| /* |
| * TLS server-side functions |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" |
| #include "ssl_misc.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/debug.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| #include "constant_time_internal.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many |
| * arguments in each translating place. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) |
| static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) |
| { |
| return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, |
| ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), |
| psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); |
| } |
| #define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *info, |
| size_t ilen) |
| { |
| if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); |
| |
| if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen); |
| ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, |
| mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, |
| mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, |
| void *p_cookie) |
| { |
| conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; |
| conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; |
| conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) |
| { |
| if (conf->f_psk != NULL) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { |
| /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ |
| if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || |
| buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || |
| mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, |
| ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| { |
| if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| /* |
| * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic |
| * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. |
| * |
| * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a |
| * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): |
| * enum { |
| * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), |
| * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), |
| * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), |
| * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), |
| * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), |
| * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), |
| * (0xFFFF) |
| * } NamedGroup; |
| * struct { |
| * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; |
| * } NamedGroupList; |
| * |
| * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains |
| * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): |
| * enum { |
| * deprecated(1..22), |
| * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), |
| * x25519(29), x448(30), |
| * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), |
| * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), |
| * (0xFFFF) |
| * } NamedCurve; |
| * struct { |
| * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> |
| * } NamedCurveList; |
| * |
| * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible |
| * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both |
| * share the same extension identifier. |
| * |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t list_size, our_size; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| uint16_t *curves_tls_id; |
| |
| if (len < 2) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); |
| if (list_size + 2 != len || |
| list_size % 2 != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, |
| * and leave room for a final 0 */ |
| our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; |
| if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) { |
| our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, |
| sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id; |
| |
| p = buf + 2; |
| while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) { |
| uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); |
| |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) != |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { |
| *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id; |
| our_size--; |
| } |
| |
| list_size -= 2; |
| p += 2; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t list_size; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| |
| if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| list_size = buf[0]; |
| |
| p = buf + 1; |
| while (list_size > 0) { |
| if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || |
| p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) |
| ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p[0]); |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| list_size--; |
| p++; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) |
| #else |
| if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( |
| &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, |
| MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { |
| psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); |
| psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( |
| ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| buf, len)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ |
| ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t peer_cid_len; |
| |
| /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ |
| if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; |
| * } ConnectionId; |
| */ |
| |
| if (len < 1) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| peer_cid_len = *buf++; |
| len--; |
| |
| if (len != peer_cid_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ |
| if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { |
| /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default |
| * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; |
| ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; |
| memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated")); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| if (len != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ((void) buf); |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| if (len != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ((void) buf); |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { |
| ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_session session; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || |
| ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len)); |
| |
| if (len == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. |
| */ |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, |
| buf, len)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); |
| |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); |
| } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to |
| * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) |
| */ |
| session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); |
| memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); |
| |
| /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket")); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
| |
| /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; |
| size_t i, j; |
| size_t profile_length; |
| uint16_t mki_length; |
| /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ |
| const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; |
| |
| /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ |
| if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || |
| (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || |
| (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 |
| * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; |
| * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; |
| * } UseSRTPData; |
| |
| * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) |
| * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) |
| * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length |
| * and one of srtp_mki length |
| */ |
| if (len < size_of_lengths) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; |
| |
| /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ |
| profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; |
| buf += 2; |
| |
| /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ |
| if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || |
| profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| /* |
| * parse the extension list values are defined in |
| * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml |
| */ |
| for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) { |
| uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; |
| client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value); |
| |
| if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s", |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( |
| client_protection))); |
| } else { |
| continue; |
| } |
| /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ |
| for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) { |
| if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) { |
| ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s", |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( |
| client_protection))); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ |
| mki_length = *buf; |
| buf++; |
| |
| if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || |
| mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ |
| if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && |
| mki_length > 0) { |
| ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; |
| |
| memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, |
| ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions |
| */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, |
| uint16_t *curves_tls_id) |
| { |
| uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id; |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id; |
| |
| while (*curr_tls_id != 0) { |
| curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); |
| if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| curr_tls_id++; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, |
| * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_algorithm_t pk_alg = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info); |
| psa_key_usage_t pk_usage = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info); |
| #else |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| uint32_t flags; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { |
| list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| list = ssl->conf->key_cert; |
| |
| int pk_alg_is_none = 0; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE); |
| #else |
| pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| if (pk_alg_is_none) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate")); |
| |
| if (list == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| flags = 0; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", |
| cur->cert); |
| |
| int key_type_matches = 0; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL || |
| ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL || |
| mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) && |
| mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage)); |
| #else |
| key_type_matches = ( |
| mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| #else |
| key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| if (!key_type_matches) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type")); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on |
| * keyUsage or other extensions. |
| * |
| * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for |
| * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing |
| * and decrypting with the same RSA key. |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " |
| "(extended) key usage extension")); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && |
| ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, |
| ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve")); |
| continue; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* If we get there, we got a winner */ |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ |
| if (cur != NULL) { |
| ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", |
| ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc |
| * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; |
| #endif |
| |
| suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id); |
| if (suite_info == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", |
| (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name)); |
| |
| if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version || |
| suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && |
| (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " |
| "not configured or ext missing")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) && |
| (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL || |
| ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " |
| "no common elliptic curve")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't |
| * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && |
| ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a |
| * certificate/key of a particular type: |
| * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or |
| * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't |
| * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. |
| */ |
| if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " |
| "no suitable certificate")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether |
| * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ |
| sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); |
| if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( |
| ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " |
| "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during |
| ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is |
| not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret, got_common_suite; |
| size_t i, j; |
| size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; |
| size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; |
| #endif |
| unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; |
| #endif |
| int handshake_failure = 0; |
| const int *ciphersuites; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, |
| * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed |
| * signature-hash pairs. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); |
| |
| int renegotiating; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
| read_record_header: |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), |
| * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 |
| * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. |
| * Otherwise in a scenario of TLS 1.3/TLS 1.2 version negotiation, the |
| * ClientHello has been already fully fetched by the TLS 1.3 code and the |
| * flag ssl->keep_current_message is raised. |
| */ |
| renegotiating = 0; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); |
| #endif |
| if (!renegotiating && !ssl->keep_current_message) { |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) { |
| /* No alert on a read error. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_hdr; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); |
| |
| /* |
| * TLS Client Hello |
| * |
| * Record layer: |
| * 0 . 0 message type |
| * 1 . 2 protocol version |
| * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number |
| * 3 . 4 message length |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", |
| buf[0])); |
| |
| if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d", |
| MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0))); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", |
| buf[1], buf[2])); |
| |
| /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence |
| * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
| #endif |
| ) { |
| /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ |
| if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, |
| sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record, discarding")); |
| ssl->next_record_offset = 0; |
| ssl->in_left = 0; |
| goto read_record_header; |
| } |
| |
| /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); |
| #endif |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { |
| /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ |
| msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| if (ssl->keep_current_message) { |
| ssl->keep_current_message = 0; |
| } else { |
| if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); |
| } else |
| #endif |
| ssl->in_left = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_msg; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len); |
| |
| ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); |
| if (0 != ret) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handshake layer: |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number |
| * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset |
| * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length |
| */ |
| if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0])); |
| |
| if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| } |
| { |
| size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u", |
| (unsigned) handshake_len)); |
| |
| /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and |
| * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */ |
| if (buf[1] != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", |
| (unsigned) buf[1])); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ |
| if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", |
| (unsigned) msg_len, |
| (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), |
| (unsigned) handshake_len)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| /* |
| * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, |
| * check sequence number on renego. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ |
| unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); |
| if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: " |
| "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); |
| ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; |
| } |
| { |
| /* |
| * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure |
| * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length |
| */ |
| size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length; |
| fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); |
| fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); |
| length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", |
| (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length, |
| (unsigned) length)); |
| if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); |
| msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); |
| |
| /* |
| * ClientHello layout: |
| * 0 . 1 protocol version |
| * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) |
| * 34 . 34 session id length (1 byte) |
| * 35 . 34+x session id, where x = session id length from byte 34 |
| * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) |
| * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie |
| * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) |
| * .. . .. ciphersuite list |
| * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) |
| * .. . .. compression alg. list |
| * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) |
| * .. . .. extensions (optional) |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is |
| * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can |
| * read at least up to session id length without worrying. |
| */ |
| if (msg_len < 38) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check and save the protocol version |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2); |
| |
| ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, |
| ssl->conf->transport); |
| ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; |
| |
| if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Save client random (inc. Unix time) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32); |
| |
| memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the session ID length and save session ID |
| */ |
| sess_len = buf[34]; |
| |
| if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) || |
| sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) { /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; |
| memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, |
| sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)); |
| memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the cookie length and content |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
| cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; |
| |
| if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", |
| buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
| #endif |
| ) { |
| if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
| buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, |
| ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed")); |
| ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1; |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed")); |
| ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0; |
| } |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| { |
| /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ |
| if (cookie_len != 0) { |
| /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped")); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) |
| */ |
| ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
| |
| ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset); |
| |
| if (ciph_len < 2 || |
| ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ |
| (ciph_len % 2) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", |
| buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the compression algorithm's length. |
| * The list contents are ignored because implementing |
| * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only |
| * option supported by Mbed TLS. |
| */ |
| comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; |
| |
| comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; |
| |
| if (comp_len < 1 || |
| comp_len > 16 || |
| comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", |
| buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the extension length |
| */ |
| ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; |
| if (msg_len > ext_offset) { |
| if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset); |
| |
| if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ext_len = 0; |
| } |
| |
| ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len); |
| |
| while (ext_len != 0) { |
| unsigned int ext_id; |
| unsigned int ext_size; |
| if (ext_len < 4) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); |
| ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); |
| |
| if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| switch (ext_id) { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4, |
| ext + 4 + ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension")); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| renegotiation_info_seen = 1; |
| #endif |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported point formats extension")); |
| ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \ |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found max fragment length extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found extended master secret extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, |
| ext + 4 + ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", |
| ext_id)); |
| } |
| |
| ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; |
| ext += 4 + ext_size; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client |
| * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. |
| */ |
| if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) { |
| uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; |
| const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), |
| #endif |
| MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE |
| }; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0]) |
| <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE, |
| "default_sig_algs is too big"); |
| |
| memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs)); |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
| */ |
| for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) { |
| if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ")); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " |
| "during renegotiation")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| #endif |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Renegotiation security checks |
| */ |
| if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
| ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
| renegotiation_info_seen == 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)")); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
| ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed")); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
| renegotiation_info_seen == 1) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)")); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| |
| if (handshake_failure == 1) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions) |
| */ |
| if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; |
| ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Search for a matching ciphersuite |
| * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions |
| * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension |
| * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.) |
| */ |
| got_common_suite = 0; |
| ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; |
| ciphersuite_info = NULL; |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) { |
| for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { |
| for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { |
| if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| got_common_suite = 1; |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
| &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { |
| goto have_ciphersuite; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { |
| for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { |
| if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| got_common_suite = 1; |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
| &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { |
| goto have_ciphersuite; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (got_common_suite) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " |
| "but none of them usable")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| have_ciphersuite: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name)); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); |
| if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { |
| unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( |
| ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u", |
| sig_hash)); |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " |
| "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| size_t ext_len; |
| const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
| |
| *olen = 0; |
| |
| /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if |
| * the client hasn't offered it. */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX |
| * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ |
| if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension")); |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; |
| * } ConnectionId; |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; |
| memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); |
| |
| *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) |
| static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension |
| * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption |
| * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an |
| * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." |
| */ |
| suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); |
| if (suite == NULL) { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; |
| } else { |
| mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( |
| ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, |
| suite); |
| |
| if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret " |
| "extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF; |
| *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; |
| |
| memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); |
| p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
| memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); |
| p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| { |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x01; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| } |
| |
| *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 1; |
| |
| *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; |
| |
| *olen = 5; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| ((void) ssl); |
| |
| if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts & |
| MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 1; |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; |
| |
| *olen = 6; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
| size_t kkpp_len; |
| |
| *olen = 0; |
| |
| /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension")); |
| |
| if (end - p < 4) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, |
| p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, |
| MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); |
| psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); |
| return; |
| } |
| #else |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| *olen = kkpp_len + 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen) |
| { |
| size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; |
| uint16_t profile_value = 0; |
| const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
| |
| *olen = 0; |
| |
| if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || |
| (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension")); |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { |
| mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : |
| * - 2 bytes for the extension tag |
| * - 2 bytes for the total size |
| * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length |
| * - 2 bytes for the protection profile |
| * - 1 byte for the mki length |
| * + the actual mki length |
| * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ |
| if ((size_t) (end - buf) < mki_len + 9) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* extension */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0); |
| /* |
| * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) |
| * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) |
| */ |
| ext_len = 5 + mki_len; |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, buf, 2); |
| |
| /* protection profile length: 2 */ |
| buf[4] = 0x00; |
| buf[5] = 0x02; |
| profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( |
| ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); |
| if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, buf, 6); |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile")); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; |
| memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len); |
| |
| *olen = 9 + mki_len; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; |
| unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request")); |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolVersion server_version; |
| * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; |
| * } HelloVerifyRequest; |
| */ |
| |
| /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated |
| * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ |
| if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ |
| cookie_len_byte = p++; |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
| &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, |
| ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char) (p - (cookie_len_byte + 1)); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte); |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg); |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
| |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request")); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; |
| mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; |
| |
| /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). |
| * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { |
| return; |
| } |
| if (session->id_len == 0) { |
| return; |
| } |
| if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp); |
| |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, |
| session->id, |
| session->id_len, |
| &session_tmp); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) { |
| /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Move semantics */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); |
| *session = session_tmp; |
| memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp)); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache")); |
| ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| mbedtls_time_t t; |
| #endif |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated")); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); |
| |
| return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 5 protocol version |
| * 6 . 9 UNIX time() |
| * 10 . 37 random bytes |
| */ |
| buf = ssl->out_msg; |
| p = buf + 4; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", |
| buf[4], buf[5])); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| t = mbedtls_time(NULL); |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); |
| p += 4; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, |
| (long long) t)); |
| #else |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| p += 4; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| p += 20; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) |
| /* |
| * RFC 8446 |
| * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's |
| * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in |
| * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random |
| * value specially in their ServerHello. |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) { |
| static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] = |
| { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 }; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT( |
| sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8, |
| "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size"); |
| |
| memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string, |
| sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string)); |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| p += 8; |
| |
| memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32); |
| |
| ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl); |
| |
| if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { |
| /* |
| * New session, create a new session id, |
| * unless we're about to issue a session ticket |
| */ |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; |
| memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32); |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, |
| n)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * Resuming a session |
| */ |
| n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 38 . 38 session id length |
| * 39 . 38+n session id |
| * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite |
| * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. |
| * 42+n . 43+n extensions length |
| * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions |
| */ |
| *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); |
| p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed", |
| ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no")); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", |
| (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); |
| |
| /* |
| * First write extensions, then the total length |
| */ |
| ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) |
| ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = |
| mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); |
| if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) { |
| ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) |
| != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) |
| ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, |
| ext_len)); |
| |
| if (ext_len > 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); |
| p += 2 + ext_len; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| #else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ |
| size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; |
| int authmode; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { |
| authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) || |
| authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 4 cert type count |
| * 5 .. m-1 cert types |
| * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) |
| * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) |
| * n .. n+1 length of all DNs |
| * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 |
| * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 |
| * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. |
| */ |
| buf = ssl->out_msg; |
| p = buf + 4; |
| |
| /* |
| * Supported certificate types |
| * |
| * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; |
| * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; |
| */ |
| ct_len = 0; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; |
| #endif |
| |
| p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; |
| p += ct_len; |
| |
| sa_len = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) |
| * |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * HashAlgorithm hash; |
| * SignatureAlgorithm signature; |
| * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; |
| * |
| * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; |
| * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; |
| */ |
| const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); |
| if (sig_alg == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; |
| } |
| |
| for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { |
| unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg); |
| |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the |
| * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the |
| * partial list including that element. */ |
| sa_len += 2; |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* Fill in list length. */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); |
| sa_len += 2; |
| p += sa_len; |
| |
| /* |
| * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; |
| */ |
| p += 2; |
| |
| total_dn_size = 0; |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) { |
| /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned |
| * via a CA callback (configured through |
| * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the |
| * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) { |
| crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) { |
| crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { |
| crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; |
| |
| while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) { |
| /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length |
| * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ |
| dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; |
| |
| if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short")); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); |
| p += dn_size; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); |
| |
| total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size); |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_pk_context *pk; |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; |
| psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; |
| unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; |
| size_t key_len; |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) |
| uint16_t tls_id = 0; |
| psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; |
| mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key; |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ |
| |
| pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); |
| |
| if (pk == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); |
| |
| switch (pk_type) { |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ |
| if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in |
| * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */ |
| status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes); |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes); |
| |
| if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { |
| /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS) |
| * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags |
| * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */ |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id; |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK |
| * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need |
| * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with |
| * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type |
| * and bits that we just got above. */ |
| key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); |
| psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); |
| psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); |
| psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); |
| |
| status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, |
| &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty |
| * to clear it exit. */ |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| break; |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: |
| case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: |
| key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); |
| grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); |
| if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); |
| if (tls_id == 0) { |
| /* This elliptic curve is not supported */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will |
| be, so there is no need to check the return value here */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, |
| &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; |
| |
| key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); |
| psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); |
| psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); |
| psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); |
| |
| key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->grp.pbits); |
| ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key(key, buf, key_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, |
| &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| ret = 0; |
| break; |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ |
| default: |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| exit: |
| psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); |
| if (private_key == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; |
| } |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)), |
| MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| size_t *signature_len) |
| { |
| /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the |
| * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange |
| * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. |
| * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing |
| * ssl->out_msglen. */ |
| unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; |
| size_t sig_max_len = (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN |
| - sig_start); |
| int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, |
| sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len); |
| if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; |
| mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); |
| } |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ |
| |
| /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including |
| * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the |
| * signature and sending the message. */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| size_t *signature_len) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ |
| |
| (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| (void) signature_len; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) |
| size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); |
| #else |
| size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ |
| |
| /* |
| * |
| * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * - ECJPAKE key exchanges |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
| unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - |
| ssl->out_msglen; |
| size_t output_offset = 0; |
| size_t output_len = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * The first 3 bytes are: |
| * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE |
| * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID |
| * |
| * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its |
| * TLS ID here |
| */ |
| uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); |
| if (tls_id == 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } |
| *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1); |
| output_offset += 3; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, |
| out_p + output_offset, |
| end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len, |
| MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); |
| psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| output_offset += output_len; |
| ssl->out_msglen += output_offset; |
| #else |
| size_t len = 0; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( |
| &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen += len; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support |
| * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, |
| * we use empty support identity hints here. |
| **/ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * - DHE key exchanges |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len = 0; |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Ephemeral DH parameters: |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; |
| * } ServerDHParams; |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| &ssl->conf->dhm_P, |
| &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( |
| &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), |
| ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen += len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * - ECDHE key exchanges |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| /* |
| * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ECParameters curve_params; |
| * ECPoint public; |
| * } ServerECDHParams; |
| */ |
| uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; |
| const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len = 0; |
| |
| /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ |
| if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; |
| } |
| for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { |
| for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; |
| *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) { |
| if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) { |
| goto curve_matching_done; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| curve_matching_done: |
| if (*curr_tls_id == 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id))); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; |
| psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
| const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2), |
| // data length(1) |
| const size_t data_length_size = 1; |
| psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; |
| size_t ec_bits = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); |
| |
| /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id, |
| &key_type, |
| &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse.")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; |
| |
| key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); |
| psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); |
| psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); |
| psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); |
| |
| /* |
| * ECParameters curve_params |
| * |
| * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve |
| */ |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; |
| |
| /* |
| * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* Generate ECDH private key. */ |
| status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, |
| &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ECPoint public |
| * |
| * First byte is data length. |
| * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location. |
| */ |
| |
| /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. |
| * Make one byte space for the length. |
| */ |
| unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size; |
| |
| size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN |
| - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg)); |
| |
| status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, |
| own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, |
| &len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); |
| (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Store the length of the exported public key. */ |
| *p = (uint8_t) len; |
| |
| /* Determine full message length. */ |
| len += header_size; |
| #else |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| curr_grp_id)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( |
| &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, |
| ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen += len; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * |
| * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the |
| * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. |
| * |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| if (dig_signed == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed); |
| size_t hashlen = 0; |
| unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| /* |
| * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: |
| * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension |
| * to choose appropriate hash. |
| */ |
| |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); |
| |
| unsigned char sig_hash = |
| (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( |
| ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); |
| |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash); |
| |
| /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension |
| * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ |
| if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| /* (... because we choose a cipher suite |
| * only if there is a matching hash.) */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg)); |
| |
| /* |
| * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed |
| */ |
| if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, |
| dig_signed, |
| dig_signed_len, |
| md_alg); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); |
| |
| /* |
| * 2.3: Compute and add the signature |
| */ |
| /* |
| * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through |
| * a prefix to the signature. |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * HashAlgorithm hash; |
| * SignatureAlgorithm signature; |
| * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; |
| * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } DigitallySigned; |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) { |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), |
| md_alg, hash, hashlen); |
| switch (ret) { |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: |
| /* act as if f_async_sign was null */ |
| break; |
| case 0: |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
| return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; |
| } |
| |
| /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the |
| * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange |
| * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. |
| * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing |
| * ssl->out_msglen. */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), |
| md_alg, hash, hashlen, |
| ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, |
| out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, |
| signature_len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, |
| ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites |
| * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either |
| * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state |
| * machine. */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t signature_len = 0; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange")); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) |
| /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange |
| * is not needed. */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters |
| * from certificate at this point. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use |
| * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing |
| * signature operation, resume signing. */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation")); |
| ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); |
| } else |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ |
| { |
| /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ |
| ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen |
| * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, |
| * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be |
| * preserved. */ |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange (pending)")); |
| } else { |
| ssl->out_msglen = 0; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* If there is a signature, write its length. |
| * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature |
| * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) |
| if (signature_len != 0) { |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(signature_len); |
| ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(signature_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature", |
| ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
| signature_len); |
| |
| /* Skip over the already-written signature */ |
| ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* Add header and send. */ |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done")); |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = 4; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done")); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| size_t n; |
| |
| /* |
| * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P |
| */ |
| if (*p + 2 > end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); |
| *p += 2; |
| |
| if (*p + n > end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| *p += n; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *peer_pms, |
| size_t *peer_pmslen, |
| size_t peer_pmssize) |
| { |
| int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, |
| peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); |
| if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; |
| mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); |
| } |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| unsigned char *peer_pms, |
| size_t *peer_pmslen, |
| size_t peer_pmssize) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); |
| if (own_cert == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no local certificate")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; |
| } |
| mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk; |
| mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); |
| size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing |
| * decryption operation, resume signing. */ |
| if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation")); |
| return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, |
| peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key |
| */ |
| if (p + 2 > end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || |
| *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (p + len != end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Decrypt the premaster secret |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) { |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), |
| p, len); |
| switch (ret) { |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: |
| /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ |
| break; |
| case 0: |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
| return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, |
| peer_pms, |
| peer_pmslen, |
| peer_pmssize); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: |
| ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len, |
| peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| size_t pms_offset) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; |
| unsigned char ver[2]; |
| unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; |
| size_t peer_pmslen; |
| mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff; |
| |
| /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than |
| * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't |
| * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to |
| * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. |
| * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This |
| * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, |
| * even if it's an unsigned char). */ |
| peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; |
| peer_pmslen = 0; |
| |
| ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, |
| peer_pms, |
| &peer_pmslen, |
| sizeof(peer_pms)); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport, |
| ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version); |
| |
| /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid |
| * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type |
| * attacks. */ |
| diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); |
| diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48)); |
| diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0])); |
| diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1])); |
| |
| /* |
| * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding |
| * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a |
| * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. |
| * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must |
| * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was |
| * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, |
| * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. |
| */ |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms)); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal |
| * anything about the RSA decryption. */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) |
| if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset || |
| sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; |
| |
| /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without |
| * data-dependent branches. */ |
| mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| uint16_t n; |
| |
| if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Receive client pre-shared key identity name |
| */ |
| if (end - *p < 2) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); |
| *p += 2; |
| |
| if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { |
| if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, |
| * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ |
| if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || |
| mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
| } |
| |
| *p += n; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| unsigned char *p, *end; |
| |
| ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange")); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ |
| (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)) |
| if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) && |
| (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) { |
| /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous |
| * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the |
| * record. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record")); |
| } else |
| #endif |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); |
| end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; |
| |
| if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) { |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, |
| MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, |
| &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++); |
| size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p); |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key.")); |
| |
| /* |
| * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data) |
| */ |
| if (buf_len < 2) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, |
| buf_len)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET |
| " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, |
| data_len, buf_len)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */ |
| if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET |
| " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, |
| data_len, |
| sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len; |
| |
| /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ |
| status = psa_raw_key_agreement( |
| PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, |
| handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster), |
| &handshake->pmslen); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); |
| if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { |
| (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| } |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { |
| status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| #else |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, |
| (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> |
| key_exchange)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
| if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { |
| /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to |
| * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip |
| * directly to resuming this operation. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed")); |
| /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms |
| * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ |
| p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, |
| (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> |
| key_exchange)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != end) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; |
| unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); |
| size_t pms_len; |
| |
| /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); |
| pms += 2 + pms_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); |
| #else |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, |
| (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> |
| key_exchange)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| uint8_t ecpoint_len; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); |
| psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ |
| if (p >= end) { |
| psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ecpoint_len = *(p++); |
| if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) { |
| psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account |
| the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits. |
| The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any |
| possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/ |
| #if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) |
| if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { |
| psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| #else |
| MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX, |
| "peer key buffer too small"); |
| #endif |
| |
| memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; |
| p += ecpoint_len; |
| |
| /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: |
| * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation |
| * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation |
| * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK |
| * - the PSK itself |
| */ |
| unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster; |
| const unsigned char * const psm_end = |
| psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); |
| /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ |
| const size_t zlen_size = 2; |
| size_t zlen = 0; |
| |
| /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ |
| status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, |
| psm + zlen_size, |
| psm_end - (psm + zlen_size), |
| &zlen); |
| |
| destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); |
| } |
| |
| /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0); |
| psm += zlen_size + zlen; |
| |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, |
| (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> |
| key_exchange)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { |
| if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( |
| &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p), |
| MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { |
| psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); |
| psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p, (size_t) (end - p)); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange")); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| #else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| size_t i, sig_len; |
| unsigned char hash[48]; |
| unsigned char *hash_start = hash; |
| size_t hashlen; |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); |
| |
| if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) |
| if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ |
| if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ |
| |
| /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */); |
| if (0 != ret) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| /* Process the message contents */ |
| if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || |
| ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| } |
| |
| i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) |
| peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; |
| #else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ |
| if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only |
| * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } DigitallySigned; |
| */ |
| if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Hash |
| */ |
| md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); |
| |
| if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
| " for verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) |
| if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { |
| hash_start += 16; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ |
| hashlen = 0; |
| |
| i++; |
| |
| /* |
| * Signature |
| */ |
| if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) |
| == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
| " for verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg |
| */ |
| if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| |
| i++; |
| |
| if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i); |
| i += 2; |
| |
| if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ |
| { |
| size_t dummy_hlen; |
| ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); |
| if (0 != ret) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, |
| md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, |
| ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); |
| if (0 != ret) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t tlen; |
| uint32_t lifetime; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket")); |
| |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } NewSessionTicket; |
| * |
| * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) |
| * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) |
| * 10 . 9+n ticket content |
| */ |
| |
| if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, |
| ssl->session_negotiate, |
| ssl->out_msg + 10, |
| ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, |
| &tlen, &lifetime)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret); |
| tlen = 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4); |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8); |
| ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and |
| * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. |
| */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| /* |
| * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state)); |
| |
| switch (ssl->state) { |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * <== ClientHello |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: |
| ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * ==> ServerHello |
| * Certificate |
| * ( ServerKeyExchange ) |
| * ( CertificateRequest ) |
| * ServerHelloDone |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: |
| ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) |
| * ClientKeyExchange |
| * ( CertificateVerify ) |
| * ChangeCipherSpec |
| * Finished |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
| ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
| ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) |
| * ChangeCipherSpec |
| * Finished |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { |
| ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); |
| } else |
| #endif |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order) |
| { |
| conf->respect_cli_pref = order; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |