| /* |
| * X.509 certificate parsing and verification |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may |
| * not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT |
| * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| * |
| * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) |
| */ |
| /* |
| * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. |
| * |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) |
| * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) |
| * |
| * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf |
| * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf |
| * |
| * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf |
| */ |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) |
| #include "mbedtls/config.h" |
| #else |
| #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/oid.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/pem.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| #include "psa/crypto.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| #else |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #define mbedtls_free free |
| #define mbedtls_calloc calloc |
| #define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/threading.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) |
| #include <windows.h> |
| #else |
| #include <time.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <dirent.h> |
| #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it |
| */ |
| typedef struct { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; |
| uint32_t flags; |
| } x509_crt_verify_chain_item; |
| |
| /* |
| * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root |
| */ |
| #define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) |
| |
| /* |
| * Default profile |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) |
| /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) | |
| #endif |
| /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), |
| 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ |
| 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ |
| 2048, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Next-default profile |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = |
| { |
| /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), |
| 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ), |
| #else |
| 0, |
| #endif |
| 2048, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * NSA Suite B Profile |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = |
| { |
| /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ), |
| /* Only ECDSA */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ), |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | |
| MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ), |
| #else |
| 0, |
| #endif |
| 0, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check md_alg against profile |
| * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) |
| { |
| if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check pk_alg against profile |
| * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg ) |
| { |
| if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check key against profile |
| * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) |
| { |
| if( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( pk ) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || |
| pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || |
| pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; |
| |
| if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different |
| */ |
| static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| unsigned char diff; |
| const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2; |
| |
| for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) |
| { |
| diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i]; |
| |
| if( diff == 0 ) |
| continue; |
| |
| if( diff == 32 && |
| ( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) || |
| ( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) ) |
| { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name ) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn ); |
| |
| /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */ |
| if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i ) |
| { |
| if( cn[i] == '.' ) |
| { |
| cn_idx = i; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( cn_idx == 0 ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 && |
| x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding |
| * variations (but not all). |
| * |
| * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b ) |
| { |
| if( a->tag == b->tag && |
| a->len == b->len && |
| memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && |
| ( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && |
| a->len == b->len && |
| x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence). |
| * |
| * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm: |
| * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal, |
| * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation |
| * or space folding.) |
| * |
| * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b ) |
| { |
| /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */ |
| while( a != NULL || b != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( a == NULL || b == NULL ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| /* type */ |
| if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag || |
| a->oid.len != b->oid.len || |
| memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* value */ |
| if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| /* structure of the list of sets */ |
| if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| a = a->next; |
| b = b->next; |
| } |
| |
| /* a == NULL == b */ |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain |
| */ |
| static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain ) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ ) |
| { |
| ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; |
| ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; |
| } |
| |
| ver_chain->len = 0; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| int *ver ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) |
| { |
| *ver = 0; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); |
| } |
| |
| end = *p + len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret ); |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * notBefore Time, |
| * notAfter Time } |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_time *from, |
| mbedtls_x509_time *to ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret ); |
| |
| end = *p + len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( *p == end ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| uid->tag = **p; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); |
| } |
| |
| uid->p = *p; |
| *p += uid->len; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| int *ca_istrue, |
| int *max_pathlen ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| /* |
| * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, |
| * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } |
| */ |
| *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ |
| *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( *p == end ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); |
| |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) |
| *ca_istrue = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if( *p == end ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| (*max_pathlen)++; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| unsigned char *ns_cert_type) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( bs.len != 1 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); |
| |
| /* Get actual bitstring */ |
| *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| unsigned int *key_usage) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t i; |
| mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( bs.len < 1 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); |
| |
| /* Get actual bitstring */ |
| *key_usage = 0; |
| for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ ) |
| { |
| *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId |
| * |
| * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ |
| if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames |
| * |
| * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName |
| * |
| * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { |
| * otherName [0] OtherName, |
| * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, |
| * dNSName [2] IA5String, |
| * x400Address [3] ORAddress, |
| * directoryName [4] Name, |
| * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, |
| * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, |
| * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, |
| * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } |
| * |
| * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } |
| * |
| * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, |
| * partyName [1] DirectoryString } |
| * |
| * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName |
| * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len, tag_len; |
| mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; |
| unsigned char tag; |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; |
| |
| /* Get main sequence tag */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( *p + len != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| while( *p < end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; |
| memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) ); |
| |
| if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); |
| |
| tag = **p; |
| (*p)++; |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) |
| { |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the SAN are structured correct. |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf ); |
| /* |
| * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, |
| * and clear the allocated sequences. |
| */ |
| if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; |
| while( seq_cur != NULL ) |
| { |
| seq_prv = seq_cur; |
| seq_cur = seq_cur->next; |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, |
| sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); |
| mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); |
| } |
| subject_alt_name->next = NULL; |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ |
| if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( cur->next != NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); |
| |
| cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); |
| |
| if( cur->next == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| buf = &(cur->buf); |
| buf->tag = tag; |
| buf->p = *p; |
| buf->len = tag_len; |
| *p += buf->len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ |
| cur->next = NULL; |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } |
| * |
| * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } |
| * |
| * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation |
| * |
| * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, |
| * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF |
| * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } |
| * |
| * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER |
| * |
| * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, |
| * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } |
| * |
| * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers |
| * |
| * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } |
| * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } |
| * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } |
| * |
| * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) |
| * |
| * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { |
| * cPSuri CPSuri, |
| * userNotice UserNotice } |
| * |
| * CPSuri ::= IA5String |
| * |
| * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, |
| * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } |
| * |
| * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * organization DisplayText, |
| * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } |
| * |
| * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { |
| * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), |
| * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } |
| * |
| * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point |
| * as defined in RFC 5280. |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) |
| { |
| int ret, parse_ret = 0; |
| size_t len; |
| mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; |
| mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; |
| |
| /* Get main sequence tag */ |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( *p + len != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Cannot be an empty sequence. |
| */ |
| if( len == 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| while( *p < end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; |
| const unsigned char *policy_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the policy sequence |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| policy_end = *p + len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| policy_oid.len = len; |
| policy_oid.p = *p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. |
| */ |
| if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this |
| * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION |
| * is configured. |
| */ |
| parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ |
| if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( cur->next != NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); |
| |
| cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); |
| |
| if( cur->next == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| buf = &( cur->buf ); |
| buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; |
| buf->p = policy_oid.p; |
| buf->len = policy_oid.len; |
| |
| *p += len; |
| |
| /* |
| * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end |
| * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. |
| */ |
| if( *p < policy_end ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| /* |
| * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. |
| */ |
| *p += len; |
| } |
| |
| if( *p != policy_end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ |
| cur->next = NULL; |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| return( parse_ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * X.509 v3 extensions |
| * |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; |
| |
| if( *p == end ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; |
| while( *p < end ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, |
| * extnValue OCTET STRING } |
| */ |
| mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL}; |
| int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ |
| int ext_type = 0; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| end_ext_data = *p + len; |
| |
| /* Get extension ID */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| extn_oid.p = *p; |
| *p += extn_oid.len; |
| |
| /* Get optional critical */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && |
| ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| /* Data should be octet string type */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| end_ext_octet = *p + len; |
| |
| if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Detect supported extensions |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); |
| |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| /* No parser found, skip extension */ |
| *p = end_ext_octet; |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) |
| if( is_critical ) |
| { |
| /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Forbid repeated extensions */ |
| if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); |
| |
| crt->ext_types |= ext_type; |
| |
| switch( ext_type ) |
| { |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: |
| /* Parse basic constraints */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: |
| /* Parse key usage */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: |
| /* Parse extended key usage */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: |
| /* Parse subject alt name */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: |
| /* Parse netscape certificate type */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: |
| /* Parse certificate policies type */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet, |
| &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) |
| if( is_critical ) |
| return( ret ); |
| else |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we |
| * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to |
| * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, |
| * unless the extension is critical. |
| */ |
| if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| /* |
| * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer |
| * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, |
| * skip the extension. |
| */ |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) |
| if( is_critical ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); |
| else |
| #endif |
| *p = end_ext_octet; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( *p != end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen, |
| int make_copy ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; |
| mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; |
| |
| memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); |
| memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); |
| memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ |
| p = (unsigned char*) buf; |
| len = buflen; |
| end = p + len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING } |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); |
| } |
| |
| end = crt_end = p + len; |
| crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; |
| if( make_copy != 0 ) |
| { |
| /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ |
| crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); |
| if( crt->raw.p == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len ); |
| crt->own_buffer = 1; |
| |
| p += crt->raw.len - len; |
| end = crt_end = p + len; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf; |
| crt->own_buffer = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| */ |
| crt->tbs.p = p; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); |
| } |
| |
| end = p + len; |
| crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } |
| * |
| * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER |
| * |
| * signature AlgorithmIdentifier |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid, |
| &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); |
| } |
| |
| crt->version++; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, |
| &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, |
| &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * issuer Name |
| */ |
| crt->issuer_raw.p = p; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; |
| |
| /* |
| * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * notBefore Time, |
| * notAfter Time } |
| * |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from, |
| &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * subject Name |
| */ |
| crt->subject_raw.p = p; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; |
| |
| /* |
| * SubjectPublicKeyInfo |
| */ |
| crt->pk_raw.p = p; |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; |
| |
| /* |
| * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 |
| * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 |
| * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL |
| * -- If present, version shall be v3 |
| */ |
| if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) |
| { |
| ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) |
| { |
| ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) |
| if( crt->version == 3 ) |
| #endif |
| { |
| ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| |
| end = crt_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * } |
| * -- end of TBSCertificate |
| * |
| * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| * signatureValue BIT STRING |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || |
| memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || |
| sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || |
| ( sig_params1.len != 0 && |
| memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a |
| * chained list |
| */ |
| static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen, |
| int make_copy ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL ) |
| { |
| prev = crt; |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. |
| */ |
| if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL ) |
| { |
| crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); |
| |
| if( crt->next == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| prev = crt; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next ); |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( prev ) |
| prev->next = NULL; |
| |
| if( crt != chain ) |
| mbedtls_free( crt ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen ) |
| { |
| return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen ) |
| { |
| return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained |
| * list |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t buflen ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; |
| int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for valid input |
| */ |
| if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or |
| * one or more PEM certificates. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && |
| strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL ) |
| { |
| buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; |
| } |
| |
| if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER ) |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); |
| #else |
| return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_pem_context pem; |
| |
| /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ |
| while( buflen > 1 ) |
| { |
| size_t use_len; |
| mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); |
| |
| /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ |
| ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, |
| "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", |
| "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", |
| buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); |
| |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Was PEM encoded |
| */ |
| buflen -= use_len; |
| buf += use_len; |
| } |
| else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) |
| { |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); |
| |
| /* |
| * PEM header and footer were found |
| */ |
| buflen -= use_len; |
| buf += use_len; |
| |
| if( first_error == 0 ) |
| first_error = ret; |
| |
| total_failed++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| else |
| break; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); |
| |
| mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); |
| |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Quit parsing on a memory error |
| */ |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( first_error == 0 ) |
| first_error = ret; |
| |
| total_failed++; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| success = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( success ) |
| return( total_failed ); |
| else if( first_error ) |
| return( first_error ); |
| else |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| /* |
| * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n ); |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); |
| mbedtls_free( buf ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) |
| int w_ret; |
| WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; |
| char filename[MAX_PATH]; |
| char *p; |
| size_t len = strlen( path ); |
| |
| WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; |
| HANDLE hFind; |
| |
| if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) ); |
| memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH ); |
| memcpy( filename, path, len ); |
| filename[len++] = '\\'; |
| p = filename + len; |
| filename[len++] = '*'; |
| |
| w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, |
| MAX_PATH - 3 ); |
| if( w_ret == 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data ); |
| if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| |
| len = MAX_PATH - len; |
| do |
| { |
| memset( p, 0, len ); |
| |
| if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) |
| continue; |
| |
| w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, |
| lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), |
| p, (int) len - 1, |
| NULL, NULL ); |
| if( w_ret == 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); |
| if( w_ret < 0 ) |
| ret++; |
| else |
| ret += w_ret; |
| } |
| while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 ); |
| |
| if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| FindClose( hFind ); |
| #else /* _WIN32 */ |
| int t_ret; |
| int snp_ret; |
| struct stat sb; |
| struct dirent *entry; |
| char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; |
| DIR *dir = opendir( path ); |
| |
| if( dir == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| closedir( dir ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ |
| |
| while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) |
| { |
| snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, |
| "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name ); |
| |
| if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| if( !( S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) || S_ISLNK( sb.st_mode ) ) ) |
| continue; |
| |
| // Ignore parse errors |
| // |
| t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name ); |
| if( t_ret < 0 ) |
| ret++; |
| else |
| ret += t_ret; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| closedir( dir ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ |
| |
| #endif /* _WIN32 */ |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ |
| |
| /* |
| * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } |
| * |
| * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } |
| * |
| * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, |
| * as defined in RFC 4108. |
| */ |
| static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, |
| mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; |
| const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; |
| mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; |
| |
| if( ( subject_alt_name->tag & |
| ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) != |
| ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". |
| */ |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| cur_oid.p = p; |
| cur_oid.len = len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. |
| */ |
| if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p + len >= end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| p += len; |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; |
| |
| if( p + len >= end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| p += len; |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret ); |
| |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; |
| p += len; |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, |
| sizeof( *other_name ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence |
| *subject_alt_name, |
| const char *prefix ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; |
| mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; |
| int parse_ret; |
| |
| while( cur != NULL ) |
| { |
| memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) ); |
| parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); |
| if( parse_ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| cur = cur->next; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| switch( san.type ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * otherName |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, |
| &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n ) |
| { |
| *p = '\0'; |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| } |
| |
| memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p, |
| other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len ); |
| p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; |
| |
| n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; |
| |
| }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * dNSName |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) |
| { |
| *p = '\0'; |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| } |
| |
| memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len ); |
| p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; |
| n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * Type not supported, skip item. |
| */ |
| default: |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| *p = '\0'; |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, |
| mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| switch( san_buf->tag & |
| ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * otherName |
| */ |
| case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; |
| |
| ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); |
| san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; |
| memcpy( &san->san.other_name, |
| &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); |
| |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * dNSName |
| */ |
| case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): |
| { |
| memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); |
| san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; |
| |
| memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name, |
| san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) ); |
| |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * Type not supported |
| */ |
| default: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); |
| } |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ |
| { \ |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ |
| sep = ", "; \ |
| } |
| |
| #define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \ |
| if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \ |
| PRINT_ITEM( name ); |
| |
| static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, |
| unsigned char ns_cert_type ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" ); |
| CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" ); |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \ |
| if( key_usage & (code) ) \ |
| PRINT_ITEM( name ); |
| |
| static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, |
| unsigned int key_usage ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" ); |
| KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" ); |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const char *desc; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| while( cur != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) |
| desc = "???"; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| sep = ", "; |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size, |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const char *desc; |
| size_t n = *size; |
| char *p = *buf; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; |
| const char *sep = ""; |
| |
| while( cur != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) |
| desc = "???"; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| sep = ", "; |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| *size = n; |
| *buf = p; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return an informational string about the certificate. |
| */ |
| #define BEFORE_COLON 18 |
| #define BC "18" |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n; |
| char *p; |
| char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; |
| |
| p = buf; |
| n = size; |
| |
| if( NULL == crt ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| return( (int) ( size - n ) ); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", |
| prefix, crt->version ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ", |
| prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ |
| "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, |
| crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, |
| crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, |
| crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ |
| "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, |
| crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, |
| crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, |
| crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, |
| crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| /* Key size */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, |
| mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, |
| (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| /* |
| * Optional extensions |
| */ |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, |
| crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, |
| &crt->subject_alt_names, |
| prefix ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n, |
| &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n, |
| &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| |
| return( (int) ( size - n ) ); |
| } |
| |
| struct x509_crt_verify_string { |
| int code; |
| const char *string; |
| }; |
| |
| static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, |
| { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
| |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, |
| uint32_t flags ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; |
| char *p = buf; |
| size_t n = size; |
| |
| for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ ) |
| { |
| if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 ) |
| continue; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| flags ^= cur->code; |
| } |
| |
| if( flags != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason " |
| "(this should not happen)\n", prefix ); |
| MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; |
| } |
| |
| return( (int) ( size - n ) ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| unsigned int usage ) |
| { |
| unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; |
| unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY |
| | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; |
| |
| if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; |
| |
| if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| usage_may = usage & may_mask; |
| |
| if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const char *usage_oid, |
| size_t usage_len ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; |
| |
| /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ |
| if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list |
| */ |
| for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; |
| |
| if( cur_oid->len == usage_len && |
| memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; |
| |
| while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && |
| memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) ) |
| return( 1 ); |
| } |
| |
| cur = cur->next; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. |
| * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) |
| { |
| int flags = 0; |
| unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; |
| |
| if( ca == NULL ) |
| return( flags ); |
| |
| while( crl_list != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( crl_list->version == 0 || |
| x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| crl_list = crl_list->next; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) |
| if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, |
| MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA |
| */ |
| if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 ) |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; |
| |
| if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 ) |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; |
| |
| md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md ); |
| if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 ) |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, |
| crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), |
| crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) ) |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) ) |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if certificate is revoked |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) ) |
| { |
| flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| crl_list = crl_list->next; |
| } |
| |
| return( flags ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) |
| { |
| unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; |
| md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); |
| hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); |
| |
| /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ |
| if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| #else |
| psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md ); |
| |
| if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len ) |
| != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) |
| != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ |
| if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) |
| { |
| return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk, |
| child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, |
| child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) ); |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) rs_ctx; |
| #endif |
| |
| return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, |
| child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, |
| child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. |
| * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. |
| * |
| * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, |
| int top ) |
| { |
| int need_ca_bit; |
| |
| /* Parent must be the issuer */ |
| if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ |
| need_ca_bit = 1; |
| |
| /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ |
| if( top && parent->version < 3 ) |
| need_ca_bit = 0; |
| |
| if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) |
| if( need_ca_bit && |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL. |
| * |
| * Here suitable is defined as: |
| * 1. subject name matches child's issuer |
| * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs |
| * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct |
| * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) |
| * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied |
| * |
| * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first |
| * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is |
| * none). |
| * |
| * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted |
| * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods. |
| * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.) |
| * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is |
| * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that |
| * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here. |
| * |
| * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might |
| * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the |
| * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't |
| * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to |
| * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].) |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent |
| * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents |
| * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) |
| * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 |
| * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top |
| * of the chain, 0 otherwise |
| * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far |
| * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far |
| * (will never be greater than path_cnt) |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - 0 on success |
| * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, |
| int *r_signature_is_good, |
| int top, |
| unsigned path_cnt, |
| unsigned self_cnt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; |
| int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* did we have something in progress? */ |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL ) |
| { |
| /* restore saved state */ |
| parent = rs_ctx->parent; |
| fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| /* clear saved state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent = NULL; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; |
| |
| /* resume where we left */ |
| goto check_signature; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| fallback_parent = NULL; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = 0; |
| |
| for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next ) |
| { |
| /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */ |
| if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, parent, top ) != 0 ) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */ |
| if( parent->max_pathlen > 0 && |
| (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt ) |
| { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* Signature */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| check_signature: |
| #endif |
| ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent = parent; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; |
| rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| signature_is_good = ret == 0; |
| if( top && ! signature_is_good ) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* optional time check */ |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) || |
| mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) ) |
| { |
| if( fallback_parent == NULL ) |
| { |
| fallback_parent = parent; |
| fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; |
| } |
| |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| *r_parent = parent; |
| *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if( parent == NULL ) |
| { |
| *r_parent = fallback_parent; |
| *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL. |
| * |
| * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found |
| * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable). |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed |
| * by a chain of possible intermediates |
| * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates |
| * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) |
| * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 |
| * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 |
| * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) |
| * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far |
| * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - 0 on success |
| * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_find_parent( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, |
| int *parent_is_trusted, |
| int *signature_is_good, |
| unsigned path_cnt, |
| unsigned self_cnt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; |
| |
| *parent_is_trusted = 1; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 ) |
| { |
| *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; |
| rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| while( 1 ) { |
| search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; |
| |
| ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list, |
| parent, signature_is_good, |
| *parent_is_trusted, |
| path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ |
| if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 ) |
| break; |
| |
| /* prepare second iteration */ |
| *parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ |
| if( *parent == NULL ) |
| { |
| *parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| *signature_is_good = 0; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted |
| * |
| * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only |
| * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked) |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cur; |
| |
| /* must be self-issued */ |
| if( x509_name_cmp( &crt->issuer, &crt->subject ) != 0 ) |
| return( -1 ); |
| |
| /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */ |
| for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) |
| { |
| if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len && |
| memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* too bad */ |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Build and verify a certificate chain |
| * |
| * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and |
| * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain |
| * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj] |
| * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one, |
| * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible. |
| * |
| * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found. |
| * |
| * Special cases: |
| * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it |
| * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root |
| * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq |
| * |
| * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: |
| * - trusted EE |
| * - EE -> trusted root |
| * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root |
| * - if relevant: EE untrusted |
| * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted |
| * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). |
| * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is |
| * enough (but length 1 is not in general). |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn |
| * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp |
| * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() |
| * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain |
| * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! |
| * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. |
| * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined |
| * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined, |
| * even if it was found to be invalid |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verify_chain( |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, |
| void *p_ca_cb, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) |
| { |
| /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can |
| * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| uint32_t *flags; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *child; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; |
| int parent_is_trusted; |
| int child_is_trusted; |
| int signature_is_good; |
| unsigned self_cnt; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent ) |
| { |
| /* restore saved state */ |
| *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ |
| self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; |
| |
| /* restore derived state */ |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; |
| child = cur->crt; |
| flags = &cur->flags; |
| |
| goto find_parent; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ |
| |
| child = crt; |
| self_cnt = 0; |
| parent_is_trusted = 0; |
| child_is_trusted = 0; |
| |
| while( 1 ) { |
| /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; |
| cur->crt = child; |
| cur->flags = 0; |
| ver_chain->len++; |
| flags = &cur->flags; |
| |
| /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; |
| |
| /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ |
| if( child_is_trusted ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ |
| if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; |
| |
| if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; |
| |
| /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ |
| if( ver_chain->len == 1 && |
| x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| find_parent: |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, |
| * or use statically provided list. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| if( f_ca_cb != NULL ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); |
| mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); |
| ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| |
| ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); |
| |
| cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| { |
| ((void) f_ca_cb); |
| ((void) p_ca_cb); |
| cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; |
| } |
| |
| /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ |
| ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, |
| &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, |
| ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| /* save state */ |
| rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; |
| rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; |
| rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #else |
| (void) ret; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* No parent? We're done here */ |
| if( parent == NULL ) |
| { |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. |
| * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], |
| * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ |
| if( ver_chain->len != 1 && |
| x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| self_cnt++; |
| } |
| |
| /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, |
| * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ |
| if( ! parent_is_trusted && |
| ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) |
| { |
| /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| /* signature was checked while searching parent */ |
| if( ! signature_is_good ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; |
| |
| /* check size of signing key */ |
| if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &parent->pk ) != 0 ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) |
| /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ |
| *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl( child, parent, ca_crl, profile ); |
| #else |
| (void) ca_crl; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* prepare for next iteration */ |
| child = parent; |
| parent = NULL; |
| child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; |
| signature_is_good = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for CN match |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, |
| const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) |
| { |
| /* try exact match */ |
| if( name->len == cn_len && |
| x509_memcasecmp( cn, name->p, cn_len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* try wildcard match */ |
| if( x509_check_wildcard( cn, name ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! |
| */ |
| static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| const char *cn, |
| uint32_t *flags ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_x509_name *name; |
| const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; |
| size_t cn_len = strlen( cn ); |
| |
| if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) |
| { |
| for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) |
| { |
| if( x509_crt_check_cn( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if( cur == NULL ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| for( name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next ) |
| { |
| if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 && |
| x509_crt_check_cn( &name->val, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( name == NULL ) |
| *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( |
| uint32_t *flags, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| unsigned i; |
| uint32_t cur_flags; |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; |
| |
| for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i ) |
| { |
| cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; |
| cur_flags = cur->flags; |
| |
| if( NULL != f_vrfy ) |
| if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| *flags |= cur_flags; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version |
| * |
| * This function: |
| * - checks the requested CN (if any) |
| * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key, |
| * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently |
| * - builds and verifies the chain |
| * - then calls the callback and merges the flags |
| * |
| * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` |
| * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the |
| * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will |
| * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list |
| * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list |
| * of CRLs. |
| */ |
| static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, |
| mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, |
| void *p_ca_cb, |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, |
| const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, |
| int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), |
| void *p_vrfy, |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; |
| uint32_t ee_flags; |
| |
| *flags = 0; |
| ee_flags = 0; |
| x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain ); |
| |
| if( profile == NULL ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* check name if requested */ |
| if( cn != NULL ) |
| x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags ); |
| |
| /* Check the type and size of the key */ |
| pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk ); |
| |
| if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 ) |
| ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; |
| |
| if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 ) |
| ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; |
| |
| /* Check the chain */ |
| ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, |
| f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, |
| &ver_chain, rs_ctx ); |
| |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| /* Merge end-entity flags */ |
| ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; |
| |
| /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ |
| ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); |
| mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); |
| ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) |
| if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx ); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by |
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