Merge pull request #4488 from tom-daubney-arm/remove_rsa_mode_params
Remove rsa mode params part 1
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue4036.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue4036.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7009496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/issue4036.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Default behavior changes
+ * Enable by default the functionalities which have no reason to be disabled.
+ They are: ARIA block cipher, CMAC mode, elliptic curve J-PAKE library and
+ Key Wrapping mode as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Fixes #4036.
+
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue4282.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue4282.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..685f64d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/issue4282.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Removals
+ * Remove the following deprecated functions and constants of hex-encoded
+ primes based on RFC 5114 and RFC 3526 from library code and tests:
+ mbedtls_aes_encrypt(), mbedtls_aes_decrypt(), mbedtls_mpi_is_prime(),
+ mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt(), mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt(),
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(), mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(),
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det(), mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(),
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param(), mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(),
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P, MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G,
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P, MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G,
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P, MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G,
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P, MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G.
+ Remove the deprecated file: include/mbedtls/net.h. Fixes #4282.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/posix-define.txt b/ChangeLog.d/posix-define.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98cf2d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/posix-define.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Bugfix
+ * In library/net_sockets.c, _POSIX_C_SOURCE and _XOPEN_SOURCE are
+ defined to specific values. If the code is used in a context
+ where these are already defined, this can result in a compilation
+ error. Instead, assume that if they are defined, the values will
+ be adequate to build Mbed TLS.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/remove-config-psa-crypto.txt b/ChangeLog.d/remove-config-psa-crypto.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb7cc50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/remove-config-psa-crypto.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Changes
+ * Remove configs/config-psa-crypto.h, which no longer had any intended
+ differences from the default configuration, but had accidentally diverged.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..768d190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+API changes
+ * Remove SSL error codes `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED`
+ and `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH` which are never
+ returned from the public SSL API.
+ * Remove `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE` and return
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` instead.
diff --git a/configs/config-psa-crypto.h b/configs/config-psa-crypto.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 846900a..0000000
--- a/configs/config-psa-crypto.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3170 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * \file config.h
- *
- * \brief Configuration options (set of defines)
- *
- * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable
- * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global
- * memory footprint.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
-#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)
-#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
-#endif
-
-/**
- * \name SECTION: System support
- *
- * This section sets system specific settings.
- * \{
- */
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
- *
- * The compiler has support for asm().
- *
- * Requires support for asm() in compiler.
- *
- * Used in:
- * library/aria.c
- * library/timing.c
- * library/bn_mul.h
- *
- * Required by:
- * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
- * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
- *
- * Comment to disable the use of assembly code.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
- *
- * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit
- * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform).
- *
- * Used in:
- * include/mbedtls/bignum.h
- * library/bignum.c
- *
- * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations.
- * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to
- * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer
- * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros,
- * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to
- * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type.
- * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present.
- * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division.
- *
- * Note that division for the native integer type is always required.
- * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit
- * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some
- * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For
- * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling
- * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
- *
- * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication.
- *
- * Used in:
- * library/poly1305.c
- *
- * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit
- * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some
- * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in
- * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain.
- *
- * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option
- * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware
- * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS.
- *
- * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared
- * to using the library function provided by the toolchain.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
- *
- * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set.
- *
- * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific).
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
- *
- * System has time.h and time().
- * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used,
- * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
- *
- * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT,
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME.
- *
- * Comment if your system does not support time functions
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
- *
- * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for
- * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below).
- * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least
- * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of
- * X.509 certificates.
- *
- * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock.
- *
- * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that
- * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to
- * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information.
- *
- * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for
- * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
- *
- * Enable the memory allocation layer.
- *
- * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free().
- * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be
- * provided to the platform abstraction layer.
- *
- * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide
- * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and
- * free() function pointer at runtime.
- *
- * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the
- * alternate function at compile time.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
- *
- * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
- *
- * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF)
- *
- * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support
- * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime
- * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting
- * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
- *
- * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the
- * platform layer.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT
- *
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the
- * function in the platform abstraction layer.
- *
- * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will
- * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an
- * alternative printf function pointer.
- *
- * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined!
- *
- * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows;
- * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h
- *
- * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO!
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
- *
- * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base
- * platform function
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING
- *
- * Mark deprecated functions so that they generate a warning if used.
- * Functions deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the next
- * version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a new
- * major version by making sure your code is not using these functions.
- *
- * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to
- * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
- *
- * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
- *
- * Remove deprecated functions so that they generate an error if used.
- * Functions deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the next
- * version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a new
- * major version by making sure your code is not using these functions.
- *
- * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS
- *
- * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of
- * the parameters passed to it.
- *
- * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an
- * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the
- * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in
- * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the
- * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose
- * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers).
- *
- * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate
- * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always
- * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted.
- *
- * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may
- * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer
- * must not be NULL:
- * - the pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled
- * - the content of the buffer is always validated
- *
- * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that
- * is invalid, it will:
- * - invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() which by default expands to a
- * call to the function mbedtls_param_failed()
- * - immediately return (with a specific error code unless the function
- * returns void and can't communicate an error).
- *
- * When defining this flag, you also need to:
- * - either provide a definition of the function mbedtls_param_failed() in
- * your application (see platform_util.h for its prototype) as the library
- * calls that function, but does not provide a default definition for it,
- * - or provide a different definition of the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED()
- * below if the above mechanism is not flexible enough to suit your needs.
- * See the documentation of this macro later in this file.
- *
- * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS
-
-/* \} name SECTION: System support */
-
-/**
- * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support
- *
- * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed
- * within the modules that are enabled.
- * \{
- */
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT
- *
- * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(),
- * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay()
- *
- * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled.
- *
- * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at
- * compile time.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
- *
- * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your
- * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash
- * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep
- * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same.
- *
- * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the
- * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags.
- *
- * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer
- * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base
- * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from
- * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions.
- *
- * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
- * module.
- *
- * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their
- * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend
- * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message
- * digests and ciphers instead.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT
-
-/*
- * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is
- * implemented with two .c files:
- * - ecp.c
- * - ecp_curves.c
- * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT
- * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure
- * that you provide functionality for both .c files.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
- *
- * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you
- * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in
- * mind that function prototypes should remain the same.
- *
- * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still
- * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags.
- *
- * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will
- * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide
- * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition
- * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible
- * with this definition.
- *
- * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are
- * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt,
- * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should
- * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt
- * must stay untouched.
- *
- * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set
- * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES
- * tables.
- *
- * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
- * function.
- *
- * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
- * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
- * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
- * and ciphers instead.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
- *
- * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module.
- *
- * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your
- * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind
- * that function prototypes should remain the same.
- *
- * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still
- * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation
- * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the
- * alternative.
- *
- * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
- * and implementing the following functions:
- * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(
- * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
- * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
- * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
- * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the
- * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0
- * otherwise.
- * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are
- * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to
- * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions.
- *
- * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and
- * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac
- * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac if the group is
- * supported (your mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function returns 1 when
- * receives it as an argument). If the group is not supported then the original
- * implementation is used. The other functions and the definition of
- * mbedtls_ecp_group and mbedtls_ecp_point will not change, so your
- * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac and
- * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable must be compatible with this definition.
- *
- * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
- * function.
- */
-/* Required for all the functions in this section */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
-/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT
-/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
- *
- * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources.
- * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has
- * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the
- * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches).
- *
- * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable
- * only for development.
- * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library.
- *
- * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a
- * hardware entropy collector.
- *
- * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same
- * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument.
- *
- * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES
- *
- * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM.
- * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime.
- *
- * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb
- * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the
- * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed.
- * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c
- * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded
- * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access.
- *
- * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES
- *
- * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables.
- *
- * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from
- * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES)
- * by computing their values on the fly during operations
- * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another).
- *
- * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint
- * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during
- * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within
- * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic
- * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss
- * depends on the system and memory details.
- *
- * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY
- *
- * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes).
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
- *
- * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
- *
- * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
- *
- * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
- *
- * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
- *
- * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
- *
- * Enable NULL cipher.
- * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for
- * encryption or channels without any security!
- *
- * To enable the following ciphersuites:
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
- *
- * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for
- * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support
- * padding (e.g. CBC)
- *
- * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC.
- *
- * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
- *
- * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve
- * module. By default all supported curves are enabled.
- *
- * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
- *
- * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime.
- * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times
- * faster on the corresponding curve.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
- *
- * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed.
- *
- * This allows various functions to pause by returning
- * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module,
- * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in
- * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is
- * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum
- * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see
- * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information.
- *
- * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking
- * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations.
- *
- * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of
- * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with
- * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
- *
- * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979).
- * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing
- * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by
- * the deterministic variant.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *
- * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
- * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
- * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
- * preferring other methods of key exchange.
- * See dhm.h for more details.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
- * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
- * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
- * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *
- * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
- * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
- * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
- * preferring other methods of key exchange.
- * See dhm.h for more details.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
- * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C,
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
- *
- * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
- *
- * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the
- * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification
- * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
- * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
- * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
- *
- * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
- *
- * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by
- * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480.
- *
- * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC
- * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to
- * avoid validation issues).
- *
- * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
- *
- * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in
- * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled
- * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled).
- *
- * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're
- * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application.
- *
- * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the
- * mbedtls_strerror()
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
- *
- * Enable the prime-number generation code.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO
- *
- * Enable functions that use the filesystem.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
- *
- * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific
- * or mbedtls_timing_hardclock poll function.
- *
- * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an
- * application.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
- *
- * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions.
- * This is useful if your platform does not support
- * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
- *
- * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the
- * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available).
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
- *
- * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option
- * if you have performance concerns.
- *
- * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and
- * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
- *
- * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source.
- * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer)
- *
- * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a
- * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
- *
- * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are
- * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or
- * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used.
- *
- * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile
- * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the
- * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at
- * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from
- * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default
- * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
- * bytes from the file.
- *
- * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is
- * given to an external source, to update it.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
-
-/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
- *
- * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier.
- *
- * This is only meaningful when building the library as part of a
- * multi-client service. When you activate this option, you must provide an
- * implementation of the type mbedtls_key_owner_id_t and a translation from
- * mbedtls_svc_key_id_t to file name in all the storage backends that you
- * you wish to support.
- *
- * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed
- * without notice.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
- *
- * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints
- * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables
- * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
- *
- * Include backtrace information with each allocated block.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
- * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT
- *
- * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
- *
- * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C
- *
- * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
- *
- * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C
- *
- * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
- *
- * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure
- * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a
- * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process
- * Environment).
- *
- * Module: library/psa_crypto.c
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY
- *
- * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is
- * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG).
- * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in
- * entropy source.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
- *
- * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
- * for the RSA private operation.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
- *
- * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test).
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
- *
- * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also
- * lower performance.
- *
- * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between
- * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at
- * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of
- * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about
- * 30%.
- *
- * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
- *
- * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC.
- * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate
- * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder.
- *
- * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given
- * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel.
- *
- * Enable sending of all alert messages
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
- *
- * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows
- * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic
- * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the
- * operation inside the library.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL
- *
- * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues.
- * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing
- * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls.
- *
- * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging,
- * but remove this for production servers that should log as well.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing
- * a timing side-channel.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
- *
- * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366.
- *
- * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for
- * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks
- * on the padding or underlying cipher.
- *
- * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or
- * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or
- * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
- *
- * Enable support for Extended Master Secret, aka Session Hash
- * (draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02).
- *
- * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of
- * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable
- * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the
- * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or
- * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or
- * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV
- *
- * Enable support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00).
- *
- * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support
- * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients
- * implements a fallback strategy.
- *
- * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which
- * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to
- * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
- *
- * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in TLS 1.0.
- *
- * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk
- * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
- *
- * Enable support for TLS renegotiation.
- *
- * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived
- * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake.
- * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since
- * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to
- * misuse/misunderstand.
- *
- * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation.
- *
- * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware
- * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to
- * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1).
- * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the
- * configuration of this extension).
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE
- *
- * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours
- * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C).
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
- *
- * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1
- *
- * Enable support for TLS 1.0.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C
- * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
- *
- * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled).
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C
- * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
- *
- * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled).
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
- * (Depends on ciphersuites)
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
- *
- * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions).
- *
- * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0,
- * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1
- * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
- *
- * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
- *
- * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
- * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
- *
- * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk!
- * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details.
- *
- * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
- *
- * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers.
- *
- * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as
- * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled
- * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the
- * environment in which your server operates.
- *
- * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above)
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
- *
- * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
- *
- * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port.
- *
- * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the
- * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the
- * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This
- * flag enables that support.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
- *
- * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT
- *
- * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC.
- *
- * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit().
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
- *
- * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL.
- * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a
- * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though).
- * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing
- * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example
- * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
- *
- * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret.
- * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for key export
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
- *
- * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC
- *
- * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT
- *
- * Provide your own alternate threading implementation.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
- *
- * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
- *
- * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
- *
- * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
- *
- * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, see
- * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
- *
- * Note: this option is still in progress, the full X.509 and TLS modules are
- * not covered yet, but parts that are not ported to PSA yet will still work
- * as usual, so enabling this option should not break backwards compatibility.
- *
- * \warning Support for PSA is still an experimental feature.
- * Any public API that depends on this option may change
- * at any time until this warning is removed.
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
- *
- * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users
- * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading
- * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature().
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
- *
- * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
- *
- * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate
- * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate.
- *
- * Uncomment to prevent an error.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
- *
- * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate
- * and encountering an unknown critical extension.
- *
- * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk!
- *
- * Uncomment to prevent an error.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE
- *
- * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates).
- *
- * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused
- * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates.
- *
- * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk!
- *
- * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
- *
- * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates).
- *
- * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates.
- *
- * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk!
- *
- * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
- *
- * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS
- * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1).
- *
- * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
-/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */
-
-/**
- * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules
- *
- * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS
- * \{
- */
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
- *
- * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64.
- *
- * Module: library/aesni.c
- * Caller: library/aes.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
- *
- * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C
- *
- * Enable the AES block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/aes.c
- * Caller: library/cipher.c
- * library/pem.c
- * library/ctr_drbg.c
- *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- *
- * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
- *
- * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/arc4.c
- * Caller: library/cipher.c
- *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- *
- * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
- * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on
- * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable the generic ASN1 parser.
- *
- * Module: library/asn1.c
- * Caller: library/x509.c
- * library/dhm.c
- * library/pkcs12.c
- * library/pkcs5.c
- * library/pkparse.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
- *
- * Enable the generic ASN1 writer.
- *
- * Module: library/asn1write.c
- * Caller: library/ecdsa.c
- * library/pkwrite.c
- * library/x509_create.c
- * library/x509write_crt.c
- * library/x509write_csr.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
- *
- * Enable the Base64 module.
- *
- * Module: library/base64.c
- * Caller: library/pem.c
- *
- * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509).
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
- *
- * Enable the multi-precision integer library.
- *
- * Module: library/bignum.c
- * Caller: library/dhm.c
- * library/ecp.c
- * library/ecdsa.c
- * library/rsa.c
- * library/rsa_alt_helpers.h
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C
- *
- * Enable the Blowfish block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/blowfish.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
- *
- * Enable the Camellia block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/camellia.c
- * Caller: library/cipher.c
- *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
- *
- * Enable the ARIA block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/aria.c
- * Caller: library/cipher.c
- *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- *
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C
- *
- * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/ccm.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
- *
- * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are
- * enabled as well.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
- *
- * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/chacha20.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
- *
- * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/chachapoly.c
- *
- * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
- *
- * Enable the generic cipher layer.
- *
- * Module: library/cipher.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
- *
- * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block
- * ciphers.
- *
- * Module: library/cmac.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
- *
- * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator.
- * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default.
- * To use AES-128 instead, enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY below.
- *
- * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
- *
- * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
- *
- * Enable the debug functions.
- *
- * Module: library/debug.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * This module provides debugging functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C
- *
- * Enable the DES block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/des.c
- * Caller: library/pem.c
- * library/cipher.c
- *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *
- * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys.
- *
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
- * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C
- *
- * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module.
- *
- * Module: library/dhm.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- *
- * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
- * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK
- *
- * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
- * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
- * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
- * preferring other methods of key exchange.
- * See dhm.h for more details.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
- *
- * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library.
- *
- * Module: library/ecdh.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- *
- * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
- * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
- *
- * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library.
- *
- * Module: library/ecdsa.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
- * ECDHE-ECDSA
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
- *
- * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library.
- *
- * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the
- * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification
- * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default.
- *
- * Module: library/ecjpake.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
- * ECJPAKE
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C
- *
- * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library.
- *
- * Module: library/ecp.c
- * Caller: library/ecdh.c
- * library/ecdsa.c
- * library/ecjpake.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
- *
- * Enable the platform-specific entropy code.
- *
- * Module: library/entropy.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
- *
- * This module provides a generic entropy pool
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
- *
- * Enable error code to error string conversion.
- *
- * Module: library/error.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * This module enables mbedtls_strerror().
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C
- *
- * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for AES.
- *
- * Module: library/gcm.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
- *
- * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other
- * requisites are enabled as well.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
- *
- * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869).
- *
- * Module: library/hkdf.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C
- *
- * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code
- * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF).
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
- *
- * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator.
- *
- * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C
- *
- * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
- *
- * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers,
- * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes
- * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST.
- *
- * Module: library/nist_kw.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C
- *
- * Enable the generic message digest layer.
- *
- * Module: library/md.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C
- *
- * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/md2.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs.
- *
- * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
- * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
- * it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C
- *
- * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/md4.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs.
- *
- * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
- * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
- * it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C
- *
- * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/md5.c
- * Caller: library/md.c
- * library/pem.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2
- * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking
- * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded
- * encrypted keys.
- *
- * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
- * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
- * it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
- *
- * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack)
- * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free()
- * calls)
- *
- * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
- * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS)
- *
- * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C
- *
- * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines.
- *
- * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X)
- * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your
- * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
- *
- * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new
- * environment:
- * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS
- *
- * Module: library/net_sockets.c
- *
- * This module provides networking routines.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_NET_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C
- *
- * Enable the OID database.
- *
- * Module: library/oid.c
- * Caller: library/asn1write.c
- * library/pkcs5.c
- * library/pkparse.c
- * library/pkwrite.c
- * library/rsa.c
- * library/x509.c
- * library/x509_create.c
- * library/x509_crl.c
- * library/x509_crt.c
- * library/x509_csr.c
- * library/x509write_crt.c
- * library/x509write_csr.c
- *
- * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
- *
- * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86.
- *
- * Module: library/padlock.c
- * Caller: library/aes.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
- *
- * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable PEM decoding / parsing.
- *
- * Module: library/pem.c
- * Caller: library/dhm.c
- * library/pkparse.c
- * library/x509_crl.c
- * library/x509_crt.c
- * library/x509_csr.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
- *
- * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C
- *
- * Enable PEM encoding / writing.
- *
- * Module: library/pem.c
- * Caller: library/pkwrite.c
- * library/x509write_crt.c
- * library/x509write_csr.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
- *
- * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C
- *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer.
- *
- * Module: library/pk.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c
- * library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C
- *
- * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser.
- *
- * Module: library/pkparse.c
- * Caller: library/x509_crt.c
- * library/x509_csr.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C
- *
- * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
- *
- * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer.
- *
- * Module: library/pkwrite.c
- * Caller: library/x509write.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C
- *
- * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
- *
- * Enable PKCS#5 functions.
- *
- * Module: library/pkcs5.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C
- *
- * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
- *
- * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions.
- * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys
- *
- * Module: library/pkcs12.c
- * Caller: library/pkparse.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
- * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
- *
- * This module enables PKCS#12 functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
- *
- * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign
- * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit().
- *
- * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT
- * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned
- * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively.
- *
- * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2)
- * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation.
- *
- * Module: library/platform.c
- * Caller: Most other .c files
- *
- * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
- *
- * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/poly1305.c
- * Caller: library/chachapoly.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
- *
- * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
- *
- * Module: library/psa_crypto.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
- *
- * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage.
- *
- * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C,
- * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of
- * the PSA ITS interface
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
- *
- * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture
- * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files.
- *
- * Module: library/psa_its_file.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
- *
- * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/ripemd160.c
- * Caller: library/md.c
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C
- *
- * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
- *
- * Module: library/rsa.c
- * library/rsa_alt_helpers.h
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- * library/x509.c
- *
- * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
- * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
- *
- * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm.
- *
- * Module: library/sha1.c
- * Caller: library/md.c
- * library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- * library/x509write_crt.c
- *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2
- * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates.
- *
- * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
- * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
- * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
- *
- * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms.
- *
- * Module: library/sha256.c
- * Caller: library/entropy.c
- * library/md.c
- * library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256.
- * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
- *
- * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms.
- *
- * Module: library/sha512.c
- * Caller: library/entropy.c
- * library/md.c
- * library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- *
- * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
- *
- * Enable simple SSL cache implementation.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_cache.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C
- *
- * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c
- * Caller:
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
- *
- * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
- *
- * Enable the SSL/TLS client code.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_cli.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
- *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
- *
- * Enable the SSL/TLS server code.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_srv.c
- * Caller:
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
- *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
- *
- * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code.
- *
- * Module: library/ssl_tls.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
- * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines
- *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
- *
- * Enable the threading abstraction layer.
- * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that
- * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
- * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race
- * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
- * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading
- *
- * Module: library/threading.c
- *
- * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or
- * provided).
- *
- * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or
- * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD.
- *
- * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
- *
- * Enable the semi-portable timing interface.
- *
- * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux,
- * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that
- * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by
- * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide
- * your own implementation of the whole module by setting
- * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file.
- *
- * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new
- * environment:
- * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS
- *
- * Module: library/timing.c
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
- *
- * Enable run-time version information.
- *
- * Module: library/version.c
- *
- * This module provides run-time version information.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
- *
- * Enable X.509 core for using certificates.
- *
- * Module: library/x509.c
- * Caller: library/x509_crl.c
- * library/x509_crt.c
- * library/x509_csr.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C,
- * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
- *
- * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable X.509 certificate parsing.
- *
- * Module: library/x509_crt.c
- * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c
- * library/ssl_srv.c
- * library/ssl_tls.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
- *
- * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable X.509 CRL parsing.
- *
- * Module: library/x509_crl.c
- * Caller: library/x509_crt.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
- *
- * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C
- *
- * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing.
- *
- * Module: library/x509_csr.c
- * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
- *
- * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
- *
- * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates.
- *
- * Module: library/x509_create.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
- *
- * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C
- *
- * Enable creating X.509 certificates.
- *
- * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
- *
- * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C
- *
- * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR).
- *
- * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c
- *
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
- *
- * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C
- *
- * Enable the XTEA block cipher.
- *
- * Module: library/xtea.c
- * Caller:
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C
-
-/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */
-
-/**
- * \name SECTION: Module configuration options
- *
- * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and
- * configuration options. The default values are already present in the
- * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases.
- *
- * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here
- * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences.
- *
- * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these
- * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation).
- * \{
- */
-
-/* MPI / BIGNUM options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum windows size used. */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */
-
-/* CTR_DRBG options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
-//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY /**< Use 128-bit key for CTR_DRBG - may reduce security (see ctr_drbg.h) */
-
-/* HMAC_DRBG options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
-//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
-//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
-//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
-
-/* ECP options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */
-
-/* Entropy options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */
-
-/* Memory buffer allocator options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */
-
-/* Platform options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR <stdlib.h> /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */
-/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */
-
-/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */
-/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */
-/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
-
-/**
- * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter
- * is detected that is only checked with MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS
- * (see the documentation of that option for context).
- *
- * When you leave this undefined here, a default definition is
- * provided that invokes the function mbedtls_param_failed(),
- * which is declared in platform_util.h for the benefit of the
- * library, but that you need to define in your application.
- *
- * When you define this here, this replaces the default
- * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the
- * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility
- * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in
- * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible
- * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing
- * them in this file next to the macro definition).
- *
- * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in
- * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or
- * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid
- * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will
- * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which
- * partially negates the benefits of enabling
- * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged.
- *
- * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond )
-
-/* SSL Cache options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */
-
-/* SSL options */
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
- *
- * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments.
- *
- * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers
- * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of
- * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used.
- *
- * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use
- * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
- * which overwrite the value set by this option.
- *
- * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is
- * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to
- * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there
- * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about
- * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless
- * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended
- * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
- * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer.
- *
- * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both
- * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
- *
- * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments.
- *
- * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way
- * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
- * regardless of the protection mechanism used.
- *
- * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from
- * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN.
- *
- * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is
- * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to
- * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there
- * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about
- * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless
- * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended
- * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
- * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer.
- *
- * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer
- * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
- *
- * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments.
- *
- * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way
- * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
- * regardless of the protection mechanism used.
- *
- * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from
- * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN.
- *
- * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping
- * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification.
- *
- * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake
- * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small.
- * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any
- * certificate data which is sent during the handshake.
- *
- * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer
- * independently of the incoming I/O buffer.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING
- *
- * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
- * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
- *
- * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
- * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size,
- * together with its reassembly bitmap.
- *
- * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default)
- * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows
- * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate)
- * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
-
-//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */
-
-/**
- * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference.
- *
- * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only
- * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your
- * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active.
- *
- * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all
- * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM.
- *
- * The value below is only an example, not the default.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-
-/* X509 options */
-//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */
-//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */
-
-/**
- * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake
- * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1
- * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes.
- * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by
- * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use
- * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default
- * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general
- * warning applies nonetheless:
- *
- * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
- * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
- * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE
-
-/**
- * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of
- * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in
- * platform_util.c.
- *
- * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to
- * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the
- * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls
- * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination
- * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to
- * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older
- * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation
- * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to
- * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for
- * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer
- * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from
- * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD).
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT
-
-/**
- * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of
- * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in
- * platform_util.c.
- *
- * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The
- * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as
- * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target
- * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to
- * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to
- * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex
- * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the
- * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However,
- * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will
- * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
- * supplied at compile time.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT
-
-/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */
-
-/* Target and application specific configurations
- *
- * Allow user to override any previous default.
- *
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
-#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
-#endif
-
-#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_deprecated_functions_and_constants.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_deprecated_functions_and_constants.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b18b310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_deprecated_functions_and_constants.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+Deprecated functions were removed from AES
+------------------------------------------
+
+The functions `mbedtls_aes_encrypt()` and `mbedtls_aes_decrypt()` were
+removed.
+
+If you're simply using the AES module, you should be calling the higher-level
+functions `mbedtls_aes_crypt_xxx()`.
+
+If you're providing an alternative implementation using
+`MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT` or `MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT`, you should be
+replacing the removed functions with `mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt()` and
+`mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt()` respectively.
+
+Deprecated functions were removed from bignum
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The function `mbedtls_mpi_is_prime()` was removed. Please use
+`mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext()` instead which additionally allows specifying the
+number of Miller-Rabin rounds.
+
+Deprecated functions were removed from cipher
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The functions `mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt()` and
+`mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt()` were removed. They were superseded by
+`mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext()` and `mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext()`
+respectively which additionally support key wrapping algorithms such as
+NIST_KW.
+
+Deprecated functions were removed from DRBGs
+--------------------------------------------
+
+The functions `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update()` and `mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update()`
+were removed. They were superseded by `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret()` and
+`mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret()` respectively.
+
+Deprecated functions were removed from ECDSA
+--------------------------------------------
+
+The functions `mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det()` and
+`mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det()` were removed. They were superseded by
+`mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature()` and `mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()`
+respectively.
+
+Deprecated functions were removed from SSL
+------------------------------------------
+
+The function `mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param()` was removed. Please use
+`mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin()` or `mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx()` instead.
+
+The function `mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len()` was removed. Please use
+`mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len()` instead.
+
+Deprecated hex-encoded primes were removed from DHM
+---------------------------------------------------
+
+The macros `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P`, `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G`,
+`MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P`, `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G`,
+`MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P`, `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G`,
+`MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P `and `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G` were
+removed. The primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated because their derivation is not
+documented and therefore their usage constitutes a security risk; they are fully
+removed from the library. Please use parameters from RFC3526 (still in the
+library, only in binary form) or RFC 7919 (also available in the library) or
+other trusted sources instead.
+
+Deprecated net.h file was removed
+---------------------------------
+
+The file `include/mbedtls/net.h` was removed because its only function was to
+include `mbedtls/net_sockets.h` which now should be included directly.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49d1a0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-error-code-cleanup.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Removal of some SSL error codes
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This affects users manually checking for the following error codes:
+- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED`
+- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH`
+- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE`
+
+Migration paths:
+- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED` and `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH`
+ should never be returned from Mbed TLS, and there is no need to check for it.
+ Users should simply remove manual checks for those codes, and let the Mbed TLS
+ team know if -- contrary to the team's understanding -- there is in fact a situation
+ where one of them was ever returned.
+- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE` has been removed, and
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` is returned instead if the user's own certificate
+ is too large to fit into the output buffers. Users should check for
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL` instead, and potentially compare the size of their
+ own certificate against the configured size of the output buffer to understand if
+ the error is due to an overly large certificate.
diff --git a/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md
index 23274c7..125a415 100644
--- a/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md
+++ b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md
@@ -305,9 +305,12 @@
* `"key_derivation_setup"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_setup()`.
* `"key_derivation_set_capacity"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_set_capacity()`. The core will always enforce the capacity, therefore this function does not need to do anything for algorithms where the output stream only depends on the effective generated length and not on the capacity.
* `"key_derivation_input_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()` and `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`. For transparent drivers, when processing a call to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, the core always calls the applicable driver's `"key_derivation_input_bytes"` entry point.
+* `"key_derivation_input_integer"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_input_integer()`.
* `"key_derivation_input_key"` (opaque drivers only)
* `"key_derivation_output_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_bytes()`; also by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` for transparent drivers.
* `"key_derivation_output_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` for transparent drivers when deriving an asymmetric key pair, and also for opaque drivers.
+* `"key_derivation_verify_bytes"` (opaque drivers only).
+* `"key_derivation_verify_key"` (opaque drivers only).
* `"key_derivation_abort"`: called by all key derivation functions of the PSA Cryptography API.
TODO: key input and output for opaque drivers; deterministic key generation for transparent drivers
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
index 25accb6..da741c8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aes.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
@@ -611,44 +611,6 @@
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] );
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function
- * without return value.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt()
- *
- * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption.
- * \param input Plaintext block.
- * \param output Output (ciphertext) block.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] );
-
-/**
- * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function
- * without return value.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt()
- *
- * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption.
- * \param input Ciphertext block.
