Merge pull request #6011 from gabor-mezei-arm/coverity_22_07_01
Fix uninitialised memory access in test
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f569a36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+ * Add accessors to configure DN hints for certificate request:
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() and mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints()
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a575b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix a TLS 1.3 handshake failure when the first attempt to send the client
+ Finished message on the network cannot be satisfied. Fixes #5499.
+
+Features
+ * Add support for authentication of TLS 1.3 clients by TLS 1.3 servers.
+ * Add support for server HelloRetryRequest message. The TLS 1.3 client is
+ now capable of negotiating another shared secret if the one sent in its
+ first ClientHello was not suitable to the server.
+ * Add support for client-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
+ TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled in the build of Mbed TLS, the TLS client now
+ negotiates TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2 with TLS servers.
+ * Enable building of Mbed TLS with TLS 1.3 protocol support but without TLS
+ 1.2 protocol support.
+ * Mbed TLS provides an implementation of a TLS 1.3 server (ephemeral key
+ establishment only). See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a
+ description of the support. The MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 and
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C configuration options control this.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bd97a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Features
+ * The configuration option MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, which previously
+ affected only a limited subset of crypto operations in TLS, X.509 and PK,
+ now causes most of them to be done using PSA Crypto; see
+ docs/use-psa-crypto.md for the list of exceptions.
+ * The function mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque() now supports RSA key pairs as well.
+ Opaque keys can now be used everywhere a private key is expected in the
+ TLS and X.509 modules.
+ * Opaque pre-shared keys for TLS, provisioned with
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() or mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(), which
+ previously only worked for "pure" PSK key exchange, now can also be used
+ for the "mixed" PSK key exchanges as well: ECDHE-PSK, DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 275e2dd..8978faf 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -286,11 +286,9 @@
### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS
Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API.
-This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size.
+However, it does not aim to implement the whole specification; in particular it does not implement all the algorithms.
-The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `mbedtls_config.h`.
-
-There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list.
+The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for most operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `mbedtls_config.h`. Note that TLS 1.3 uses PSA cryptography for most operations regardless of this option. See `docs/use-psa-crypto.md` for details.
### Upcoming features
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
index 3653683..b933edf 100644
--- a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
This guide details the steps required to migrate from Mbed TLS version 2.x to
Mbed TLS version 3.0 or greater. Unlike normal releases, Mbed TLS 3.0 breaks
-compatibility with previous versions, so users (and alt implementors) might
+compatibility with previous versions, so users (and alt implementers) might
need to change their own code in order to make it work with Mbed TLS 3.0.
Here's the list of breaking changes; each entry should help you answer these
@@ -13,7 +13,28 @@
- Removal of many insecure or obsolete features
- Tidying up of configuration options (including removing some less useful options).
- Changing function signatures, e.g. adding return codes, adding extra parameters, or making some arguments const.
-- Removal of functions previously marked as deprecated.
+- Removal of functions, macros, and types previously marked as deprecated.
+
+Much of the information needed to determine a migration path can be found in the Mbed TLS 2.x documentation.
+
+
+## Accessing the Mbed TLS 2.x documentation
+
+For features previously marked as deprecated, Mbed TLS 2.x documentation may
+explain how to upgrade, and should be referred to when migrating code. Where a
+migration path is not provided in prior documentation, changes made and the
+upgrade steps required will be explained later in this guide.
+
+It's best to use the latest version of Mbed TLS 2.x for this purpose, which is the 2.28 LTS release.
+So to generate the documentation, checkout the `mbedtls-2.28` branch and follow
+the instructions in the [Documentation section of the README](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-2.28/README.md#documentation).
+Then browse `apidoc/deprecated.html` for guidance on upgrading deprecated code.
+
+For some deprecated functions, 2.x documentation will suggest using a variant
+suffixed with `_ret`. In Mbed TLS 3.x, this change may not be required, as most
+of these variants have been renamed without the suffix. The section
+[Rename mbedtls_*_ret...](#rename-mbedtls__ret-cryptography-functions-whose-deprecated-variants-have-been-removed)
+has further detail on which functions this applies to.
## General changes
@@ -157,7 +178,7 @@
`MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P `and `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G` were
removed. The primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated because their derivation is not
documented and therefore their usage constitutes a security risk; they are fully
-removed from the library. Please use parameters from RFC3526 (still in the
+removed from the library. Please use parameters from RFC 3526 (still in the
library, only in binary form) or RFC 7919 (also available in the library) or
other trusted sources instead.
@@ -248,22 +269,29 @@
### Deprecated error codes for hardware failures were removed
-- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` from various crypto modules
+- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE` from various crypto modules
were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` is now used
instead.
+- The macro `MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION` was removed;
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` is now used instead.
- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_HW_ACCEL_FAILED` from various crypto modules
were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED` is now used instead.
+### Deprecated error codes for invalid input data were removed
+
+- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH` from ARIA and Camellia
+ modules were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA` is now used instead.
+
### Remove the mode parameter from RSA functions
-This affects all users who use the RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
+This affects all users who use the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and
verify APIs.
The RSA module no longer supports private-key operations with the public key or
vice versa. As a consequence, RSA operation functions no longer have a mode
parameter. If you were calling RSA operations with the normal mode (public key
for verification or encryption, private key for signature or decryption), remove
-the `MBEDTLS_MODE_PUBLIC` or `MBEDTLS_MODE_PRIVATE` argument. If you were calling
+the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC` or `MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE` argument. If you were calling
RSA operations with the wrong mode, which rarely makes sense from a security
perspective, this is no longer supported.
@@ -334,7 +362,7 @@
### Remove the padding parameters from `mbedtls_rsa_init()`
-This affects all users who use the RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
+This affects all users who use the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and
verify APIs.
The function `mbedtls_rsa_init()` no longer supports selecting the PKCS#1 v2.1
@@ -552,13 +580,13 @@
### Remove `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_*_KEY_USAGE` options from `mbedtls_config.h`
This change affects users who have chosen the configuration options to disable the
-library's verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of x509
+library's verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X.509
certificates.
The `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE` and `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE`
-configuration options are removed and the X509 code now behaves as if they were
+configuration options are removed and the X.509 code now behaves as if they were
always enabled. It is consequently not possible anymore to disable at compile
-time the verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X509
+time the verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X.509
certificates.
The verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields is important,
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
index f5b5700..7b8ec99 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
Restartable ECC operations
--------------------------
-There is currently no support for that in PSA at all. API design, as well as
-implementation, would be non-trivial.
+There is currently no support for that in PSA at all, but it will be added at
+some point, see <https://github.com/orgs/Mbed-TLS/projects/1#column-18816849>.
Currently, `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is simply incompatible with
`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`.
@@ -60,16 +60,25 @@
1. Implement support for custom FFDH parameters in PSA Crypto: this would pose
non-trivial API design problem, but most importantly seems backwards, as
-the crypto community is moving away from custom FFDH parameters.
+the crypto community is moving away from custom FFDH parameters. (Could be
+done any time.)
2. Drop the DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK key exchanges in TLS 1.2 when moving to PSA.
-3. Implement RFC 7919, support DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK only in conjunction with it
- when moving to PSA. We can modify our server so that it only selects a DHE
- ciphersuite if the client offered name FFDH groups; unfortunately
+ (For people who want some algorithmic variety in case ECC collapses, FFDH
+would still be available in TLS 1.3, just not in 1.2.) (Can only be done in
+4.0 or another major version.)
+3. Variant of the precedent: only drop client-side support. Server-side is
+ easy to support in terms of API/protocol, as the server picks the
+parameters: we just need remove the existing `mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_xxx()`
+APIs and tell people to use `mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups()` instead. (Can only be
+done in 4.0 or another major version.)
+4. Implement RFC 7919, support DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK only in conjunction with it
+ when moving to PSA. Server-side would work as above; unfortunately
client-side the only option is to offer named groups and break the handshake
if the server didn't take on our offer. This is not fully satisfying, but is
perhaps the least unsatisfying option in terms of result; it's also probably
the one that requires the most work, but it would deliver value beyond PSA
-migration by implementing RFC 7919.
+migration by implementing RFC 7919. (Implementing RFC 7919 could be done any
+time; making it mandatory can only be done in 4.0 or another major version.)
RSA-PSS parameters
------------------
@@ -294,7 +303,7 @@
Mask Algorithm: mgf1 with sha512
Salt Length: 0x3E
-These CSRss are signed with a 2048-bit key. It appears that they are
+These CSRs are signed with a 2048-bit key. It appears that they are
all using saltlen = keylen - hashlen - 2.
### Possible courses of action
@@ -308,87 +317,13 @@
saltlen happens to match hashlen, and falling back to `ANY_SALT` otherwise.
Same issue as with the previous point, except more contained.
3. Reject all certificates with saltlen != hashlen. This includes all
- certificates generate with OpenSSL using the default parameters, so it's
+ certificates generated with OpenSSL using the default parameters, so it's
probably not acceptable.
4. Request an extension to the PSA Crypto API and use one of the above options
in the meantime. Such an extension seems inconvenient and not motivated by
strong security arguments, so it's unclear whether it would be accepted.
-HKDF: Expand not exposed on its own (TLS 1.3)
----------------------------------------------
-
-The HKDF function uses an Extract-then-Expand approach, that is:
-
- HKDF(x, ...) = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(x, ...), ...)
-
-Only the full HKDF function is safe in general, however there are cases when
-one case safely use the individual Extract and Expand; the TLS 1.3 key
-schedule does so. Specifically, looking at the [hierarchy of secrets][13hs]
-is seems that Expand and Extract are always chained, so that this hierarchy
-can be implemented using only the full HKDF. However, looking at the
-derivation of traffic keys (7.3) and the update mechanism (7.2) it appears
-that calls to HKDF-Expand are iterated without any intermediated call to
-HKDF-Extract : that is, the traffic keys are computed as
-
- HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(...)))
-
-(with possibly more than two Expands in a row with update).
-
-[13hs]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#page-93
-
-In the short term (early 2022), we'll work around that by re-implementing HKDF
-in `ssl_tls13_keys.c` based on the `psa_mac_` APIs (for HMAC).
-
-In the long term, it is desirable to extend the PSA API. See
-https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-crypto-api/issues/539
-
Limitations relevant for G2 (isolation of long-term secrets)
============================================================
-Custom key derivations for mixed-PSK handshake
-----------------------------------------------
-
-Currently, `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` enables the new configuration function
-`mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` which allows a PSA-held key to be used for the
-(pure) `PSK` key exchange in TLS 1.2. This requires that the derivation of the
-Master Secret (MS) be done on the PSA side. To support this, an algorithm
-family `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)` was added to PSA Crypto.
-
-If we want to support key isolation for the "mixed PSK" key exchanges:
-DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK, where the PSK is concatenated with the result of
-a DH key agreement (resp. RSA decryption) to form the pre-master secret (PMS)
-from which the MS is derived. If the value of the PSK is to remain hidden, we
-need the derivation PSK + secondary secret -> MS to be implemented as an
-ad-hoc PSA key derivation algorithm.
-
-Adding this new, TLS-specific, key derivation algorithm to PSA Crypto should
-be no harder than it was to add `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS()` but still requires
-an extension to PSA Crypto.
-
-Note: looking at RFCs 4279 and 5489, it appears that the structure of the PMS
-is always the same: 2-byte length of the secondary secret, secondary secret,
-2-byte length of the PSK, PSK. So, a single key derivation algorithm should be
-able to cover the 3 key exchanges DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK and ECDHE-PSK. (That's a
-minor gain: adding 3 algorithms would not be a blocker anyway.)
-
-Note: if later we want to also isolate short-term secret (G3), the "secondary
-secret" (output of DHE/ECDHE key agreement or RSA decryption) could be a
-candidate. This wouldn't be a problem as the PSA key derivation API always
-allows inputs from key slots. (Tangent: the hard part in isolating the result
-of RSA decryption would be still checking that is has the correct format:
-48 bytes, the first two matching the TLS version - note that this is timing
-sensitive.)
-
-HKDF: Expand not exposed on its own (TLS 1.3)
----------------------------------------------
-
-See the section with the same name in the G1 part above for background.
-
-The work-around mentioned there works well enough just for acceleration, but
-is not sufficient for key isolation or generally proper key management (it
-requires marking keys are usable for HMAC while they should only be used for
-key derivation).
-
-The obvious long-term solution is to make HKDF-Expand available as a new KDF
-(in addition to the full HKDF) in PSA (with appropriate warnings in the
-documentation).
+Currently none.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
index 2bb0284..7bb8247 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
@@ -40,16 +40,14 @@
The reasons why `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is optional and disabled by default
are:
- it's incompatible with `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`;
-- historical: used to be incompatible
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` (fixed early 2022, see
- <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5259>);
- it does not work well with `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` (could compile with
both of them, but then `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` won't have the desired
effect)
- to avoid a hard/default dependency of TLS, X.509 and PK on
`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backward compatibility reasons:
- - when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
- `psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions
+ - When `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
+ `psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions. (This prevents us
+from even enabling the option by default.)
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` has a hard depend on `MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C ||
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG` but it's
currently possible to compilte TLS and X.509 without any of the options.
@@ -65,8 +63,11 @@
cost. The rest of this section explains the reasons for the
incompatibilities mentioned above.
-In the medium term (writing this in early 2020), we're going to look for ways
-to make `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` non-optional (always enabled).
+At the time of writing (early 2022) it is unclear what could be done about the
+backward compatibility issues, and in particular if the cost of implementing
+solutions to these problems would be higher or lower than the cost of
+maintaining dual code paths until the next major version. (Note: these
+solutions would probably also solve other problems at the same time.)
### `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`
@@ -84,7 +85,13 @@
Note: it is possible to make the options compatible at build time simply by
deciding that when `USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled, PSA APIs are used except if
restartable behaviour was requested at run-time (in addition to enabling
-`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` in the build).
+`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` in the build). This would require some work to
+dispatch operations as intended, and test.
+
+Currently (early 2022) the mild consensus seems to be that since we'll need to
+implement restartable in PSA anyway, it's probably not worth spending time on
+the compatibility issue while waiting for it to get a more satisfying
+resolution when PSA starts supporting restartable.
### `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG`
@@ -174,9 +181,8 @@
- Downside: tricky to implement if the PSA implementation is currently done on
top of that layer (dependency loop).
-This strategy is currently (late 2021) used for ECDSA signature
-verification in the PK layer, and could be extended to all operations in the
-PK layer.
+This strategy is currently (early 2022) used for all operations in the PK
+layer.
This strategy is not very well suited to the Cipher layer, as the PSA
implementation is currently done on top of that layer.
@@ -184,9 +190,9 @@
This strategy will probably be used for some time for the PK layer, while we
figure out what the future of that layer is: parts of it (parse/write, ECDSA
signatures in the format that X.509 & TLS want) are not covered by PSA, so
-they will need to keep existing in some way. Also the PK layer is also a good
+they will need to keep existing in some way. (Also, the PK layer is a good
place for dispatching to either PSA or `mbedtls_xxx_restartable` while that
-part is not covered by PSA yet.
+part is not covered by PSA yet, if we decide to do that.)
Replace calls for each operation
--------------------------------
@@ -199,10 +205,8 @@
code size.
- Downside: TLS/X.509 code has to be done for each operation.
-This strategy is currently (late 2021) used for the MD layer. (Currently only
-a subset of calling places, but will be extended to all of them.)
