| /* |
| * X.509 certificate parsing and verification |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later |
| */ |
| /* |
| * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. |
| * |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) |
| * |
| * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf |
| * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf |
| * |
| * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" |
| #include "x509_internal.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/oid.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/pem.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| #include "psa/crypto.h" |
| #include "psa_util_internal.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| #include "pk_internal.h" |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/threading.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) |
| #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN |
| #include <windows.h> |
| #else |
| #include <time.h> |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #if defined(__MBED__) |
| #include <platform/mbed_retarget.h> |
| #else |
| #include <dirent.h> |
| #endif /* __MBED__ */ |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it |
| */ |
| typedef struct { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; |
| uint32_t flags; |
| } x509_crt_verify_chain_item; |
| |
| /* |
| * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root |
| */ |
| #define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE (MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2) |
| |
| /* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security |
| * concerns. */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = |
| { |
| /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection |
| * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), |
| 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) |
| /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection |
| * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | |
| 0, |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ |
| 0, |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ |
| 2048, |
| }; |
| |
| /* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may |
| * be tightened at any time. */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = |
| { |
| /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), |
| 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1), |
| #else |
| 0, |
| #endif |
| 2048, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * NSA Suite B Profile |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = |
| { |
| /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), |
| /* Only ECDSA */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY), |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) |
| /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1), |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ |
| 0, |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ |
| 0, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Empty / all-forbidden profile |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none = |
| { |
| 0, |
| 0, |
| 0, |
| (uint32_t) -1, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check md_alg against profile |
| * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_md_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) |
| { |
| if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if ((profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(md_alg)) != 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check pk_alg against profile |
| * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg) |
| { |
| if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if ((profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(pk_alg)) != 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check key against profile |
| * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { |
| if (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) |
| if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || |
| pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || |
| pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); |
| |
| if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if ((profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(gid)) != 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different |
| */ |
| static int x509_memcasecmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| unsigned char diff; |
| const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { |
| diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i]; |
| |
| if (diff == 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (diff == 32 && |
| ((n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z') || |
| (n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z'))) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_check_wildcard(const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen(cn); |
| |
| /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */ |
| if (name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.') { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i) { |
| if (cn[i] == '.') { |
| cn_idx = i; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (cn_idx == 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 && |
| x509_memcasecmp(name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding |
| * variations (but not all). |
| * |
| * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int x509_string_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b) |
| { |
| if (a->tag == b->tag && |
| a->len == b->len && |
| memcmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && |
| (b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && |
| a->len == b->len && |
| x509_memcasecmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence). |
| * |
| * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm: |
| * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal, |
| * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation |
| * or space folding.) |
| * |
| * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int x509_name_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b) |
| { |
| /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */ |
| while (a != NULL || b != NULL) { |
| if (a == NULL || b == NULL) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* type */ |
| if (a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag || |
| a->oid.len != b->oid.len || |
| memcmp(a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* value */ |
| if (x509_string_cmp(&a->val, &b->val) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* structure of the list of sets */ |
| if (a->next_merged != b->next_merged) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| a = a->next; |
| b = b->next; |
| } |
| |
| /* a == NULL == b */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain |
| */ |
| static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++) { |
| ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; |
| ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; |
| } |
| |
| ver_chain->len = 0; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_version(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| int *ver) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| 0)) != 0) { |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { |
| *ver = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); |
| } |
| |
| end = *p + len; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * notBefore Time, |
| * notAfter Time } |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_dates(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_time *from, |
| mbedtls_x509_time *to) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret); |
| } |
| |
| end = *p + len; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, from)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, to)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_uid(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if (*p == end) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uid->tag = **p; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &uid->len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| n)) != 0) { |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); |
| } |
| |
| uid->p = *p; |
| *p += uid->len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| int *ca_istrue, |
| int *max_pathlen) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| /* |
| * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, |
| * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } |
| */ |
| *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ |
| *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p == end) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end, ca_istrue)) != 0) { |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ca_istrue); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*ca_istrue != 0) { |
| *ca_istrue = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (*p == end) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, max_pathlen)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer |
| * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ |
| if (*max_pathlen == INT_MAX) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); |
| } |
| |
| (*max_pathlen)++; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId |
| * |
| * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ |
| if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier |
| * |
| * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len = 0u; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| subject_key_id->len = len; |
| subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; |
| subject_key_id->p = *p; |
| *p += len; |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, |
| * authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } |
| * |
| * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p, |
| unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len = 0u; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p + len != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); |
| |
| /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */ |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len; |
| authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p; |
| /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04. |
| * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL), |
| * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */ |
| authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; |
| |
| *p += len; |
| } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p < end) { |
| /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | |
| 1)) != 0) { |
| /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both |
| be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */ |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, |
| (*p+len), |
| &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len; |
| authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p; |
| authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER; |
| *p += len; |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } |
| * |
| * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } |
| * |
| * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation |
| * |
| * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, |
| * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF |
| * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } |
| * |
| * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER |
| * |
| * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, |
| * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } |
| * |
| * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers |
| * |
| * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } |
| * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } |
| * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } |
| * |
| * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) |
| * |
| * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { |
| * cPSuri CPSuri, |
| * userNotice UserNotice } |
| * |
| * CPSuri ::= IA5String |
| * |
| * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, |
| * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } |
| * |
| * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * organization DisplayText, |
| * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } |
| * |
| * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { |
| * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } |
| * |
| * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point |
| * as defined in RFC 5280. |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies) |
| { |
| int ret, parse_ret = 0; |
| size_t len; |
| mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; |
| |
| /* Get main sequence tag */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (*p + len != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Cannot be an empty sequence. |
| */ |
| if (len == 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| while (*p < end) { |
| mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; |
| const unsigned char *policy_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the policy sequence |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| policy_end = *p + len; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| policy_oid.len = len; |
| policy_oid.p = *p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. |
| */ |
| if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) { |
| /* |
| * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this |
| * extension is critical. |
| */ |
| parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ |
| if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { |
| if (cur->next != NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; |
| } |
| |
| cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); |
| |
| if (cur->next == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); |
| } |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| buf = &(cur->buf); |
| buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; |
| buf->p = policy_oid.p; |
| buf->len = policy_oid.len; |
| |
| *p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end |
| * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. |
| */ |
| if (*p < policy_end) { |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != |
| 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| /* |
| * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. |
| */ |
| *p += len; |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != policy_end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ |
| cur->next = NULL; |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return parse_ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * X.509 v3 extensions |
| * |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, |
| void *p_ctx) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; |
| |
| if (*p == end) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; |
| while (*p < end) { |
| /* |
| * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, |
| * extnValue OCTET STRING } |
| */ |
| mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; |
| int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ |
| int ext_type = 0; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| end_ext_data = *p + len; |
| |
| /* Get extension ID */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| extn_oid.p = *p; |
| *p += extn_oid.len; |
| |
| /* Get optional critical */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 && |
| (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* Data should be octet string type */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); |
| } |
| |
| start_ext_octet = *p; |
| end_ext_octet = *p + len; |
| |
| if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Detect supported extensions |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type); |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| ret = cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet); |
| if (ret != 0 && is_critical) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| *p = end_ext_octet; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* No parser found, skip extension */ |