- * \param output Output (plaintext) block.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] );
-
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 637360e..073b4a4 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -904,37 +904,6 @@
int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *N );
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error
- * probability of 2<sup>-80</sup>.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows
- * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds.
- *
- * \param X The MPI to check for primality.
- * This must point to an initialized MPI.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
- * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
- * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a
- * context parameter.
- *
- * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime.
- * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng );
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/**
* \brief Miller-Rabin primality test.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index 19b0d6c..aacceda 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -467,8 +467,8 @@
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
* \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the
* authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() must provide
* the same tag length.
* For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0.
*
@@ -853,129 +853,6 @@
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
-#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
-/**
- * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
- *
- * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key
- * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
- *
- * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
- * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm.
- * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of
- * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL.
- * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the
- * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used.
- * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may
- * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0.
- * \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
- * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be
- * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0.
- * \param ilen The length of the input data.
- * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a
- * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must
- * not be \c NULL.
- * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes
- * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a
- * writable object of type \c size_t.
- * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a
- * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note
- * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts.
- * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This
- * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher
- * used, and in particular must not be \c 0.
- *
- * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up
- * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required
- * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be
- * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
- * parameter-verification failure.
- * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED;
-
-/**
- * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext().
- *
- * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key
- * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext().
- *
- * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer
- * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being
- * used, making this interface safer.
- *
- * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
- * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm.
- * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of
- * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL.
- * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the
- * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used.
- * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may
- * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0.
- * \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
- * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be
- * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0.
- * \param ilen The length of the input data.
- * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a
- * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must
- * not be \c NULL.
- * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes
- * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a
- * writable object of type \c size_t.
- * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a
- * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note
- * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts.
- * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match
- * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in
- * particular must not be \c 0.
- *
- * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up
- * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required
- * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be
- * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
- * parameter-verification failure.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic.
- * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED;
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
/**
* \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index fb4f5ed..a4479d7 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -421,13 +421,7 @@
* of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible
* with this definition.
*
- * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are
- * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt,
- * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should
- * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt
- * must stay untouched.
- *
- * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set
+ * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set
* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES
* tables.
*
@@ -445,9 +439,7 @@
* alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
* the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
- * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
- * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
- * desirable).
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext().
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
@@ -1815,7 +1807,7 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP
*
- * Enable support for negotation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764)
+ * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764)
* through the use_srtp extension.
*
* \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required
@@ -2435,7 +2427,7 @@
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
* MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C
@@ -2499,7 +2491,7 @@
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C
*
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
@@ -2623,9 +2615,9 @@
*
* Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library.
*
- * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the
- * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification
- * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default.
+ * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification.
+ * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as
+ * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236.
*
* Module: library/ecjpake.c
* Caller:
@@ -2635,7 +2627,7 @@
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C
@@ -2731,7 +2723,7 @@
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
*/
-//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
+#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_MD_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
index 653fd83..0f2c551 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
@@ -528,35 +528,6 @@
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len );
-
-#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret()
- * in 2.16.0.
- *
- * \note If \p add_len is greater than
- * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first
- * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used.
- * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded.
- *
- * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
- * \param additional The data to update the state with.
- * \param add_len Length of \p additional data.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len );
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
/**
* \brief This function writes a seed file.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
index 0a259d1..0e8892e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -382,161 +382,6 @@
*
*/
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-
-/**
- * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and
- * their use therefore constitutes a security risk!
- *
- * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are
- * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without
- * replacement.
- */
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the
- * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined
- * in <em>RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with
- * IETF Standards</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \
- "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \
- "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \
- "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \
- "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \
- "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \
- "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \
- "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \
- "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \
- "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \
- "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \
- "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP
- * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in <em>RFC-5114:
- * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \
- "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \
- "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \
- "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \
- "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \
- "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \
- "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \
- "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \
- "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \
- "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \
- "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \
- "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- *
- * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and
- * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as
- * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely
- * to be removed in a future version of the library.
- *
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \
- "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \
- "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \
- "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
- "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \
- "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \
- "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \
- "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \
- "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \
- "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \
- "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \
- "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \
- "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \
- "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
- "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \
- "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \
- "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \
- "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \
- "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \
- "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \
- "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \
- "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \
- "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \
- "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \
- "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \
- "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \
- "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \
- "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \
- "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \
- "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \
- "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \
- "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \
- "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \
- "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \
- "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \
- "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \
- "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \
- "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \
- "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \
- "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \
- "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \
- "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \
- "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \
- "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \
- "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \
- "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" )
-
-/**
- * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP
- * Group, as defined in <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em>.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \
- MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" )
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form
*/
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index 264a638..525de5d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
* previously-hashed message.
*
* \note The deterministic version implemented in
- * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred.
+ * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is usually preferred.
*
* \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
* bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated
@@ -174,67 +174,6 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
- * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
- *
- * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
- * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
- * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
- *
- * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
- * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
- * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
- * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
- * 4.1.3, step 5.
- *
- * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
- * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
- * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
- * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
- *
- * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
- * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
- * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
- * each execution. This means that this blinding does not
- * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
- * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
- * that exploit relationships between secret data.)
- *
- * \see ecp.h
- *
- * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
- * This must be initialized and have group parameters
- * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
- * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
- * the signature. This must be initialized.
- * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
- * the signature. This must be initialized.
- * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
- * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
- * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
- * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
- * \p blen is zero.
- * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
- * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success.
- * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
- * error code on failure.
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
- mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED;
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/**
* \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
* previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
@@ -421,64 +360,6 @@
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes
- * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in <em>RFC-4492:
- * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
- * Transport Layer Security (TLS)</em>.
- *
- * The deterministic version is defined in <em>RFC-6979:
- * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
- * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
- *
- * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in
- * multiple threads.
- *
- * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
- * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
- * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
- * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
- * 4.1.3, step 5.
- *
- * \see ecp.h
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in
- * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later.
- *
- * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
- * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example
- * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair().
- * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable
- * buffer of length \p blen Bytes.
- * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes.
- * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a
- * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the
- * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if
- * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of
- * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe.
- * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of
- * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL.
- * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success.
- * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or
- * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED;
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
-
/**
* \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 149bda0..dd400a0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@
*
* \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
* \param key The destination key.
- * \param buf The the buffer containing the binary representation of the
+ * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the
* key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte
* string for Montgomery curves.)
* \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index 7936f6b..199ea3d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@
* HKDF 5 1 (Started from top)
* SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00)
* CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080)
- * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
- * SSL 7 32
+ * SSL 6 23 (Started from top, plus 0x6000, gaps at
+ * 0x6600)
+ * SSL 7 28 (Started from 0x7080, gaps at
+ * 0x7300, 0x7500, 0x7580, 0x7800)
*
* Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.)
*/
@@ -154,8 +156,8 @@
*
* \param high high-level error code. See error.h for more details.
* \param low low-level error code. See error.h for more details.
- * \param file file where this error code addition occured.
- * \param line line where this error code addition occured.
+ * \param file file where this error code addition occurred.
+ * \param line line where this error code addition occurred.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_error_add( int high, int low,
const char *file, int line )
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
index fa33611..1ab3422 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
@@ -397,30 +397,6 @@
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx );
-#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-/**
- * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context.
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret()
- * in 2.16.0.
- *
- * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
- * \param additional The data to update the state with.
- * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data.
- * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes.
- * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len );
-#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
/**
* \brief This function writes a seed file.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/net.h b/include/mbedtls/net.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6692188..0000000
--- a/include/mbedtls/net.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * \file net.h
- *
- * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h
- */
-/*
- * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
-#include "mbedtls/config.h"
-#else
-#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 2350910..c9c1a66 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -67,17 +67,17 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 /**< Verification of the message MAC failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /**< An invalid SSL record was received. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 /**< The connection indicated an EOF. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 /**< An unknown cipher was received. */
+/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 /**< The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /**< No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 /**< No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 /**< Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 /**< The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */
+/* NOTE: Error space gap */
+/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /**< The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 /**< No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /**< An unexpected message was received from our peer. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 /**< A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 /**< Verification of our peer failed. */
+/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 /**< The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 /**< Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 /**< Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 /**< The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /**< Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 /**< The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */
+/* NOTE: Error space gap */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /**< Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /**< The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 /**< Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
@@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration.
* \param prot_version Protocol version. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_x macros.
- * \return Ciphersuites pointer if succesful.
+ * \return Ciphersuites pointer if successful.
* \return \c NULL if no ciphersuites where found.
*/
const int *mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites(
@@ -2859,34 +2859,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-
-/**
- * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values,
- * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only)
- * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG])
- *
- * \param conf SSL configuration
- * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus
- * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator
- *
- * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin.
- *
- * \return 0 if successful
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
- const char *dhm_P,
- const char *dhm_G );
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/**
* \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values
* from big-endian binary presentations.
@@ -3659,32 +3631,6 @@
* \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
-#else
-#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-
-/**
- * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max
- * fragment length. Its an alias for
- * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour
- * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for
- * more detail.
- *
- * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len()
- * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len()
- *
- * \param ssl SSL context
- *
- * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
- */
-MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(
- const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
/**
@@ -4242,7 +4188,7 @@
/**
* \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation.
*
- * \param prf The tls_prf type funtion type to be used.
+ * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used.
* \param secret Secret for the key derivation function.
* \param slen Length of the secret.
* \param label String label for the key derivation function,
@@ -4252,7 +4198,7 @@
* \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key.
* \param dlen Length of the output buffer.
*
- * \return 0 on sucess. An SSL specific error on failure.
+ * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
index bf5fc97..a882eed 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
* Recommended value: 86400 (one day).
*
* \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at
- * least as strong as the the strongest ciphersuite
+ * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite
* supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key.
*
* \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets.
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index 94b8f99..6aa7ccc 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -2890,6 +2890,123 @@
*/
/**
+ * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
+ * this includes the hashing step.
+ *
+ * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use
+ * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to
+ * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the
+ * hash algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with the type of
+ * \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The input message to sign.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
+ * must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - The required signature size is
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ * bit-size respectively of key.
+ * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
+ * maximum signature size of any supported
+ * signature algorithm.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
+ * the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
+ * or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t * signature_length );
+
+/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
+ * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
+ *
+ * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification
+ * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message
+ * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash().
+ * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm
+ * to use.
+ *
+ * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
+ * pair. The key must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with the type of
+ * \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
+ * or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature
+ * is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_length );
+
+/**
* \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
*
* Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
@@ -2942,7 +3059,7 @@
size_t *signature_length);
/**
- * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key.
+ * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key.
*
* Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
@@ -3337,6 +3454,50 @@
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length);
+/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs
+ * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative
+ * integers.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use.
+ * It must have been set up with
+ * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ * have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param[in] value The value of the numeric input.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c step does not allow numeric inputs.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+ uint64_t value);
+
/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key.
*
* Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
@@ -3361,12 +3522,29 @@
* \param step Which step the input data is for.
* \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an
* appropriate type for step and must allow the
- * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note)
+ * and the algorithm used by the operation.
+ *
+ * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow:
+ * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
+ * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() if the input for step
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD
+ * was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was
+ * either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
+ * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes().
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this
+ * algorithm.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@@ -3479,6 +3657,9 @@
* \param output_length Number of bytes to output.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
* The operation's capacity was less than
* \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
@@ -3539,7 +3720,8 @@
* - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4;
* - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
* - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE;
- * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
*
* - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve
* (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a
@@ -3601,6 +3783,10 @@
* on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key.
*
* \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * If the key type to be created is
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in
+ * the policy must be the same as in the current
+ * operation.
* \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
* \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
* key. For persistent keys, this is the key
@@ -3625,8 +3811,10 @@
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input was not provided through
- * a key.
+ * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
+ * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
* all required input steps).
@@ -3648,6 +3836,129 @@
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
+ * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time.
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the
+ * stream before comparing them.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to the following code:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length);
+ * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0)
+ * return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+ * \endcode
+ * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the
+ * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+ * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] expected_output Buffer where the output will be written.
+ * \param output_length Length ot the expected output; this is also the
+ * number of bytes that will be read.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected
+ * output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * The operation's capacity was less than
+ * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
+ * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
+ * subsequent calls to this function will not
+ * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *expected_output,
+ size_t output_length);
+
+/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value
+ * stored in a key object.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
+ * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding the the
+ * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it
+ * works even if the key cannot be exported.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+ * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] expected A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+ * containing the expected output. Its policy must
+ * include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag
+ * and the permitted algorithm must match the
+ * operation. The value of this key was likely
+ * computed by a previous call to
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected
+ * output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * The key passed as the expected value does not exist.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or
+ * this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't
+ * allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * The operation's capacity was less than
+ * the length of the expected value. In this case,
+ * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
+ * subsequent calls to this function will not
+ * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_id_t expected);
+
/** Abort a key derivation operation.
*
* Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d11b00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers
+ * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer.
+ * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to
+ * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The
+ * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the
+ * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H
+
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+/*
+ * MAC multi-part operation definitions.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+typedef struct
+{
+ /** The HMAC algorithm in use */
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ /** The hash context. */
+ struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx;
+ /** The HMAC part of the context. */
+ uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, {0}}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+
+#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ union
+ {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t hmac;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+ } ctx;
+} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}}
+
+/*
+ * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER DECLARATIONS ONLY.
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+
+typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_builtin.h b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h
similarity index 93%
rename from include/psa/crypto_builtin.h
rename to include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h
index b3bc140..75801a1 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_builtin.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
/*
* Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers
* called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer.
+ * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not
+ * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms.
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h.
@@ -28,8 +30,8 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_H
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H
#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
@@ -141,4 +143,4 @@
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_H */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
index b20a6e1..1d3253c 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT
-/** Check wether an handle is null.
+/** Check whether an handle is null.
*
* \param handle Handle
*
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
index 736d9ab..eb16492 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_config.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1
@@ -72,6 +73,9 @@
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1
+/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS.
+ * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */
+//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
similarity index 74%
copy from include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h
copy to include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
index d725e84..239fdcb 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
/*
* Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper
- * interface.
+ * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite'
+ * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations
+ * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h)
*
* Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future.
*
@@ -29,17 +31,16 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h"
/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were
* declared during the autogeneration process. */
/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */
-#include "psa/crypto_builtin.h"
+#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h"
/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the
* PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts.
@@ -50,20 +51,12 @@
typedef union {
unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
- mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
- mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx;
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx;
#endif
-} psa_driver_hash_context_t;
+} psa_driver_mac_context_t;
-typedef union {
- unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
- mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
-#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
- mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
- mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx;
-#endif
-} psa_driver_cipher_context_t;
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */
/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h
similarity index 88%
rename from include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h
rename to include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h
index d725e84..104d4bd 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/*
* Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper
- * interface.
+ * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive'
+ * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts.
*
* Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future.
*
@@ -29,17 +30,16 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h"
/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were
* declared during the autogeneration process. */
/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */
-#include "psa/crypto_builtin.h"
+#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h"
/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the
* PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts.
