processing routine in case of HRR |
| */ |
| ssl->handshake->extensions_present = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE; |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( ssl, &buf, &buf_len ); |
| if( ret < 0 ) |
| goto cleanup; |
| else |
| is_hrr = ( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR ); |
| |
| if( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 ) |
| { |
| ret = 0; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello( ssl, buf, |
| buf + buf_len, |
| is_hrr ) ); |
| if( is_hrr ) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr( ssl ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, |
| buf, buf_len ); |
| |
| if( is_hrr ) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr( ssl ) ); |
| else |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello( ssl ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= %s ( %s )", __func__, |
| is_hrr?"HelloRetryRequest":"ServerHello" ) ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * |
| * EncryptedExtensions message |
| * |
| * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which |
| * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish |
| * the cryptographic context. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Overview |
| */ |
| |
| /* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ); |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| size_t buf_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse encrypted extensions" ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| &buf, &buf_len ) ); |
| |
| /* Process the message contents */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( |
| ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
| buf, buf_len ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( ssl ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse encrypted extensions" ) ); |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse EncryptedExtensions message |
| * struct { |
| * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } EncryptedExtensions; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| size_t extensions_len; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const unsigned char *extensions_end; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len ); |
| extensions_end = p + extensions_len; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len ); |
| |
| while( p < extensions_end ) |
| { |
| unsigned int extension_type; |
| size_t extension_data_len; |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) |
| * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } Extension; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 ); |
| extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 ); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len ); |
| |
| /* The client MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the |
| * presence of any forbidden extensions and if any are found MUST abort |
| * the handshake with an "unsupported_extension" alert. |
| */ |
| switch( extension_type ) |
| { |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extensions supported groups" ) ); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, p, (size_t)extension_data_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 3, ( "unsupported extension found: %u ", extension_type) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); |
| return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION ); |
| } |
| |
| p += extension_data_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned" ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ); |
| else |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); |
| #else |
| ((void) ssl); |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ); |
| #endif |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| /* |
| * |
| * STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest |
| * |
| */ |
| #define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST 0 |
| #define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 |
| /* Coordination: |
| * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if a CertificateRequest |
| * will be sent. Returns a negative code on failure, or |
| * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST |
| * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP |
| * indicating if a Certificate Request is expected or not. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); |
| return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| ssl->keep_current_message = 1; |
| |
| if( ( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) && |
| ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ) ) |
| { |
| return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST ); |
| } |
| |
| return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request() |
| * Parse certificate request |
| * struct { |
| * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; |
| * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; |
| * } CertificateRequest; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const unsigned char *p = buf; |
| size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; |
| size_t extensions_len = 0; |
| const unsigned char *extensions_end; |
| unsigned char sig_alg_ext_found = 0; |
| |
| /* ... |
| * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> |
| * ... |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 1 ); |
| certificate_request_context_len = (size_t) p[0]; |
| p += 1; |
| |
| if( certificate_request_context_len > 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, certificate_request_context_len ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Certificate Request Context", |
| p, certificate_request_context_len ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| handshake->certificate_request_context = |
| mbedtls_calloc( 1, certificate_request_context_len ); |
| if( handshake->certificate_request_context == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); |
| return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| } |
| memcpy( handshake->certificate_request_context, p, |
| certificate_request_context_len ); |
| p += certificate_request_context_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* ... |
| * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; |
| * ... |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 ); |
| extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len ); |
| extensions_end = p + extensions_len; |
| |
| while( p < extensions_end ) |
| { |
| unsigned int extension_type; |
| size_t extension_data_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, 4 ); |
| extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ); |
| extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 2 ); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, extensions_end, extension_data_len ); |
| |
| switch( extension_type ) |
| { |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, |
| ( "found signature algorithms extension" ) ); |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( ssl, p, |
| p + extension_data_len ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| if( ! sig_alg_ext_found ) |
| sig_alg_ext_found = 1; |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, |
| ( "Duplicate signature algorithms extensions found" ) ); |
| goto decode_error; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 3, |
| ( "unknown extension found: %u ( ignoring )", |
| extension_type ) ); |
| break; |
| } |
| p += extension_data_len; |
| } |
| /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, |
| ( "CertificateRequest misaligned" ) ); |
| goto decode_error; |
| } |
| /* Check that we found signature algorithms extension */ |
| if( ! sig_alg_ext_found ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, |
| ( "no signature algorithms extension found" ) ); |
| goto decode_error; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->client_auth = 1; |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| decode_error: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate( ssl ) ); |
| |
| if( ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| size_t buf_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
| &buf, &buf_len ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request( ssl, |
| buf, buf + buf_len ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
| buf, buf_len ); |
| } |
| else if( ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); |
| ret = 0; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request", |
| ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( |
| ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED ); |
| #else |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int non_empty_certificate_msg = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, |
| ( "Switch to handshake traffic keys for outbound traffic" ) ); |
| mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| if( ssl->handshake->client_auth ) |
| { |
| int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) != NULL ) |
| non_empty_certificate_msg = 1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "No certificate message to send." ) ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if( non_empty_certificate_msg ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| else |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
| |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_resumption_master_secret( ssl ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, |
| "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_resumption_master_secret ", ret ); |
| return ( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_flush_buffers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| switch( ssl->state ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * ssl->state is initialized as HELLO_REQUEST. It is the same |
| * as CLIENT_HELLO state. |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_hello( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_flush_buffers( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: |
| ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ |
| |
| |