| *p = end_ext_octet; |
| |
| if (is_critical) { |
| /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); |
| } |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Forbid repeated extensions */ |
| if ((crt->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; |
| } |
| |
| crt->ext_types |= ext_type; |
| |
| switch (ext_type) { |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: |
| /* Parse basic constraints */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_basic_constraints(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: |
| /* Parse key usage */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: |
| /* Parse extended key usage */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: |
| /* Parse subject key identifier */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data, |
| &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: |
| /* Parse authority key identifier */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: |
| /* Parse subject alt name |
| * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: |
| /* Parse netscape certificate type */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: |
| /* Parse certificate policies type */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_certificate_policies(p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) { |
| /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension |
| * if it contains unsupported policies */ |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && |
| cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, |
| start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet) == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_critical) { |
| return ret; |
| } else |
| /* |
| * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we |
| * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to |
| * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, |
| * unless the extension is critical. |
| */ |
| if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| /* |
| * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer |
| * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, |
| * skip the extension. |
| */ |
| if (is_critical) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } else { |
| *p = end_ext_octet; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (*p != end) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen, |
| int make_copy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, |
| void *p_ctx) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; |
| mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; |
| |
| memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); |
| memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); |
| memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ |
| p = (unsigned char *) buf; |
| len = buflen; |
| end = p + len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING } |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| } |
| |
| end = crt_end = p + len; |
| crt->raw.len = (size_t) (crt_end - buf); |
| if (make_copy != 0) { |
| /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ |
| crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len); |
| if (crt->raw.p == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len); |
| crt->own_buffer = 1; |
| |
| p += crt->raw.len - len; |
| end = crt_end = p + len; |
| } else { |
| crt->raw.p = (unsigned char *) buf; |
| crt->own_buffer = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| */ |
| crt->tbs.p = p; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); |
| } |
| |
| end = p + len; |
| crt->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crt->tbs.p); |
| |
| /* |
| * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } |
| * |
| * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER |
| * |
| * signature AlgorithmIdentifier |
| */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_version(&p, end, &crt->version)) != 0 || |
| (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(&p, end, &crt->serial)) != 0 || |
| (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crt->sig_oid, |
| &sig_params1)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION; |
| } |
| |
| crt->version++; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, |
| &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, |
| &crt->sig_opts)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * issuer Name |
| */ |
| crt->issuer_raw.p = p; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->issuer)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| crt->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->issuer_raw.p); |
| |
| /* |
| * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * notBefore Time, |
| * notAfter Time } |
| * |
| */ |
| if ((ret = x509_get_dates(&p, end, &crt->valid_from, |
| &crt->valid_to)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * subject Name |
| */ |
| crt->subject_raw.p = p; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (len && (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->subject)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| crt->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->subject_raw.p); |
| |
| /* |
| * SubjectPublicKeyInfo |
| */ |
| crt->pk_raw.p = p; |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &crt->pk)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| crt->pk_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->pk_raw.p); |
| |
| /* |
| * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 |
| * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 |
| * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL |
| * -- If present, version shall be v3 |
| */ |
| if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) { |
| ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) { |
| ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->version == 3) { |
| ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (p != end) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| end = crt_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * } |
| * -- end of TBSCertificate |
| * |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || |
| memcmp(crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len) != 0 || |
| sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || |
| sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || |
| (sig_params1.len != 0 && |
| memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crt->sig)) != 0) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (p != end) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a |
| * chained list |
| */ |
| static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen, |
| int make_copy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, |
| void *p_ctx) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| while (crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL) { |
| prev = crt; |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. |
| */ |
| if (crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL) { |
| crt->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); |
| |
| if (crt->next == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| prev = crt; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_init(crt->next); |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| |
| ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core(crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| if (prev) { |
| prev->next = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (crt != chain) { |
| mbedtls_free(crt); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen) |
| { |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen, |
| int make_copy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, |
| void *p_ctx) |
| { |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen) |
| { |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained |
| * list |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; |
| int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or |
| * one or more PEM certificates. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| if (buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && |
| strstr((const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") != NULL) { |
| buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; |
| } |
| |
| if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER) { |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen); |
| } |
| #else |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM) { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_pem_context pem; |
| |
| /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ |
| while (buflen > 1) { |
| size_t use_len; |
| mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); |
| |
| /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ |
| ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, |
| "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", |
| "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", |
| buf, NULL, 0, &use_len); |
| |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Was PEM encoded |
| */ |
| buflen -= use_len; |
| buf += use_len; |
| } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { |
| return ret; |
| } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { |
| mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); |
| |
| /* |
| * PEM header and footer were found |
| */ |
| buflen -= use_len; |
| buf += use_len; |
| |
| if (first_error == 0) { |
| first_error = ret; |
| } |
| |
| total_failed++; |
| continue; |
| } else { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen); |
| |
| mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| /* |
| * Quit parsing on a memory error |
| */ |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (first_error == 0) { |
| first_error = ret; |
| } |
| |
| total_failed++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| success = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (success) { |
| return total_failed; |
| } else if (first_error) { |
| return first_error; |
| } else { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| /* |
| * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n); |
| |
| mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) |
| int w_ret; |
| WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; |
| char filename[MAX_PATH]; |
| char *p; |
| size_t len = strlen(path); |
| |
| WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; |
| HANDLE hFind; |
| |
| if (len > MAX_PATH - 3) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| memset(szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir)); |
| memset(filename, 0, MAX_PATH); |
| memcpy(filename, path, len); |
| filename[len++] = '\\'; |
| p = filename + len; |
| filename[len++] = '*'; |
| |
| /* |
| * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default |
| * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the |
| * output length is described in WCHARs. |
| */ |
| w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir, |
| MAX_PATH - 3); |
| if (w_ret == 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| hFind = FindFirstFileW(szDir, &file_data); |
| if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| len = MAX_PATH - len; |
| do { |
| memset(p, 0, len); |
| |
| if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, |
| -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL); |
| if (w_ret == 0) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, filename); |
| if (w_ret < 0) { |
| ret++; |
| } else { |
| ret += w_ret; |
| } |
| } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &file_data) != 0); |
| |
| if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| FindClose(hFind); |
| #else /* _WIN32 */ |
| int t_ret; |
| int snp_ret; |
| struct stat sb; |
| struct dirent *entry; |
| char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; |
| DIR *dir = opendir(path); |
| |
| if (dir == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex)) != 0) { |
| closedir(dir); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ |
| |
| memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); |
| |
| while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { |
| snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof(entry_name), |
| "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name); |
| |
| if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof(entry_name)) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } else if (stat(entry_name, &sb) == -1) { |
| if (errno == ENOENT) { |
| /* Broken symbolic link - ignore this entry. |
| stat(2) will return this error for either (a) a dangling |
| symlink or (b) a missing file. |
| Given that we have just obtained the filename from readdir, |
| assume that it does exist and therefore treat this as a |
| dangling symlink. */ |
| continue; |
| } else { |
| /* Some other file error; report the error. */ |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Ignore parse errors |
| // |
| t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, entry_name); |
| if (t_ret < 0) { |
| ret++; |
| } else { |
| ret += t_ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| closedir(dir); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex) != 0) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ |
| |
| #endif /* _WIN32 */ |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) |
| #define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ |
| do { \ |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ |
| sep = ", "; \ |
| } while (0) |
| |
| #define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ |
| do { \ |
| if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ |
| PRINT_ITEM(name); \ |
| } \ |
| } while (0) |
| |
| #define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ |
| do { \ |
| if (key_usage & (code)) { \ |
| PRINT_ITEM(name); \ |
| } \ |
| } while (0) |
| |
| static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const char *desc; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| while (cur != NULL) { |
| if (mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) { |
| desc = "???"; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| sep = ", "; |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_info_cert_policies(char **buf, size_t *size, |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const char *desc; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| while (cur != NULL) { |
| if (mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) { |
| desc = "???"; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| sep = ", "; |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return an informational string about the certificate. |
| */ |
| #define BEFORE_COLON 18 |
| #define BC "18" |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n; |
| char *p; |
| char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; |
| |
| p = buf; |
| n = size; |
| |
| if (NULL == crt) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n"); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| return (int) (size - n); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", |
| prefix, crt->version); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sserial number : ", |
| prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &crt->serial); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->issuer); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->subject); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ |
| "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, |
| crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, |
| crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, |
| crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ |
| "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, |
| crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, |
| crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, |
| crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, |
| crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| /* Key size */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, |
| mbedtls_pk_get_name(&crt->pk))) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, |
| (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&crt->pk)); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| /* |
| * Optional extensions |
| */ |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, |
| crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false"); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if (crt->max_pathlen > 0) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, |
| &crt->subject_alt_names, |
| prefix)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if ((ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage(&p, &n, |
| &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if ((ret = x509_info_cert_policies(&p, &n, |
| &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| return (int) (size - n); |
| } |
| |
| struct x509_crt_verify_string { |
| int code; |
| const char *string; |
| }; |
| |
| #define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info }, |
| static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { |
| MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
| #undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, |
| uint32_t flags) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; |
| char *p = buf; |
| size_t n = size; |
| |
| for (cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL; cur++) { |
| if ((flags & cur->code) == 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| flags ^= cur->code; |
| } |
| |
| if (flags != 0) { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sUnknown reason " |
| "(this should not happen)\n", prefix); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| |
| return (int) (size - n); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| unsigned int usage) |
| { |
| unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; |
| unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY |
| | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; |
| |
| if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; |
| |
| if (((crt->key_usage & ~may_mask) & usage_must) != usage_must) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| usage_may = usage & may_mask; |
| |
| if (((crt->key_usage & may_mask) | usage_may) != usage_may) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const char *usage_oid, |
| size_t usage_len) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; |
| |
| /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ |
| if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list |
| */ |
| for (cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; |
| |
| if (cur_oid->len == usage_len && |
| memcmp(cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; |
| |
| while (cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0) { |
| if (crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && |
| memcmp(crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len) == 0) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. |
| * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const mbedtls_x509_time *now) |
| { |
| int flags = 0; |
| unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; |
| #else |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| size_t hash_length; |
| |
| if (ca == NULL) { |
| return flags; |
| } |
| |
| while (crl_list != NULL) { |
| if (crl_list->version == 0 || |
| x509_name_cmp(&crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject) != 0) { |
| crl_list = crl_list->next; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca, |
| MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA |
| */ |
| if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_md) != 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; |
| } |
| |
| if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_pk) != 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); |
| if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, |
| crl_list->tbs.p, |
| crl_list->tbs.len, |
| hash, |
| sizeof(hash), |
| &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| #else |
| md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); |
| hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); |
| if (mbedtls_md(md_info, |
| crl_list->tbs.p, |
| crl_list->tbs.len, |
| hash) != 0) { |
| /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| } |
| |
| if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, |
| crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length, |
| crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) |
| /* |
| * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; |
| } |
| |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; |
| } |
| #else |
| ((void) now); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if certificate is revoked |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(crt, crl_list)) { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| crl_list = crl_list->next; |
| } |
| |
| return flags; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) |
| { |
| size_t hash_len; |
| unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; |
| md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md); |
| hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); |
| |
| /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ |
| if (mbedtls_md(md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #else |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md); |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, |
| child->tbs.p, |
| child->tbs.len, |
| hash, |
| sizeof(hash), |
| &hash_len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ |
| if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) { |
| return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&parent->pk, |
| child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, |
| child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk); |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) rs_ctx; |
| #endif |
| |
| return mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, |
| child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, |
| child->sig.p, child->sig.len); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. |
| * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. |
| * |
| * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, |
| int top) |
| { |
| int need_ca_bit; |
| |
| /* Parent must be the issuer */ |
| if (x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &parent->subject) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ |
| need_ca_bit = 1; |
| |
| /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ |
| if (top && parent->version < 3) { |
| need_ca_bit = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (need_ca_bit && !parent->ca_istrue) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (need_ca_bit && |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL. |
| * |
| * Here suitable is defined as: |
| * 1. subject name matches child's issuer |
| * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs |
| * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct |
| * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) |
| * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied |
| * |
| * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first |
| * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is |
| * none). |
| * |
| * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted |
| * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods. |
| * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.) |
| * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is |
| * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that |
| * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here. |
| * |
| * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might |
| * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the |
| * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't |
| * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to |
| * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].) |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent |
| * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents |
| * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) |
| * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 |
| * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top |
| * of the chain, 0 otherwise |
| * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far |
| * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far |
| * (will never be greater than path_cnt) |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - 0 on success |
| * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, |
| int *r_signature_is_good, |
| int top, |
| unsigned path_cnt, |
| unsigned self_cnt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, |
| const mbedtls_x509_time *now) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; |
| int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* did we have something in progress? */ |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL) { |
| /* restore saved state */ |
| parent = rs_ctx->parent; |
| fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| /* clear saved state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent = NULL; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; |
| |
| /* resume where we left */ |
| goto check_signature; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| fallback_parent = NULL; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = 0; |
| |
| for (parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next) { |
| /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */ |
| if (x509_crt_check_parent(child, parent, top) != 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */ |
| if (parent->max_pathlen > 0 && |
| (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Signature */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| check_signature: |
| #endif |
| ret = x509_crt_check_signature(child, parent, rs_ctx); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent = parent; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| signature_is_good = ret == 0; |
| if (top && !signature_is_good) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) |
| /* optional time check */ |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 || /* past */ |
| mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) { /* future */ |
| if (fallback_parent == NULL) { |
| fallback_parent = parent; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; |
| } |
| |
| continue; |
| } |
| #else |
| ((void) now); |
| #endif |
| |
| *r_parent = parent; |
| *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (parent == NULL) { |
| *r_parent = fallback_parent; |
| *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL. |
| * |
| * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found |
| * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable). |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed |
| * by a chain of possible intermediates |
| * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates |
| * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) |
| * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 |
| * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 |
| * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) |
| * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far |
| * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - 0 on success |
| * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_find_parent( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, |
| int *parent_is_trusted, |
| int *signature_is_good, |
| unsigned path_cnt, |
| unsigned self_cnt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, |
| const mbedtls_x509_time *now) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; |
| |
| *parent_is_trusted = 1; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1) { |
| *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; |
| rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| while (1) { |
| search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; |
| |
| ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list, |
| parent, signature_is_good, |
| *parent_is_trusted, |
| path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ |
| if (*parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* prepare second iteration */ |
| *parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ |
| if (*parent == NULL) { |
| *parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| *signature_is_good = 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted |
| * |
| * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only |
| * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked) |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cur; |
| |
| /* must be self-issued */ |
| if (x509_name_cmp(&crt->issuer, &crt->subject) != 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */ |
| for (cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| if (crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len && |
| memcmp(crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* too bad */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Build and verify a certificate chain |
| * |
| * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and |
| * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain |
| * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj] |
| * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one, |
| * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible. |
| * |
| * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found. |
| * |
| * Special cases: |
| * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it |
| * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root |
| * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq |
| * |
| * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: |
| * - trusted EE |
| * - EE -> trusted root |
| * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root |
| * - if relevant: EE untrusted |
| * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted |
| * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). |
| * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is |
| * enough (but length 1 is not in general). |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn |
| * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp |
| * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() |
| * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain |
| * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! |
| * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined |
| * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined, |
| * even if it was found to be invalid |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verify_chain( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, |
| void *p_ca_cb, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) |
| { |
| /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can |
| * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| uint32_t *flags; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; |
| int parent_is_trusted; |
| int child_is_trusted; |
| int signature_is_good; |
| unsigned self_cnt; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; |
| mbedtls_x509_time now; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent) { |
| /* restore saved state */ |
| *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ |
| self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; |
| |
| /* restore derived state */ |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; |
| child = cur->crt; |
| flags = &cur->flags; |
| |
| goto find_parent; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ |
| |
| child = crt; |
| self_cnt = 0; |
| parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| child_is_trusted = 0; |
| |
| while (1) { |
| /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; |
| cur->crt = child; |
| cur->flags = 0; |
| ver_chain->len++; |
| flags = &cur->flags; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) |
| /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; |
| } |
| |
| if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ |
| if (child_is_trusted) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ |
| if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, child->sig_md) != 0) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; |
