Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted
* development: (55 commits)
Log change as bugfix
Add changelog entry
Clarify updates to the persistent state in storage
With multiple applicable transparent drivers, the order is unspecified
Minor clarifications
Give some examples of purpsoses of pure-software transparent driver
Fix typos
Add a link to the PSA API specification
Explain locations vs lifetimes
Initialize key pointer in ecdh to NULL
Add buffer zeroization when ecp_write_key fails
Simplified key slot deletion
Style fixes
Use arc4random_buf instead of rand on NetBSD
Apply review feedback
Update open question section about public key storage
Remove the paragraph about declaring application needs
Change driver persistent data to a callback interface
Rework and expand key management in opaque drivers
Fix typos and copypasta
...
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/build_with_only_montgomery_curves.txt b/ChangeLog.d/build_with_only_montgomery_curves.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4ec7c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/build_with_only_montgomery_curves.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix build errors when the only enabled elliptic curves are Montgomery
+ curves. Raised by signpainter in #941 and by Taiki-San in #1412. This
+ also fixes missing declarations reported by Steven Cooreman in #1147.
+ * Fix self-test failure when the only enabled short Weierstrass elliptic
+ curve is secp192k1. Fixes #2017.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8539d1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/netbsd-rand-arc4random_buf.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical
+ lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_curve25519_public_key_import.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_curve25519_public_key_import.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ea11e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_curve25519_public_key_import.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * PSA key import will now correctly import a Curve25519/Curve448 public key
+ instead of erroring out. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3492.
diff --git a/docs/.gitignore b/docs/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33ae5ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+*.html
+*.pdf
+!PSACryptoDriverModelSpec.pdf
diff --git a/docs/architecture/.gitignore b/docs/architecture/.gitignore
deleted file mode 100644
index 23f832b..0000000
--- a/docs/architecture/.gitignore
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-*.html
-*.pdf
diff --git a/docs/proposed/Makefile b/docs/proposed/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2132b08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/proposed/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+PANDOC = pandoc
+
+default: all
+
+all_markdown = \
+ psa-driver-developer-guide.md \
+ psa-driver-integration-guide.md \
+ psa-driver-interface.md \
+ # This line is intentionally left blank
+
+html: $(all_markdown:.md=.html)
+pdf: $(all_markdown:.md=.pdf)
+all: html pdf
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .md .html .pdf
+
+.md.html:
+ $(PANDOC) -o $@ $<
+.md.pdf:
+ $(PANDOC) -o $@ $<
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.html *.pdf
diff --git a/docs/proposed/README b/docs/proposed/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09eae9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/proposed/README
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+The documents in this directory are proposed specifications for Mbed
+TLS features. They are not implemented yet, or only partially
+implemented. Please follow activity on the `development` branch of
+Mbed TLS if you are interested in these features.
diff --git a/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca24441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+PSA Cryptoprocessor driver developer's guide
+============================================
+
+**This is a specification of work in progress. The implementation is not yet merged into Mbed TLS.**
+
+This document describes how to write drivers of cryptoprocessors such as accelerators and secure elements for the PSA cryptography subsystem of Mbed TLS.
+
+This document focuses on behavior that is specific to Mbed TLS. For a reference of the interface between Mbed TLS and drivers, refer to the [PSA Cryptoprocessor Driver Interface specification](architecture/psa-driver-interface.md).
+
+The interface is not fully implemented in Mbed TLS yet and is disabled by default. You can enable the experimental work in progress by setting `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the compile-time configuration. Please note that the interface may still change: until further notice, we do not guarantee backward compatibility with existing driver code when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` is enabled.
+
+## Introduction
+
+### Purpose
+
+The PSA cryptography driver interface provides a way to build Mbed TLS with additional code that implements certain cryptographic primitives. This is primarily intended to support platform-specific hardware.
+
+There are two types of drivers:
+
+* **Transparent** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that are provided in cleartext at the beginning of each operation. They are typically used for hardware **accelerators**. When a transparent driver is available for a particular combination of parameters (cryptographic algorithm, key type and size, etc.), it is used instead of the default software implementation. Transparent drivers can also be pure software implementations that are distributed as plug-ins to a PSA Crypto implementation.
+* **Opaque** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that can only be used inside a protected environment such as a **secure element**, a hardware security module, a smartcard, a secure enclave, etc. An opaque driver is invoked for the specific key location that the driver is registered for: the dispatch is based on the key's lifetime.
+
+### Deliverables for a driver
+
+To write a driver, you need to implement some functions with C linkage, and to declare these functions in a **driver description file**. The driver description file declares which functions the driver implements and what cryptographic mechanisms they support. Depending on the driver type, you may also need to define some C types and macros in a header file.
+
+The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON. The structure of this JSON file is specified in the section [“Driver description syntax”](architecture/psa-driver-interface.md#driver-description-syntax) of the PSA cryptography driver interface specification.
+
+A driver therefore consists of:
+
+* A driver description file (in JSON format).
+* C header files defining the types required by the driver description. The names of these header files is declared in the driver description file.
+* An object file compiled for the target platform defining the functions required by the driver description. Implementations may allow drivers to be provided as source files and compiled with the core instead of being pre-compiled.
+
+## Driver C interfaces
+
+Mbed TLS calls [driver functions as specified in the PSA Cryptography Driver Interface specification](architecture/psa-driver-interface.md#) except as otherwise indicated in this section.
+
+### Key handles
+
+Mbed TLS currently implements the interface for opening and closing persistent keys from version 1.0 beta 3 of the PSA Crypto specification. As a consequence, functions that operate on an existing key take an argument of type `psa_key_handle_t` instead of `psa_key_id_t`. Functions that create a new key take an argument of type `psa_key_handle_t *` instead of `psa_key_id_t *`.
+
+## Building and testing your driver
+
+<!-- TODO -->
+
+## Dependencies on the Mbed TLS configuration
+
+<!-- TODO -->
diff --git a/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfd765e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Building Mbed TLS with PSA cryptoprocessor drivers
+==================================================
+
+**This is a specification of work in progress. The implementation is not yet merged into Mbed TLS.**
+
+This document describes how to build Mbed TLS with additional cryptoprocessor drivers that follow the PSA cryptoprocessor driver interface.
+
+The interface is not fully implemented in Mbed TLS yet and is disabled by default. You can enable the experimental work in progress by setting `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the compile-time configuration. Please note that the interface may still change: until further notice, we do not guarantee backward compatibility with existing driver code when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` is enabled.
+
+## Introduction
+
+The PSA cryptography driver interface provides a way to build Mbed TLS with additional code that implements certain cryptographic primitives. This is primarily intended to support platform-specific hardware.
+
+Note that such drivers are only available through the PSA cryptography API (crypto functions beginning with `psa_`, and X.509 and TLS interfaces that reference PSA types).
+
+Concretely speaking, a driver consists of one or more **driver description files** in JSON format and some code to include in the build. The driver code can either be provided in binary form as additional object file to link, or in source form.
+
+## How to build Mbed TLS with drivers
+
+To build Mbed TLS with drivers:
+
+1. Activate `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the library configuration.
+
+ ```
+ cd /path/to/mbedtls
+ scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
+ ```
+
+2. Pass the driver description files through the Make variable `PSA_DRIVERS` when building the library.
+
+ ```
+ cd /path/to/mbedtls
+ make PSA_DRIVERS="/path/to/acme/driver.json /path/to/nadir/driver.json" lib
+ ```
+
+3. Link your application with the implementation of the driver functions.
+
+ ```
+ cd /path/to/application
+ ld myapp.o -L/path/to/acme -lacmedriver -L/path/to/nadir -lnadirdriver -L/path/to/mbedtls -lmbedcrypto
+ ```
+
+<!-- TODO: what if the driver is provided as C source code? -->
+
+<!-- TODO: what about additional include files? -->
diff --git a/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ef972a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md
@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+PSA Cryptoprocessor Driver Interface
+====================================
+
+This document describes an interface for cryptoprocessor drivers in the PSA cryptography API. This interface complements the [PSA Cryptography API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface), which describes the interface between a PSA Cryptography implementation and an application.
+
+This specification is work in progress and should be considered to be in a beta stage. There is ongoing work to implement this interface in Mbed TLS, which is the reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. At this stage, Arm does not expect major changes, but minor changes are expected based on experience from the first implementation and on external feedback.
+
+Time-stamp: "2020/08/05 20:37:24 GMT"
+
+## Introduction
+
+### Purpose of the driver interface
+
+The PSA Cryptography API defines an interface that allows applications to perform cryptographic operations in a uniform way regardless of how the operations are performed. Under the hood, different keys may be processed in different hardware or in different logical partitions, and different algorithms may involve different hardware or software components.
+
+The driver interface allows implementations of the PSA Crypytography API to be built compositionally. An implementation of the PSA Cryptography API is composed of a **core** and zero or more **drivers**. The core handles key management, enforces key usage policies, and dispatches cryptographic operations either to the applicable driver or to built-in code.
+
+Functions in the PSA Cryptography API invoke functions in the core. Code from the core calls drivers as described in the present document.
+
+### Types of drivers
+
+The PSA Cryptography driver interface supports two types of cryptoprocessors, and accordingly two types of drivers.
+
+* **Transparent** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that are provided in cleartext at the beginning of each operation. They are typically used for hardware **accelerators**. When a transparent driver is available for a particular combination of parameters (cryptographic algorithm, key type and size, etc.), it is used instead of the default software implementation. Transparent drivers can also be pure software implementations that are distributed as plug-ins to a PSA Crypto implementation (for example, an alternative implementation with different performance characteristics, or a certified implementation).
+* **Opaque** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that can only be used inside a protected environment such as a **secure element**, a hardware security module, a smartcard, a secure enclave, etc. An opaque driver is invoked for the specific [key location](#lifetimes-and-locations) that the driver is registered for: the dispatch is based on the key's lifetime.
+
+### Requirements
+
+The present specification was designed to fulfil the following high-level requirements.
+
+[Req.plugins] It is possible to combine multiple drivers from different providers into the same implementation, without any prior arrangement other than choosing certain names and values from disjoint namespaces.
+
+[Req.compile] It is possible to compile the code of each driver and of the core separately, and link them together. A small amount of glue code may need to be compiled once the list of drivers is available.
+
+[Req.types] Support drivers for the following types of hardware: accelerators that operate on keys in cleartext; cryptoprocessors that can wrap keys with a built-in keys but not store user keys; and cryptoprocessors that store key material.
+
+[Req.portable] The interface between drivers and the core does not involve any platform-specific consideration. Driver calls are simple C functions. Interactions between driver code and hardware happen inside the driver (and in fact a driver need not involve any hardware at all).