-
-In the future (early 2022) we're going to use it for the Cipher layer as well.
+This strategy is currently (early 2022) used for the MD layer and the Cipher
+layer.
Opt-in use of PSA from the abstraction layer
--------------------------------------------
@@ -225,20 +229,16 @@
supporting both G1 and G2 in that area), and one without isolation (the key is
still stored outside of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
-This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (end of 2021) used for ECDSA
-signature generation in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This
+This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (early 2022) used for
+private-key operations in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This
allows use of PSA-held private ECDSA keys in TLS and X.509 with no change to
-the TLS/X.509 code, but a contained change in the application. If could be
-extended to other private key operations in the PK layer, which is the plan as
-of early 2022.
+the TLS/X.509 code, but a contained change in the application.
-This strategy, without key isolation, is also currently used in the Cipher
-layer - see `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()`. This allows use of PSA for cipher
-operations in TLS with no change to the application code, and a
-contained change in TLS code. (It currently only supports a subset of
-ciphers.) However, we'll move to the "Replace calls for each operation"
-strategy (early 2022), in the hope of being able to build without this layer
-in order to save some code size in the future.
+This strategy, without key isolation, was also previously used (until 3.1
+included) in the Cipher layer - see `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()`. This allowed
+use of PSA for cipher operations in TLS with no change to the application
+code, and a contained change in TLS code. (It only supported a subset of
+ciphers.)
Note: for private key operations in the PK layer, both the "silent" and the
"opt-in" strategy can apply, and can complement each other, as one provides
@@ -249,13 +249,11 @@
Summary
-------
-Strategies currently used with each abstraction layer:
+Strategies currently (early 2022) used with each abstraction layer:
- PK (for G1): silently call PSA
- PK (for G2): opt-in use of PSA (new key type)
-- Cipher (G1):
- - late 2021: opt-in use of PSA (new setup function)
- - early 2022: moving to "replace calls at each call site"
+- Cipher (G1): replace calls at each call site
- MD (G1): replace calls at each call site
Migrating away from the legacy API
@@ -281,7 +279,7 @@
runtime, RAM usage or code size penalty), for example just a bunch of
`#define`s, essentially mapping `mbedtls_` APIs to their `psa_` equivalent.
-Unfortunately that's unlikely fully work. For example, the MD layer uses the
+Unfortunately that's unlikely to fully work. For example, the MD layer uses the
same context type for hashes and HMACs, while the PSA API (rightfully) has
distinct operation types. Similarly, the Cipher layer uses the same context
type for unauthenticated and AEAD ciphers, which again the PSA API
@@ -373,5 +371,5 @@
the low-level crypto APIs and making PK, MD and Cipher optional compatibility
layers is to be sure to preserve testing quality. A lot of the existing test
cases use the low level crypto APIs; we would need to either keep using that
-API for tests, or manually migrated test to the PSA Crypto API. Perhaps a
+API for tests, or manually migrate tests to the PSA Crypto API. Perhaps a
combination of both, perhaps evolving gradually over time.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 72bd377..0000000
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-This document is temporary; it lists tasks to achieve G2 as described in
-`strategy.md` while the strategy is being reviewed - once that's done,
-corresponding github issues will be created and this document removed.
-
-For all of the tasks here, specific testing (integration and unit test depending
-on the task) is required, see `testing.md`.
-
-RSA Signature operations
-========================
-
-In PK
------
-
-### Modify existing `PK_OPAQUE` type to allow for RSA keys
-
-- the following must work and be tested: `mbedtls_pk_get_type()`,
- `mbedtls_pk_get_name()`, `mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen()`, `mbedtls_pk_get_len()`,
-`mbedtls_pk_can_do()`.
-- most likely adapt `pk_psa_genkey()` in `test_suite_pk.function`.
-- all other function (sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt, check pair, debug) will
- return `MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH` and this will be tested too.
-
-### Modify `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque()` to work with RSA.
-
-- OK to have policy hardcoded on signing with PKCS1v1.5, or allow more if
- available at this time
-
-### Modify `mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der()` to work with RSA-opaque.
-
-- OK to just test that a generated key (with `pk_psa_genkey()`) can be
- written, without checking for correctness of the result - this will be
-tested as part of another task
-
-### Make `mbedtls_pk_sign()` work with RSA-opaque.
-
-- testing may extend `pk_psa_sign()` in `test_suite_pk_function` by adding
- selector for ECDSA/RSA.
-
-In X.509
---------
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for CSR generation
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-
-### Test using opaque keys for Certificate generation
-
-- similar to what's done with testing CSR generation
-- should test both RSA and ECDSA as ECDSA is not tested yet
-- might require slight code adaptations, even if unlikely
-
-
-In TLS
-------
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for TLS client auth
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for TLS server auth
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-- key exchanges: ECDHE-RSA and DHE-RSA
-
-RSA decrypt
-===========
-
-### Extend `PK_OPAQUE` to allow RSA decryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
-
-### Test using that in TLS for RSA and RSA-PSK key exchange.
-
-Support opaque PSKs for "mixed-PSK" key exchanges
-=================================================
-
-See `PSA-limitations.md`.
-
-Possible split:
-- one task to extend PSA (see `PSA-limitations.md`)
-- then one task per handshake: DHE-PSK, ECDHE-PSK, RSA-PSK (with tests for
- each)
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
index 70229ce..f205c16 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
However, when it comes to TLS, we also have the option of using debug messages
to confirm which code path is taken. This is generally unnecessary, except when
a decision is made at run-time about whether to use the PSA or legacy code
-path. For example, for record protection, currently some ciphers are supported
-via PSA while some others aren't, with a run-time fallback. In this case, it's
+path. (For example, for record protection, previously (until 3.1), some ciphers were supported
+via PSA while some others weren't, with a run-time fallback. In this case, it's
good to have a debug message checked by the test case to confirm that the
right decision was made at run-time, i. e. that we didn't use the fallback for
-ciphers that are supposed to be supported.
+ciphers that are supposed to be supported.)
New APIs meant for application use
@@ -54,9 +54,8 @@
(We should have the same server-side.)
- in `test_suite_x509write` we have a new test function
`x509_csr_check_opaque()` checking integration of the new API with the
- existing `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()`.
- (We should have something similar for
- `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`.)
+ existing `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()`. (And also
+ `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()` since #5710.)
For some APIs, for example with `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`, testing in
`test_suite_ssl` was historically not possible, so we only have testing in
@@ -65,8 +64,9 @@
New APIs meant for internal use
-------------------------------
-For example, `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` is meant to be used by the TLS
-layer, but probably not directly by applications.
+For example, `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` (no longer used, soon to be
+deprecated - #5261) was meant to be used by the TLS layer, but probably not
+directly by applications.
In that case, we want:
diff --git a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
index 85219c3..10da3c5 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
Overview
--------
-Mbed TLS provides a minimum viable implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol
-defined in the "MVP definition" section below. The TLS 1.3 support enablement
+Mbed TLS provides a partial implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol defined in
+the "Support description" section below. The TLS 1.3 support enablement
is controlled by the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 configuration option.
The development of the TLS 1.3 protocol is based on the TLS 1.3 prototype
@@ -16,38 +16,22 @@
status" below describes what remains to be upstreamed.
-MVP definition
---------------
+Support description
+-------------------
- Overview
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP implements only the client side of the protocol.
+ - Mbed TLS implements both the client and the server side of the TLS 1.3
+ protocol.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports ECDHE key establishment.
+ - Mbed TLS supports ECDHE key establishment.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support DHE key establishment.
+ - Mbed TLS does not support DHE key establishment.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
+ - Mbed TLS does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
session resumption. This implies that it does not support sending early
data (0-RTT data).