@@ -65,5 +65,5 @@
#endif
} psa_driver_cipher_context_t;
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_H */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */
/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
index aaf117f..1dc8f9b 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@
* can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed
* to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that
* is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key
- * derivation algorithm that required 3 paramter inputs, the flow would look
+ * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look
* something like:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes);
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@
* element key derivation or key agreement operation
*
* Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is
- * expeced that this function may be called multiple times for the same
+ * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same
* operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id`
*
* \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
index 8ac7ce1..47012fd 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@@ -76,8 +76,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
-/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers */
-#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts.h"
+/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive
+ * algorithms. */
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h"
struct psa_hash_operation_s
{
@@ -98,46 +99,6 @@
return( v );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-typedef struct
-{
- /** The HMAC algorithm in use */
- psa_algorithm_t alg;
- /** The hash context. */
- struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx;
- /** The HMAC part of the context. */
- uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-} psa_hmac_internal_data;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
-
-struct psa_mac_operation_s
-{
- psa_algorithm_t alg;
- unsigned int key_set : 1;
- unsigned int iv_required : 1;
- unsigned int iv_set : 1;
- unsigned int has_input : 1;
- unsigned int is_sign : 1;
- uint8_t mac_size;
- union
- {
- unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
- psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
- mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac;
-#endif
- } ctx;
-};
-
-#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}}
-static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void )
-{
- const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
- return( v );
-}
-
struct psa_cipher_operation_s
{
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
@@ -163,6 +124,31 @@
return( v );
}
+/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite
+ * algorithms. */
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h"
+
+struct psa_mac_operation_s
+{
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int id;
+ uint8_t mac_size;
+ unsigned int is_sign : 1;
+ psa_driver_mac_context_t ctx;
+};
+
+#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}}
+static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void )
+{
+ const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return( v );
+}
+
struct psa_aead_operation_s
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
@@ -184,12 +170,12 @@
return( v );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
typedef struct
{
uint8_t *info;
size_t info_length;
- psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
+ psa_mac_operation_t hmac;
uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff
@@ -200,9 +186,10 @@
unsigned int state : 2;
unsigned int info_set : 1;
} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
typedef enum
{
PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */
@@ -227,17 +214,20 @@
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t state;
+ uint8_t *secret;
+ size_t secret_length;
uint8_t *seed;
size_t seed_length;
uint8_t *label;
size_t label_length;
- psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
+
uint8_t Ai[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
/* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */
uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) ||
+ * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
struct psa_key_derivation_s
{
@@ -248,8 +238,11 @@
{
/* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
uint8_t dummy;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t hkdf;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t tls12_prf;
#endif
} ctx;
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
index 9bfd5ab..497bd8f 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -409,11 +409,55 @@
/** A secret for key derivation.
*
+ * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets,
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.
+ *
+ * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms.
+ *
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
* can be used for.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200)
+/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.
+ *
+ * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically
+ * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to
+ * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with
+ * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable
+ * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy,
+ * such as numerical PINs.
+ *
+ * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of
+ * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were
+ * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or
+ * key stretching algorithms.
+ *
+ * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of
+ * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect
+ * it to be high-entropy.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be
+ * used for, among the permissible subset defined above.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t)0x1203)
+
+/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
+ * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t)0x1205)
+
+/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
+ * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t)0x1206)
+
/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
*
* The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
@@ -786,6 +830,24 @@
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm
+ * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password.
+ * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / passowrd hashing algorithm, 0
+ * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
+ * supported algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \
+ (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
+
#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff)
/** MD2 */
#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001)
@@ -1487,6 +1549,20 @@
PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \
PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
+ * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
+ * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
+ * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
+ * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
+ * supported algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA )
+
/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
*
* A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
@@ -1667,6 +1743,67 @@
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for
+ * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also
+ * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the
+ * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD.
+ *
+ * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800100)
+/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
+ *
+ * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
+ * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
+ * HMAC with the specified hash.
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` specifies PBKDF2
+ * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
+ * provided in the following order:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count.
+ * This input step must be used exactly once.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
+ * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the
+ * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt
+ * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed.
+ * This input step must be used exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE)
+
+/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
+ *
+ * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
+ * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the
+ * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as
+ * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800200)
+
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xfe00ffff)
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xffff0000)
@@ -1804,6 +1941,18 @@
(alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \
(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that
+ * uses a hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
+ (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t)0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff))
+
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
@@ -2065,6 +2214,26 @@
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
+ * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
+ * key’s type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
+ * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
+ * permitted by the key’s type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
+ *
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
* or for an asymmetric signature operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
@@ -2083,10 +2252,34 @@
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000)
-/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys.
+/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password
+ * hash.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used as the input of
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_key() at the step
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET of #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD
+ * depending on the algorithm, and allows the use of
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_output_key()
+ * at the end of the operation.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000)
+/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation,
+ * including password hashing.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used:
+ *
+ * - for a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, as the \c key argument of
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key();
+ * - for a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE), as
+ * the input to psa_key_derivation_input_key() at the step
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD (or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET);
+ * then at the end of the operation use of psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes()
+ * or psa_key_derivation_verify_key() will be permitted (but not
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_xxx() unless #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE is set).
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00008000)
+
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
@@ -2102,11 +2295,32 @@
*
* The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
* key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
- * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
- * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ * may not be used to derive or verify keys: the operation will only allow
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() but not
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key().
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101)
+/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching.
+ *
+ * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can
+ * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or
+ * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.
+ *
+ * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
+ * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
+ * may not be used to derive or verify keys: the operation will only allow
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), not
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key().
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0102)
+
/** A label for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
@@ -2117,7 +2331,8 @@
/** A salt for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
- * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
+ * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202)
@@ -2135,6 +2350,12 @@
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204)
+/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching.
+ *
+ * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0205)
+
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index e7ba130..f31820a 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
psa_crypto_ecp.c
psa_crypto_hash.c
+ psa_crypto_mac.c
psa_crypto_rsa.c
psa_crypto_se.c
psa_crypto_slot_management.c
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index 17e42c2..d7fa4d9 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.o \
psa_crypto_ecp.o \
psa_crypto_hash.o \
+ psa_crypto_mac.o \
psa_crypto_rsa.o \
psa_crypto_se.o \
psa_crypto_slot_management.o \
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index b36b81c..422e158 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -921,15 +921,6 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] )
-{
- mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* AES-ECB block decryption
*/
@@ -994,15 +985,6 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] )
-{
- mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* AES-ECB block encryption/decryption
*/
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index f3a899e..c20c6b7 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -2717,26 +2717,6 @@
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/*
- * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng )
-{
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
-
- /*
- * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most
- * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty
- * here as well.
- */
- return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* Prime number generation
*
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index 043bb91..18ab710 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -1288,8 +1288,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@@ -1368,8 +1368,8 @@
}
/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@@ -1468,54 +1468,6 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
-{
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
- return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
- input, ilen, output, olen,
- tag, tag_len ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
-{
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
- return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
- input, ilen, output, olen,
- tag, tag_len ) );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c
index ab52861..602ec69 100644
--- a/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
@@ -335,19 +335,6 @@
return( ret );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
- * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
- if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
- (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len)
* implements
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 7f259e1..35713a6 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
+ *
+ * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL.
+ *
*/
static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
@@ -475,69 +478,9 @@
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
- if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
- f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
- else
- {
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- /*
- * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
- * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
- * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
- * risk that they leak this way.
- */
- const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
-
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
- p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
- data, 2 * grp_len );
- ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
- (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
- strlen( blind_label ) );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
- goto cleanup;
- }
-#else
- /*
- * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
- * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
- * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
- * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
- * restartable feature.
- *
- * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
- * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
- * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
- * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
- * a valid ECDSA signature.
- */
- p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
- /*
- * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
- * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
- * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
- * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
- * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
- */
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
- rs_ctx );
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
-#endif
- }
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@@ -550,26 +493,8 @@
}
/*
- * Deterministic signature wrappers
+ * Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
- mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
-
- return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
- NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
@@ -756,10 +681,13 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
+
+ if( f_rng == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
@@ -811,22 +739,6 @@
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
- return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
- NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* Read and check signature
*/
diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index a176deb..3a84366 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -374,18 +374,12 @@
return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF):
return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" );
- case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER):
- return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN):
return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG):
return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE):
return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" );
- case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE):
- return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" );
- case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED):
- return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED):
return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED):
@@ -394,8 +388,6 @@
return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE):
return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" );
- case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED):
- return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY):
return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO):
@@ -462,8 +454,6 @@
return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL):
return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" );
- case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH):
- return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING):
return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" );
case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS):
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index de97068..7e1b4fb 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -104,15 +104,6 @@
return( ret );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
*/
diff --git a/library/net_sockets.c b/library/net_sockets.c
index ad1ac13..8f79b74 100644
--- a/library/net_sockets.c
+++ b/library/net_sockets.c
@@ -20,8 +20,12 @@
/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must
* be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly.
* Harmless on other platforms. */
+#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
+#endif
+#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE
#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */
+#endif
#include "common.h"
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 64ead5b..bc7cf3c 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
#include "psa_crypto_hash.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_mac.h"
#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
@@ -92,20 +93,6 @@
#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) )
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int safer_memcmp( const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n )
-{
- size_t i;
- unsigned char diff = 0;
-
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
- diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
-
- return( diff );
-}
-
-
-
/****************************************************************/
/* Global data, support functions and library management */
/****************************************************************/
@@ -1505,8 +1492,11 @@
PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
@@ -2183,7 +2173,7 @@
return( status );
if( actual_hash_length != hash_length )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
- if( safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
@@ -2219,7 +2209,7 @@
return( status );
if( actual_hash_length != hash_length )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
- if( safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
@@ -2246,222 +2236,19 @@
/* MAC */
/****************************************************************/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
-static size_t psa_get_hash_block_size( psa_algorithm_t alg )
-{
- switch( alg )
- {
- case PSA_ALG_MD2:
- return( 16 );
- case PSA_ALG_MD4:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_MD5:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
- return( 64 );
- case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
- return( 128 );
- case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
- return( 128 );
- default:
- return( 0 );
- }
-}
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) */
-
-/* Initialize the MAC operation structure. Once this function has been
- * called, psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */
-static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
- psa_algorithm_t alg )
-{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-
- operation->alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg );
- operation->key_set = 0;
- operation->iv_set = 0;
- operation->iv_required = 0;
- operation->has_input = 0;
- operation->is_sign = 0;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
- if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
- {
- operation->iv_required = 0;
- mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac );
- status = PSA_SUCCESS;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
- {
- /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */
- operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0;
- status = PSA_SUCCESS;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
- {
- if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) )
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- }
-
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
- return( status );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
-static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac )
-{
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) );
- return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
-
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
{
- if( operation->alg == 0 )
- {
- /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not
- * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
- * nothing to do. */
+ /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */
+ if( operation->id == 0 )
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
- }
- else
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
- if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
- {
- mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
- {
- psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
- {
- /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should
- * always have been initialized to a valid value). */
- goto bad_state;
- }
- operation->alg = 0;
- operation->key_set = 0;
- operation->iv_set = 0;
- operation->iv_required = 0;
- operation->has_input = 0;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( operation );
+ operation->mac_size = 0;
operation->is_sign = 0;
-
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-
-bad_state:
- /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust
- * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data.
- * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten,
- * but it's too late to do anything about this. */
- memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
-static psa_status_t psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
- psa_key_slot_t *slot )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info =
- mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( PSA_ALG_CMAC,
- slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits,
- NULL );
- if( cipher_info == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-
- ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info );
- if( ret != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
- ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->attr.bits );
-exit:
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
-static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac,
- const uint8_t *key,
- size_t key_length,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg )
-{
- uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- size_t i;
- size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
- size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
- psa_status_t status;
-
- hmac->alg = hash_alg;
-
- /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer
- * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm
- * is implemented correctly. */
- /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written
- * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )`
- * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */
- if( block_size > sizeof( ipad ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- if( block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- if( block_size < hash_size )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-
- if( key_length > block_size )
- {
- status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg, key, key_length,
- ipad, sizeof( ipad ), &key_length );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto cleanup;
- }
- /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC,
- * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for
- * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be
- * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */
- else if( key_length != 0 )
- memcpy( ipad, key, key_length );
-
- /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36
- * to create the ipad value. */
- for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ )
- ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
- memset( ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length );
-
- /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits,
- * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */
- for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ )
- hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C;
- memset( hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length );
-
- status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto cleanup;
-
- status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size );
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) );
+ operation->id = 0;
return( status );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
@@ -2471,35 +2258,38 @@
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
- psa_key_usage_t usage =
- is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH;
/* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
- if( operation->alg != 0 )
- {
+ if( operation->id != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
- status = psa_mac_init( operation, alg );
+ if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
+ key,
+ &slot,
+ is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
+ alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- if( is_sign )
- operation->is_sign = 1;
- status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
- key, &slot, usage, alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+ .core = slot->attr
+ };
/* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */
- status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, slot->attr.type );
+ status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, psa_get_key_type( &attributes ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
- /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination. None of the
- * currently supported algorithms have an output length dependent on actual
- * key size, so setting it to a bogus value is currently OK. */
- operation->mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, 0, alg );
+ operation->is_sign = is_sign;
+
+ /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */
+ operation->mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(
+ psa_get_key_type( &attributes ),
+ psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ),
+ alg );
if( operation->mac_size < 4 )
{
@@ -2511,8 +2301,9 @@
goto exit;
}
- if( operation->mac_size >
- PSA_MAC_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, 0, PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) )
+ if( operation->mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ),
+ psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ),
+ PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) )
{
/* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length
* of the algorithm. */
@@ -2520,49 +2311,27 @@
goto exit;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */
+ if( is_sign )
{
- status = psa_cmac_setup( operation, slot );
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation,
+ &attributes,
+ slot->key.data,
+ slot->key.bytes,
+ alg );
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
{
- /* Sanity check. This shouldn't fail on a valid configuration. */
- if( operation->mac_size > sizeof( operation->ctx.hmac.opad ) )
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- if( slot->attr.type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC )
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
- slot->key.data,
- slot->key.bytes,
- PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( operation,
+ &attributes,
+ slot->key.data,
+ slot->key.bytes,
+ alg );
}
exit:
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
psa_mac_abort( operation );
- }
- else
- {
- operation->key_set = 1;
- }
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
@@ -2587,200 +2356,102 @@
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length )
{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
- if( ! operation->key_set )
+ if( operation->id == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- operation->has_input = 1;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
- if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
- {
- int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac,
- input, input_length );
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
- {
- status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, input,
- input_length );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
- {
- /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
- * a setup function. */
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
+ /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a
+ * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */
+ if( input_length == 0 )
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( operation,
+ input, input_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
psa_mac_abort( operation );
+
return( status );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
-static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac,
- uint8_t *mac,
- size_t mac_size )
-{
- uint8_t tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg;
- size_t hash_size = 0;
- size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
- psa_status_t status;
-
- status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */
-
- status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, hash_size );
- return( status );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
-
-static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
- uint8_t *mac,
- size_t mac_size )
-{
- if( ! operation->key_set )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
- if( mac_size < operation->mac_size )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
- if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
- {
- uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE];
- int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, tmp );
- if( ret == 0 )