+
+[Req.location] Applications can tell which location values correspond to which secure element drivers.
+
+[Req.fallback] Accelerator drivers can specify that they do not fully support a cryptographic mechanism and that a fallback to core code may be necessary. Conversely, if an accelerator fully supports cryptographic mechanism, the core must be able to omit code for this mechanism.
+
+[Req.mechanisms] Drivers can specify which mechanisms they support. A driver's code will not be invoked for cryptographic mechanisms that it does not support.
+
+## Overview of drivers
+
+### Deliverables for a driver
+
+To write a driver, you need to implement some functions with C linkage, and to declare these functions in a **driver description file**. The driver description file declares which functions the driver implements and what cryptographic mechanisms they support. Depending on the driver type, you may also need to define some C types and macros in a header file.
+
+The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON. The structure of this JSON file is specified in the section [“Driver description syntax”](#driver-description-syntax).
+
+A driver therefore consists of:
+
+* A driver description file (in JSON format).
+* C header files defining the types required by the driver description. The names of these header files is declared in the driver description file.
+* An object file compiled for the target platform defining the functions required by the driver description. Implementations may allow drivers to be provided as source files and compiled with the core instead of being pre-compiled.
+
+How to provide the driver description file, the C header files and the object code is implementation-dependent.
+
+Implementations should support multiple drivers.
+
+### Driver description syntax
+
+The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON.
+
+#### Driver description top-level element
+
+A driver description is a JSON object containing the following properties:
+
+* `"prefix"` (mandatory, string). This must be a valid prefix for a C identifier. All the types and functions provided by the driver have a name that starts with this prefix unless overridden with a `"name"` element in the applicable capability as described below.
+* `"type"` (mandatory, string). One of `"transparent"` or `"opaque"`.
+* `"headers"` (optional, array of strings). A list of header files. These header files must define the types provided by the driver and may declare the functions provided by the driver. They may include other PSA headers and standard headers of the platform. Whether they may include other headers is implementation-specific. If omitted, the list of headers is empty.
+* `"capabilities"` (mandatory, array of [capabilities](#driver-description-capability)).
+A list of **capabilities**. Each capability describes a family of functions that the driver implements for a certain class of cryptographic mechanisms.
+* `"key_context"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, mandatory for opaque drivers): information about the [representation of keys](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers).
+* `"persistent_state_size"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, optional for opaque drivers, integer or string). The size in bytes of the [persistent state of the driver](#opaque-driver-persistent-state). This may be either a non-negative integer or a C constant expression of type `size_t`.
+* `"location"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, optional for opaque drivers, integer or string). The [location value](#lifetimes-and-locations) for which this driver is invoked. In other words, this determines the lifetimes for which the driver is invoked. This may be either a non-negative integer or a C constant expression of type `psa_key_location_t`.
+
+#### Driver description capability
+
+A capability declares a family of functions that the driver implements for a certain class of cryptographic mechanisms. The capability specifies which key types and algorithms are covered and the names of the types and functions that implement it.
+
+A capability is a JSON object containing the following properties:
+
+* `"functions"` (optional, list of strings). Each element is the name of a [driver function](#driver-functions) or driver function family. If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only when performing one of the specified operations. If omitted, the `"algorithms"` property is mandatory and the core will invoke this capability of the driver for all operations that are applicable to the specified algorithms. The driver must implement all the specified or implied functions, as well as the types if applicable.
+* `"algorithms"` (optional, list of strings). Each element is an [algorithm specification](#algorithm-specifications). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only when performing one of the specified algorithms. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability for all applicable algorithms.
+* `"key_types"` (optional, list of strings). Each element is a [key type specification](#key-type-specifications). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only for operations involving a key with one of the specified key types. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability of the driver for all applicable key types.
+* `"key_sizes"` (optional, list of integers). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only for operations involving a key with one of the specified key sizes. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability of the driver for all applicable key sizes. Key sizes are expressed in bits.
+* `"names"` (optional, object). A mapping from entry point names described by the `"functions"` property, to the name of the C function in the driver that implements the corresponding function. If a function is not listed here, name of the driver function that implements it is the driver's prefix followed by an underscore (`_`) followed by the function name. If this property is omitted, it is equivalent to an empty object (so each entry point *suffix* is implemented by a function called *prefix*`_`*suffix*).
+* `"fallback"` (optional for transparent drivers, not permitted for opaque drivers, boolean). If present and true, the driver may return `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, in which case the core should call another driver or use built-in code to perform this operation. If absent or false, the core should not include built-in code to perform this particular cryptographic mechanism. See the section “[Fallback](#fallback)” for more information.
+
+Example: the following capability declares that the driver can perform deterministic ECDSA signatures using SHA-256 or SHA-384 with a SECP256R1 or SECP384R1 private key (with either hash being possible in combination with either curve). If the prefix of this driver is `"acme"`, the function that performs the signature is called `acme_sign_hash`.
+```
+{
+ "functions": ["sign_hash"],
+ "algorithms": ["PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)",
+ "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)"],
+ "key_types": ["PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1)"],
+ "key_sizes": [256, 384]
+}
+```
+
+### Algorithm and key specifications
+
+#### Algorithm specifications
+
+An algorithm specification is a string consisting of a `PSA_ALG_xxx` macro that specifies a cryptographic algorithm defined by the PSA Cryptography API. If the macro takes arguments, the string must have the syntax of a C macro call and each argument must be an algorithm specification or a decimal or hexadecimal literal with no suffix, depending on the expected type of argument.
+
+Spaces are optional after commas. Whether other whitespace is permitted is implementation-specific.
+
+Valid examples:
+```
+PSA_ALG_SHA_256
+PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256))
+```
+
+#### Key type specifications
+
+An algorithm specification is a string consisting of a `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx` macro that specifies a key type defined by the PSA Cryptography API. If the macro takes an argument, the string must have the syntax of a C macro call and each argument must be the name of a constant of suitable type (curve or group).
+
+The name `_` may be used instead of a curve or group to indicate that the capability concerns all curves or groups.
+
+Valid examples:
+```
+PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
+PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1)
+PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(_)
+```
+
+### Driver entry points
+
+#### Overview of driver entry points
+
+Drivers define functions, each of which implements an aspect of a capability of a driver, such as a cryptographic operation, a part of a cryptographic operation, or a key management action. These functions are called the **entry points** of the driver. Most driver entry points correspond to a particular function in the PSA Cryptography API. For example, if a call to `psa_sign_hash()` is dispatched to a driver, it invokes the driver's `sign_hash` function.
+
+All driver entry points return a status of type `psa_status_t` which should use the status codes documented for PSA services in general and for PSA Crypto in particular: `PSA_SUCCESS` indicates that the function succeeded, and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` values indicate that an error occurred.
+
+The signature of a driver entry point generally looks like the signature of the PSA Crypto API that it implements, with some modifications. This section gives an overview of modifications that apply to whole classes of entry points. Refer to the reference section for each entry point or entry point family for details.
+
+* For entry points that operate on an existing key, the `psa_key_id_t` parameter is replaced by a sequence of three parameters that describe the key:
+ 1. `const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes`: the key attributes.
+ 2. `const uint8_t *key_buffer`: a key material or key context buffer.
+ 3. `size_t key_buffer_size`: the size of the key buffer in bytes.
+
+ For transparent drivers, the key buffer contains the key material, in the same format as defined for `psa_export_key()` and `psa_export_public_key()` in the PSA Cryptography API. For opaque drivers, the content of the key buffer is entirely up to the driver.
+
+* For entry points that involve a multi-part operation, the operation state type (`psa_XXX_operation_t`) is replaced by a driver-specific operation state type (*prefix*`_XXX_operation_t`).
+
+Some entry points are grouped in families that must be implemented as a whole. If a driver supports a entry point family, it must provide all the entry points in the family.
+
+#### General considerations on driver entry point parameters
+
+Buffer parameters for driver entry points obey the following conventions:
+
+* An input buffer has the type `const uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size.
+* An output buffer has the type `uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size. A third parameter of type `size_t *` is provided to report the actual buffer size if the function succeeds.
+* An in-out buffer has the type `uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size. Note that the buffer size does not change.
+
+Buffers of size 0 may be represented with either a null pointer or a non-null pointer.
+
+Input buffers and other input-only parameters (`const` pointers) may be in read-only memory. Overlap is possible between input buffers, and between an input buffer and an output buffer, but not between two output buffers or between a non-buffer parameter and another parameter.
+
+#### Driver entry points for single-part cryptographic operations
+
+The following driver entry points perform a cryptographic operation in one shot (single-part operation):
+
+* `"hash_compute"` (transparent drivers only): calculation of a hash. Called by `psa_hash_compute()` and `psa_hash_compare()`. To verify a hash with `psa_hash_compare()`, the core calls the driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point and compares the result with the reference hash value.
+* `"mac_compute"`: calculation of a MAC. Called by `psa_mac_compute()` and possibly `psa_mac_verify()`. To verify a mac with `psa_mac_verify()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"mac_verify"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"mac_compute"` entry point and compares the result with the reference MAC value.
+* `"mac_verify"`: verification of a MAC. Called by `psa_mac_verify()`. This entry point is mainly useful for drivers of secure elements that verify a MAC without revealing the correct MAC. Although transparent drivers may implement this entry point in addition to `"mac_compute"`, it is generally not useful because the core can call the `"mac_compute"` entry point and compare with the expected MAC value.
+* `"cipher_encrypt"`: unauthenticated symmetric cipher encryption. Called by `psa_cipher_encrypt()`.
+* `"cipher_decrypt"`: unauthenticated symmetric cipher decryption. Called by `psa_cipher_decrypt()`.
+* `"aead_encrypt"`: authenticated encryption with associated data. Called by `psa_aead_encrypt()`.
+* `"aead_decrypt"`: authenticated decryption with associated data. Called by `psa_aead_decrypt()`.
+* `"asymmetric_encrypt"`: asymmetric encryption. Called by `psa_asymmetric_encrypt()`.
+* `"asymmetric_decrypt"`: asymmetric decryption. Called by `psa_asymmetric_decrypt()`.
+* `"sign_hash"`: signature of an already calculated hash. Called by `psa_sign_hash()` and possibly `psa_sign_message()`. To sign a message with `psa_sign_message()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"sign_message"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point followed by an applicable driver's `"sign_hash"` entry point.
+* `"verify_hash"`: verification of an already calculated hash. Called by `psa_verify_hash()` and possibly `psa_verify_message()`. To verify a message with `psa_verify_message()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"verify_message"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point followed by an applicable driver's `"verify_hash"` entry point.
+* `"sign_message"`: signature of a message. Called by `psa_sign_message()`.