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports the authentication of the server by the client
- but does not support authentication of the client by the server. In terms
- of TLS 1.3 authentication messages, this means that the TLS 1.3 MVP
- supports the processing of the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages
- but not of the CertificateRequest message.
-
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support the handling of server HelloRetryRequest
- message. In practice, this means that the handshake will fail if the MVP
- does not provide in its ClientHello the shared secret associated to the
- group selected by the server for key establishement. For more information,
- see the comment associated to the `key_share` extension below.
-
- - If the TLS 1.3 MVP receives a HelloRetryRequest or a CertificateRequest
- message, it aborts the handshake with an handshake_failure closure alert
- and the `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` returns in error with the
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE` error code.
-
- Supported cipher suites: depends on the library configuration. Potentially
all of them:
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
@@ -55,100 +39,72 @@
- Supported ClientHello extensions:
- | Extension | MVP | Prototype (1) |
- | ---------------------------- | ------- | ------------- |
- | server_name | YES | YES |
- | max_fragment_length | no | YES |
- | status_request | no | no |
- | supported_groups | YES | YES |
- | signature_algorithms | YES | YES |
- | use_srtp | no | no |
- | heartbeat | no | no |
- | apln | no | YES |
- | signed_certificate_timestamp | no | no |
- | client_certificate_type | no | no |
- | server_certificate_type | no | no |
- | padding | no | no |
- | key_share | YES (2) | YES |
- | pre_shared_key | no | YES |
- | psk_key_exchange_modes | no | YES |
- | early_data | no | YES |
- | cookie | no | YES |
- | supported_versions | YES (3) | YES |
- | certificate_authorities | no | no |
- | post_handshake_auth | no | no |
- | signature_algorithms_cert | no | no |
+ | Extension | Support |
+ | ---------------------------- | ------- |
+ | server_name | YES |
+ | max_fragment_length | no |
+ | status_request | no |
+ | supported_groups | YES |
+ | signature_algorithms | YES |
+ | use_srtp | no |
+ | heartbeat | no |
+ | apln | YES |
+ | signed_certificate_timestamp | no |
+ | client_certificate_type | no |
+ | server_certificate_type | no |
+ | padding | no |
+ | key_share | YES |
+ | pre_shared_key | no |
+ | psk_key_exchange_modes | no |
+ | early_data | no |
+ | cookie | no |
+ | supported_versions | YES |
+ | certificate_authorities | no |
+ | post_handshake_auth | no |
+ | signature_algorithms_cert | no |
- (1) This is just for comparison.
-
- (2) The MVP sends only one shared secret corresponding to the configured
- preferred group. This could end up with connection failure if the
- server does not support our preferred curve, as the MVP does not implement
- HelloRetryRequest. The preferred group is the group of the first curve in
- the list of allowed curves as defined by the configuration. The allowed
- curves are by default ordered as follows: `x25519`, `secp256r1`,
- `secp384r1` and finally `secp521r1`. Note that, in the absence of an
- application profile standard specifying otherwise, section 9.1 of the
- specification rather promotes curve `secp256r1` to be supported over
- curve `x25519`. The MVP would, however, rather keep the preference order
- currently promoted by Mbed TLS as this applies to TLS 1.2 as well, and
- changing the order only for TLS1.3 would be potentially difficult.
- In the unlikely event a server does not support curve `x25519` but does
- support curve `secp256r1`, curve `secp256r1` can be set as the preferred
- curve through the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()` API.
-
- (3) The MVP proposes only TLS 1.3 and does not support version negotiation.
- Out-of-protocol fallback is supported though if the Mbed TLS library
- has been built to support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2: just set the
- maximum of the minor version of the SSL configuration to
- MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 (`mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version()` API) and
- re-initiate a server handshake.
- Supported groups: depends on the library configuration.
- Potentially all ECDHE groups but x448:
- secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1 and secp521r1.
+ Potentially all ECDHE groups:
+ secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1, x448 and secp521r1.
Finite field groups (DHE) are not supported.
- Supported signature algorithms (both for certificates and CertificateVerify):
depends on the library configuration.
Potentially:
- rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
- ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 and ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512.
+ ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pkcs1_sha384, rsa_pkcs1_sha512, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
+ rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 and rsa_pss_rsae_sha512.
Note that in absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise
- the three first ones in the list above are mandatory (see section 9.1 of the
- specification).
+ rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 are
+ mandatory (see section 9.1 of the specification).
- Supported versions:
- - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 but version negotiation is not supported.
+ - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 with version negotiation on the client side, not server
+ side.
- - TLS 1.3 cannot be enabled in the build (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
- configuration option) without TLS 1.2 (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 configuration
- option).
-
- - TLS 1.2 can be enabled in the build independently of TLS 1.3.
+ - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 can be enabled in the build independently of each
+ other.
- If both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 are enabled at build time, only one of them can
- be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_version`. Otherwise,
- `mbedtls_ssl_setup` will raise `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG` error.
+ be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_tls_version` for a
+ server endpoint. Otherwise, `mbedtls_ssl_setup` will raise
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG` error.
- Compatibility with existing SSL/TLS build options:
- The TLS 1.3 MVP is compatible with nearly all TLS 1.2 configuration options
- in the sense that when enabling the TLS 1.3 MVP in the library there is rarely
- any need to modify the configuration from that used for TLS 1.2.
+ The TLS 1.3 implementation is compatible with nearly all TLS 1.2
+ configuration options in the sense that when enabling TLS 1.3 in the library
+ there is rarely any need to modify the configuration from that used for
+ TLS 1.2. There are two exceptions though: the TLS 1.3 implementation requires
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, so these options
+ must be enabled.
- The exceptions to this are:
-
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP is not compatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, so this option
- must be disabled.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP requires MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE,
- so these options must be enabled.
-
- Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related features are not supported or not applicable to the
- TLS 1.3 MVP:
+ Most of the Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related options are not supported or not
+ applicable to the TLS 1.3 implementation:
| Mbed TLS configuration option | Support |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------- |
@@ -163,7 +119,7 @@
| MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS | no |
- | MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | no |
+ | MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | yes |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE | no |
@@ -182,7 +138,7 @@
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED | n/a |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C | no (1) |
- | MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | no |
+ | MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | yes |
(1) These options must remain in their default state of enabled.
(2) Key exchange configuration options for TLS 1.3 will likely to be
@@ -190,27 +146,11 @@
of the MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE/PSK/PSK_EPHEMERAL/EPHEMERAL
runtime configuration macros.
-- Quality considerations
- - Standard Mbed TLS review bar
- - Interoperability testing with OpenSSL and GnuTLS. Test with all the
- cipher suites and signature algorithms supported by OpenSSL/GnuTLS server.
- - Negative testing against OpenSSL/GnuTLS servers with which the
- handshake fails due to incompatibility with the capabilities of the
- MVP: TLS 1.2 or 1.1 server, server sending an HelloRetryRequest message in
- response to the MVP ClientHello, server sending a CertificateRequest
- message ...
-
Prototype upstreaming status
----------------------------
-The following summarizes which parts of the TLS 1.3 prototype remain to be
-upstreamed:
-
-- Ephemeral only handshake on client side: client authentication,
- HelloRetryRequest support, version negotiation.
-
-- Ephemeral only handshake server side.
+The following parts of the TLS 1.3 prototype remain to be upstreamed:
- Pre-shared keys, session resumption and 0-RTT data (both client and server
side).
diff --git a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
index 9c97b5d..c849221 100644
--- a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
+++ b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
@@ -1,107 +1,80 @@
This document describes the compile-time configuration option
-`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective, more specifically its
-current effects as well as the parts that aren't covered yet.
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective.
-Current effects
-===============
+This option makes the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic
+operations, and enables new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto.
-General limitations
--------------------
+General considerations
+----------------------
-Compile-time: enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires
-`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` and
-`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` to be disabled.
+**Compile-time:** enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires
+`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` to be disabled.