- memcpy( mac, tmp, operation->mac_size );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
- {
- return( psa_hmac_finish_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
- mac, operation->mac_size ) );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
- {
- /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
- * a setup function. */
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
-}
-
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length )
{
- psa_status_t status;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( operation->alg == 0 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
-
- /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid mac
- * (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
- * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
+ /* Set the output length and content to a safe default, such that in
+ * case the caller misses an error check, the output would be an
+ * unachievable MAC. */
*mac_length = mac_size;
- /* If mac_size is 0 then mac may be NULL and then the
- * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */
- if( mac_size != 0 )
- memset( mac, '!', mac_size );
+
+ if( operation->id == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( ! operation->is_sign )
- {
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
- status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size );
+ /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL)
+ * once all the error checks are done. */
+ if( operation->mac_size == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ if( mac_size < operation->mac_size )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( operation,
+ mac, operation->mac_size,
+ mac_length );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
{
- status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
- if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
- *mac_length = operation->mac_size;
- else
- memset( mac, '!', mac_size );
+ /* Set the excess room in the output buffer to an invalid value, to
+ * avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. */
+ if( mac_size > operation->mac_size )
+ memset( &mac[operation->mac_size],
+ '!',
+ mac_size - operation->mac_size );
}
else
- psa_mac_abort( operation );
- return( status );
+ {
+ /* Set the output length and content to a safe default, such that in
+ * case the caller misses an error check, the output would be an
+ * unachievable MAC. */
+ *mac_length = mac_size;
+ memset( mac, '!', mac_size );
+ }
+
+ abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
+
+ return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_length )
{
- uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
- psa_status_t status;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( operation->alg == 0 )
- {
+ if( operation->id == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
if( operation->is_sign )
- {
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- }
+
if( operation->mac_size != mac_length )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
goto cleanup;
}
- status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation,
- actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto cleanup;
-
- if( safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 )
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( operation,
+ mac, mac_length );
cleanup:
- if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
- status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
- else
- psa_mac_abort( operation );
+ abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) );
-
- return( status );
+ return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status );
}
@@ -2789,7 +2460,254 @@
/* Asymmetric cryptography */
/****************************************************************/
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
+static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ if( input_is_message )
+ {
+ if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+ if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ int input_is_message,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t * signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+
+ *signature_length = 0;
+
+ status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
+ * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input
+ * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
+ * to be a hash.) */
+ if( signature_size == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
+ key, &slot,
+ input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE :
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
+ alg );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+ .core = slot->attr
+ };
+
+ if( input_is_message )
+ {
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+ }
+
+
+exit:
+ /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
+ * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature
+ * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input),
+ * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
+ signature_size - *signature_length );
+ else
+ memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
+ /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
+ * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
+
+ unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+
+ return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ int input_is_message,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+
+ status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
+ key, &slot,
+ input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE :
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
+ alg );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+ .core = slot->attr
+ };
+
+ if( input_is_message )
+ {
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
+ &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
+ alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+ }
+
+ unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+
+ return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
+
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ size_t hash_length;
+ uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
+ input, input_length,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+ }
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t * signature_length )
+{
+ return psa_sign_internal(
+ key, 1, alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ size_t hash_length;
+ uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
+ input, input_length,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+ }
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t * input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t * signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ return psa_verify_internal(
+ key, 1, alg, input, input_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@@ -2855,57 +2773,12 @@
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length )
{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_key_slot_t *slot;
-
- *signature_length = signature_size;
- /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
- * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
- * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
- * to be a hash.) */
- if( signature_size == 0 )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
-
- status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
- alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
- if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
- .core = slot->attr
- };
-
- status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
- &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
- alg, hash, hash_length,
+ return psa_sign_internal(
+ key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
-
-exit:
- /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
- * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid mac
- * (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
- * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
- if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
- memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
- signature_size - *signature_length );
- else
- memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
- /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
- * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
-
- unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
-
- return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@@ -2969,28 +2842,9 @@
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_key_slot_t *slot;
-
- status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
- alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
- .core = slot->attr
- };
-
- status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
- &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
- alg, hash, hash_length,
+ return psa_verify_internal(
+ key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
-
- unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
-
- return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP)
@@ -3551,7 +3405,35 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF
-#endif
+#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+ const uint8_t *hmac_key,
+ size_t hmac_key_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
+ psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( hmac_key_length ) );
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH );
+
+ operation->is_sign = 1;
+ operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+
+ status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation,
+ &attributes,
+ hmac_key, hmac_key_length,
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) );
+
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ return( status );
+}
+#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */
#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */
#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */
@@ -3582,7 +3464,7 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
{
mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.hkdf.info );
- status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac );
+ status = psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
@@ -3592,6 +3474,13 @@
/* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
{
+ if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret,
+ operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length );
+ mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret );
+ }
+
if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed,
@@ -3606,7 +3495,7 @@
mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label );
}
- status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf.hmac );
+ status = PSA_SUCCESS;
/* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the
* mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */
@@ -3649,11 +3538,12 @@
/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk
* of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- uint8_t *output,
- size_t output_length )
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_length )
{
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+ size_t hmac_output_length;
psa_status_t status;
if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set )
@@ -3683,31 +3573,35 @@
/* We need a new block */
++hkdf->block_number;
hkdf->offset_in_block = 0;
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- hkdf->prk, hash_length,
- hash_alg );
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ hkdf->prk,
+ hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
+
if( hkdf->block_number != 1 )
{
- status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- hkdf->output_block,
- hash_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hkdf->output_block,
+ hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
}
- status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- hkdf->info,
- hkdf->info_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hkdf->info,
+ hkdf->info_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- &hkdf->block_number, 1 );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
+ &hkdf->block_number, 1 );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- hkdf->output_block,
- sizeof( hkdf->output_block ) );
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hkdf->output_block,
+ sizeof( hkdf->output_block ),
+ &hmac_output_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
}
@@ -3724,7 +3618,8 @@
{
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg );
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
- psa_hash_operation_t backup = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ size_t hmac_output_length;
psa_status_t status, cleanup_status;
/* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise
@@ -3756,10 +3651,10 @@
* `block_number`.
*/
- /* Save the hash context before using it, to preserve the hash state with
- * only the inner padding in it. We need this, because inner padding depends
- * on the key (secret in the RFC's terminology). */
- status = psa_hash_clone( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx, &backup );
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ tls12_prf->secret,
+ tls12_prf->secret_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
@@ -3769,57 +3664,58 @@
/* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads
* the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the
* P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac,
+ tls12_prf->label,
+ tls12_prf->label_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac,
+ tls12_prf->seed,
+ tls12_prf->seed_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
}
else
{
/* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
}
- status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
- tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hash_clone( &backup, &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx );
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac,
+ tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length,
+ &hmac_output_length );
+ if( hmac_output_length != hash_length )
+ status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
/* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ tls12_prf->secret,
+ tls12_prf->secret_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hash_update( &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
- tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
- status = psa_hash_clone( &backup, &tls12_prf->hmac.hash_ctx );
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac,
+ tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length,
+ &hmac_output_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
-
- cleanup_status = psa_hash_abort( &backup );
+ cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort( &hmac );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
status = cleanup_status;
@@ -3916,8 +3812,8 @@
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
{
status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
- kdf_alg, output,
- output_length );
+ kdf_alg, output,
+ output_length );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF ||
@@ -4145,33 +4041,37 @@
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- data, data_length,
- hash_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ else
+ {
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ data, data_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ }
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
/* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
{
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- NULL, 0,
- hash_alg );
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ NULL, 0 );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
}
if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx,
- data, data_length );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
+ data, data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- hkdf->prk,
- sizeof( hkdf->prk ) );
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hkdf->prk,
+ sizeof( hkdf->prk ),
+ &data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
@@ -4224,17 +4124,21 @@
}
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
- psa_status_t status;
if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &prf->hmac, data, data_length, hash_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
+ if( data_length != 0 )
+ {
+ prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
+ if( prf->secret == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+
+ memcpy( prf->secret, data, data_length );
+ prf->secret_length = data_length;
+ }
prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET;
@@ -4264,7 +4168,6 @@
}
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
@@ -4274,7 +4177,7 @@
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:
return( psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( prf, data, data_length ) );
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
- return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, hash_alg, data, data_length ) );
+ return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, data, data_length ) );
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:
return( psa_tls12_prf_set_label( prf, data, data_length ) );
default:
@@ -4287,7 +4190,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
@@ -4314,7 +4216,7 @@
memcpy( cur, data, data_length );
cur += data_length;
- status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, hash_alg, pms, cur - pms );
+ status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, pms, cur - pms );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) );
return( status );
@@ -4322,18 +4224,17 @@
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET )
{
- return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf, hash_alg,
+ return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf,
data, data_length ) );
}
- return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, hash_alg, step, data, data_length ) );
+ return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, step, data, data_length ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
@@ -4398,7 +4299,6 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
{
status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
step, data, data_length );
}
else
@@ -4407,7 +4307,6 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
{
status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
step, data, data_length );
}
else
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index 90f9d18..4420ec2 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -30,6 +30,26 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h"
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison
+ *
+ * \param[in] a Left-hand buffer for comparison.
+ * \param[in] b Right-hand buffer for comparison.
+ * \param n Amount of bytes to compare.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the buffer contents are equal, non-zero otherwise
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp(
+ const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n )
+{
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char diff = 0;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+ diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ return( diff );
+}
+
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
*/
@@ -358,6 +378,86 @@
size_t key_buffer_size,
size_t *key_buffer_length );
+/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
+ * this includes the hashing step.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash
+ * and go through driver dispatch again.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * the type of the key.
+ * \param[in] input The input message to sign.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of the key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length );
+
+/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
+ * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message
+ * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ * transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash
+ * and go through driver dispatch again.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * the type of the key.
+ * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key.
*
* \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
@@ -368,7 +468,6 @@
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
- * format.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
@@ -392,7 +491,7 @@
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
*/
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
@@ -409,7 +508,6 @@
* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
* operation.
* \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context.
- * format.
* \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of the key.
@@ -428,7 +526,7 @@
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
*/
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
index 9bef02c..aab66ab 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h"
#include "psa_crypto_hash.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_mac.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
@@ -64,6 +65,152 @@
#endif
/* Start delegation functions */
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+ switch( location )
+ {
+ case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+ /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+ * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_size,
+ signature_length );
+ /* Declared with fallback == true */
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ break;
+
+ /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+ status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_size,
+ signature_length );
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+ break;
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+ (void)status;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_size,
+ signature_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+ switch( location )
+ {
+ case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+ /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+ * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length );
+ /* Declared with fallback == true */
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ break;
+
+ /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+ return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message(
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length ) );
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+ break;
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+ (void)status;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ input,
+ input_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length ) );
+}
+
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@@ -116,15 +263,15 @@
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
/* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
- return( psa_sign_hash_internal( attributes,
- key_buffer,
- key_buffer_size,
- alg,
- hash,
- hash_length,
- signature,
- signature_size,
- signature_length ) );
+ return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ hash,
+ hash_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_size,
+ signature_length ) );
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
@@ -200,14 +347,14 @@
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
- return( psa_verify_hash_internal( attributes,
- key_buffer,
- key_buffer_size,
- alg,
- hash,
- hash_length,
- signature,
- signature_length ) );
+ return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ alg,
+ hash,
+ hash_length,
+ signature,
+ signature_length ) );
/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
@@ -1290,4 +1437,344 @@
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
}
+
+
+/*
+ * MAC functions
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+ switch( location )
+ {
+ case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+ /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+ * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ /* Declared with fallback == true */
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
+ status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+ /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+ status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ (void) status;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+ switch( location )
+ {
+ case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+ /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+ * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+ /* Declared with fallback == true */
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
+ status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+ /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+ status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+ (void) status;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_location_t location =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+ switch( location )
+ {
+ case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+ /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+ * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+ /* Declared with fallback == true */
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
+ status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ return( status );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+ /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+ status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx,
+ attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg );
+
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID;
+
+ return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
+ (void) status;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ switch( operation->id )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+ input, input_length ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+ input, input_length ) );
+
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx,
+ input, input_length ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ switch( operation->id )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ switch( operation->id )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+ mac, mac_length ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx,
+ mac, mac_length ) );
+
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx,
+ mac, mac_length ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ switch( operation->id )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort(
+ &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) );
+ case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID:
+ return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort(
+ &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+ default:
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ }
+}
/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
index e82d093..732ed2a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
@@ -28,6 +28,27 @@
/*
* Signature functions
*/
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length );
+
psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
@@ -183,6 +204,53 @@
const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length,
uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length );
+/*
+ * MAC functions
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort(
+ psa_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */
/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20c56a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+/*
+ * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_mac.h"
+#include <mbedtls/md.h>
+
+#include <mbedtls/error.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Use builtin defines specific to this compilation unit, since the test driver
+ * relies on the software driver. */
+#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1
+#endif
+#if( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \
+ ( defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) ) )
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+static size_t psa_get_hash_block_size( psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ switch( alg )
+ {
+ case PSA_ALG_MD2:
+ return( 16 );
+ case PSA_ALG_MD4:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_MD5:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
+ return( 64 );
+ case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
+ return( 128 );
+ case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
+ return( 128 );
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal(
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac )
+{
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) );
+ return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal(
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg )
+{
+ uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t i;
+ size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+ size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ hmac->alg = hash_alg;
+
+ /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer
+ * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm
+ * is implemented correctly. */
+ /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written
+ * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )`
+ * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */
+ if( block_size > sizeof( ipad ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ if( block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ if( block_size < hash_size )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+ if( key_length > block_size )
+ {
+ status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg, key, key_length,
+ ipad, sizeof( ipad ), &key_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC,
+ * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for
+ * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be
+ * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */
+ else if( key_length != 0 )
+ memcpy( ipad, key, key_length );
+
+ /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36
+ * to create the ipad value. */
+ for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ )
+ ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+ memset( ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length );
+
+ /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits,
+ * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */
+ for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ )
+ hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C;
+ memset( hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length );
+
+ status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size );
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) );
+
+ return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal(
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length )
+{
+ return( psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length ) );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal(
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size )
+{
+ uint8_t tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg;
+ size_t hash_size = 0;
+ size_t block_size = psa_get_hash_block_size( hash_alg );
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */
+
+ status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, hash_size );
+ return( status );
+}
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+static psa_status_t cmac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES)
+ /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept
+ * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */
+ if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES &&
+ ( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 64 ||
+ psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 128 ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * cipher_info =
+ mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(
+ PSA_ALG_CMAC,
+ psa_get_key_type( attributes ),
+ psa_get_key_bits( attributes ),
+ NULL );
+
+ if( cipher_info == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac,
+ key_buffer,
+ psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) );
+exit:
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+}
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+
+/* Implement the PSA driver MAC interface on top of mbed TLS if either the
+ * software driver or the test driver requires it. */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+
+/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been
+ * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */
+static psa_status_t mac_init(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ operation->alg = alg;
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ {
+ mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac );
+ status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
+ {
+ /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */
+ operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0;
+ status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
+ return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_abort( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ if( operation->alg == 0 )
+ {
+ /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not
+ * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
+ * nothing to do. */
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ }
+ else
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ {
+ mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
+ {
+ psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+ {
+ /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should
+ * always have been initialized to a valid value). */
+ goto bad_state;
+ }
+
+ operation->alg = 0;
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+bad_state:
+ /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust
+ * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data.
+ * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten,
+ * but it's too late to do anything about this. */
+ memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
+ if( operation->alg != 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ status = mac_init( operation, alg );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ {
+ /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the
+ * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ status = cmac_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
+ {
+ status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
+ key_buffer,
+ key_buffer_size,
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+ {
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ mac_abort( operation );
+
+ return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ /* One-shot MAC has not been implemented in this PSA implementation yet. */
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_update(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ if( operation->alg == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ {
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac,
+ input, input_length ) ) );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
+ {
+ return( psa_hmac_update_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
+ input, input_length ) );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+ {
+ /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
+ * a setup function. */
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+ }
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_finish_internal( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size )
+{
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
+ {
+ uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE];
+ int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, tmp );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
+ {
+ return( psa_hmac_finish_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
+ mac, mac_size ) );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+ {
+ /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
+ * a setup function. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+ }
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( operation->alg == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ status = mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size );
+
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ *mac_length = mac_size;
+
+ return( status );
+}
+
+static psa_status_t mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if( operation->alg == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */
+ if( mac_length > sizeof( actual_mac ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+ status = mac_finish_internal( operation, actual_mac, mac_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 )
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) );
+
+ return( status );
+}
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ return( mac_compute( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ return( mac_setup( operation, attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ return( mac_setup( operation, attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ return( mac_update( operation, input, input_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ return( mac_sign_finish( operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ return( mac_verify_finish( operation, mac, mac_length ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ return( mac_abort( operation ) );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+ /*
+ * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+
+static int is_mac_accelerated( psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
+ return( 1 );
+#endif
+
+ switch( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)
+ case PSA_ALG_CMAC:
+ return( 1 );
+#endif
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) )
+ return( mac_compute( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) )
+ return( mac_setup( operation, attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( alg ) )
+ return( mac_setup( operation, attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) )
+ return( mac_update( operation, input, input_length ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) )
+ return( mac_sign_finish( operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ if( is_mac_accelerated( operation->alg ) )
+ return( mac_verify_finish( operation, mac, mac_length ) );
+ else
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ return( mac_abort( operation ) );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key_buffer;
+ (void) key_buffer_size;
+ (void) alg;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_size;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ (void) mac;
+ (void) mac_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ /* Opaque driver testing is not implemented yet through this mechanism. */
+ (void) operation;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b81e73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H
+
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+
+/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute
+ * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as
+ * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ * drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for
+ * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key
+ * in export representation as defined by
+ * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes).
+ * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the MAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p mac_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup
+ * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as
+ * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ * drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized and not yet in use.
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for
+ * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key
+ * in export representation as defined by
+ * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes).
+ * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup
+ * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as
+ * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ * drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized and not yet in use.
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for
+ * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key
+ * in export representation as defined by
+ * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes).
+ * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive).
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update
+ * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as
+ * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ * drivers.
+ *
+ * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or
+ * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the
+ * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to
+ * the MAC calculation.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish
+ * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as
+ * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent
+ * drivers.
+ *
+ * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update().
+ *
+ * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently
+ * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA
+ * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the
+ * algorithm and key combination passed to
+ * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the
+ * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the
+ * requested output size.
+ * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer
+ * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length
+ * \p mac_size.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign
+ * operation).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size
+ * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with
+ * an expected value using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a
+ * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface
+ * specification for transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this
+ * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by
+ * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the
+ * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function.
+ *
+ * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently
+ * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA
+ * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC
+ * length for the algorithm and key combination passed
+ * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup().
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ * differs from the expected MAC.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
+ * operation).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again.
+ *
+ * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized by one of the methods described in
+ * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(),
+ * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and
+ * has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
+/*
+ * BEYOND THIS POINT, TEST DRIVER ENTRY POINTS ONLY.
+ */
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 9ac48c7..b6124fc 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -130,6 +130,14 @@
* counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256).
*/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2_OR_EARLIER
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2_OR_EARLIER)
+
/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
@@ -139,6 +147,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
#endif
+/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a
+ * stream cipher can be used. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM
+#endif
+
/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 is supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
@@ -147,12 +161,14 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2_OR_EARLIER */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
@@ -161,7 +177,7 @@
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
#endif
-#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
#endif
@@ -711,7 +727,7 @@
unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
@@ -720,7 +736,7 @@
int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
@@ -747,7 +763,7 @@
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
#else
(void) transform;
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index c7d12f6..faafaba 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@
/*
* Add MAC before if needed
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
@@ -678,12 +678,12 @@
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/*
* Encrypt
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@
}
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@
&rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@
size_t olen;
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int ret, auth_done = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
#endif
unsigned char* data;
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
padlen = 0;
@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@
}
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@
* Authenticate if not done yet.
* Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME).
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
@@ -1712,7 +1712,7 @@
*/
if( correct == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
if( auth_done != 1 )
@@ -5112,6 +5112,120 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is
+ * received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages
+ * may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations.
+ *
+ * This function is introduced as a separate helper since the handling
+ * of post-handshake handshake messages changes significantly in TLS 1.3,
+ * and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and
+ * TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read().
+ */
+static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /*
+ * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST.
+ * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO.
+ * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
+ ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
+ ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
+
+ /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+#endif
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) );
+
+ /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+#endif
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
+ if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
+ ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Accept renegotiation request
+ */
+
+ /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
+ {
+ ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING;
+ }
+#endif
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl );
+ if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
+ ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation",
+ ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+ {
+ /*
+ * Refuse renegotiation
+ */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ||
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
/*
* Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer
*/
@@ -5210,108 +5324,17 @@
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
-
- /*
- * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST.
- * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO.
- * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases.
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
- ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
- ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) )
+ ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake( ssl );
+ if( ret != 0)
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
-
- /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
- if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
- ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) );
-
- /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
- {
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
- }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
- /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
- if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
- ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
- ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
- MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) )
- {
- /*
- * Accept renegotiation request
- */
-
- /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
- if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
- ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
- {
- ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING;
- }
-#endif
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl );
- if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
- ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation",
- ret );
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
- {
- /*
- * Refuse renegotiation
- */
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
- if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
- {
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
- {
- return( ret );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ||
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake",
+ ret );
+ return( ret );
}
- /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been
- * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following:
+ /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered
+ * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases
+ * to consider are the following:
* 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record
* has been read yet.
* 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
@@ -5319,7 +5342,8 @@
* 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
* a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting
* the ServerHello.
- * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action:
+ *
+ * In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action:
* - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check
* if it's application data.
* - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data
@@ -5328,6 +5352,7 @@
* will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client
* when expecting the ServerHello.
*/
+
continue;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
@@ -5603,7 +5628,7 @@
mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
#endif
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 75faf22..e3f1f34 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -806,14 +806,14 @@
static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
int ciphersuite,
const unsigned char master[48],
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
int encrypt_then_mac,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
int trunc_hmac,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf,
const unsigned char randbytes[64],
int minor_ver,
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@
* Some data just needs copying into the structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac;
#endif
transform->minor_ver = minor_ver;
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@
}
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@
goto end;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto end;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
((void) mac_dec);
((void) mac_enc);
@@ -1518,14 +1518,14 @@
ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate,
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
ssl->session_negotiate->master,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
ssl->handshake->tls_prf,
ssl->handshake->randbytes,
ssl->minor_ver,
@@ -1936,8 +1936,9 @@
{
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no certificate to send" ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED );
+ /* Should never happen because we shouldn't have picked the
+ * ciphersuite if we don't have a certificate. */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
#endif
@@ -1964,7 +1965,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[i ] = (unsigned char)( n >> 16 );
@@ -3322,7 +3323,7 @@
mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
#endif
@@ -4180,24 +4181,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len )
@@ -4722,13 +4705,6 @@
return( max_len );
}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
@@ -6186,14 +6162,14 @@
ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform,
ssl->session->ciphersuite,
ssl->session->master,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
ssl->session->trunc_hmac,
#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ),
p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */
@@ -6998,14 +6974,14 @@
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH;
+ return( -1 );
switch( md )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH;
+ return( -1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
@@ -7024,7 +7000,7 @@
break;
#endif
default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH;
+ return( -1 );
}
return 0;
@@ -7032,7 +7008,7 @@
(void) ssl;
(void) md;
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH;
+ return( -1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
}
diff --git a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c
index 14d4494..b5fea04 100644
--- a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c
+++ b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c
@@ -52,12 +52,6 @@
}
#endif
-/* There are different GET_HASH macros for different kinds of algorithms
- * built from hashes, but the values are all constructed on the
- * same model. */
-#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
- (((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
-
static void append(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size,
size_t *required_size,
const char *string, size_t length)
diff --git a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
index dcbe87f..0b256a2 100644
--- a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
+++ b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE", 32); break;
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC", 17); break;
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE", 17); break;
+ case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD", 21); break;
+ case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH", 26); break;
+ case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER", 19); break;
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA", 21); break;
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR", 25); break;
case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY", 27); break;
@@ -221,6 +224,8 @@
case PSA_ALG_MD4: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_MD4", 11); break;
case PSA_ALG_MD5: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_MD5", 11); break;
case PSA_ALG_OFB: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_OFB", 11); break;
+ case PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128", 31); break;
+ case PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE", 24); break;
case PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA", 18); break;
case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160", 17); break;
case PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE", 21); break;
@@ -286,6 +291,13 @@
psa_hash_algorithm_name,
PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg));
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1);
+ } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(core_alg)) {
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
+ "PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(", 19 + 1);
+ append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
+ psa_hash_algorithm_name,
+ PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg));
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1);
} else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(core_alg)) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(", 16 + 1);
@@ -394,6 +406,20 @@
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH", 23);
usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH;
}
+ if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) {
+ if (required_size != 0) {
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
+ }
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE", 26);
+ usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE;
+ }
+ if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION) {
+ if (required_size != 0) {
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
+ }
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION", 31);
+ usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION;
+ }
if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) {
if (required_size != 0) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
@@ -401,6 +427,13 @@
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH", 25);
usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH;
}
+ if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE) {
+ if (required_size != 0) {
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
+ }
+ append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE", 28);
+ usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE;
+ }
if (usage != 0) {
if (required_size != 0) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
diff --git a/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp b/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
index 68117c5..ea345a3 100644
--- a/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
+++ b/programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/md2.h"
#include "mbedtls/md4.h"
#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
-#include "mbedtls/net.h"
#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py
index 500acea..aa52790 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@
'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE': (120, 128), # sample
'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES': (64, 128, 192), # exhaustive
'PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC': (128, 160, 224, 256, 384, 512), # standard size for each supported hash
+ 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD': (48, 168, 336), # sample
+ 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH': (128, 256), # sample
+ 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER': (128, 256), # sample
'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA': (8, 40, 128), # sample
'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR': (1024, 1536), # small sample
}
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7733dd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * Test driver for MAC driver entry points.
+ */
+/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include "mbedtls/config.h"
+#else
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the
+ * function call. */
+ psa_status_t forced_status;
+ /* Count the amount of times MAC driver functions are called. */
+ unsigned long hits;
+ /* Status returned by the last MAC driver function call. */
+ psa_status_t driver_status;
+} mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT { 0, 0, 0 }
+static inline mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init( void )
+{
+ const mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT;
+ return( v );
+}
+
+extern mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks;
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation );
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
index 1586ce9..5e64edc 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h
@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@
extern mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t
mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks;
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length );
+
psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
index dc2136a..5b60932 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "test/drivers/aead.h"
#include "test/drivers/cipher.h"
#include "test/drivers/hash.h"
+#include "test/drivers/mac.h"
#include "test/drivers/key_management.h"
#include "test/drivers/signature.h"
#include "test/drivers/size.h"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index b3f1415..8b9d7d1 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1099,6 +1099,7 @@
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
# Disable all curves
for c in $(sed -n 's/#define \(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*_ENABLED\).*/\1/p' <"$CONFIG_H"); do
scripts/config.py unset "$c"
@@ -1437,6 +1438,8 @@
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$loc_cflags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
@@ -2061,6 +2064,7 @@
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
make
msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC"
@@ -2233,6 +2237,8 @@
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC"
+ loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC"
loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2"
make CC=gcc CFLAGS="${loc_cflags}" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/curves.pl b/tests/scripts/curves.pl
index 188bd29..2572e93 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/curves.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/curves.pl
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
}
# Depends on a specific curve. Also, ignore error if it wasn't enabled.
system( "scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED" );
+system( "scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C" );
# Test with only $curve enabled, for each $curve.
for my $curve (@curves) {
diff --git a/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl b/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
index cf4175a..57263a3 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@
},
'config-no-entropy.h' => {
},
- 'config-psa-crypto.h' => {
- },
'config-suite-b.h' => {
'compat' => "-m tls1_2 -f 'ECDHE-ECDSA.*AES.*GCM' -p mbedTLS",
},
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69af107
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+/*
+ * Test driver for MAC entry points.
+ */
+/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include "mbedtls/config.h"
+#else
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+#include "psa_crypto_mac.h"
+
+#include "test/drivers/mac.h"
+
+mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks =
+ MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT;
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_update(
+ operation, input, input_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ operation, mac, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_abort( operation );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_compute(
+ attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,
+ input, input_length,
+ mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_setup(
+ operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_setup(
+ operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_update(
+ operation, input, input_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_sign_finish(
+ operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_verify_finish(
+ operation, mac, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort(
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation )
+{
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status =
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_abort( operation );
+ }
+
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c
index be8c179..14de831 100644
--- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_hash.h"
#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
@@ -46,30 +47,17 @@
mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t
mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT;
-psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(
+psa_status_t sign_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length )
{
- ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits;
-
- if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status );
-
- if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output != NULL )
- {
- if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length >
- signature_size )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
- memcpy( signature,
- mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output,
- mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length );
- *signature_length = mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
- }
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
@@ -124,38 +112,16 @@
}
}
-psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash(
+psa_status_t verify_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
- uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
{
- (void) attributes;
- (void) key;
- (void) key_length;
- (void) alg;
- (void) hash;
- (void) hash_length;
- (void) signature;
- (void) signature_size;
- (void) signature_length;
-
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-}
-
-psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash(
- const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
- const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
-{
- ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits;
-
- if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status );
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) )
@@ -204,6 +170,191 @@
}
}
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t hash_length;
+ uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status );
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output != NULL )
+ {
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length > signature_size )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ memcpy( signature, mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output,
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length );
+ *signature_length = mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length;
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ }
+
+ status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_compute(
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ return sign_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key;
+ (void) key_length;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ (void) signature;
+ (void) signature_size;
+ (void) signature_length;
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t hash_length;
+ uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status );
+
+ status = mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_compute(
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length,
+ hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return status;
+
+ return verify_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length )
+{
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key;
+ (void) key_length;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) input;
+ (void) input_length;
+ (void) signature;
+ (void) signature_length;
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status );
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output != NULL )
+ {
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length > signature_size )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ memcpy( signature, mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output,
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length );
+ *signature_length = mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length;
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ }
+
+ return sign_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_size, signature_length );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length )
+{
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) key;
+ (void) key_length;
+ (void) alg;
+ (void) hash;
+ (void) hash_length;
+ (void) signature;
+ (void) signature_size;
+ (void) signature_length;
+
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
+{
+ ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits;
+
+ if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status );
+
+ return verify_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+ alg, hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+}
+
psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length,
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
index e7e6863..f48a64e 100644
--- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
@@ -297,46 +297,77 @@
psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
- unsigned char payload[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE] = {1};
- size_t payload_length = 16;
- unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
- size_t signature_length = sizeof( signature );
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
-
- /* If the policy allows signing with any hash, just pick one. */
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
+ if( usage & ( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) )
{
-#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG)
- hash_alg = KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG;
- alg ^= PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ^ hash_alg;
-#else
- TEST_ASSERT( ! "No hash algorithm for hash-and-sign testing" );
-#endif
+ unsigned char payload[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE] = {1};
+ size_t payload_length = 16;
+ unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
+ size_t signature_length = sizeof( signature );
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg );
+
+ /* If the policy allows signing with any hash, just pick one. */
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH )
+ {
+ #if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG)
+ hash_alg = KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG;
+ alg ^= PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ^ hash_alg;
+ #else
+ TEST_ASSERT( ! "No hash algorithm for hash-and-sign testing" );
+ #endif
+ }
+
+ if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH )
+ {
+ /* Some algorithms require the payload to have the size of
+ * the hash encoded in the algorithm. Use this input size
+ * even for algorithms that allow other input sizes. */
+ if( hash_alg != 0 )
+ payload_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg,
+ payload, payload_length,
+ signature, sizeof( signature ),
+ &signature_length ) );
+ }
+
+ if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH )
+ {
+ psa_status_t verify_status =
+ ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ?
+ PSA_SUCCESS :
+ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_hash( key, alg,
+ payload, payload_length,
+ signature, signature_length ),
+ verify_status );
+ }
}
- if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH )
+ if( usage & ( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ) )
{
- /* Some algorithms require the payload to have the size of
- * the hash encoded in the algorithm. Use this input size
- * even for algorithms that allow other input sizes. */
- if( hash_alg != 0 )
- payload_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
- PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg,
- payload, payload_length,
- signature, sizeof( signature ),
- &signature_length ) );
- }
+ unsigned char message[256] = "Hello, world...";
+ unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
+ size_t message_length = 16;
+ size_t signature_length = sizeof( signature );
- if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH )
- {
- psa_status_t verify_status =
- ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ?
- PSA_SUCCESS :
- PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
- TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_hash( key, alg,
- payload, payload_length,
- signature, signature_length ),
- verify_status );
+ if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg,
+ message, message_length,
+ signature, sizeof( signature ),
+ &signature_length ) );
+ }
+
+ if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE )
+ {
+ psa_status_t verify_status =
+ ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ?
+ PSA_SUCCESS :
+ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ message, message_length,
+ signature, signature_length ),
+ verify_status );
+ }
}
return( 1 );
@@ -893,6 +924,19 @@
{
if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) )
{
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
+ {
+ if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) )
+ return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ?
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ }
+ else if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg) )
+ return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ?
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE :
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+
return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ?
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH :
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
index 76e474f..3d3f6a3 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
@@ -422,124 +422,6 @@
valid_buffer, valid_size,
valid_buffer, NULL ) );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
- /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() */
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( NULL,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, NULL,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- NULL, valid_size ) );
-
- /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() */
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( NULL,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- NULL, &size_t_var,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, NULL,
- valid_buffer, valid_size ) );
- TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
- MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
- mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, valid_size,
- valid_buffer, &size_t_var,
- NULL, valid_size ) );
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
/* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext */
TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
@@ -1126,11 +1008,6 @@
* of AEAD decryption and AEAD encryption. Check that
* this results in the expected plaintext, and that
* decryption and encryption are inverse to one another.
- *
- * Do that twice:
- * - once with legacy functions auth_decrypt/auth_encrypt
- * - once with new functions auth_decrypt_ext/auth_encrypt_ext
- * This allows testing both without duplicating test cases.
*/
int ret;
@@ -1146,13 +1023,6 @@
unsigned char *encrypt_buf = NULL;
size_t encrypt_buf_len = 0;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- unsigned char *tmp_tag = NULL;
- unsigned char *tmp_cipher = NULL;
- unsigned char *tag_buf = NULL;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/* Null pointers are documented as valid for inputs of length 0.
* The test framework passes non-null pointers, so set them to NULL.
* key, cipher and tag can't be empty. */
@@ -1184,12 +1054,6 @@
cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW ||
using_nist_kw_padding;
- /****************************************************************
- * *
- * Part 1: non-deprecated API *
- * *
- ****************************************************************/
-
/*
* Prepare context for decryption
*/
@@ -1253,7 +1117,6 @@
ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len );
}
- /* Free this, but keep cipher_plus_tag for deprecated function with PSA */
mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf );
decrypt_buf = NULL;
@@ -1315,135 +1178,12 @@
encrypt_buf = NULL;
}
- /****************************************************************
- * *
- * Part 2: deprecated API *
- * *
- ****************************************************************/
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-
- /*
- * Prepare context for decryption
- */
- if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key,
- MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) )
- goto exit;
-
- /*
- * Prepare pointers for decryption
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
- if( use_psa == 1 )
- {
- /* PSA requires that the tag immediately follows the ciphertext.
- * Fortunately, we already have that from testing the new API. */
- tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag;
- tmp_tag = tmp_cipher + cipher->len;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
- {
- tmp_cipher = cipher->x;
- tmp_tag = tag->x;
- }
-
- /*
- * Authenticate and decrypt, and check result
- */
-
- ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, cipher->len );
- outlen = 0;
- ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len,
- tmp_cipher, cipher->len, decrypt_buf, &outlen,
- tmp_tag, tag->len );
-
- if( using_nist_kw )
- {
- /* NIST_KW with legacy API */
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- }
- else if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 )
- {
- /* unauthentic message */
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
- TEST_ASSERT( buffer_is_all_zero( decrypt_buf, cipher->len ) );
- }
- else
- {
- /* authentic message: is the plaintext correct? */
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
- ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len );
- }
-
- mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf );
- decrypt_buf = NULL;
- mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag );
- cipher_plus_tag = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Encrypt back if test data was authentic
- */
- if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) != 0 )
- {
- /* prepare context for encryption */
- if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key,
- MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) )
- goto exit;
-
- /* prepare buffers for encryption */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
- if( use_psa )
- {
- ASSERT_ALLOC( cipher_plus_tag, cipher->len + tag->len );
- tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag;
- tmp_tag = cipher_plus_tag + cipher->len;
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
- {
- ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, cipher->len );
- ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, tag->len );
- tmp_cipher = encrypt_buf;
- tmp_tag = tag_buf;
- }
-
- /*
- * Encrypt and check the result
- */
- outlen = 0;
- ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len,
- clear->x, clear->len, tmp_cipher, &outlen,
- tmp_tag, tag->len );
-
- if( using_nist_kw )
- {
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- }
- else
- {
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
-
- TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len );
- if( cipher->len != 0 )
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_cipher, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 );
- }
- }
-
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
exit:
mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx );
mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf );
mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf );
mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag );
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( use_psa == 1 )
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
index 8157234..58cedc1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function
@@ -599,7 +599,8 @@
cnt_restart = 0;
do {
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx,
- md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx );
+ md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL,
+ &rs_ctx );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -614,7 +615,8 @@
if( min_restart > 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx,
- md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx );
+ md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL,
+ &rs_ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index b81bd7b..f346b78 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -821,7 +821,8 @@
cnt_restart = 0;
do {
ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &prv, md_alg, hash, hlen,
- sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx );
+ sig, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand,
+ NULL, &rs_ctx );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -868,7 +869,8 @@
slen = sizeof( sig );
ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &prv, md_alg, hash, hlen,
- sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx );
+ sig, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand,
+ NULL, &rs_ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index 944ef23..cb0cb9c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -373,6 +373,14 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
+PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, sign message
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, sign+verify message
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
Key attributes initializers zero properly
key_attributes_init:
@@ -648,6 +656,42 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C
asymmetric_signature_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, sign | verify
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wrong algorithm family
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, wrong algorithm family
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, ECDSA SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, wrong hash algorithm
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, alg=0 in policy
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, sign but not verify
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1
+
+PSA key policy: asymmetric signature for message, verify but not sign
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1
+
PSA key policy: derive via HKDF, permitted
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
@@ -720,6 +764,10 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
+PSA key policy algorithm2 with message signature: ECDH, ECDSA
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
Copy key: raw, 1 byte
copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2a":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0
@@ -1294,6 +1342,22 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 4):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cde"
+PSA MAC sign: CMAC-3DES (CAVP vector #95)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"7c34e67a2a8fef581cc4f7dceaea130dad52c189739e401f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"eb3365a0a9d141270334065547418fe64c47823c024082b94d54a66d149f2af1":"e1d7c3736739e726"
+
+PSA MAC verify: CMAC-3DES (CAVP vector #95)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"7c34e67a2a8fef581cc4f7dceaea130dad52c189739e401f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"eb3365a0a9d141270334065547418fe64c47823c024082b94d54a66d149f2af1":"e1d7c3736739e726"
+
+PSA MAC: CMAC-3DES-2key (not supported in PSA)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
+mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"89fe91f1c1ef2f01efc4c18f5715894c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA MAC: CMAC-DES (not supported in PSA)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES
+mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"89fe91f1c1ef2f01":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
PSA MAC sign: CMAC-AES-128
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827"
@@ -2106,197 +2170,421 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
import_and_exercise_key:"c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:192:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a"
+sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a"
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
+sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca"
+sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca"
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":"52d92aac1fcc0fea3ecce01a9ed4bc9ac342f92470fd3f54d0d6d2fa5d2940405057a9d49a817c2b193322f05fc93ac1c7a055edac93bec0ade6814ab27b86b5295ac1ddb323818200f00c3d94d959f714f128b64a2e19628037ac009b14774f"
+sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":"52d92aac1fcc0fea3ecce01a9ed4bc9ac342f92470fd3f54d0d6d2fa5d2940405057a9d49a817c2b193322f05fc93ac1c7a055edac93bec0ade6814ab27b86b5295ac1ddb323818200f00c3d94d959f714f128b64a2e19628037ac009b14774f"
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash size
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash size
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard)
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw, input too large
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw, input too large
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, output buffer too small
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, output buffer too small
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":127:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":127:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, empty output buffer
+PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, empty output buffer
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty output buffer
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty output buffer
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (0)
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (0)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( 0 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( 0 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (wildcard)
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (wildcard)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: invalid key type, signing with a public key
+PSA sign hash: invalid key type, signing with a public key
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: invalid algorithm for ECC key
+PSA sign hash: invalid algorithm for ECC key
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA sign: deterministic ECDSA not supported
+PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA not supported
depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
-PSA sign/verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263"
-PSA sign/verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
-PSA sign/verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, 0 bytes
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, 0 bytes
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):""
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):""
-PSA sign/verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, 32 bytes (hash size)
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, 32 bytes (hash size)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
-PSA sign/verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, 129 bytes
+PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, 129 bytes
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
-PSA sign/verify: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
-PSA sign/verify: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
-PSA sign/verify: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f"
-PSA sign/verify: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f"
-PSA sign/verify: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
-PSA sign/verify: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-sign_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
+sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b"
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
-PSA verify with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
+PSA verify hash with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash length
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash length
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (same size)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (same size)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (empty)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (empty)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (truncated)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (truncated)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc73":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc73":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (trailing junk)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (trailing junk)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc731121":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc731121":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (leading junk)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (leading junk)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 0 bytes
+PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 0 bytes
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d"
-PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
+PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"1967ae568cc071dfebeeca76b11d40bd1ec5af241c50b3dcceff21f4536c0693a7179a8d5d163a7625fefd37c161127800edeebc24fa73ca772096827bd3f75e8ccf2c64f07b7171b5c99022a4d73b760f34a385ccff0bd5ed7997d2a29d2847acb0767f93a2a404bc046c97de66d95dc9f7646fdb216b627b2ea0de8afcefb7"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"1967ae568cc071dfebeeca76b11d40bd1ec5af241c50b3dcceff21f4536c0693a7179a8d5d163a7625fefd37c161127800edeebc24fa73ca772096827bd3f75e8ccf2c64f07b7171b5c99022a4d73b760f34a385ccff0bd5ed7997d2a29d2847acb0767f93a2a404bc046c97de66d95dc9f7646fdb216b627b2ea0de8afcefb7"
-PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
+PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308"
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
-PSA verify with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
+PSA verify hash with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
+verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded)
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"304502206a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151022100ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"304502206a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151022100ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (empty)
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (empty)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (truncated)
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (truncated)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f5":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f5":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (trailing junk)
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (trailing junk)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f21":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f21":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (leading junk)
+PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (leading junk)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"216a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"216a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
-PSA verify: invalid algorithm for ECC key
+PSA verify hash: invalid algorithm for ECC key
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+
+PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548"
+
+PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263":"7ea712a20e3a8cbe0c6e64195362ba7635bbe78af51ddedd7a5fd858395250c592654c35d3b0614ae0e3b329c25cf5b4a5fcb243af3e3ad15c8446fe401be066"
+
+PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"3548ea85eb66d756ae90fd64a3104b5b9a17aa282f8722409762e9da4811ec5d3060a97d3450b4bc484cd21ac588f563c4873843506fed8609b7d093db0e9a2496c36995ee74c906528af6898feb502f45bfb1e9ccf371416c68d32bb5ebc1b6"
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash algorithm (0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(0):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, output buffer too small
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":127:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, empty output buffer
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 without hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, invalid key type
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid hash (wildcard)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid hash algorithm (0)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(0):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty output buffer
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid key type
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: invalid algorithm for ECC key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA sign message: ECDSA without hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"616263":96:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 0 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):""
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 32 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 128 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 129 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 0 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):""
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 32 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 64 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 65 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+
+PSA verify message with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 0 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"50c06249deb97228e277b51d3e3542a6e5c140d6f6d1cb8a3dff53b5ce6e6fcb39d0767703174135208adf5d75399dd7525702b275153e7605ec38b65d33337bb9bbeb8c392ee22e3e9c0dafa43074a8205e17df2106bedd7bf6f1ada702aeb2ce04864c0ca9ec31964f9a957d8ebb9abc82454ad37c541e9b4d9842436c14a4"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 128 bytes (signature size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"43286cc0fc599603fbb0cd1fd70c3a17b08d2adf4f90202dddfa4b9d74be8c720bbb1c714665466de6452d401ca061b68225785ff387c2615f03c81351cc3838cd3014a031a4f4c9f70bba06f504c6a9942ac2dbfed2329e590d526a9be26b4025a6d7c4151b4e795cfe756c9a8a5e8fa9228a6f5f6f427a5a070e5c0ea69830"
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b"
+
+PSA verify message with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b"
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (same size)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (empty)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (truncated)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc73":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (trailing junk)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc731121":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (leading junk)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 without hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"304502200b295f3dc3ac2bde92f550b7e73a2de15a753b4ebc761c521a32d1ed9bf5800a022100fe7301254058347c3dec7768f62dfc63f7c049d28bfdd1d6712126fd888e9f04":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf00":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (empty)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (truncated)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (trailing junk)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0bff":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (leading junk)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"ff0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+
+PSA verify message: invalid algorithm for ECC key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA verify message: ECDSA without hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, good
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index bff0c35..5b5531f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -3170,9 +3170,9 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void sign_deterministic( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
- int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
- data_t *output_data )
+void sign_hash_deterministic( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
+ data_t *output_data )
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
@@ -3225,9 +3225,9 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void sign_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
- int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
- int signature_size_arg, int expected_status_arg )
+void sign_hash_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg, data_t *input_data,
+ int signature_size_arg, int expected_status_arg )
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
@@ -3270,8 +3270,8 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void sign_verify( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
- int alg_arg, data_t *input_data )
+void sign_verify_hash( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg, data_t *input_data )
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
@@ -3341,9 +3341,9 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void asymmetric_verify( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
- int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
- data_t *signature_data )
+void verify_hash( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
+ data_t *signature_data )
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
@@ -3373,10 +3373,10 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void asymmetric_verify_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
- int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
- data_t *signature_data,
- int expected_status_arg )
+void verify_hash_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data,
+ data_t *signature_data,
+ int expected_status_arg )
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
@@ -3407,6 +3407,239 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void sign_message_deterministic( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input_data,
+ data_t *output_data )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ size_t key_bits;
+ unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+ size_t signature_size;
+ size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+ signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_size <= PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE );
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature, signature_size,
+ &signature_length ) );
+
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output_data->x, output_data->len,
+ signature, signature_length );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ mbedtls_free( signature );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void sign_message_fail( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input_data,
+ int signature_size_arg,
+ int expected_status_arg )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ size_t signature_size = signature_size_arg;
+ psa_status_t actual_status;
+ psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+ size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ actual_status = psa_sign_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature, signature_size,
+ &signature_length );
+ TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status );
+ /* The value of *signature_length is unspecified on error, but