| } |
| |
| if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, child->sig_pk) != 0) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; |
| } |
| |
| /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ |
| if (ver_chain->len == 1 && |
| x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(child, trust_ca) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| find_parent: |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, |
| * or use statically provided list. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| if (f_ca_cb != NULL) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); |
| mbedtls_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); |
| ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| |
| ret = f_ca_cb(p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| { |
| ((void) f_ca_cb); |
| ((void) p_ca_cb); |
| cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; |
| } |
| |
| /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ |
| ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, |
| &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, |
| ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx, |
| &now); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; |
| rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; |
| rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* No parent? We're done here */ |
| if (parent == NULL) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. |
| * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], |
| * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ |
| if (ver_chain->len != 1 && |
| x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &child->subject) == 0) { |
| self_cnt++; |
| } |
| |
| /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, |
| * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ |
| if (!parent_is_trusted && |
| ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) { |
| /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* signature was checked while searching parent */ |
| if (!signature_is_good) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| } |
| |
| /* check size of signing key */ |
| if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &parent->pk) != 0) { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) |
| /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ |
| *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now); |
| #else |
| (void) ca_crl; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* prepare for next iteration */ |
| child = parent; |
| parent = NULL; |
| child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; |
| signature_is_good = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef _WIN32 |
| #ifdef _MSC_VER |
| #pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib") |
| #include <winsock2.h> |
| #include <ws2tcpip.h> |
| #elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600 |
| #include <winsock2.h> |
| #include <ws2tcpip.h> |
| #else |
| /* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */ |
| #define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON |
| #endif |
| #elif defined(__sun) |
| /* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */ |
| #elif defined(__has_include) |
| #if __has_include(<sys/socket.h>) |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #endif |
| #if __has_include(<arpa/inet.h>) |
| #include <arpa/inet.h> |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use |
| * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below). The local |
| * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides |
| * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the |
| * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries. |
| * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link |
| * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies. |
| * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler |
| * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not |
| * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above. |
| * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names |
| * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */ |
| #if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names |
| /* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */ |
| static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst); |
| |
| #define li_cton(c, n) \ |
| (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0)) |
| |
| static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; |
| int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1; |
| uint16_t addr[8]; |
| do { |
| /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */ |
| uint16_t group = num_digits = 0; |
| for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) { |
| if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| group = (group << 4) | digit; |
| p++; |
| } |
| if (num_digits != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups); |
| nonzero_groups++; |
| if (*p == '\0') { |
| break; |
| } else if (*p == '.') { |
| /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */ |
| if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) || |
| nonzero_groups >= 7) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */ |
| int steps = 4; |
| do { |
| p--; |
| steps--; |
| } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0); |
| |
| if (*p != ':') { |
| break; |
| } |
| p++; |
| nonzero_groups--; |
| if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p, |
| addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| nonzero_groups += 2; |
| p = (const unsigned char *) ""; |
| break; |
| } else if (*p != ':') { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */ |
| if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| zero_group_start = nonzero_groups; |
| |
| /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */ |
| if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (p[1] == '\0') { |
| ++p; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| ++p; |
| } while (nonzero_groups < 8); |
| |
| if (*p != '\0') { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (zero_group_start != -1) { |
| if (nonzero_groups > 6) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups; |
| int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start; |
| |
| /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */ |
| if (groups_after_zero) { |
| memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups, |
| addr + zero_group_start, |
| groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr)); |
| } |
| memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr)); |
| } else { |
| if (nonzero_groups != 8) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; |
| uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst; |
| uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0; |
| uint8_t num_octets = 0; |
| uint16_t octet; |
| |
| do { |
| octet = num_digits = 0; |
| do { |
| digit = *p - '0'; |
| if (digit > 9) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format, |
| * which this implementation does not support. */ |
| if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| octet = octet * 10 + digit; |
| num_digits++; |
| p++; |
| } while (num_digits < 3); |
| |
| if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| *res++ = (uint8_t) octet; |
| num_octets++; |
| } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.'); |
| return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1; |
| } |
| |
| #else |
| |
| static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) |
| { |
| return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) |
| { |
| return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names |
| |
| size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst) |
| { |
| return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL |
| ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0 |
| : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for CN match |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, |
| const char *cn, size_t cn_len) |
| { |
| /* try exact match */ |
| if (name->len == cn_len && |