-Effect: `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` has no effect on TLS 1.3 for which PSA
-cryptography is mandatory.
+**Application code:** when this option is enabled, you need to call
+`psa_crypto_init()` before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK
+module.
-Stability: any API that's only available when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is
-defined is considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any
-time. Said otherwise, these APIs are explicitly excluded from the usual API
-stability promises.
+**Scope:** `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` has no effect on the parts of the code that
+are specific to TLS 1.3; those parts always use PSA Crypto. The parts of the
+TLS 1.3 code that are common with TLS 1.2, however, follow this option;
+currently this is the record protection code, computation of the running
+handshake hash, and X.509). You need to enable `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` if you
+want TLS 1.3 to use PSA everywhere.
New APIs / API extensions
-------------------------
-Some of these APIs are meant for the application to use in place of
-pre-existing APIs, in order to get access to the benefits; in the sub-sections
-below these are indicated by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: opt-in", meaning that
-this requires changes to the application code for the (X.509 and) TLS layers
-to pick up the improvements.
-
-Some of these APIs are mostly meant for internal use by the TLS (and X.509)
-layers; they are indicated below by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: automatic",
-meaning that no changes to the application code are required for the TLS (and
-X.509) layers to pick up the improvements.
-
### PSA-held (opaque) keys in the PK layer
-There is a new API function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` that can be used to
-wrap a PSA keypair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key
+**New API function:** `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` - can be used to
+wrap a PSA key pair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key
operations and its public part can be exported.
-Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+**Benefits:** isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-Limitations: only for private keys, only ECC. (That is, only ECDSA signature
-generation. Note: currently this will use randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses
-deterministic ECDSA by default.) The following operations are not supported
+**Limitations:** can only wrap a key pair, can only use it for private key
+operations. (That is, signature generation, and for RSA decryption too.)
+Note: for ECDSA, currently this uses randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses
+deterministic ECDSA by default. The following operations are not supported
with a context set this way, while they would be available with a normal
-`ECKEY` context: `mbedtls_pk_verify()`, `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`,
-`mbedtls_pk_debug()`.
+context: `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`, `mbedtls_pk_debug()`, all public key
+operations.
-Use in X.509 and TLS: opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context
+**Use in X.509 and TLS:** opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context
using the new API in order to get the benefits; it can then pass the
resulting context to the following existing APIs:
- `mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert()` or `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert()` to use the
- key together with a certificate for ECDSA-based key exchanges (note: while
-this is supported on both sides, it's currently only tested client-side);
+ key together with a certificate for certificate-based key exchanges;
- `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()` to generate a CSR (certificate signature
- request).
-
-In the TLS and X.509 API, there's one other function which accepts a keypair
-as a PK context: `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`. Use of opaque
-contexts here probably works but is so far untested.
+ request);
+- `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()` to generate a certificate.
### PSA-held (opaque) keys for TLS pre-shared keys (PSK)
-There are two new API functions `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and
+**New API functions:** `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and
`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`. Call one of these from an application to
register a PSA key for use with a PSK key exchange.
-Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets.
+**Benefits:** isolation of long-term secrets.
-Limitations: the key can only be used with "pure"
-PSK key exchanges (ciphersuites starting with `TLS_PSK_WITH_`), to the
-exclusion of RSA-PSK, DHE-PSK and ECDHE-PSK key exchanges. It is the responsibility of
-the user to make sure that when provisioning an opaque pre-shared key, the
-only PSK ciphersuites that can be negotiated are "pure" PSK; other XXX-PSK key
-exchanges will result in a handshake failure with the handshake function
-returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE`.
+**Limitations:** none.
-Use in TLS: opt-in. The application needs to register the key using the new
-APIs to get the benefits.
+**Use in TLS:** opt-in. The application needs to register the key using one of
+the new APIs to get the benefits.
### PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer
There is a new API function `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` to set up a context
that will call PSA to store the key and perform the operations.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers; partial isolation of short-term secrets
-(still generated outside of PSA, but then held by PSA).
+This function only worked for a small number of ciphers. It is now deprecated
+and it is recommended to use `psa_cipher_xxx()` or `psa_aead_xxx()` functions
+directly instead.
-Limitations: the key is still passed in the clear by the application. The
-multi-part APIs are not supported, only the one-shot APIs. The only modes
-supported are ECB, CBC without padding, GCM and CCM (this excludes stream
-ciphers and ChachaPoly); the only cipher supported is AES (this excludes Aria,
-Camellia, and ChachaPoly). (Note: ECB is currently not tested.) (Note: it is
-possible to perform multiple one-shot operations with the same context;
-however this is not unit-tested, only tested via usage in TLS.)
-
-Use in TLS: automatic. Used when the cipher and mode is supported (with
-gracious fallback to the legacy API otherwise) in all places where a cipher is
-used. There are two such places: in `ssl_tls.c` for record protection, and in
-`ssl_ticket.c` for protecting tickets we issue.
+**Warning:** This function will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS. If
+you are using it and would like us to keep it, please let us know about your
+use case.
Internal changes
----------------
@@ -109,89 +82,34 @@
All of these internal changes are active as soon as `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`
is enabled, no change required on the application side.
-### TLS: cipher operations based on PSA
+### TLS: most crypto operations based on PSA
-See "PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer" above.
+Current exceptions:
-### PK layer: ECDSA verification based on PSA
+- EC J-PAKE (when `MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED` is defined)
+- finite-field (non-EC) Diffie-Hellman (used in key exchanges: DHE-RSA,
+ DHE-PSK)
-Scope: `mbedtls_pk_verify()` will call to PSA for ECDSA signature
-verification.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+### X.509: most crypto operations based on PSA
-Use in TLS and X.509: in all places where an ECDSA signature is verified.
+Current exception:
-### TLS: ECDHE computation based on PSA
+- verification of RSA-PSS signatures with a salt length that is different from
+ the hash length.
-Scope: Client-side, for ECDHE-RSA and ECDHE-ECDSA key exchanges, the
-computation of the ECDHE key exchange is done by PSA.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Limitations: client-side only, ECDHE-PSK not covered
+### PK layer: most crypto operations based on PSA
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+Current exception:
-### TLS: handshake hashes and PRF computed with PSA
+- verification of RSA-PSS signatures with a salt length that is different from
+ the hash length.
-Scope: with TLS 1.2, the following are computed with PSA:
-- the running handshake hashes;
-- the hash of the ServerKeyExchange part that is signed;
-- the `verify_data` part of the Finished message;
-- the TLS PRF.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-
-### X.509: some hashes computed with PSA
-
-Scope: the following hashes are computed with PSA:
-- when verifying a certificate chain, hash of the child for verifying the
- parent's signature;
-- when writing a CSR, hash of the request for self-signing the request.
-
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-
-Parts that are not covered yet
-==============================
-
-This is only a high-level overview, grouped by theme
-
-TLS: key exchanges / asymmetric crypto
---------------------------------------
-
-The following key exchanges are not covered at all:
-
-- RSA
-- DHE-RSA
-- DHE-PSK
-- RSA-PSK
-- ECDHE-PSK
-- ECDH-RSA
-- ECDH-ECDSA
-- ECJPAKE
-
-The following key exchanges are only partially covered:
-
-- ECDHE-RSA: RSA operations are not covered and, server-side, the ECDHE
- operation isn't either
-- ECDHE-ECDSA: server-side, the ECDHE operation isn't covered. (ECDSA
- signature generation is only covered if using `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`.)
-
-PSK if covered when the application uses `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` or
-`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`.
-
-TLS: symmetric crypto
----------------------
-
-- some ciphers not supported via PSA yet: ARIA, Camellia, ChachaPoly (silent
- fallback to the legacy APIs)
-- the HMAC part of the CBC and NULL ciphersuites
-- the HMAC computation in `ssl_cookie.c`
-
-X.509
------
-
-- most hash operations are still done via the legacy API, except the few that
- are documented above as using PSA
-- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation (from PSA-held keys)
-- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification
-- RSA-PSS signature verification
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index 37200e7..8629721 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -1506,9 +1506,15 @@
* 1.3 support that this option enables.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * Note: even though TLS 1.3 depends on PSA Crypto, if you want it to only use
+ * PSA for all crypto operations, you need to also enable
+ * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO; otherwise X.509 operations, and functions that are
+ * common with TLS 1.2 (record protection, running handshake hash) will still
+ * use non-PSA crypto.
*
* Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3.
- *
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1763,12 +1769,11 @@
* \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this
* option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far.
*
- * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently
- * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time.
- * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual
- * promises of API stability.
+ * \warning If you enable this option, you need to call `psa_crypto_init()`
+ * before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK modules.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
+ * Conflicts with: MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
*
* Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs.
*/
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index ad7b8f0..b3b5d47 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1496,6 +1496,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
+#endif
};
struct mbedtls_ssl_context
@@ -3128,6 +3132,26 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken
+ * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain()
+ * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain())
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+static inline
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/**
* \brief Set the trusted certificate callback.
@@ -3652,6 +3676,21 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
/**
* \brief Set authmode for the current handshake.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
index c770528..cd6ccbc 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
@@ -389,6 +389,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
#endif
diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
index 7deb57a..62988f2 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
@@ -1921,11 +1921,57 @@
}
}
-mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
{
switch( info->key_exchange )
{
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+ return( PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT );
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
+ mbedtls_psa_translate_md( info->mac ) ) );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( info->mac ) ) );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_ECDH );
+
+ default:
+ return( PSA_ALG_NONE );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+{
+ switch( info->key_exchange )
+ {
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+{
+ switch( info->key_exchange )
+ {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 119826f..bd8c14d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -850,6 +850,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */
size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
};
@@ -1922,8 +1925,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL )
+ if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
+ ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 &&
+ ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL )
+ {
return( ssl->handshake->sig_algs );
+ }
#endif
return( ssl->conf->sig_algs );
@@ -1969,97 +1976,177 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
{
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( sig_alg & 0xff );
+ *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ( sig_alg >> 8 ) & 0xff );
+
+ if( *pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
+ return( 0 );
switch( sig_alg )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
-
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
default:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
return( 0 );
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ switch( sig_alg )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ return( 1 );
+
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ switch( sig_alg )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+ default:
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
+ sig_alg ) );
+ }
+ return( 1 );
+}
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ /* High byte is hash */
+ unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( sig_alg );
+ unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( sig_alg );
+
+ switch( hash )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ switch( sig )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ return( 1 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const uint16_t sig_alg )
@@ -2068,79 +2155,28 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 )
{
- /* High byte is hash */
- unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( sig_alg );
- unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( sig_alg );
-
- switch( hash )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512:
- break;
-#endif
-
- default:
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- switch( sig )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
- break;
-#endif
-
- default:
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( 1 );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( sig_alg ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 )
{
- mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
- return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
- sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( sig_alg ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
((void) ssl);
((void) sig_alg);
return( 0 );
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( uint16_t sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *key );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
@@ -2276,10 +2312,6 @@
const unsigned char *end );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_pk_context *own_key,
- uint16_t *algorithm );
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 5fa02d2..d3bb291 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -853,10 +853,9 @@
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
- ssl->handshake->sig_algs = ssl->conf->sig_algs;
ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
@@ -1472,6 +1471,14 @@
ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+ ssl->handshake->dn_hints = crt;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int authmode )
{
@@ -4019,28 +4026,6 @@
memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in
- * x509_crt.c. Here, the order matters. Currently we favor stronger hashes,
- * for no fundamental reason.
- * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise
- * about this list. */
-static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
-};
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
-
/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in
* x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters:
* curves with a lower resource usage come first.
@@ -4082,17 +4067,6 @@
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
-};
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/* NOTICE:
* For ssl_preset_*_sig_algs and ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs, the following
@@ -4101,6 +4075,13 @@
* - But if there is a good reason, do not change the order of the algorithms.
* - ssl_tls12_present* is for TLS 1.2 use only.
* - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes.
+ *
+ * When GnuTLS/Openssl server is configured in TLS 1.2 mode with a certificate
+ * declaring an RSA public key and Mbed TLS is configured in hybrid mode, if
+ * `rsa_pss_rsae_*` algorithms are before `rsa_pkcs1_*` ones in this list then
+ * the GnuTLS/Openssl server chooses an `rsa_pss_rsae_*` signature algorithm
+ * for its signature in the key exchange message. As Mbed TLS 1.2 does not
+ * support them, the handshake fails.
*/
static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = {
@@ -4122,10 +4103,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA384_C &&
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
@@ -4138,6 +4115,18 @@
MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE
};
@@ -4421,9 +4410,6 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( conf ) )
conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs;
@@ -4450,9 +4436,6 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( conf ) )
conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs;
@@ -4937,13 +4920,20 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, supported_sig_algs_end, 2 );
sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "received signature algorithm: 0x%x",
- sig_alg ) );
-
- if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, sig_alg ) ||
- ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_alg ) )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "received signature algorithm: 0x%x %s",
+ sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( sig_alg ) ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+ ( ! ( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_alg ) ) ) )
+ {
continue;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "valid signature algorithm: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( sig_alg ) ) );
if( common_idx + 1 < MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE )
{
@@ -7691,10 +7681,38 @@
for( i = 0; received_sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++ )
{
- if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
- received_sig_algs[i] ) )
- return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
- received_sig_algs[i] ) );
+ unsigned int hash_alg_received =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
+ received_sig_algs[i] );
+ unsigned int sig_alg_received =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
+ received_sig_algs[i] );
+
+ if( sig_alg == sig_alg_received )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key )
+ {
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg =
+ mbedtls_psa_translate_md( hash_alg_received );
+
+ if( sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( ssl->handshake->key_cert->key,
+ PSA_ALG_ECDSA( psa_hash_alg ),
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) )
+ continue;
+
+ if( sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( ssl->handshake->key_cert->key,
+ PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
+ psa_hash_alg ),
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) )
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ return( hash_alg_received );
+ }
}
return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE );
@@ -8181,12 +8199,17 @@
for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++ )
{
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got signature scheme [%x] %s",
+ *sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, *sig_alg ) )
continue;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, 0 );
p += 2;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "signature scheme [%x]", *sig_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sent signature scheme [%x] %s",
+ *sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
}
/* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index f516efa..35f11ea 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -2534,6 +2534,7 @@
size_t sig_alg_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
unsigned char *sig_alg;
+ unsigned char *dn;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
@@ -2681,6 +2682,43 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n - dn_len;
+ for( size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len )
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2;
+ mbedtls_x509_name name;
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur, *name_prv;
+ size_t asn1_len;
+ char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
+ memset( &name, 0, sizeof( name ) );
+ dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( dn + i, 0 );
+ if( dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 ||
+ mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + asn1_len, &name ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "DN hint: %.*s",
+ mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( s, sizeof(s), &name ), s ) );
+ name_cur = name.next;
+ while( name_cur != NULL )
+ {
+ name_prv = name_cur;
+ name_cur = name_cur->next;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
+ mbedtls_free( name_prv );
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 21e5cda..4ab3db5 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -682,8 +682,15 @@
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info )
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_algorithm_t pk_alg =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( ciphersuite_info );
+ psa_key_usage_t pk_usage =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( ciphersuite_info );
+#else
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
uint32_t flags;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
@@ -693,7 +700,11 @@
#endif
list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE )
+#else
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) );
@@ -710,7 +721,18 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
cur->cert );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if( ( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start == NULL &&
+ ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start == NULL &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage ) ) ||
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage ) )
+#else
+ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage ) )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+#else
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) );
continue;
@@ -821,21 +843,6 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
- /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
- * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
- sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
- if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
- mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
- ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_type ) ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
- "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
@@ -852,6 +859,21 @@
}
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
+ * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
+ sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
+ if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+ ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_type ) ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
+ "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
*ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
return( 0 );
}
@@ -2489,6 +2511,16 @@
* `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
* CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL )
+ crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints;
+ else
+#endif
+ if( ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL )
+ crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints;
+ else
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 1002414..8ec9f90 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -850,120 +850,84 @@
/*
* STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_pk_context *own_key,
- uint16_t *algorithm )
-{
- mbedtls_pk_type_t sig = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( own_key );
- /* Determine the size of the key */
- size_t own_key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( own_key );
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE;
- ((void) own_key_size);
- switch( sig )
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( uint16_t sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *key )
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( key );
+ size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( key );
+
+ switch( pk_type )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
- switch( own_key_size )
+ switch( key_size )
{
case 256:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 );
+
case 384:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 );
+
case 521:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 );
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "unknown key size: %"
- MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bits",
- own_key_size ) );
break;
}
break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 2048 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 ) )
+ switch( sig_alg )
{
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 3072 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 4096 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 2048 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 3072 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 4096 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "unknown key size: %"
- MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bits",
- own_key_size ) );
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+ return( key_size <= 3072 );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
+ return( key_size <= 7680 );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
+ return( 1 );
+
+ default:
+ break;
}
break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "unknown signature type : %u", sig ) );
break;
}
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *own_key,
+ uint16_t *algorithm )
+{
+ uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
+
+ *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE;
+ for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE ; sig_alg++ )
+ {
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, *sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( *sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( *sig_alg, own_key ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:"
+ "selected signature algorithm %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
+ *algorithm = *sig_alg;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
+ ( "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:"
+ "no suitable signature algorithm found" ) );
return( -1 );
}
@@ -1020,8 +984,9 @@
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateVerify;
*/
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk( ssl, own_key, &algorithm );
- if( ret != 0 || ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl, algorithm ) )
+ ret = ssl_tls13_select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify( ssl, own_key,
+ &algorithm );
+ if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "signature algorithm not in received or offered list." ) );
@@ -1034,6 +999,9 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CertificateVerify with %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( algorithm )) );
+
if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
algorithm, &pk_type, &md_alg ) != 0 )
{
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index ffbbbcf..144c70d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -352,7 +352,6 @@
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert, *key_cert_list;
const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
- uint16_t key_sig_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL )
@@ -372,7 +371,6 @@
for( key_cert = key_cert_list; key_cert != NULL;
key_cert = key_cert->next )
{
- int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "certificate (chain) candidate",
key_cert->cert );
@@ -391,13 +389,21 @@
continue;
}
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk(
- ssl, &key_cert->cert->pk, &key_sig_alg );
- if( ret != 0 )
- continue;
- if( *sig_alg == key_sig_alg )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "check signature algorithm %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(
+ *sig_alg, &key_cert->cert->pk ) )
{
ssl->handshake->key_cert = key_cert;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "selected signature algorithm"
+ " %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(
3, "selected certificate (chain)",
ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert );
@@ -406,6 +412,8 @@
}
}
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "no suitable certificate found" ) );
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C &&
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 97b786a..d6724df 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -1534,7 +1534,19 @@
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
- if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
}
@@ -1558,22 +1570,39 @@
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
}
- else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed25519" ) == 0 )
{
- sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed448" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1;
}
else
{
- mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
- mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms: " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pkcs1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+ ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm \"%s\"\n", q );
+ mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs();
goto exit;
}
}
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index 4251817..8e432bd 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL
#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1
#define DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED
+#define DFL_CERT_REQ_DN_HINT 0
#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE
#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1
#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
@@ -506,6 +507,7 @@
" options: none, optional, required\n" \
" cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list)\n" \
" options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send)\n" \
+ " 2 (send conf dn hint), 3 (send hs dn hint)\n" \
USAGE_IO \
USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
"\n" \
@@ -629,6 +631,7 @@
int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */
int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */
int cert_req_ca_list; /* should we send the CA list? */
+ int cert_req_dn_hint; /* mode to set DN hints for CA list to send */
unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */
int trunc_hmac; /* accept truncated hmac? */
int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */
@@ -1597,6 +1600,7 @@
opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1;
opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
opt.cert_req_ca_list = DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST;
+ opt.cert_req_dn_hint = DFL_CERT_REQ_DN_HINT;
opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE;
opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC;
opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS;
@@ -1923,8 +1927,13 @@
else if( strcmp( p, "cert_req_ca_list" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cert_req_ca_list = atoi( q );
- if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 )
+ if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 3 )
goto usage;
+ if( opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 )
+ {
+ opt.cert_req_dn_hint = opt.cert_req_ca_list;
+ opt.cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED;
+ }
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 )
{
@@ -2370,7 +2379,19 @@
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
- if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
}
@@ -2394,22 +2415,39 @@
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
}
- else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed25519" ) == 0 )
{
- sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed448" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1;
}
else
{
- mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
- mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms: " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pkcs1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+ ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm \"%s\"\n", q );
+ mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs();
goto exit;
}
}
@@ -2732,6 +2770,16 @@
if( opt.cert_req_ca_list != DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( &conf, opt.cert_req_ca_list );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ /* exercise setting DN hints for server certificate request
+ * (Intended for use where the client cert expected has been signed by
+ * a specific CA which is an intermediate in a CA chain, not the root) */
+ if( opt.cert_req_dn_hint == 2 && key_cert_init2 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints( &conf, &srvcert2 );
+#endif
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( &conf, opt.hs_to_min, opt.hs_to_max );
@@ -3332,6 +3380,20 @@
}
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ /* exercise setting DN hints for server certificate request
+ * (Intended for use where the client cert expected has been signed by
+ * a specific CA which is an intermediate in a CA chain, not the root)
+ * (Additionally, the CA choice would typically be influenced by SNI
+ * if being set per-handshake using mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints()) */
+ if( opt.cert_req_dn_hint == 3 && key_cert_init2 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( &ssl, &srvcert2 );
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
index 0e66895..ad9dcdd 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
@@ -263,12 +263,32 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/*
+ * When GnuTLS/Openssl server is configured in TLS 1.2 mode with a certificate
+ * declaring an RSA public key and Mbed TLS is configured in hybrid mode, if
+ * `rsa_pss_rsae_*` algorithms are before `rsa_pkcs1_*` ones in this list then
+ * the GnuTLS/Openssl server chooses an `rsa_pss_rsae_*` signature algorithm
+ * for its signature in the key exchange message. As Mbed TLS 1.2 does not
+ * support them, the handshake fails.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA), \
+ (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA), \
+ ( 0x800 | hash ),
+#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA), \
(( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA),
+#endif
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA),
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/* See above */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA), \
+ ( 0x800 | hash ),
+#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA),
+#endif
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash )
#endif
@@ -330,3 +350,25 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+void mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs( void )
+{
+ mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms:\n" );
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pkcs1_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\tecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pss_rsae_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_rsae_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pss_pss_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_pss_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_pss_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\ted25519 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ed448 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha1 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_sha1\n");
+ mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+}
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index afabb64..edd5161 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -1702,11 +1702,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
@@ -1722,11 +1722,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
@@ -1740,11 +1740,12 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: DHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
+ key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
@@ -1753,47 +1754,16 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-run_test "RSA opaque key on server configured for decryption" \
- "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none" \
- "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \
- 0 \
- -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
- -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
- -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
- -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
- -S "error" \
- -C "error"
-
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-run_test "RSA-PSK opaque key on server configured for decryption" \
- "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
- psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
- "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
- 0 \
- -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
- -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
- -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
- -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
- -S "error" \
- -C "error"
-
# Test using an EC opaque private key for server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
@@ -1807,10 +1777,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "Opaque key for server authentication (ECDH-)" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDH-" \
"$P_SRV force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required key_opaque=1\
crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt\
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none" \
"$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1820,6 +1790,120 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: decrypt with ECC key" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: ecdh with RSA key" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: ECDHE-ECDSA with ecdh" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC keys with different algs, force ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server7.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server5.crt key_file2=data_files/server5.key \
+ key_opaque_algs2=ecdsa-sign,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC keys with different algs, force ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server7.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server5.crt key_file2=data_files/server5.key \
+ key_opaque_algs2=ecdh,none debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC + RSA, force ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
# Test using a RSA opaque private key for server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
@@ -1827,11 +1911,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
@@ -1846,11 +1929,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: DHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
@@ -1859,17 +1941,113 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: RSA-PSK" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
+ psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
+ psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: RSA-" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none " \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: DHE-RSA, PSS instead of PKCS1" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pss,none debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: RSA keys with different algs" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pss,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server4.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server4.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC + RSA, force DHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server4.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server4.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
# Test using an EC opaque private key for client/server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1887,11 +2065,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1908,11 +2086,12 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: DHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1923,6 +2102,7 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+
# Test ciphersuites which we expect to be fully supported by PSA Crypto
# and check that we don't fall back to Mbed TLS' internal crypto primitives.
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM
@@ -5116,6 +5296,39 @@
-c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt conf DN hints in CertificateRequest" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=2 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server1.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server1.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt conf DN hints in CertificateRequest (2)" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=2 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server2.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt hs DN hints in CertificateRequest" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=3 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server1.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server1.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
# Tests for auth_mode, using CA callback, these are duplicated from the authentication tests
# When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly
@@ -11882,6 +12095,229 @@
-s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
-c "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received"
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->O" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key
+ -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache
+ -Verify 10 -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->G" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key
+ -d 4
+ --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key \
+ -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Negotiated version: 3.4" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key \
+ -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI allow_sha1=0 debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI allow_sha1=0 debug_level=4 \
+ sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->O" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key
+ -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache
+ -Verify 10 -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->G" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key
+ -d 4
+ --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
# Test heap memory usage after handshake
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index f643335..1b36d32 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2
Handshake, tls1_3
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3
Handshake, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
@@ -317,6 +317,146 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, no psk
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
Sending app data via TLS, MFL=512 without fragmentation
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:400:512:1:1
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index b8caca3..efec5ea 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -60,7 +60,12 @@
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version server_min_version;
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version server_max_version;
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version expected_negotiated_version;
+ int expected_handshake_result;
+ int expected_ciphersuite;
int pk_alg;
+ int opaque_alg;
+ int opaque_alg2;
+ int opaque_usage;
data_t *psk_str;
int dtls;
int srv_auth_mode;
@@ -87,7 +92,12 @@
opts->server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
opts->server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
opts->expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
+ opts->expected_handshake_result = 0;
+ opts->expected_ciphersuite = 0;
opts->pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
+ opts->opaque_alg = 0;
+ opts->opaque_alg2 = 0;
+ opts->opaque_usage = 0;
opts->psk_str = NULL;
opts->dtls = 0;
opts->srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
@@ -759,11 +769,16 @@
*
* \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code.
*/
-int mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int pk_alg )
+int mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int pk_alg,
+ int opaque_alg, int opaque_alg2,
+ int opaque_usage )
{
int i = 0;
int ret = -1;
mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_slot = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#endif
if( ep == NULL )
{
@@ -846,6 +861,19 @@
}
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( opaque_alg != 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &( cert->pkey ), &key_slot,
+ opaque_alg, opaque_usage,
+ opaque_alg2 ), 0 );
+ }
+#else
+ (void) opaque_alg;
+ (void) opaque_alg2;
+ (void) opaque_usage;
+#endif
+
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->ca_cert ), NULL );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->cert ),
@@ -866,6 +894,10 @@
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( opaque_alg != 0 )
+ psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) );
}
@@ -888,6 +920,7 @@
*/
int mbedtls_endpoint_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int endpoint_type, int pk_alg,
+ int opaque_alg, int opaque_alg2, int opaque_usage,
mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *dtls_context,
mbedtls_test_message_queue *input_queue,
mbedtls_test_message_queue *output_queue,
@@ -977,7 +1010,8 @@
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &( ep->conf ), NULL, NULL, NULL );
#endif
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( ep, pk_alg );
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( ep, pk_alg, opaque_alg,
+ opaque_alg2, opaque_usage );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n( &ep->conf ), user_data_n );
@@ -997,6 +1031,14 @@
mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert = &( ep->cert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &( cert->pkey ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
+ {
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_slot = cert->pkey.pk_ctx;
+
+ psa_destroy_key( *key_slot );
+ }
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) );
}
@@ -1929,7 +1971,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int ret = -1;
#endif
- int expected_handshake_result = 0;
+ int expected_handshake_result = options->expected_handshake_result;
USE_PSA_INIT( );
@@ -1942,7 +1984,11 @@
if( options->dtls != 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- options->pk_alg, &client_context,
+ options->pk_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg2,
+ options->opaque_usage,
+ &client_context,
&client_queue,
&server_queue, NULL ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
@@ -1954,7 +2000,11 @@
else
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL,
+ options->pk_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg2,
+ options->opaque_usage,
+ NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
}
@@ -1988,7 +2038,11 @@
if( options->dtls != 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- options->pk_alg, &server_context,
+ options->pk_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg2,
+ options->opaque_usage,
+ &server_context,
&server_queue,
&client_queue, NULL ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
@@ -2000,7 +2054,11 @@
else
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL,
+ options->pk_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg2,
+ options->opaque_usage,
+ NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
}
@@ -2106,7 +2164,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ), 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( &server.ssl ) == 1 );
-
/* Check that both sides have negotiated the expected version. */
mbedtls_test_set_step( 0 );
if( ! check_ssl_version( options->expected_negotiated_version,
@@ -2118,6 +2175,12 @@
&server.ssl ) )
goto exit;
+ if( options->expected_ciphersuite != 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( server.ssl.session->ciphersuite,
+ options->expected_ciphersuite );
+ }
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
if( options->resize_buffers != 0 )
{
@@ -4710,13 +4773,13 @@
int ret = -1;
ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( NULL, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret );
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( NULL, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( NULL, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, 0, 0, 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret );
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, 0, 0, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -4735,13 +4798,14 @@
USE_PSA_INIT( );
ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &base_ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &second_ep,
( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, 0, 0, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
ret = mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(base_ep.socket),
@@ -4824,6 +4888,30 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+void handshake_ciphersuite_select( char* cipher, int pk_alg, data_t *psk_str,
+ int psa_alg, int psa_alg2, int psa_usage,
+ int expected_handshake_result,
+ int expected_ciphersuite )
+{
+ handshake_test_options options;
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+
+ options.cipher = cipher;
+ options.psk_str = psk_str;
+ options.pk_alg = pk_alg;
+ options.opaque_alg = psa_alg;
+ options.opaque_alg2 = psa_alg2;
+ options.opaque_usage = psa_usage;
+ options.expected_handshake_result = expected_handshake_result;
+ options.expected_ciphersuite = expected_ciphersuite;
+ perform_handshake( &options );
+
+ /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
+ goto exit;
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
void app_data( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len,
int expected_cli_fragments,
@@ -5479,13 +5567,13 @@
* the raw key agreement. Flipping the first byte makes the
* required 0x04 identifier invalid. */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL,
NULL, iana_tls_group_list ), 0 );
/* Server side */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL ), 0 );
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, 0, 0, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(client.socket),
&(server.socket),