+ * whatever it is, it should be less than signature_size, so that
+ * if the caller tries to read *signature_length bytes without
+ * checking the error code then they don't overflow a buffer. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_length <= signature_size );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ mbedtls_free( signature );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void sign_verify_message( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input_data )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ size_t key_bits;
+ unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+ size_t signature_size;
+ size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+ signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_size <= PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE );
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature, signature_size,
+ &signature_length ) );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_length <= signature_size );
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_length > 0 );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature, signature_length ) );
+
+ if( input_data->len != 0 )
+ {
+ /* Flip a bit in the input and verify that the signature is now
+ * detected as invalid. Flip a bit at the beginning, not at the end,
+ * because ECDSA may ignore the last few bits of the input. */
+ input_data->x[0] ^= 1;
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature, signature_length ),
+ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ mbedtls_free( signature );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void verify_message( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input_data,
+ data_t *signature_data )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( signature_data->len <= PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ input_data->x, input_data->len,
+ signature_data->x, signature_data->len ) );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void verify_message_fail( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *hash_data,
+ data_t *signature_data,
+ int expected_status_arg )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ psa_status_t actual_status;
+ psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ actual_status = psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ hash_data->x, hash_data->len,
+ signature_data->x,
+ signature_data->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
void asymmetric_encrypt( int key_type_arg,
data_t *key_data,
int alg_arg,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
index 5fbfac6..dbc5b1f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
@@ -1,35 +1,68 @@
sign_hash through transparent driver: calculate in driver
-ecdsa_sign:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_sign_hash:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
sign_hash through transparent driver: fallback
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
-ecdsa_sign:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_sign_hash:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
sign_hash through transparent driver: error
-ecdsa_sign:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+ecdsa_sign_hash:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
sign_hash through transparent driver: fake
-ecdsa_sign:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":1:PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_sign_hash:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":1:PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: fallback
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using private key through transparent driver: error
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: fallback
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS
verify_hash using public key through transparent driver: error
-ecdsa_verify:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+ecdsa_verify_hash:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+sign_message through transparent driver: calculate in driver
+ecdsa_sign_message:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+sign_message through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
+ecdsa_sign_message:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+sign_message through transparent driver: error
+ecdsa_sign_message:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+sign_message through transparent driver: fake
+ecdsa_sign_message:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":1:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+verify_message using private key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+verify_message using private key through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+verify_message using private key through transparent driver: error
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+verify_message using public key through transparent driver: calculate in driver
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+verify_message using public key through transparent driver: fallback
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+verify_message using public key through transparent driver: error
+ecdsa_verify_message:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
generate_key through transparent driver: fake
generate_key:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -197,7 +230,7 @@
cipher_entry_points:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, fallback
@@ -205,11 +238,11 @@
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, fallback
@@ -217,11 +250,11 @@
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes, fallback
@@ -229,11 +262,11 @@
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1, fallback
@@ -241,31 +274,87 @@
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+PSA MAC sign, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA MAC sign, fallback: HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+PSA MAC sign, through driver: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA MAC sign, fallback: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+PSA MAC verify, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA MAC verify, fallback: HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA MAC verify, driver reports error: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
+PSA MAC verify, through driver: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA MAC verify, fallback: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA MAC verify, driver reports error: CMAC-AES-128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
+mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES (registered to ID_MAX-1)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX - 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES (registered to ID_MAX)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: key ID out of range (ID_MIN - 1)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN - 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: key ID out of range (ID_MAX + 1)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
PSA opaque driver builtin key export: secp256r1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR
builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"dc7d9d26d67a4f632c34c2dc0b6986183882c206df04cdb7d69aabe28be4f81a":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA opaque driver builtin pubkey export: secp256r1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR
builtin_pubkey_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"0485f64d89f00be66c88dd937efd6d7c445648dcb701150b8a9509295850f41c1931e571fb8f8c78317a20b380e866584bbc2516c3d2702d792f131a922095fd6c":PSA_SUCCESS
PSA opaque driver builtin pubkey export: not a public key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR
builtin_pubkey_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"0485f64d89f00be66c88dd937efd6d7c445648dcb701150b8a9509295850f41c1931e571fb8f8c78317a20b380e866584bbc2516c3d2702d792f131a922095fd6c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Hash compute: SHA-256, computed by the driver
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
index a0b719e..e86309b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-void ecdsa_sign( int force_status_arg,
- data_t *key_input,
- data_t *data_input,
- data_t *expected_output,
- int fake_output,
- int expected_status_arg )
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
+void ecdsa_sign_hash( int force_status_arg,
+ data_t *key_input,
+ data_t *data_input,
+ data_t *expected_output,
+ int fake_output,
+ int expected_status_arg )
{
psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg;
psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
@@ -65,19 +65,19 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-void ecdsa_verify( int force_status_arg,
- int register_public_key,
- data_t *key_input,
- data_t *data_input,
- data_t *signature_input,
- int expected_status_arg )
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
+void ecdsa_verify_hash( int force_status_arg,
+ int register_public_key,
+ data_t *key_input,
+ data_t *data_input,
+ data_t *signature_input,
+ int expected_status_arg )
{
psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg;
psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
psa_status_t actual_status;
mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks =
mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init();
@@ -121,7 +121,125 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
+void ecdsa_sign_message( int force_status_arg,
+ data_t *key_input,
+ data_t *data_input,
+ data_t *expected_output,
+ int fake_output,
+ int expected_status_arg )
+{
+ psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg;
+ psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+ uint8_t signature[64];
+ size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef;
+ psa_status_t actual_status;
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init();
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) );
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_import_key( &attributes,
+ key_input->x, key_input->len,
+ &key );
+
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status = force_status;
+ if( fake_output == 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output =
+ expected_output->x;
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length =
+ expected_output->len;
+ }
+
+ actual_status = psa_sign_message( key, alg,
+ data_input->x, data_input->len,
+ signature, sizeof( signature ),
+ &signature_length );
+ TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status );
+ if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( signature, signature_length,
+ expected_output->x, expected_output->len );
+ }
+ /* In the builtin algorithm the driver is called twice. */
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits,
+ force_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 2 : 1 );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
+void ecdsa_verify_message( int force_status_arg,
+ int register_public_key,
+ data_t *key_input,
+ data_t *data_input,
+ data_t *signature_input,
+ int expected_status_arg )
+{
+ psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg;
+ psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+ psa_status_t actual_status;
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init();
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+ if( register_public_key )
+ {
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) );
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_import_key( &attributes,
+ key_input->x, key_input->len,
+ &key );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) );
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_import_key( &attributes,
+ key_input->x, key_input->len,
+ &key );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status = force_status;
+
+ actual_status = psa_verify_message( key, alg,
+ data_input->x, data_input->len,
+ signature_input->x, signature_input->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status );
+ /* In the builtin algorithm the driver is called twice. */
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits,
+ force_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 2 : 1 );
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks =
+ mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
void generate_key( int force_status_arg,
data_t *fake_output,
int expected_status_arg )
@@ -194,7 +312,7 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
void validate_key( int force_status_arg,
int key_type_arg,
data_t *key_input,
@@ -230,7 +348,7 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
void export_key( int force_status_arg,
data_t *fake_output,
int key_in_type_arg,
@@ -963,6 +1081,197 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mac_sign( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input,
+ data_t *expected_mac,
+ int forced_status_arg )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ uint8_t *actual_mac = NULL;
+ size_t mac_buffer_size =
+ PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( key_data->len ), alg );
+ size_t mac_length = 0;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg;
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init();
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mac_buffer_size <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE );
+ /* We expect PSA_MAC_LENGTH to be exact. */
+ TEST_ASSERT( expected_mac->len == mac_buffer_size );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_mac, mac_buffer_size );
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status;
+
+ /* Calculate the MAC. */
+ status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status );
+
+ status = psa_mac_update( &operation,
+ input->x, input->len );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 2 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status );
+
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation,
+ actual_mac, mac_buffer_size,
+ &mac_length );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len,
+ actual_mac, mac_length );
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free( actual_mac );
+ actual_mac = NULL;
+
+exit:
+ psa_mac_abort( &operation );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+ mbedtls_free( actual_mac );
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mac_verify( int key_type_arg,
+ data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *input,
+ data_t *expected_mac,
+ int forced_status_arg )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+ psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg;
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init();
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( expected_mac->len <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status;
+
+ /* Test the correct MAC. */
+ status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status );
+
+ status = psa_mac_update( &operation,
+ input->x, input->len );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 2 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status );
+
+ status = psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation,
+ expected_mac->x,
+ expected_mac->len );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ||
+ forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+ }
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status );
+
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) );
+ if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 );
+ else
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+exit:
+ psa_mac_abort( &operation );
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+ mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
void builtin_key_export( int builtin_key_id_arg,
int builtin_key_type_arg,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data
index e39c8ed..23ce19f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data
@@ -152,6 +152,62 @@
depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512
+PSA import PASSWORD 48-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:"486572650069"
+
+PSA generate PASSWORD 48-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:48
+
+PSA import PASSWORD 168-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500"
+
+PSA generate PASSWORD 168-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:168
+
+PSA import PASSWORD 336-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b65"
+
+PSA generate PASSWORD 336-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:336
+
+PSA import PASSWORD_HASH 128-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA generate PASSWORD_HASH 128-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:128
+
+PSA import PASSWORD_HASH 256-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA generate PASSWORD_HASH 256-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:256
+
+PSA import PEPPER 128-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA generate PEPPER 128-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:128
+
+PSA import PEPPER 256-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA generate PEPPER 256-bit not supported
+depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET
+generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:256
+
PSA import RSA_KEY_PAIR 1024-bit not supported
depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data
index f74d0e2..732b80b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001000000000000000000000010000004b"
+PSA storage save: usage: VERIFY_DERIVATION
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800008000000000000000000000010000004b"
+
PSA storage save: usage: VERIFY_HASH
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002000000000000000000000010000004b"
@@ -52,9 +56,13 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800011000000000000000000000010000004b"
-PSA storage save: usage: SIGN_HASH | VERIFY_HASH
+PSA storage save: usage: SIGN_HASH | VERIFY_DERIVATION
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
-key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800003000000000000000000000010000004b"
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800009000000000000000000000010000004b"
+
+PSA storage save: usage: VERIFY_DERIVATION | VERIFY_HASH
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080000a000000000000000000000010000004b"
PSA storage save: usage: VERIFY_HASH | COPY
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
@@ -62,7 +70,7 @@
PSA storage save: usage: all known
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
-key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800037300000000000000000000010000004b"
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080003f300000000000000000000010000004b"
PSA storage save: type: AES 128-bit
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
@@ -148,6 +156,34 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100020100000000000000000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+PSA storage save: type: PASSWORD 48-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:48:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"486572650069":"505341004b45590000000000010000000312300001000000000000000000000006000000486572650069"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PASSWORD 168-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:168:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500":"505341004b45590000000000010000000312a8000100000000000000000000001500000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PASSWORD 336-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:336:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b65":"505341004b4559000000000001000000031250010100000000000000000000002a00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b65"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PASSWORD_HASH 128-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000051280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PASSWORD_HASH 256-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000051200010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PEPPER 128-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000061280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
+PSA storage save: type: PEPPER 256-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000061200010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461"
+
PSA storage save: type: RAW_DATA 8-bit
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000000000000100000048"
@@ -584,6 +620,14 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_OFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000012c004010000004c"
+PSA storage save: alg: PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002800800000000010000004b"
+
+PSA storage save: alg2: PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000028008010000004c"
+
PSA storage save: alg: PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000008000600000000010000004b"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data
index 2b2f1b7..82f55dd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001000000000000000000000010000004b":0
+PSA storage read: usage: VERIFY_DERIVATION
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800008000000000000000000000010000004b":0
+
PSA storage read: usage: VERIFY_HASH
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002000000000000000000000010000004b":0
@@ -52,9 +56,13 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800011000000000000000000000010000004b":0
-PSA storage read: usage: SIGN_HASH | VERIFY_HASH
+PSA storage read: usage: SIGN_HASH | VERIFY_DERIVATION
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
-key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800003000000000000000000000010000004b":0
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800009000000000000000000000010000004b":0
+
+PSA storage read: usage: VERIFY_DERIVATION | VERIFY_HASH
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080000a000000000000000000000010000004b":0
PSA storage read: usage: VERIFY_HASH | COPY
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
@@ -62,7 +70,7 @@
PSA storage read: usage: all known
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
-key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800037300000000000000000000010000004b":0
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080003f300000000000000000000010000004b":0
PSA storage read: type: AES 128-bit
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
@@ -148,6 +156,34 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100020100000000000000000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":1
+PSA storage read: type: PASSWORD 48-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:48:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"486572650069":"505341004b45590000000000010000000312300001000000000000000000000006000000486572650069":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PASSWORD 168-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:168:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500":"505341004b45590000000000010000000312a8000100000000000000000000001500000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PASSWORD 336-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:336:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b65":"505341004b4559000000000001000000031250010100000000000000000000002a00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b65":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PASSWORD_HASH 128-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000051280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PASSWORD_HASH 256-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000051200010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PEPPER 128-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000061280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":1
+
+PSA storage read: type: PEPPER 256-bit
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000061200010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":1
+
PSA storage read: type: RAW_DATA 8-bit
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000000000000100000048":0
@@ -584,6 +620,14 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_OFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000012c004010000004c":0
+PSA storage read: alg: PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002800800000000010000004b":0
+
+PSA storage read: alg2: PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
+key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000028008010000004c":0
+
PSA storage read: alg: PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000008000600000000010000004b":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 2f59afe..ef8d3b2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@
keylen << 3, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) == 0 );
/* Setup MAC contexts */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ||
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@
}
#else
((void) hash_id);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/* Pick IV's (regardless of whether they
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
t_out->encrypt_then_mac = etm;
t_in->encrypt_then_mac = etm;
#else
diff --git a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
index c3e1d02..c2f1063 100644
--- a/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
+++ b/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj
@@ -176,7 +176,6 @@
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\md4.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\md5.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\memory_buffer_alloc.h" />
- <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\net.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\net_sockets.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\nist_kw.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\oid.h" />
@@ -208,11 +207,13 @@
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\x509_csr.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\mbedtls\xtea.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto.h" />
- <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_builtin.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_builtin_composites.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_builtin_primitives.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_compat.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_config.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_driver_common.h" />
- <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_driver_contexts.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_extra.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_platform.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\include\psa\crypto_se_driver.h" />
@@ -234,6 +235,7 @@
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\cipher.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\hash.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\key_management.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\mac.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\signature.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\size.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\tests\include\test\drivers\test_driver.h" />
@@ -260,6 +262,7 @@
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_hash.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_invasive.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_its.h" />
+ <ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_mac.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_random_impl.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_rsa.h" />
<ClInclude Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_se.h" />
@@ -335,6 +338,7 @@
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_ecp.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_hash.c" />
+ <ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_mac.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_rsa.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_se.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\library\psa_crypto_slot_management.c" />
@@ -380,6 +384,7 @@
<ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_aead.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_cipher.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_key_management.c" />
+ <ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_mac.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_signature.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\tests\src\drivers\test_driver_size.c" />
<ClCompile Include="..\..\3rdparty\everest\library\everest.c" />