+* `"verify_message"`: verification of a message. Called by `psa_verify_message()`.
+* `"key_agreement"`: key agreement without a subsequent key derivation. Called by `psa_raw_key_agreement()` and possibly `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`.
+
+### Driver entry points for multi-part operations
+
+#### General considerations on multi-part operations
+
+The entry points that implement each step of a multi-part operation are grouped into a family. A driver that implements a multi-part operation must define all of the entry points in this family as well as a type that represents the operation context. The lifecycle of a driver operation context is similar to the lifecycle of an API operation context:
+
+1. The core initializes operation context objects to either all-bits-zero or to logical zero (`{0}`), at its discretion.
+1. The core calls the `xxx_setup` entry point for this operation family. If this fails, the core destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it.
+1. The core calls other entry points that manipulate the operation context object, respecting the constraints.
+1. If any entry point fails, the core calls the driver's `xxx_abort` entry point for this operation family, then destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it.
+1. If a “finish” entry point fails, the core destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it. The finish entry points are: *prefix*`_mac_sign_finish`, *prefix*`_mac_verify_finish`, *prefix*`_cipher_fnish`, *prefix*`_aead_finish`, *prefix*`_aead_verify`.
+
+If a driver implements a multi-part operation but not the corresponding single-part operation, the core calls the driver's multipart operation entry points to perform the single-part operation.
+
+#### Multi-part operation entry point family `"hash_multipart"`
+
+This family corresponds to the calculation of a hash in multiple steps.
+
+This family applies to transparent drivers only.
+
+This family requires the following type and functions:
+
+* Type `"hash_operation_t"`: the type of a hash operation context. It must be possible to copy a hash operation context byte by byte, therefore hash operation contexts must not contain any embedded pointers (except pointers to global data that do not change after the setup step).
+* `"hash_setup"`: called by `psa_hash_setup()`.
+* `"hash_update"`: called by `psa_hash_update()`.
+* `"hash_finish"`: called by `psa_hash_finish()` and `psa_hash_verify()`.
+* `"hash_abort"`: called by all multi-part hash functions.
+
+To verify a hash with `psa_hash_verify()`, the core calls the driver's *prefix`_hash_finish` entry point and compares the result with the reference hash value.
+
+For example, a driver with the prefix `"acme"` that implements the `"hash_multipart"` entry point family must define the following type and entry points (assuming that the capability does not use the `"names"` property to declare different type and entry point names):
+
+```
+typedef ... acme_hash_operation_t;
+psa_status_t acme_hash_setup(acme_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+psa_status_t acme_hash_update(acme_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+psa_status_t acme_hash_finish(acme_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_size,
+ size_t *hash_length);
+psa_status_t acme_hash_abort(acme_hash_operation_t *operation);
+```
+
+#### Operation family `"mac_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"mac_verify_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"cipher_encrypt_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"cipher_decrypt_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"aead_encrypt_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"aead_decrypt_multipart"`
+
+TODO
+
+#### Operation family `"key_derivation"`
+
+This family requires the following type and entry points:
+
+* Type `"key_derivation_operation_t"`: the type of a key derivation operation context.
+* `"key_derivation_setup"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_setup()`.
+* `"key_derivation_set_capacity"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_set_capacity()`. The core will always enforce the capacity, therefore this function does not need to do anything for algorithms where the output stream only depends on the effective generated length and not on the capacity.
+* `"key_derivation_input_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()` and `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`. For transparent drivers, when processing a call to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, the core always calls the applicable driver's `"key_derivation_input_bytes"` entry point.
+* `"key_derivation_input_key"` (opaque drivers only)
+* `"key_derivation_output_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_bytes()`; also by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` for transparent drivers.
+* `"key_derivation_abort"`: called by all key derivation functions.
+
+TODO: key input and output for opaque drivers; deterministic key generation for transparent drivers
+
+TODO
+
+### Driver entry points for key management
+
+The driver entry points for key management differs significantly between [transparent drivers](#key-management-with-transparent-drivers) and [opaque drivers](#key-management-with-transparent-drivers). Refer to the applicable section for each driver type.
+
+### Miscellaneous driver entry points
+
+#### Driver initialization
+
+A driver may declare an `"init"` entry point in a capability with no algorithm, key type or key size. If so, the driver calls this entry point once during the initialization of the PSA Crypto subsystem. If the init entry point of any driver fails, the initialization of the PSA Crypto subsystem fails.
+
+When multiple drivers have an init entry point, the order in which they are called is unspecified. It is also unspecified whether other drivers' init functions are called if one or more init function fails.
+
+On platforms where the PSA Crypto implementation is a subsystem of a single application, the initialization of the PSA Crypto subsystem takes place during the call to `psa_crypto_init()`. On platforms where the PSA Crypto implementation is separate from the application or applications, the initialization the initialization of the PSA Crypto subsystem takes place before or during the first time an application calls `psa_crypto_init()`.
+
+The init function does not take any parameter.
+
+### Combining multiple drivers
+
+To declare a cryptoprocessor can handle both cleartext and plaintext keys, you need to provide two driver descriptions, one for a transparent driver and one for an opaque driver. You can use the mapping in capabilities' `"names"` property to arrange for multiple driver entry points to map to the same C function.
+
+## Transparent drivers
+
+### Key format for transparent drivers
+
+The format of a key for transparent drivers is the same as in applications. Refer to the documentation of `psa_export_key()` and `psa_export_public_key()`.
+
+### Key management with transparent drivers
+
+Transparent drivers may provide the following key management entry points:
+
+* `"generate_key"`: called by `psa_generate_key()`, only when generating a key pair (key such that `PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC` is true).
+* `"derive_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()`, only when deriving a key pair (key such that `PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC` is true).
+* `"export_public_key"`: called by the core to obtain the public key of a key pair. The core may call this function at any time to obtain the public key, which can be for `psa_export_public_key()` but also at other times, including during a cryptographic operation that requires the public key such as a call to `psa_verify_message()` on a key pair object.
+
+Transparent drivers are not involved when importing, exporting, copying or destroying keys, or when generating or deriving symmetric keys.
+
+### Fallback
+
+If a transparent driver entry point is part of a capability which has a true `"fallback"` property and returns `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, the built-in software implementation will be called instead. Any other value (`PSA_SUCCESS` or a different error code) is returned to the application.
+
+If there are multiple available transparent drivers, the core tries them in turn until one is declared without a true `"fallback"` property or returns a status other than `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. The order in which the drivers are called is unspecified and may be different for different entry points.
+
+If a transparent driver entry point is part of a capability where the `"fallback"` property is false or omitted, the core should not include any other code for this capability, whether built in or in another transparent driver.
+
+## Opaque drivers
+
+Opaque drivers allow a PSA Cryptography implementation to delegate cryptographic operations to a separate environment that might not allow exporting key material in cleartext. The opaque driver interface is designed so that the core never inspects the representation of a key. The opaque driver interface is designed to support two subtypes of cryptoprocessors:
+
+* Some cryptoprocessors do not have persistent storage for individual keys. The representation of a key is the key material wrapped with a master key which is located in the cryptoprocessor and never exported from it. The core stores this wrapped key material on behalf of the cryptoprocessor.
+* Some cryptoprocessors have persistent storage for individual keys. The representation of a key is an identifier such as label or slot number. The core stores this identifier.
+
+### Key format for opaque drivers
+
+The format of a key for opaque drivers is an opaque blob. The content of this blob is fully up to the driver. The core merely stores this blob.
+
+Note that since the core stores the key context blob as it is in memory, it must only contain data that is meaningful after a reboot. In particular, it must not contain any pointers or transient handles.
+
+The `"key_context"` property in the [driver description](#driver-description-top-level-element) specifies how to calculate the size of the key context as a function of the key type and size. This is an object with the following properties:
+
+* `"base_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context. If omitted, this value defaults to 0.
+* `"key_pair_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context for a key pair. If omitted, this value defaults to 0.
+* `"public_key_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context for a public key. If omitted, this value defaults to 0.
+* `"symmetric_factor"` (integer or string, optional): every key context for a symmetric key includes this many times the key size. If omitted, this value defaults to 0.
+* `"store_public_key"` (boolean, optional): If specified and true, for a key pair, the key context includes space for the public key. If omitted or false, no additional space is added for the public key.
+* `"size_function"` (string, optional): the name of a function that returns the number of bytes that the driver needs in a key context for a key. This may be a pointer to function. This must be a C identifier; more complex expressions are not permitted. If the core uses this function, it supersedes all the other properties.
+
+The integer properties must be C language constants. A typical value for `"base_size"` is `sizeof(acme_key_context_t)` where `acme_key_context_t` is a type defined in a driver header file.
+
+#### Size of a dynamically allocated key context
+
+If the core supports dynamic allocation for the key context and chooses to use it, and the driver specification includes the `"size_function"` property, the size of the key context is at least
+```
+size_function(key_type, key_bits)
+```
+where `size_function` is the function named in the `"size_function"` property, `key_type` is the key type and `key_bits` is the key size in bits. The prototype of the size function is
+```
+size_t size_function(psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits);
+```
+
+#### Size of a statically allocated key context
+
+If the core does not support dynamic allocation for the key context or chooses not to use it, or if the driver specification does not include the `"size_function"` property, the size of the key context for a key of type `key_type` and of size `key_bits` bits is:
+
+* For a key pair (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(key_type)` is true):
+ ```
+ base_size + key_pair_size + public_key_overhead
+ ```
+ where `public_key_overhead = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)` if the `"store_public_key"` property is true and `public_key_overhead = 0` otherwise.
+
+* For a public key (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)` is true):
+ ```
+ base_size + public_key_size
+ ```
+
+* For a symmetric key (not a key pair or public key):
+ ```
+ base_size + symmetric_factor * key_bytes
+ ```
+ where `key_bytes = ((key_bits + 7) / 8)` is the key size in bytes.
+
+#### Key context size for a secure element with storage
+
+If the key is stored in the secure element and the driver only needs to store a label for the key, use `"base_size"` as the size of the label plus any other metadata that the driver needs to store, and omit the other properties.
+
+If the key is stored in the secure element, but the secure element does not store the public part of a key pair and cannot recompute it on demand, additionally use the `"store_public_key"` property with the value `true`. Note that this only influences the size of the key context: the driver code must copy the public key to the key context and retrieve it on demand in its `export_public_key` entry point.
+
+#### Key context size for a secure element without storage
+
+If the key is stored in wrapped form outside the secure element, and the wrapped form of the key plus any metadata has up to *N* bytes of overhead, use *N* as the value of the `"base_size"` property and set the `"symmetric_factor"` property to 1. Set the `"key_pair_size"` and `"public_key_size"` properties appropriately for the largest supported key pair and the largest supported public key respectively.
+
+### Key management with opaque drivers
+
+Transparent drivers may provide the following key management entry points:
+
+* `"export_key"`: called by `psa_export_key()`, or by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key from or to a different [location](#lifetimes-and-locations).
+* `"export_public_key"`: called by the core to obtain the public key of a key pair. The core may call this entry point at any time to obtain the public key, which can be for `psa_export_public_key()` but also at other times, including during a cryptographic operation that requires the public key such as a call to `psa_verify_message()` on a key pair object.
+* `"import_key"`: called by `psa_import_key()`, or by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key from another location.
+* `"generate_key"`: called by `psa_generate_key()`.
+* `"derive_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()`.
+* `"copy_key"`: called by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key within the same [location](#lifetimes-and-locations).
+
+In addition, secure elements that store the key material internally must provide the following two entry points:
+
+* `"allocate_key"`: called by `psa_import_key()`, `psa_generate_key()`, `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` or `psa_copy_key()` before creating a key in the location of this driver.
+* `"destroy_key"`: called by `psa_destroy_key()`.
+
+#### Key creation in a secure element without storage
+
+This section describes the key creation process for secure elements that do not store the key material. The driver must obtain a wrapped form of the key material which the core will store. A driver for such a secure element has no `"allocate_key"` or `"destroy_key"` entry point.
+
+When creating a key with an opaque driver which does not have an `"allocate_key"` or `"destroy_key"` entry point:
+
+1. The core allocates memory for the key context.
+2. The core calls the driver's import, generate, derive or copy function.
+3. The core saves the resulting wrapped key material and any other data that the key context may contain.
+
+To destroy a key, the core simply destroys the wrapped key material, without invoking driver code.
+
+#### Key management in a secure element with storage
+
+This section describes the key creation and key destruction processes for secure elements that have persistent storage for the key material. A driver for such a secure element has two mandatory entry points:
+
+* `"allocate_key"`: this function obtains an internal identifier for the key. This may be, for example, a unique label or a slot number.
+* `"destroy_key"`: this function invalidates the internal identifier and destroys the associated key material.
+
+These functions have the following prototypes:
+```
+psa_status_t acme_allocate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+psa_status_t acme_destroy_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+```
+
+When creating a persistent key with an opaque driver which has an `"allocate_key"` entry point:
+
+1. The core calls the driver's `"allocate_key"` entry point. This function typically allocates an internal identifier for the key without modifying the state of the secure element and stores the identifier in the key context. This function should not modify the state of the secure element. It may modify the copy of the persistent state of the driver in memory.
+
+1. The core saves the key context to persistent storage.
+
+1. The core calls the driver's key creation entry point.
+
+1. The core saves the updated key context to persistent storage.
+
+If a failure occurs after the `"allocate_key"` step but before the call to the second driver entry point, the core will do one of the following:
+
+* Fail the creation of the key without indicating this to the driver. This can happen, in particular, if the device loses power immediately after the key allocation entry point returns.
+* Call the driver's `"destroy_key"` entry point.
+
+To destroy a key, the core calls the driver's `"destroy_key"` entry point.
+
+Note that the key allocation and destruction entry point must not rely solely on the key identifier in the key attributes to identify a key. Some implementations of the PSA Crypto API store keys on behalf of multiple clients, and different clients may use the same key identifier to designate different keys. The manner in which the core distinguishes keys that have the same identifier but are part of the key namespace for different clients is implementation-dependent and is not accessible to drivers. Some typical strategies to allocate an internal key identifier are:
+
+* Maintain a set of free slot numbers which is stored either in the secure element or in the driver's persistent storage. To allocate a key slot, find a free slot number, mark it as occupied and store the number in the key context. When the key is destroyed, mark the slot number as free.
+* Maintain a monotonic counter with a practically unbounded range in the secure element or in the driver's persistent storage. To allocate a key slot, increment the counter and store the current value in the key context. Destroying a key does not change the counter.
+
+TODO: explain constraints on how the driver updates its persistent state for resilience
+
+TODO: some of the above doesn't apply to volatile keys
+
+#### Key creation entry points in opaque drivers
+
+The key creation entry points have the following prototypes:
+
+```
+psa_status_t acme_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length,
+ uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+psa_status_t acme_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+```
+
+If the driver has an [`"allocate_key"` entry point](#key-management-in-a-secure-element-with-storage), the core calls the `"allocate_key"` entry point with the same attributes on the same key buffer before calling the key creation function.
+
+TODO: derivation, copy
+
+#### Key export entry points in opaque drivers
+
+The key export entry points have the following prototypes:
+
+```
+psa_status_t acme_export_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length);
+psa_status_t acme_export_public_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+ size_t key_buffer_size);
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length);
+```
+
+The core will only call `acme_export_public_key` on a private key. Drivers implementers may choose to store the public key in the key context buffer or to recalculate it on demand. If the key context includes the public key, it needs to have an adequate size; see [“Key format for opaque drivers”](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers).
+
+The core guarantees that the size of the output buffer (`data_size`) is sufficient to export any key with the given attributes. The driver must set `*data_length` to the exact size of the exported key.
+
+### Opaque driver persistent state
+
+The core maintains persistent state on behalf of an opaque driver. This persistent state consists of a single byte array whose size is given by the `"persistent_state_size"` property in the [driver description](#driver-description-top-level-element).
+
+The core loads the persistent state in memory before it calls the driver's [init entry point](#driver-initialization). It is adjusted to match the size declared by the driver, in case a driver upgrade changes the size:
+
+* The first time the driver is loaded on a system, the persistent state is all-bits-zero.
+* If the stored persistent state is smaller than the declared size, the core pads the persistent state with all-bits-zero at the end.
+* If the stored persistent state is larger than the declared size, the core truncates the persistent state to the declared size.
+
+The core provides the following callback functions, which an opaque driver may call while it is processing a call from the driver:
+```
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state(uint_8_t **persistent_state_ptr);
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state(size_t from, size_t length);
+```
+
+`psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` sets `*persistent_state_ptr` to a pointer to the first byte of the persistent state. This pointer remains valid during a call to a driver entry point. Once the entry point returns, the pointer is no longer valid. The core guarantees that calls to `psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` within the same entry point return the same address for the persistent state, but this address may change between calls to an entry point.
+
+`psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state` updates the persistent state in persistent storage. Only the portion at byte offsets `from` inclusive to `from + length` exclusive is guaranteed to be updated; it is unspecified whether changes made to other parts of the state are taken into account. The driver must call this function after updating the persistent state in memory and before returning from the entry point, otherwise it is unspecified whether the persistent state is updated.
+
+The core will not update the persistent state in storage while an entry point is running except when the entry point calls `psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state`. It may update the persistent state in storage after an entry point returns.
+
+In a multithreaded environment, the driver may only call these two functions from the thread that is executing the entry point.
+
+## How to use drivers from an application
+
+### Using transparent drivers
+
+Transparent drivers linked into the library are automatically used for the mechanisms that they implement.
+
+### Using opaque drivers
+
+Each opaque driver is assigned a [location](#lifetimes-and-locations). The driver is invoked for all actions that use a key in that location. A key's location is indicated by its lifetime. The application chooses the key's lifetime when it creates the key.
+
+For example, the following snippet creates an AES-GCM key which is only accessible inside a secure element.
+```
+psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(
+ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_acme));
+psa_set_key_identifer(&attributes, 42);
+psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
+psa_set_key_size(&attributes, 128);
+psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_GCM);
+psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+psa_key_handle_t handle = 0;
+psa_generate_key(&attributes, &handle);
+```
+
+## Using opaque drivers from an application
+
+### Lifetimes and locations
+
+The PSA Cryptography API, version 1.0.0, defines [lifetimes](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/attributes.html?highlight=psa_key_lifetime_t#c.psa_key_lifetime_t) as an attribute of a key that indicates where the key is stored and which application and system actions will create and destroy it. The lifetime is expressed as a 32-bit value (`typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t`). An upcoming version of the PSA Cryptography API defines more structure for lifetime values to separate these two aspects of the lifetime:
+
+* Bits 0–7 are a _persistence level_. This value indicates what device management actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates whether the key is volatile or persistent.
+* Bits 8–31 are a _location indicator_. This value indicates where the key material is stored and where operations on the key are performed. Location values can be stored in a variable of type `psa_key_location_t`.
+
+An opaque driver is attached to a specific location. Keys in the default location (`PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE = 0`) are transparent: the core has direct access to the key material. For keys in a location that is managed by an opaque driver, only the secure element has access to the key material and can perform operations on the key, while the core only manipulates a wrapped form of the key or an identifier of the key.
+
+### Creating a key in a secure element
+
+The core defines a compile-time constant for each opaque driver indicating its location called `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_`*prefix* where *prefix* is the value of the `"prefix"` property in the driver description. For convenience, Mbed TLS also declares a compile-time constant for the corresponding lifetime with the default persistence called `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_`*prefix*. Therefore, to declare an opaque key in the location with the prefix `foo` with the default persistence, call `psa_set_key_lifetime` during the key creation as follows:
+```
+psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_foo);
+```
+
+To declare a volatile key:
+```
+psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(
+ PSA_KEY_LOCATION_foo,
+ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE));
+```
+
+Generally speaking, to declare a key with a specified persistence:
+```
+psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(
+ PSA_KEY_LOCATION_foo,
+ persistence));
+```
+
+## Open questions
+
+### Driver declarations
+
+#### Declaring driver functions
+
+The core may want to provide declarations for the driver functions so that it can compile code using them. At the time of writing this paragraph, the driver headers must define types but there is no obligation for them to declare functions. The core knows what the function names and argument types are, so it can generate prototypes.
+
+It should be ok for driver functions to be function-like macros or function pointers.
+
+#### Driver location values
+
+How does a driver author decide which location values to use? It should be possible to combine drivers from different sources. Use the same vendor assignment as for PSA services?
+
+Can the driver assembly process generate distinct location values as needed? This can be convenient, but it's also risky: if you upgrade a device, you need the location values to be the same between builds.
+
+### Driver function interfaces
+
+#### Driver function parameter conventions
+
+Should 0-size buffers be guaranteed to have a non-null pointers?
+
+Should drivers really have to cope with overlap?
+
+Should the core guarantee that the output buffer size has the size indicated by the applicable buffer size macro (which may be an overestimation)?
+
+### Partial computations in drivers
+
+#### Substitution points
+
+Earlier drafts of the driver interface had a concept of _substitution points_: places in the calculation where a driver may be called. Some hardware doesn't do the whole calculation, but only the “main” part. This goes both for transparent and opaque drivers. Some common examples:
+
+* A processor that performs the RSA exponentiation, but not the padding. The driver should be able to leverage the padding code in the core.
+* A processor that performs a block cipher operation only for a single block, or only in ECB mode, or only in CTR mode. The core would perform the block mode (CBC, CTR, CCM, ...).
+
+This concept, or some other way to reuse portable code such as specifying inner functions like `psa_rsa_pad` in the core, should be added to the specification.
+
+### Key management
+
+#### Mixing drivers in key derivation
+
+How does `psa_key_derivation_output_key` work when the extraction part and the expansion part use different drivers?
+
+#### Public key calculation
+
+ECC key pairs are represented as the private key value only. The public key needs to be calculated from that. Both transparent drivers and opaque drivers provide a function to calculate the public key (`"export_public_key"`).
+
+The specification doesn't mention when the public key might be calculated. The core may calculate it on creation, on demand, or anything in between. Opaque drivers have a choice of storing the public key in the key context or calculating it on demand and can convey whether the core should store the public key with the `"store_public_key"` property. Is this good enough or should the specification include non-functional requirements?
+
+### Opaque drivers
+
+#### Opaque driver persistent state
+
+The driver is allowed to update the state at any time. Is this ok?
+
+An example use case for updating the persistent state at arbitrary times is to renew a key that is used to encrypt communications between the application processor and the secure element.
+
+`psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` does not identify the calling driver, so the driver needs to remember which driver it's calling. This may require a thread-local variable in a multithreaded core. Is this ok?
+
+<!--
+Local Variables:
+time-stamp-line-limit: 40
+time-stamp-start: "Time-stamp: *\""
+time-stamp-end: "\""
+time-stamp-format: "%04Y/%02m/%02d %02H:%02M:%02S %Z"
+time-stamp-time-zone: "GMT"
+End:
+-->
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 15cc21b..d8b9a97 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -103,6 +103,17 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@@ -256,12 +267,14 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \
- ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
- ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 3bb631f..5eceea1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@
*
* Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it
*/
+/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
@@ -767,6 +768,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
@@ -1083,7 +1085,7 @@
*
* Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
*
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
*
* This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
* enabled as well):
@@ -1107,7 +1109,7 @@
*
* Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
*
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
*
* This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
* enabled as well):
@@ -2587,7 +2589,9 @@
* This module is used by the following key exchanges:
* ECDHE-ECDSA
*
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C,
+ * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a
+ * short Weierstrass curve.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 450e354..980ec5e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -61,6 +61,26 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 /**< Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */
+/* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain
+ * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED
+#endif
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@@ -74,6 +94,20 @@
* parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted
* sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
*/
+/* Note: when adding a new curve:
+ * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by
+ * changing the numerical value for existing curves.
+ * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed.
+ * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to
+ * config.h.
+ * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h.
+ * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above.
+ * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c.
+ * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c.
+ * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable.
+ */
typedef enum
{
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */
@@ -906,6 +940,7 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two
* points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q
@@ -915,6 +950,10 @@
* \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not
* guarantee a constant execution flow and timing.
*
+ * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves.
+ * It may not be included in builds without any short
+ * Weierstrass curve.
+ *
* \param grp The ECP group to use.
* This must be initialized and have group parameters
* set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
@@ -933,6 +972,8 @@
* valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public
* keys.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not
+ * designate a short Weierstrass curve.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
@@ -950,6 +991,10 @@
* but it can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
+ * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves.
+ * It may not be included in builds without any short
+ * Weierstrass curve.
+ *
* \param grp The ECP group to use.
* This must be initialized and have group parameters
* set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
@@ -969,6 +1014,8 @@
* valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public
* keys.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not
+ * designate a short Weierstrass curve.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
@@ -978,6 +1025,7 @@
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
/**
* \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h
index 3b6fbf1..92fee42 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
*/
void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp );
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT)
/**
@@ -245,9 +245,9 @@
mbedtls_ecp_point *pt );
#endif
-#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)
int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
mbedtls_ecp_point *P );
#endif
-#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 2f69d68..d6ef5ed 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -501,25 +501,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
-#define ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
-#define ECP_MONTGOMERY
-#endif
-
/*
* List of supported curves:
* - internal ID
@@ -897,7 +878,8 @@
plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P );
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
*olen = plen;
@@ -907,7 +889,7 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) );
}
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
/*
@@ -970,7 +952,7 @@
plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P );
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
if( plen != ilen )
@@ -986,7 +968,7 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) );
}
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
if( buf[0] == 0x00 )
@@ -1304,7 +1286,7 @@
return( ret );
}
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
/*
* For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in
* Jacobian coordinates.
@@ -2413,9 +2395,9 @@
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
/*
* For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective
* coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is
@@ -2649,7 +2631,7 @@
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
/*
* Restartable multiplication R = m * P
@@ -2672,6 +2654,8 @@
/* reset ops count for this call if top-level */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 )
rs_ctx->ops_done = 0;
+#else
+ (void) rs_ctx;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
@@ -2693,11 +2677,11 @@
}
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif
@@ -2731,7 +2715,7 @@
return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
/*
* Check that an affine point is valid as a public key,
* short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1)
@@ -2779,8 +2763,9 @@
return( ret );
}
-#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
/*
* R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 1 and m == -1
* NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass!
@@ -2926,8 +2911,9 @@
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL );
return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
/*
* Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes
*/
@@ -2941,7 +2927,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
/*
* Check that a point is valid as a public key
@@ -2956,11 +2942,11 @@
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) );
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) );
#endif
@@ -2976,7 +2962,7 @@
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
/* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */
@@ -2991,8 +2977,8 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
/* see SEC1 3.2 */
@@ -3002,7 +2988,7 @@
else
return( 0 );
}
-#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -3024,7 +3010,7 @@
n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
/* [M225] page 5 */
@@ -3050,9 +3036,9 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
}
}
-#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
/* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
@@ -3094,7 +3080,7 @@
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || cmp != 1 );
}
-#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
cleanup:
return( ret );
@@ -3172,7 +3158,7 @@
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
/*
@@ -3207,7 +3193,7 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) );
@@ -3235,7 +3221,7 @@
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL );
-#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
{
if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 )
@@ -3250,7 +3236,7 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) );
@@ -3309,33 +3295,141 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve.
+ * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents
+ * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */
+static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *m )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ switch( grp->id )
+ {
+ /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the
+ * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */
+#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+ /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is
+ * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) );
+ /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not
+ * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1,
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) );
+ break;
+#endif
+#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */
+ default:
+ /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */
+ (void) grp;
+ (void) m;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of
+ * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */
+static int self_test_point( int verbose,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ mbedtls_mpi *m,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const char *const *exponents,
+ size_t n_exponents )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i = 0;
+ unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev;
+ add_count = 0;
+ dbl_count = 0;
+ mul_count = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) );
+
+ for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ )
+ {
+ add_c_prev = add_count;
+ dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
+ mul_c_prev = mul_count;
+ add_count = 0;
+ dbl_count = 0;
+ mul_count = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) );
+
+ if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
+ dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
+ mul_count != mul_c_prev )
+ {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ if( verbose != 0 )
+ {
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i );
+ else
+ mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+ }
+ return( ret );
+}
+
/*
* Checkup routine
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t i;
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_point R, P;
mbedtls_mpi m;
- unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev;
- /* exponents especially adapted for secp192r1 */
- const char *exponents[] =
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest
+ * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger
+ * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */
+ const char *sw_exponents[] =
{
"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830", /* N - 1 */
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */
"5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */
"400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */
"7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */
"555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */
};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ const char *m_exponents[] =
+ {
+ /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448
+ * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in
+ * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */
+ "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+ "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30",
+ "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8",
+ "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460",
+ "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550",
+ "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8",
+ };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &m );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
/* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) );
@@ -3344,81 +3438,48 @@
#endif
if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " );
-
+ mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " );
/* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
-
- add_count = 0;
- dbl_count = 0;
- mul_count = 0;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
-
- for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ )
- {
- add_c_prev = add_count;
- dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
- mul_c_prev = mul_count;
- add_count = 0;
- dbl_count = 0;
- mul_count = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
-
- if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
- dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
- mul_count != mul_c_prev )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i );
-
- ret = 1;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
+ ret = self_test_point( verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
+ sw_exponents,
+ sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] ));
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " );
+ mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " );
/* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */
+ ret = self_test_point( verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &P,
+ sw_exponents,
+ sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] ));
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
- add_count = 0;
- dbl_count = 0;
- mul_count = 0;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) );
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
- for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ )
- {
- add_c_prev = add_count;
- dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
- mul_c_prev = mul_count;
- add_count = 0;
- dbl_count = 0;
- mul_count = 0;
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) );
-
- if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
- dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
- mul_count != mul_c_prev )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i );
-
- ret = 1;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+ mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) );
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) );
+#else
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test"
+#endif
+ ret = self_test_point( verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
+ m_exponents,
+ sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] ));
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
cleanup:
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 92bbb89..137ef1e 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -553,6 +553,22 @@
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */
+#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP
+#endif
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
/*
* Create an MPI from embedded constants
* (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint)
@@ -603,6 +619,7 @@
return( 0 );
}
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
/* Forward declarations */
@@ -644,6 +661,7 @@
static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * );
#endif
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \
G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \
G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \
@@ -659,6 +677,7 @@
G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \
G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \
G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) )
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
/*
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 79bc9c9..bc1619c 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -441,9 +441,8 @@
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
-static psa_status_t prepare_raw_data_slot( psa_key_type_t type,
- size_t bits,
- struct raw_data *raw )
+static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type,
+ size_t bits )
{
/* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */
switch( type )
@@ -490,18 +489,12 @@
if( bits % 8 != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- /* Allocate memory for the key */
- raw->bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits );
- raw->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, raw->bytes );
- if( raw->data == NULL )
- {
- raw->bytes = 0;
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- }
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes
* that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only
* mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no
@@ -523,79 +516,227 @@
mbedtls_mpi_free( &n );
return( status );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */
-static psa_status_t psa_import_rsa_key( psa_key_type_t type,
- const uint8_t *data,
- size_t data_length,
- mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa )
+/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation
+ *
+ * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data.
+ * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation.
+ * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data.
+ * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing both the
+ * contents of the context and the context itself
+ * when done.
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_load_rsa_representation( psa_key_type_t type,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length,
+ mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
psa_status_t status;
- mbedtls_pk_context pk;
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa;
+ mbedtls_pk_context ctx;
size_t bits;
-
- mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx );
/* Parse the data. */
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) )
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) );
+ mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) );
else
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, data, data_length ) );
+ mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &ctx, data, data_length ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
/* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a
* valid RSA key, store it. */
- if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
+ if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
- rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk );
/* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS
* supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example,
* mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */
- bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
+ bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ) );
if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
- status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( rsa );
+ status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context
+ * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */
+ *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx );
+ ctx.pk_info = NULL;
exit:
- /* Free the content of the pk object only on error. */
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx );
+ return( status );
+#else
+ (void) data;
+ (void) data_length;
+ (void) type;
+ (void) rsa;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */
+}
+
+/** Export an RSA key to export representation
+ *
+ * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export
+ * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export
+ * \param[out] data The buffer to export to
+ * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to
+ * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_export_rsa_key( psa_key_type_t type,
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk;
+ uint8_t *pos = data + data_size;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
+ pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
+ pk.pk_ctx = rsa;
+
+ /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded
+ * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a
+ * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) )
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size );
+ else
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &pos, data, &pk );
+
+ if( ret < 0 )
+ {
+ /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */
+ memset( data, 0, data_size );
+ return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+ }
+
+ /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer.
+ * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data
+ * at the original location. */
+ if( 2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size )
+ {
+ memcpy( data, data + data_size - ret, ret );
+ memset( data + data_size - ret, 0, ret );
+ }
+ else if( (size_t) ret < data_size )
+ {
+ memmove( data, data + data_size - ret, ret );
+ memset( data + ret, 0, data_size - ret );
+ }
+
+ *data_length = ret;
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+#else
+ (void) type;
+ (void) rsa;
+ (void) data;
+ (void) data_size;
+ (void) data_length;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
+}
+
+/** Import an RSA key from import representation to a slot
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] slot The slot where to store the export representation to
+ * \param[in] data The buffer containing the import representation
+ * \param[in] data_length The amount of bytes in \p data
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_import_rsa_key( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ uint8_t* output = NULL;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse input */
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ data,
+ data_length,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(
+ mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
+
+ /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export
+ * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is
+ * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up
+ * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */
+ output = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
+ if( output == NULL )
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_export_rsa_key( slot->attr.type,
+ rsa,
+ output,
+ data_length,
+ &data_length);
+exit:
+ /* Always free the RSA object */
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+
+ /* Free the allocated buffer only on error. */
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
- mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
return( status );
}
- /* On success, store the content of the object in the RSA context. */
- *p_rsa = rsa;
+ /* On success, store the allocated export-formatted key. */
+ slot->data.key.data = output;
+ slot->data.key.bytes = data_length;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-static psa_status_t psa_prepare_import_ec_key( psa_ecc_family_t curve,
- size_t data_length,
- int is_public,
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
+/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation
+ *
+ * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data.
+ * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation.
+ * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data.
+ * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing both the
+ * contents of the context and the context itself
+ * when done.
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_load_ecp_representation( psa_key_type_t type,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
- *p_ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) );
- if( *p_ecp == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( *p_ecp );
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ size_t curve_size = data_length;
- if( is_public )
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) &&
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY )
{
- /* A public key is represented as:
+ /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as:
* - The byte 0x04;
* - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
* - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian.
@@ -603,97 +744,195 @@
*/
if( ( data_length & 1 ) == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- data_length = data_length / 2;
+ curve_size = data_length / 2;
+
+ /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning
+ * their curve_size is equal to the amount of input. */
+
+ /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer
+ * format, meaning their curve_size is equal to the amount of input. */
}
+ /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */
+ ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) );
+ if( ecp == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp );
+
/* Load the group. */
- grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve, data_length );
+ grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ),
+ curve_size );
if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &( *p_ecp )->grp, grp_id ) ) );
-}
-
-/* Import a public key given as the uncompressed representation defined by SEC1
- * 2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. */
-static psa_status_t psa_import_ec_public_key( psa_ecc_family_t curve,
- const uint8_t *data,
- size_t data_length,
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
-{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
-
- status = psa_prepare_import_ec_key( curve, data_length, 1, &ecp );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
+ }
- /* Load the public value. */
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q,
- data, data_length ) );
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
- /* Check that the point is on the curve. */
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
+ /* Load the key material. */
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) )
+ {
+ /* Load the public value. */
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q,
+ data,
+ data_length ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Check that the point is on the curve. */
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Load and validate the secret value. */
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id,
+ ecp,
+ data,
+ data_length ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+ }
*p_ecp = ecp;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-
exit:
- if( ecp != NULL )
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
mbedtls_free( ecp );
}
+
return( status );
}
-/* Import a private key given as a byte string which is the private value
- * in big-endian order. */
-static psa_status_t psa_import_ec_private_key( psa_ecc_family_t curve,
- const uint8_t *data,
- size_t data_length,
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
+/** Export an ECP key to export representation
+ *
+ * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export
+ * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export
+ * \param[out] data The buffer to export to
+ * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to
+ * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_export_ecp_key( psa_key_type_t type,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp,
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length )
{
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) )
+ {
+ /* Check whether the public part is loaded */
+ if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) )
+ {
+ /* Calculate the public key */
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &global_data.ctr_drbg ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ }
+
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ data_length,
+ data,
+ data_size ) );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ memset( data, 0, data_size );
+
+ return( status );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if( data_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ecp,
+ data,
+ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) );
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+ *data_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits );
+ else
+ memset( data, 0, data_size );
+
+ return( status );
+ }
+}
+
+/** Import an ECP key from import representation to a slot
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] slot The slot where to store the export representation to
+ * \param[in] data The buffer containing the import representation
+ * \param[in] data_length The amount of bytes in \p data
+ */
+static psa_status_t psa_import_ecp_key( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length )
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ uint8_t* output = NULL;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
- status = psa_prepare_import_ec_key( curve, data_length, 0, &ecp );
+ /* Parse input */
+ status = psa_load_ecp_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ data,
+ data_length,
+ &ecp );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
- /* Load and validate the secret key */
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id, ecp, data, data_length ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type ) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY)
+ slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) ecp->grp.nbits + 1;
+ else
+ slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) ecp->grp.nbits;
- /* Calculate the public key from the private key. */
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G,
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &global_data.ctr_drbg ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- goto exit;
-
- *p_ecp = ecp;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-
-exit:
- if( ecp != NULL )
+ /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support
+ * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1
+ * copy operation. */
+ output = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
+ if( output == NULL )
{
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
- mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+ goto exit;
}
- return( status );
+
+ status = psa_export_ecp_key( slot->attr.type,
+ ecp,
+ output,
+ data_length,
+ &data_length);
+exit:
+ /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+
+ /* Free the allocated buffer only on error. */
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ return( status );
+ }
+
+ /* On success, store the allocated export-formatted key. */
+ slot->data.key.data = output;
+ slot->data.key.bytes = data_length;
+
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
-
/** Return the size of the key in the given slot, in bits.
*
* \param[in] slot A key slot.
@@ -705,30 +944,30 @@
return( slot->attr.bits );
}
-/** Calculate the size of the key in the given slot, in bits.
+/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot.
*
- * \param[in] slot A key slot containing a transparent key.
+ * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to.
+ * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer.
*
- * \return The key size in bits, calculated from the key data.
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The buffer has been successfully allocated.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * Not enough memory was available for allocation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot.
*/
-static psa_key_bits_t psa_calculate_key_bits( const psa_key_slot_t *slot )
+static psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
+ size_t buffer_length )
{
- size_t bits = 0; /* return 0 on an empty slot */
+ if( slot->data.key.data != NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS );
- if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) )
- bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( slot->data.raw.bytes );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
- bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( slot->data.rsa ) );
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
- bits = slot->data.ecp->grp.pbits;
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
+ slot->data.key.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_length );
+ if( slot->data.key.data == NULL )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- /* We know that the size fits in psa_key_bits_t thanks to checks
- * when the key was created. */
- return( (psa_key_bits_t) bits );
+ slot->data.key.bytes = buffer_length;
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
/** Import key data into a slot. `slot->attr.type` must have been set
@@ -740,60 +979,68 @@
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+ /* zero-length keys are never supported. */
+ if( data_length == 0 )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) )
{
size_t bit_size = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length );
- /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bit conversion didn't overflow. */
+
+ /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */
if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
/* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit
* size fits in its representation type. */
if( bit_size > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- status = prepare_raw_data_slot( slot->attr.type, bit_size,
- &slot->data.raw );
+
+ status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( slot->attr.type, bit_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- if( data_length != 0 )
- memcpy( slot->data.raw.data, data, data_length );
- }
- else
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- status = psa_import_ec_private_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type ),
- data, data_length,
- &slot->data.ecp );
- }
- else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- status = psa_import_ec_public_key(
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type ),
- data, data_length,
- &slot->data.ecp );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- status = psa_import_rsa_key( slot->attr.type,
- data, data_length,
- &slot->data.rsa );
- }
- else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
- if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
+ /* Allocate memory for the key */
+ status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, data_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ /* copy key into allocated buffer */
+ memcpy( slot->data.key.data, data, data_length );
+
/* Write the actual key size to the slot.
* psa_start_key_creation() wrote the size declared by the
* caller, which may be 0 (meaning unspecified) or wrong. */
- slot->attr.bits = psa_calculate_key_bits( slot );
+ slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bit_size;
}
+ else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ status = psa_import_ecp_key( slot,
+ data, data_length );
+#else
+ /* No drivers have been implemented yet, so without mbed TLS backing
+ * there's no way to do ECP with the current library. */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
+ }
+ else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ status = psa_import_rsa_key( slot,
+ data, data_length );
+#else
+ /* No drivers have been implemented yet, so without mbed TLS backing
+ * there's no way to do RSA with the current library. */
+ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Unknown key type */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
+
return( status );
}
@@ -957,35 +1204,14 @@
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
- if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE )
{
- /* No key material to clean. */
- }
- else if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- mbedtls_free( slot->data.raw.data );
- }
- else
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_free( slot->data.rsa );
- mbedtls_free( slot->data.rsa );
- }
- else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( slot->data.ecp );
- mbedtls_free( slot->data.ecp );
- }
- else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
- {
- /* Shouldn't happen: the key type is not any type that we
- * put in. */
- return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
+ /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an
+ * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */
+ if( slot->data.key.data != NULL )
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( slot->data.key.data, slot->data.key.bytes);
+ mbedtls_free( slot->data.key.data );
+ slot->data.key.data = NULL;
+ slot->data.key.bytes = 0;
}
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
@@ -1221,7 +1447,21 @@
if( psa_key_slot_is_external( slot ) )
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
- status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( slot->data.rsa, attributes );
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ break;
+
+ status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( rsa,
+ attributes );
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+ }
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
default:
@@ -1249,21 +1489,19 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-static int pk_write_pubkey_simple( mbedtls_pk_context *key,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t size )
+static psa_status_t psa_internal_export_key_buffer( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length )
{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned char *c;
- size_t len = 0;
-
- c = buf + size;
-
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) );
-
- return( (int) len );
+ if( slot->data.key.bytes > data_size )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ memcpy( data, slot->data.key.data, slot->data.key.bytes );
+ memset( data + slot->data.key.bytes, 0,
+ data_size - slot->data.key.bytes );
+ *data_length = slot->data.key.bytes;
+ return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
static psa_status_t psa_internal_export_key( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
uint8_t *data,
@@ -1306,98 +1544,86 @@
if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) )
{
- if( slot->data.raw.bytes > data_size )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
- memcpy( data, slot->data.raw.data, slot->data.raw.bytes );
- memset( data + slot->data.raw.bytes, 0,
- data_size - slot->data.raw.bytes );
- *data_length = slot->data.raw.bytes;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+ return( psa_internal_export_key_buffer( slot, data, data_size, data_length ) );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) && !export_public_key )
+ else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ||
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
{
- psa_status_t status;
-
- size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( slot->attr.bits );
- if( bytes > data_size )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
- status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_ecp_write_key( slot->data.ecp,
- data, bytes ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- memset( data + bytes, 0, data_size - bytes );
- *data_length = bytes;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
- }
-#endif
- else
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ||
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->attr.type ) )
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) )
{
- mbedtls_pk_context pk;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
+ /* Exporting public -> public */
+ return( psa_internal_export_key_buffer( slot, data, data_size, data_length ) );
+ }
+ else if( !export_public_key )
+ {
+ /* Exporting private -> private */
+ return( psa_internal_export_key_buffer( slot, data, data_size, data_length ) );
+ }
+ /* Need to export the public part of a private key,
+ * so conversion is needed */
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
+ {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
- pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
- pk.pk_ctx = slot->data.rsa;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_load_rsa_representation(
+ slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ status = psa_export_rsa_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ rsa,
+ data,
+ data_size,
+ data_length );
+
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+
+ return( status );
#else
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
#endif
- }
- else
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
- pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_eckey_info;
- pk.pk_ctx = slot->data.ecp;
-#else
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-#endif
- }
- if( export_public_key || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) )
- {
- ret = pk_write_pubkey_simple( &pk, data, data_size );
- }
- else
- {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size );
- }
- if( ret < 0 )
- {
- memset( data, 0, data_size );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
- }
- /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer.
- * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data
- * at the original location. */
- if( 2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size )
- {
- memcpy( data, data + data_size - ret, ret );
- memset( data + data_size - ret, 0, ret );
- }
- else if( (size_t) ret < data_size )
- {
- memmove( data, data + data_size - ret, ret );
- memset( data + ret, 0, data_size - ret );
- }
- *data_length = ret;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) */
{
- /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but
- it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit
- support for exporting certain key types. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_load_ecp_representation(
+ slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ status = psa_export_ecp_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(
+ slot->attr.type ) ),
+ ecp,
+ data,
+ data_size,
+ data_length );
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ return( status );
+#else
+ /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
}
}
+ else
+ {
+ /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but
+ it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit
+ support for exporting certain key types. */
+ return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
}
psa_status_t psa_export_key( psa_key_handle_t handle,
@@ -1794,12 +2020,24 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi actual, required;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ psa_status_t status = psa_load_rsa_representation(
+ slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &required );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( slot->data.rsa,
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual );
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
if( ret != 0 )
goto rsa_exit;
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &required,
@@ -2718,7 +2956,7 @@
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac,
- slot->data.raw.data,
+ slot->data.key.data,
key_bits );
return( ret );
}
@@ -2782,7 +3020,7 @@
status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size );
cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof(ipad) );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) );
return( status );
}
@@ -2862,8 +3100,8 @@
}
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
- slot->data.raw.data,
- slot->data.raw.bytes,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
hash_alg );
}
else
@@ -3373,6 +3611,14 @@
signature + curve_bytes,
curve_bytes ) );
+ /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */
+ if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &global_data.ctr_drbg ) );
+ }
+
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length,
&ecp->Q, &r, &s );
@@ -3436,11 +3682,23 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
- status = psa_rsa_sign( slot->data.rsa,
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+
+ status = psa_rsa_sign( rsa,
alg,
hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size,
signature_length );
+
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
@@ -3455,11 +3713,22 @@
PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA( alg )
#endif
)
- status = psa_ecdsa_sign( slot->data.ecp,
+ {
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ status = psa_load_ecp_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
+ status = psa_ecdsa_sign( ecp,
alg,
hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size,
signature_length );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ }
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) */
{
@@ -3522,10 +3791,22 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
{
- return( psa_rsa_verify( slot->data.rsa,
- alg,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_length ) );
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ status = psa_rsa_verify( rsa,
+ alg,
+ hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+ return( status );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
@@ -3534,9 +3815,21 @@
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
- return( psa_ecdsa_verify( slot->data.ecp,
- hash, hash_length,
- signature, signature_length ) );
+ {
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ status = psa_load_ecp_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ status = psa_ecdsa_verify( ecp,
+ hash, hash_length,
+ signature, signature_length );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ return( status );
+ }
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) */
{
@@ -3595,20 +3888,30 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) )
{
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = slot->data.rsa;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto rsa_exit;
+
if( output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto rsa_exit;
+ }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT )
{
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa,
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
- &global_data.ctr_drbg,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
- input_length,
- input,
- output );
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
+ &global_data.ctr_drbg,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
+ input_length,
+ input,
+ output ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
@@ -3616,23 +3919,29 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) )
{
psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa,
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
- &global_data.ctr_drbg,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
- salt, salt_length,
- input_length,
- input,
- output );
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
+ &global_data.ctr_drbg,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
+ salt, salt_length,
+ input_length,
+ input,
+ output ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
{
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto rsa_exit;
}
- if( ret == 0 )
+rsa_exit:
+ if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
*output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa );
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+ return( status );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
@@ -3674,23 +3983,32 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = slot->data.rsa;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
+ status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot->attr.type,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes,
+ &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
if( input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ {
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto rsa_exit;
+ }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT )
{
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa,
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
- &global_data.ctr_drbg,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
- output_length,
- input,
- output,
- output_size );
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
+ &global_data.ctr_drbg,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ output_length,
+ input,
+ output,
+ output_size ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
@@ -3698,23 +4016,27 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) )
{
psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa,
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
- &global_data.ctr_drbg,
- MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
- salt, salt_length,
- output_length,
- input,
- output,
- output_size );
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
+ &global_data.ctr_drbg,
+ MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
+ salt, salt_length,
+ output_length,
+ input,
+ output,
+ output_size ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
{
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+ status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
- return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+rsa_exit:
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
+ mbedtls_free( rsa );
+ return( status );
}
else
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) */
@@ -3795,8 +4117,8 @@
{
/* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */
uint8_t keys[24];
- memcpy( keys, slot->data.raw.data, 16 );
- memcpy( keys + 16, slot->data.raw.data, 8 );
+ memcpy( keys, slot->data.key.data, 16 );
+ memcpy( keys + 16, slot->data.key.data, 8 );
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher,
keys,
192, cipher_operation );
@@ -3805,7 +4127,7 @@
#endif
{
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher,
- slot->data.raw.data,
+ slot->data.key.data,
(int) key_bits, cipher_operation );
}
if( ret != 0 )
@@ -4137,7 +4459,7 @@
mbedtls_ccm_init( &operation->ctx.ccm );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id,
- operation->slot->data.raw.data,
+ operation->slot->data.key.data,
(unsigned int) key_bits ) );
if( status != 0 )
goto cleanup;
@@ -4156,7 +4478,7 @@
mbedtls_gcm_init( &operation->ctx.gcm );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id,
- operation->slot->data.raw.data,
+ operation->slot->data.key.data,
(unsigned int) key_bits ) );
if( status != 0 )
goto cleanup;
@@ -4173,7 +4495,7 @@
mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &operation->ctx.chachapoly );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &operation->ctx.chachapoly,
- operation->slot->data.raw.data ) );
+ operation->slot->data.key.data ) );
if( status != 0 )
goto cleanup;
break;
@@ -4477,7 +4799,7 @@
if( operation->alg == 0 )
{
/* This is a blank key derivation operation. */
- return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
*capacity = operation->capacity;
@@ -4724,7 +5046,7 @@
if( operation->alg == 0 )
{
/* This is a blank operation. */
- return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
if( output_length > operation->capacity )
@@ -5246,8 +5568,8 @@
return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation,
step, slot->attr.type,
- slot->data.raw.data,
- slot->data.raw.bytes ) );
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes ) );
}
@@ -5271,9 +5593,10 @@
psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id, &bits );
mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh );
- status = psa_import_ec_public_key( curve,
- peer_key, peer_key_length,
- &their_key );
+ status = psa_load_ecp_representation( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve),
+ peer_key,
+ peer_key_length,
+ &their_key );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
@@ -5303,6 +5626,7 @@
mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh );
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key );
mbedtls_free( their_key );
+
return( status );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
@@ -5323,10 +5647,21 @@
case PSA_ALG_ECDH:
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( private_key->attr.type ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- return( psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length,
- private_key->data.ecp,
- shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
- shared_secret_length ) );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_load_ecp_representation(
+ private_key->attr.type,
+ private_key->data.key.data,
+ private_key->data.key.bytes,
+ &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length,
+ ecp,
+ shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+ shared_secret_length );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ return( status );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
default:
(void) private_key;
@@ -5525,17 +5860,26 @@
if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) )
{
psa_status_t status;
- status = prepare_raw_data_slot( type, bits, &slot->data.raw );
+
+ status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( slot->attr.type, bits );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- status = psa_generate_random( slot->data.raw.data,
- slot->data.raw.bytes );
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the key */
+ status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
+
+ status = psa_generate_random( slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+
+ slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES )
- psa_des_set_key_parity( slot->data.raw.data,
- slot->data.raw.bytes );
+ psa_des_set_key_parity( slot->data.key.data,
+ slot->data.key.bytes );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
}
else
@@ -5543,7 +5887,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
if ( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR )
{
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int exponent;
psa_status_t status;
@@ -5558,22 +5902,34 @@
&exponent );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- rsa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rsa ) );
- if( rsa == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- mbedtls_rsa_init( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
- ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( rsa,
+ mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa,
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
&global_data.ctr_drbg,
(unsigned int) bits,
exponent );
if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
- mbedtls_free( rsa );
return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+
+ /* Make sure to always have an export representation available */
+ size_t bytes = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE( bits );
+
+ status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa );
+ return( status );
}
- slot->data.rsa = rsa;
+
+ status = psa_export_rsa_key( type,
+ &rsa,
+ slot->data.key.data,
+ bytes,
+ &slot->data.key.bytes );
+ mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot );
+ return( status );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
@@ -5586,7 +5942,7 @@
mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) );
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info =
mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( domain_parameters_size != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
@@ -5594,25 +5950,41 @@
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
if( curve_info->bit_size != bits )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ecp ) );
- if( ecp == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp );
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grp_id, ecp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp );
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grp_id, &ecp,
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
&global_data.ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
- mbedtls_free( ecp );
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp );
return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
- slot->data.ecp = ecp;
+
+
+ /* Make sure to always have an export representation available */
+ size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits );
+ psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp );
+ return( status );
+ }
+
+ status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+ mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &ecp, slot->data.key.data, bytes ) );
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) {
+ memset( slot->data.key.data, 0, bytes );
+ psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot );
+ }
+ return( status );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-
+ {
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+ }
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index ef40f79..53fb61a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
*/
@@ -43,20 +40,13 @@
psa_core_key_attributes_t attr;
union
{
- /* Raw-data key (key_type_is_raw_bytes() in psa_crypto.c) */
- struct raw_data
+ /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer.
+ * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */
+ struct key_data
{
uint8_t *data;
size_t bytes;
- } raw;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- /* RSA public key or key pair */
- mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
- /* EC public key or key pair */
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+ } key;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
/* Any key type in a secure element */
struct se
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index fb4b8e0..29bd136 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif
@@ -2595,7 +2595,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
{
-#if !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
size_t i;
if( rng_state != NULL )
@@ -2608,7 +2608,7 @@
rng_state = NULL;
arc4random_buf( output, len );
-#endif /* !OpenBSD */
+#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh b/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4365686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# pre-commit.sh
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+#
+# This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+
+# Purpose
+#
+# This script does quick sanity checks before commiting:
+# - check that generated files are up-to-date.
+#
+# It is meant to be called as a git pre-commit hook, see README.md.
+#
+# From the git sample pre-commit hook:
+# Called by "git commit" with no arguments. The hook should
+# exit with non-zero status after issuing an appropriate message if
+# it wants to stop the commit.
+
+set -eu
+
+tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 0a7c441..6cc0cf8 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1001,6 +1001,25 @@
if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES\|RC4'
}
+component_test_everest_curve25519_only () {
+ msg "build: Everest ECDH context, only Curve25519" # ~ 6 min
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+ scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ # Disable all curves
+ for c in $(sed -n 's/#define \(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*_ENABLED\).*/\1/p' <"$CONFIG_H"); do
+ scripts/config.py unset "$c"
+ done
+ scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+
+ make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+ msg "test: Everest ECDH context, only Curve25519" # ~ 50s
+ make test
+}
+
component_test_small_ssl_out_content_len () {
msg "build: small SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN (ASan build)"
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
index e39b661..cc5db97 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh
@@ -23,11 +23,29 @@
set -eu
+if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
+ cat <<EOF
+$0 [-u]
+This script checks that all generated file are up-to-date. If some aren't, by
+default the scripts reports it and exits in error; with the -u option, it just
+updates them instead.
+
+ -u Update the files rather than return an error for out-of-date files.
+EOF
+ exit
+fi
+
if [ -d library -a -d include -a -d tests ]; then :; else
echo "Must be run from mbed TLS root" >&2
exit 1
fi
+UPDATE=
+if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "-u" ]; then
+ shift
+ UPDATE='y'
+fi
+
check()
{
SCRIPT=$1
@@ -53,9 +71,15 @@
for FILE in $FILES; do
if ! diff $FILE $FILE.bak >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "'$FILE' was either modified or deleted by '$SCRIPT'"
- exit 1
+ if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
+ exit 1
+ fi
fi
- mv $FILE.bak $FILE
+ if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
+ mv $FILE.bak $FILE
+ else
+ rm $FILE.bak
+ fi
if [ -d $TO_CHECK ]; then
# Create a grep regular expression that we can check against the
@@ -72,7 +96,9 @@
# Check if there are any new files
if ls -1 $TO_CHECK | grep -v "$PATTERN" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Files were created by '$SCRIPT'"
- exit 1
+ if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
+ exit 1
+ fi
fi
fi
}
diff --git a/tests/scripts/curves.pl b/tests/scripts/curves.pl
index cd6ea0d..8db4430 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/curves.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/curves.pl
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# curves.pl
#
-# Copyright (c) 2014-2016, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
+# Copyright (c) 2014-2020, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
@@ -21,21 +21,25 @@
#
# Purpose
#
-# To test the code dependencies on individual curves in each test suite. This
-# is a verification step to ensure we don't ship test suites that do not work
-# for some build options.
+# The purpose of this test script is to validate that the library works
+# with any combination of elliptic curves. To this effect, build the library
+# and run the test suite with each tested combination of elliptic curves.
#
-# The process is:
-# for each possible curve
-# build the library and test suites with the curve disabled
-# execute the test suites
+# Testing all 2^n combinations would be too much, so we only test 2*n:
#
-# And any test suite with the wrong dependencies will fail.
-#
+# 1. Test with a single curve, for each curve. This validates that the
+# library works with any curve, and in particular that curve-specific
+# code is guarded by the proper preprocessor conditionals.
+# 2. Test with all curves except one, for each curve. This validates that
+# the test cases have correct dependencies. Testing with a single curve
+# doesn't validate this for tests that require more than one curve.
+
# Usage: tests/scripts/curves.pl
#
# This script should be executed from the root of the project directory.
#
+# Only curves that are enabled in config.h will be tested.
+#
# For best effect, run either with cmake disabled, or cmake enabled in a mode
# that includes -Werror.
@@ -48,6 +52,25 @@
my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h';
my @curves = split( /\s+/, `sed -n -e '$sed_cmd' $config_h` );
+# Determine which curves support ECDSA by checking the dependencies of
+# ECDSA in check_config.h.
+my %curve_supports_ecdsa = ();
+{
+ local $/ = "";
+ local *CHECK_CONFIG;
+ open(CHECK_CONFIG, '<', 'include/mbedtls/check_config.h')
+ or die "open include/mbedtls/check_config.h: $!";
+ while (my $stanza = <CHECK_CONFIG>) {
+ if ($stanza =~ /\A#if defined\(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C\)/) {
+ for my $curve ($stanza =~ /(?<=\()MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_\w+_ENABLED(?=\))/g) {
+ $curve_supports_ecdsa{$curve} = 1;
+ }
+ last;
+ }
+ }
+ close(CHECK_CONFIG);
+}
+
system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die;
sub abort {
system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n";
@@ -56,6 +79,46 @@
exit 1;
}
+# Disable all the curves. We'll then re-enable them one by one.
+for my $curve (@curves) {
+ system( "scripts/config.pl unset $curve" )
+ and abort "Failed to disable $curve\n";
+}
+# Depends on a specific curve. Also, ignore error if it wasn't enabled.
+system( "scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED" );
+
+# Test with only $curve enabled, for each $curve.
+for my $curve (@curves) {
+ system( "make clean" ) and die;
+
+ print "\n******************************************\n";
+ print "* Testing with only curve: $curve\n";
+ print "******************************************\n";
+ $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = "$curve";
+
+ system( "scripts/config.pl set $curve" )
+ and abort "Failed to enable $curve\n";
+
+ my $ecdsa = $curve_supports_ecdsa{$curve} ? "set" : "unset";
+ for my $dep (qw(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) {
+ system( "scripts/config.pl $ecdsa $dep" )
+ and abort "Failed to $ecdsa $dep\n";
+ }
+
+ system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make" )
+ and abort "Failed to build: only $curve\n";
+ system( "make test" )
+ and abort "Failed test suite: only $curve\n";
+
+ system( "scripts/config.pl unset $curve" )
+ and abort "Failed to disable $curve\n";
+}
+
+system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n";
+
+# Test with $curve disabled but the others enabled, for each $curve.
for my $curve (@curves) {
system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n";
system( "make clean" ) and die;
@@ -71,10 +134,10 @@
system( "scripts/config.py unset $curve" )
and abort "Failed to disable $curve\n";
- system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make lib" )
- and abort "Failed to build lib: $curve\n";
- system( "make" ) and abort "Failed to build tests: $curve\n";
- system( "make test" ) and abort "Failed test suite: $curve\n";
+ system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make" )
+ and abort "Failed to build: all but $curve\n";
+ system( "make test" )
+ and abort "Failed test suite: all but $curve\n";
}
diff --git a/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl b/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
index 1577fee..0d5d297 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
# Some algorithms can't be disabled on their own as others depend on them, so
# we list those reverse-dependencies here to keep check_config.h happy.
my %algs = (
- 'MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C' => ['MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED'],
+ 'MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C' => ['MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED',
+ 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED'],
'MBEDTLS_ECP_C' => ['MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C',
'MBEDTLS_ECDH_C',
'MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C',
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
'MBEDTLS_RSA_C' => ['MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT',
'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED',
'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED',
+ 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED',
'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED',
'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED'],
);
diff --git a/tests/src/random.c b/tests/src/random.c
index 3345f78..45748a9 100644
--- a/tests/src/random.c
+++ b/tests/src/random.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
unsigned char *output,
size_t len )
{
-#if !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
size_t i;
if( rng_state != NULL )
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
rng_state = NULL;
arc4random_buf( output, len );
-#endif /* !OpenBSD */
+#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index 6a28591..d982f81 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -252,6 +252,10 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
import_export:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+PSA import/export curve25519 public key: good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+import_export:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+
PSA import/export AES key: policy forbids export
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:128:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1
@@ -2409,6 +2413,10 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_SUCCESS
+PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: public key not on curve
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ff":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: public key on different curve
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 4576b8b..f4b9a8f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -961,14 +961,23 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) )
{
- /* The representation of an ECC public key is:
- * - The byte 0x04;
- * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
- * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
- * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve.
- */
- TEST_EQUAL( p + 1 + 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), end );
- TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 4 );
+ if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY )
+ {
+ /* The representation of an ECC Montgomery public key is
+ * the raw compressed point */
+ TEST_EQUAL( p + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), end );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* The representation of an ECC Weierstrass public key is:
+ * - The byte 0x04;
+ * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve.
+ */
+ TEST_EQUAL( p + 1 + 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), end );
+ TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 4 );
+ }
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