| x509_memcasecmp(cn, name->p, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* try wildcard match */ |
| if (x509_check_wildcard(cn, name) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, |
| const char *cn, size_t cn_len) |
| { |
| uint32_t ip[4]; |
| cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip); |
| if (cn_len == 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; |
| if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS && |
| cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, |
| const char *cn, size_t cn_len) |
| { |
| for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; |
| if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER && |
| cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, |
| const char *cn, size_t cn_len) |
| { |
| int san_ip = 0; |
| int san_uri = 0; |
| /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */ |
| for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { |
| switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) { |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: |
| if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: |
| san_ip = 1; |
| break; |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: |
| san_uri = 1; |
| break; |
| /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ |
| default: /* Unrecognized type */ |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (san_ip) { |
| if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| if (san_uri) { |
| if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! |
| */ |
| static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const char *cn, |
| uint32_t *flags) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_name *name; |
| size_t cn_len = strlen(cn); |
| |
| if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { |
| if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return; |
| } |
| } else { |
| for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) { |
| if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 && |
| x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) { |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( |
| uint32_t *flags, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned i; |
| uint32_t cur_flags; |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; |
| |
| for (i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i) { |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; |
| cur_flags = cur->flags; |
| |
| if (NULL != f_vrfy) { |
| if ((ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *flags |= cur_flags; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version |
| * |
| * This function: |
| * - checks the requested CN (if any) |
| * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key, |
| * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently |
| * - builds and verifies the chain |
| * - then calls the callback and merges the flags |
| * |
| * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` |
| * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the |
| * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will |
| * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list |
| * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list |
| * of CRLs. |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, |
| void *p_ca_cb, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *, |
| int, |
| uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; |
| uint32_t ee_flags; |
| |
| *flags = 0; |
| ee_flags = 0; |
| x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ver_chain); |
| |
| if (profile == NULL) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* check name if requested */ |
| if (cn != NULL) { |
| x509_crt_verify_name(crt, cn, &ee_flags); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the type and size of the key */ |
| pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(&crt->pk); |
| |
| if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, pk_type) != 0) { |
| ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; |
| } |
| |
| if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &crt->pk) != 0) { |
| ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check the chain */ |
| ret = x509_crt_verify_chain(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, |
| f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, |
| &ver_chain, rs_ctx); |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Merge end-entity flags */ |
| ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; |
| |
| /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ |
| ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy); |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result); |
| mbedtls_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result); |
| ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(rs_ctx); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by |
| * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the |
| * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ |
| if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| *flags = (uint32_t) -1; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (*flags != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy) |
| { |
| return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, |
| NULL, NULL, |
| &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, |
| cn, flags, |
| f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy) |
| { |
| return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, |
| NULL, NULL, |
| profile, cn, flags, |
| f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| /* |
| * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, |
| * not restartable). |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, |
| void *p_ca_cb, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy) |
| { |
| return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, NULL, NULL, |
| f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, |
| profile, cn, flags, |
| f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) |
| { |
| return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, |
| NULL, NULL, |
| profile, cn, flags, |
| f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Initialize a certificate chain |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) |
| { |
| memset(crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unallocate all certificate data |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; |
| |
| while (cert_cur != NULL) { |
| mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) |
| mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts); |
| #endif |
| |
| mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next); |
| mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next); |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next); |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next); |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next); |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next); |
| |
| if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) { |
| mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); |
| } |
| |
| cert_prv = cert_cur; |
| cert_cur = cert_cur->next; |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); |
| if (cert_prv != crt) { |
| mbedtls_free(cert_prv); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* |
| * Initialize a restart context |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) |
| { |
| mbedtls_pk_restart_init(&ctx->pk); |
| |
| ctx->parent = NULL; |
| ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; |
| ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; |
| |
| ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; |
| |
| ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none; |
| ctx->self_cnt = 0; |
| x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ctx->ver_chain); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Free the components of a restart context |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_pk_restart_free(&ctx->pk); |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(ctx); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ |