Merge remote-tracking branch 'mbedtls-restricted/development-restricted' into mbedtls-3.2.0rc0-pr
diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index bc8e750..3aca159 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
compatibility on major version changes (e.g. from 3.x to 4.0). We also maintain
ABI compatibility within LTS branches; see the next section for details.
-## Backwards Compatibility
+## Backwards Compatibility for application code
We maintain API compatibility in released versions of Mbed TLS. If you have
code that's working and secure with Mbed TLS x.y.z and does not rely on
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@
modification with any later release x.y'.z' with the same major version
number, and your code will still build, be secure, and work.
+Note that this guarantee only applies if you either use the default
+compile-time configuration (`mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h`) or the same modified
+compile-time configuration. Changing compile-time configuration options can
+result in an incompatible API or ABI, although features will generally not
+affect unrelated features (for example, enabling or disabling a
+cryptographic algorithm does not break code that does not use that
+algorithm).
+
Note that new releases of Mbed TLS may extend the API. Here are some
examples of changes that are common in minor releases of Mbed TLS, and are
not considered API compatibility breaks:
@@ -57,6 +65,25 @@
comes in conflict with backwards compatibility, we will put security first,
but always attempt to provide a compatibility option.
+## Backward compatibility for the key store
+
+We maintain backward compatibility with previous versions of the
+PSA Crypto persistent storage since Mbed TLS 2.25.0, provided that the
+storage backend (PSA ITS implementation) is configured in a compatible way.
+We intend to maintain this backward compatibility throughout a major version
+of Mbed TLS (for example, all Mbed TLS 3.y versions will be able to read
+keys written under any Mbed TLS 3.x with x <= y).
+
+Mbed TLS 3.x can also read keys written by Mbed TLS 2.25.0 through 2.28.x
+LTS, but future major version upgrades (for example from 2.28.x/3.x to 4.y)
+may require the use of an upgrade tool.
+
+Note that this guarantee does not currently fully extend to drivers, which
+are an experimental feature. We intend to maintain compatibility with the
+basic use of drivers from Mbed TLS 2.28.0 onwards, even if driver APIs
+change. However, for more experimental parts of the driver interface, such
+as the use of driver state, we do not yet guarantee backward compatibility.
+
## Long-time support branches
For the LTS branches, additionally we try very hard to also maintain ABI
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_dn_get_next.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_dn_get_next.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04ee954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_dn_get_next.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Add mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next function to return the next relative DN in
+ an X509 name, to allow walking the name list. Fixes #5431.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_final_delay_accessor b/ChangeLog.d/add_final_delay_accessor
index 8d341df..4b8117f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add_final_delay_accessor
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_final_delay_accessor
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Features
- * Add the function mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay() to access the private
+ * Add function mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay() to access the private
final delay field in an mbedtls_timing_delay_context, as requested in
- #5183
+ #5183.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_handshake_completion_accessor b/ChangeLog.d/add_handshake_completion_accessor
index e2b28cf..c06a539 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add_handshake_completion_accessor
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_handshake_completion_accessor
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Features
* Add function mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over() to enable querying if the SSL
Handshake has completed or not, and thus whether to continue calling
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), requested in #4383
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), requested in #4383.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_own_cid_accessors b/ChangeLog.d/add_own_cid_accessors
index fb02868..553299c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add_own_cid_accessors
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_own_cid_accessors
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Features
* Add the function mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid() to access our own connection id
- within mbedtls_ssl_context, as requested in #5184
+ within mbedtls_ssl_context, as requested in #5184.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/asn1write-0-fix b/ChangeLog.d/asn1write-0-fix
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e01244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/asn1write-0-fix
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi() writing an incorrect encoding of 0.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bug_order_x448.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bug_order_x448.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cebefc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/bug_order_x448.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix order value of curve x448.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/cmake_add_subdirectory_support.txt b/ChangeLog.d/cmake_add_subdirectory_support.txt
index afcc4b6..f14f3f8 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/cmake_add_subdirectory_support.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/cmake_add_subdirectory_support.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Changes
- * Add aliases for libraries so that the normal MbedTLS::* targets
- work when MbedTLS is built as a subdirectory. Allows use of
- CMake's FetchContent, as requested in #5688.
+ * In CMake builds, add aliases for libraries so that the normal MbedTLS::*
+ targets work when MbedTLS is built as a subdirectory. This allows the
+ use of FetchContent, as requested in #5688.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/cmake_fix_dll_install.txt b/ChangeLog.d/cmake_fix_dll_install.txt
index df51c65..7f407c4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/cmake_fix_dll_install.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/cmake_fix_dll_install.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
Changes
- * cmake: Fix runtime library install location in mingw
- This install DLLs in bin directory instead of lib.
+ * Fix runtime library install location when building with CMake and MinGW.
+ DLLs are now installed in the bin directory instead of lib.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/deprecate_mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa.txt b/ChangeLog.d/deprecate_mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa.txt
index 782b751..b145243 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/deprecate_mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/deprecate_mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
New deprecations
- * Deprecate mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa() function.
- Use psa_aead_xxx() / psa_cipher_xxx() directly instead.
+ * Deprecate mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). Use psa_aead_xxx() or
+ psa_cipher_xxx() directly instead.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-csr_subject_commas.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-csr_subject_commas.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e01c9a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-csr_subject_commas.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix string representation of DNs when outputting values containing commas
+ and other special characters, conforming to RFC 1779. Fixes #769.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt
index 4746c7b..112fa85 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-parllel-cmake-build-fail.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix a race condition in out-of-source builds with CMake when generated data
- files are already present. Fixes #5374
+ files are already present. Fixes #5374.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt
index 6878645..a6540a1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-windows-cmake-build-with-shared-libraries.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
- * Fix compilation on Windows when building shared library, by setting
- library search path to CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR.
+ * Fix the library search path when building a shared library with CMake
+ on Windows.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-x25519-program.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-x25519-program.txt
index af60465..bf5d6ac 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-x25519-program.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-x25519-program.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
- * Fix a bug in x25519 example program where the removal of
+ * Fix a bug in the x25519 example program where the removal of
MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT caused the program not to run. Fixes #4901 and
#3191.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_some_resource_leaks.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_some_resource_leaks.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9761537
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_some_resource_leaks.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix resource leaks in mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() in low
+ memory conditions.
+Security
+ * Fix potential memory leak inside mbedtls_ssl_cache_set() with
+ an invalid session id length.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/hkdf_extract_expand.txt b/ChangeLog.d/hkdf_extract_expand.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c394bbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/hkdf_extract_expand.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Features
+ * Add HKDF-Expand and HKDF-Extract as separate algorithms in the PSA API.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecp_export.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecp_export.txt
index 4b5d7d4..5dce5b4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecp_export.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ecp_export.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
Features
- * Add mbedtls_ecp_export() function to export ECP
- keypair parameters. Fixes #4838.
+ * Add function mbedtls_ecp_export() to export ECP key pair parameters.
+ Fixes #4838.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha256_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha256_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 865b337..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha256_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Features
- * A64 SHA-2 crypto extension support for SHA-256
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha2_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha2_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6e7f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha2_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+ * Add support for the ARMv8 SHA-2 acceleration instructions when building
+ for Aarch64.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha512_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha512_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 01be0b3..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_sha512_a64_crypto_acceleration.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Features
- * A64 crypto extension support for SHA-512
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_comfig_defaults-memleak.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_comfig_defaults-memleak.txt
index d55c016..043b273 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_comfig_defaults-memleak.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_comfig_defaults-memleak.txt
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
Bugfix
- * Fix memory leak if mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() call is repeated
+ * Fix a memory leak if mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() is called twice.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f569a36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_dn_hint.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+ * Add accessors to configure DN hints for certificate request:
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() and mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints()
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_tls13_client.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_tls13_client.txt
index 855945b..57a26e1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_tls13_client.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_tls13_client.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,2 @@
Features
- * Add ALPN support in tls13 client. Client is able to write ALPN extension
- in client hello, and able to parse the response from server encrypted
- extension.
+ * Add ALPN support in TLS 1.3 clients.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_tlsver_enum.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_tlsver_enum.txt
index 16435c6..c027ab7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_tlsver_enum.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_tlsver_enum.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
+New deprecations
+ * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version() and
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version() in favor of
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version() and
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version().
+
Features
- * Unify internal/external TLS protocol version enums
- * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version()
- Replaced with mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version()
- * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version()
- Replaced with mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version()
+ * Add functions mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version() and
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version() that use a single value to specify
+ the protocol version.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/md_info_from_ctx.txt b/ChangeLog.d/md_info_from_ctx.txt
index f8ec1a0..aa61e1a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/md_info_from_ctx.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/md_info_from_ctx.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
Features
- * Add a function to extract message digest information from a message
- digest context.
+ * Add function mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx() to recall the message digest
+ information that was used to set up a message digest context.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_aead_singleshot_error.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_aead_singleshot_error.txt
index 7243874..ccf1d4c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_aead_singleshot_error.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_aead_singleshot_error.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Changes
- * Return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the algorithm passed to singleshot
+ * Return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the algorithm passed to one-shot
AEAD functions is not an AEAD algorithm. This aligns them with the
- multipart functions, and the PSA Crypto API 1.1 spec.
+ multipart functions, and the PSA Crypto API 1.1 specification.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_reduced_configs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_reduced_configs.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 5bc9bc1..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_reduced_configs.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Changes
- * Automatically enable MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C if MBEDTLS_PK_C and
- MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO are enabled. This is due to ecdsa_verify_wrap
- requirements, but will also probably be needed by RSA soon, hence the
- broader PK_C requirement.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_se.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_se.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8136b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_se.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+New deprecations
+ * Secure element drivers enabled by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C are deprecated.
+ This was intended as an experimental feature, but had not been explicitly
+ documented as such. Use opaque drivers with the interface enabled by
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS instead.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psk_to_ms_mixed_psk.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psk_to_ms_mixed_psk.txt
index b189661..998cc11 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psk_to_ms_mixed_psk.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psk_to_ms_mixed_psk.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Features
* Extend the existing PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS() algorithm to support
- mixed-psk. Add an optional input PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
+ mixed-PSK. Add an optional input PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
holding the other secret.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/raw-agreement-destroy-missing.txt b/ChangeLog.d/raw-agreement-destroy-missing.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7342b8c..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/raw-agreement-destroy-missing.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Add missing key slot destruction calls when a raw key agreement or
- a public key export fails in ssl_write_client_key_exchange.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/resumption_cid.txt b/ChangeLog.d/resumption_cid.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c237aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/resumption_cid.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix server connection identifier setting for outgoing encrypted records
+ on DTLS 1.2 session resumption. After DTLS 1.2 session resumption with
+ connection identifier, the Mbed TLS client now properly sends the server
+ connection identifier in encrypted record headers. Fix #5872.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/selftest-gcc12.txt b/ChangeLog.d/selftest-gcc12.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aafa256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/selftest-gcc12.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Silence a warning from GCC 12 in the selftest program. Fixes #5974.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-fix-finished-fetch.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-fix-finished-fetch.txt
index 28c30f9..9a8acb3 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-fix-finished-fetch.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-fix-finished-fetch.txt
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
- * Fix handshake failure when the peer Finished message has not been received
- yet when we first try to fetch it. The fetching is moved before the
- preprocessing computations to avoid doing them multiple times, which was
- causing the handshake to fail.
+ * Fix a TLS 1.3 handshake failure when the peer Finished message has not
+ been received yet when we first try to fetch it.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a575b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc-changelogs.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix a TLS 1.3 handshake failure when the first attempt to send the client
+ Finished message on the network cannot be satisfied. Fixes #5499.
+
+Features
+ * Add support for authentication of TLS 1.3 clients by TLS 1.3 servers.
+ * Add support for server HelloRetryRequest message. The TLS 1.3 client is
+ now capable of negotiating another shared secret if the one sent in its
+ first ClientHello was not suitable to the server.
+ * Add support for client-side TLS version negotiation. If both TLS 1.2 and
+ TLS 1.3 protocols are enabled in the build of Mbed TLS, the TLS client now
+ negotiates TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2 with TLS servers.
+ * Enable building of Mbed TLS with TLS 1.3 protocol support but without TLS
+ 1.2 protocol support.
+ * Mbed TLS provides an implementation of a TLS 1.3 server (ephemeral key
+ establishment only). See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a
+ description of the support. The MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 and
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C configuration options control this.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13_and_keep_certificates.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13_and_keep_certificates.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c2421f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/tls13_and_keep_certificates.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix check_config.h to check that we have MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+ when MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is specified, and make this and other
+ dependencies explicit in the documentation. Fixes #5610.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-ecdhe-curve.txt b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-ecdhe-curve.txt
index cc432bd..658f88f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-ecdhe-curve.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-ecdhe-curve.txt
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@
client would fail to check that the curve selected by the server for
ECDHE was indeed one that was offered. As a result, the client would
accept any curve that it supported, even if that curve was not allowed
- according to its configuration.
+ according to its configuration. Fixes #5291.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bd97a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/use-psa-improvements.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Features
+ * The configuration option MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, which previously
+ affected only a limited subset of crypto operations in TLS, X.509 and PK,
+ now causes most of them to be done using PSA Crypto; see
+ docs/use-psa-crypto.md for the list of exceptions.
+ * The function mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque() now supports RSA key pairs as well.
+ Opaque keys can now be used everywhere a private key is expected in the
+ TLS and X.509 modules.
+ * Opaque pre-shared keys for TLS, provisioned with
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() or mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(), which
+ previously only worked for "pure" PSK key exchange, now can also be used
+ for the "mixed" PSK key exchanges as well: ECDHE-PSK, DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 275e2dd..8978faf 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -286,11 +286,9 @@
### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS
Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API.
-This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size.
+However, it does not aim to implement the whole specification; in particular it does not implement all the algorithms.
-The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `mbedtls_config.h`.
-
-There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list.
+The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for most operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `mbedtls_config.h`. Note that TLS 1.3 uses PSA cryptography for most operations regardless of this option. See `docs/use-psa-crypto.md` for details.
### Upcoming features
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
index 3653683..b933edf 100644
--- a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
This guide details the steps required to migrate from Mbed TLS version 2.x to
Mbed TLS version 3.0 or greater. Unlike normal releases, Mbed TLS 3.0 breaks
-compatibility with previous versions, so users (and alt implementors) might
+compatibility with previous versions, so users (and alt implementers) might
need to change their own code in order to make it work with Mbed TLS 3.0.
Here's the list of breaking changes; each entry should help you answer these
@@ -13,7 +13,28 @@
- Removal of many insecure or obsolete features
- Tidying up of configuration options (including removing some less useful options).
- Changing function signatures, e.g. adding return codes, adding extra parameters, or making some arguments const.
-- Removal of functions previously marked as deprecated.
+- Removal of functions, macros, and types previously marked as deprecated.
+
+Much of the information needed to determine a migration path can be found in the Mbed TLS 2.x documentation.
+
+
+## Accessing the Mbed TLS 2.x documentation
+
+For features previously marked as deprecated, Mbed TLS 2.x documentation may
+explain how to upgrade, and should be referred to when migrating code. Where a
+migration path is not provided in prior documentation, changes made and the
+upgrade steps required will be explained later in this guide.
+
+It's best to use the latest version of Mbed TLS 2.x for this purpose, which is the 2.28 LTS release.
+So to generate the documentation, checkout the `mbedtls-2.28` branch and follow
+the instructions in the [Documentation section of the README](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-2.28/README.md#documentation).
+Then browse `apidoc/deprecated.html` for guidance on upgrading deprecated code.
+
+For some deprecated functions, 2.x documentation will suggest using a variant
+suffixed with `_ret`. In Mbed TLS 3.x, this change may not be required, as most
+of these variants have been renamed without the suffix. The section
+[Rename mbedtls_*_ret...](#rename-mbedtls__ret-cryptography-functions-whose-deprecated-variants-have-been-removed)
+has further detail on which functions this applies to.
## General changes
@@ -157,7 +178,7 @@
`MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P `and `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G` were
removed. The primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated because their derivation is not
documented and therefore their usage constitutes a security risk; they are fully
-removed from the library. Please use parameters from RFC3526 (still in the
+removed from the library. Please use parameters from RFC 3526 (still in the
library, only in binary form) or RFC 7919 (also available in the library) or
other trusted sources instead.
@@ -248,22 +269,29 @@
### Deprecated error codes for hardware failures were removed
-- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` from various crypto modules
+- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE` from various crypto modules
were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` is now used
instead.
+- The macro `MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION` was removed;
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` is now used instead.
- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_HW_ACCEL_FAILED` from various crypto modules
were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED` is now used instead.
+### Deprecated error codes for invalid input data were removed
+
+- The macros `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH` from ARIA and Camellia
+ modules were removed; `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA` is now used instead.
+
### Remove the mode parameter from RSA functions
-This affects all users who use the RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
+This affects all users who use the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and
verify APIs.
The RSA module no longer supports private-key operations with the public key or
vice versa. As a consequence, RSA operation functions no longer have a mode
parameter. If you were calling RSA operations with the normal mode (public key
for verification or encryption, private key for signature or decryption), remove
-the `MBEDTLS_MODE_PUBLIC` or `MBEDTLS_MODE_PRIVATE` argument. If you were calling
+the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC` or `MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE` argument. If you were calling
RSA operations with the wrong mode, which rarely makes sense from a security
perspective, this is no longer supported.
@@ -334,7 +362,7 @@
### Remove the padding parameters from `mbedtls_rsa_init()`
-This affects all users who use the RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
+This affects all users who use the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and
verify APIs.
The function `mbedtls_rsa_init()` no longer supports selecting the PKCS#1 v2.1
@@ -552,13 +580,13 @@
### Remove `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_*_KEY_USAGE` options from `mbedtls_config.h`
This change affects users who have chosen the configuration options to disable the
-library's verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of x509
+library's verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X.509
certificates.
The `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE` and `MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE`
-configuration options are removed and the X509 code now behaves as if they were
+configuration options are removed and the X.509 code now behaves as if they were
always enabled. It is consequently not possible anymore to disable at compile
-time the verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X509
+time the verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields of X.509
certificates.
The verification of the `keyUsage` and `extendedKeyUsage` fields is important,
diff --git a/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md b/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md
index 914bca3..60203a0 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
The way in which the file name is constructed from the key identifier depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0).
* Library integration: the key file name is just the key identifier as defined in the PSA crypto specification. This is a 32-bit value.
-* PSA service integration: the key file name is `(uint32_t)owner_uid << 32 | key_id` where `key_id` is the key identifier from the owner point of view and `owner_uid` (of type `int32_t`) is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value.
+* PSA service integration: the key file name is `(uint64_t)owner_uid << 32 | key_id` where `key_id` is the key identifier from the owner point of view and `owner_uid` (of type `int32_t`) is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value.
### Key file format for 1.0.0
@@ -120,7 +120,11 @@
### Nonvolatile random seed file format for 1.0.0
-[Identical to 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+The nonvolatile random seed file contains a seed for the random generator. If present, it is rewritten at each boot as part of the random generator initialization.
+
+The file format is just the seed as a byte string with no metadata or encoding of any kind.
+
+This is unchanged since [the feature was introduced in Mbed Crypto 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
### File namespace on a PSA platform for 1.0.0
@@ -167,7 +171,21 @@
Released in early June 2019. <br>
Integrated in Mbed OS 5.13.
-Identical to [1.0.0](#mbed-crypto-1.0.0) except for some changes in the key file format.
+Changes since [1.0.0](#mbed-crypto-1.0.0):
+
+* The stdio backend for storage has been replaced by an implementation of [PSA ITS over stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-1.1.0).
+* [Some changes in the key file format](#key-file-format-for-1.1.0).
+
+### File namespace on stdio for 1.1.0
+
+Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23.
+
+An undocumented build-time configuration value `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory).
+
+* `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile.psa_its"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present.
+* `sprintf(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "%016llx.psa_its", key_id)`: a key or non-key file. The `key_id` in the name is the 64-bit file identifier, which is the [key identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) for a key file or some reserved identifier for a non-key file (currently: only the [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-1.0.0)). The contents of the file are:
+ * Magic header (8 bytes): `"PSA\0ITS\0"`
+ * File contents.
### Key file format for 1.1.0
@@ -314,3 +332,134 @@
* For an opaque key (unified driver interface): driver-specific opaque key blob.
* For an opaque key (key in a secure element): slot number (8 bytes), in platform endianness.
* Any trailing data is rejected on load.
+
+Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+---------------
+
+Tags: `mbedtls-2.25.0`, `mbedtls-2.26.0`, `mbedtls-2.27.0`, `mbedtls-2.28.0`, `mbedtls-3.0.0`, `mbedtls-3.1.0`
+
+First released in December 2020.
+
+Note: this is the first version that is officially supported. The version number is still 0.
+
+Backward compatibility commitments: we promise backward compatibility for stored keys when Mbed TLS is upgraded from x to y if x >= 2.25 and y < 4. See [`BRANCHES.md`](../../BRANCHES.md) for more details.
+
+Supported integrations:
+
+* [PSA platform](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0)
+* [library using PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-as-a-library-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0)
+* [library using C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0)
+
+Supported features:
+
+* [Persistent keys](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) designated by a [key identifier and owner](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). Keys can be:
+ * Transparent, stored in the export format.
+ * Opaque, using the unified driver interface with statically registered drivers (`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS`). The driver determines the content of the opaque key blob.
+ * Opaque, using the deprecated secure element interface with dynamically registered drivers (`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C`). The driver picks a slot number which is stored in the place of the key material.
+* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) on ITS only.
+
+### Changes introduced in Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+* The numerical encodings of `psa_key_type_t`, `psa_key_usage_t` and `psa_algorithm_t` have changed.
+
+### File namespace on a PSA platform on Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace.
+
+Assumption: the owner identifier is a nonzero value of type `int32_t`.
+
+* Files 0 through 0xfffeffff: unused.
+* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). The upper 32 bits determine the owner.
+
+### File namespace on ITS as a library on Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The entity using the crypto library can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace.
+
+This is a library integration, so there is no owner. The key file identifier is identical to the key identifier.
+
+* File 0: unused.
+* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffffffff: unused.
+
+### File namespace on stdio for Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23.
+
+An undocumented build-time configuration value `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory).
+
+* `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile.psa_its"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present.
+* `sprintf(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "%016llx.psa_its", key_id)`: a key or non-key file. The `key_id` in the name is the 64-bit file identifier, which is the [key identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) for a key file or some reserved identifier for a [non-key file](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0). The contents of the file are:
+ * Magic header (8 bytes): `"PSA\0ITS\0"`
+ * File contents.
+
+### Key names for Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file designated by the key identifier. In integrations where there is no concept of key owner (in particular, in library integrations), the key identifier is exactly the key identifier as defined in the PSA Cryptography API specification (`psa_key_id_t`). In integrations where there is a concept of key owner (integration into a service for example), the key identifier is made of an owner identifier (its semantics and type are integration specific) and of the key identifier (`psa_key_id_t`) from the key owner point of view.
+
+The way in which the file name is constructed from the key identifier depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+
+* Library integration: the key file name is just the key identifier as defined in the PSA crypto specification. This is a 32-bit value which must be in the range 0x00000001..0x3fffffff (`PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN`..`PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX`).
+* PSA service integration: the key file name is `(uint64_t)owner_uid << 32 | key_id` where `key_id` is the key identifier from the owner point of view and `owner_uid` (of type `int32_t`) is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value.
+
+### Key file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes except where otherwise indicated.
+
+The layout of a key file is:
+
+* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"`.
+* version (4 bytes): 0.
+* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value.
+* type (2 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value.
+* bits (2 bytes): `psa_key_bits_t` value.
+* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value.
+* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value.
+* policy enrollment algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value.
+* key material length (4 bytes).
+* key material:
+ * For a transparent key: output of `psa_export_key`.
+ * For an opaque key (unified driver interface): driver-specific opaque key blob.
+ * For an opaque key (key in a dynamic secure element): slot number (8 bytes), in platform endianness.
+* Any trailing data is rejected on load.
+
+### Non-key files on Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+File identifiers that are outside the range of persistent key identifiers are reserved for internal use by the library. The only identifiers currently in use have the owner id (top 32 bits) set to 0.
+
+* Files 0xfffffe02 through 0xfffffeff (`PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + lifetime`): dynamic secure element driver storage. The content of the file is the secure element driver's persistent data.
+* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* File 0xffffff54 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID`): [transaction file](#transaction-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* Other files are unused and reserved for future use.
+
+### Nonvolatile random seed file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+[Identical to Mbed Crypto 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0).
+
+### Transaction file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+The transaction file contains data about an ongoing action that cannot be completed atomically. It exists only if there is an ongoing transaction.
+
+All integers are encoded in platform endianness.
+
+All currently existing transactions concern a key in a dynamic secure element.
+
+The layout of a transaction file is:
+
+* type (2 bytes): the [transaction type](#transaction-types-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0).
+* unused (2 bytes)
+* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value that corresponds to a key in a secure element.
+* slot number (8 bytes): `psa_key_slot_number_t` value. This is the unique designation of the key for the secure element driver.
+* key identifier (4 bytes in a library integration, 8 bytes on a PSA platform): the internal representation of the key identifier. On a PSA platform, this encodes the key owner in the same way as [in file identifiers for key files](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0)).
+
+#### Transaction types on Mbed TLS 2.25.0
+
+* 0x0001: key creation. The following locations may or may not contain data about the key that is being created:
+ * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number.
+ * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier.
+ * The driver persistent data.
+* 0x0002: key destruction. The following locations may or may not still contain data about the key that is being destroyed:
+ * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number.
+ * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier.
+ * The driver persistent data.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
index f5b5700..7b8ec99 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
Restartable ECC operations
--------------------------
-There is currently no support for that in PSA at all. API design, as well as
-implementation, would be non-trivial.
+There is currently no support for that in PSA at all, but it will be added at
+some point, see <https://github.com/orgs/Mbed-TLS/projects/1#column-18816849>.
Currently, `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is simply incompatible with
`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`.
@@ -60,16 +60,25 @@
1. Implement support for custom FFDH parameters in PSA Crypto: this would pose
non-trivial API design problem, but most importantly seems backwards, as
-the crypto community is moving away from custom FFDH parameters.
+the crypto community is moving away from custom FFDH parameters. (Could be
+done any time.)
2. Drop the DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK key exchanges in TLS 1.2 when moving to PSA.
-3. Implement RFC 7919, support DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK only in conjunction with it
- when moving to PSA. We can modify our server so that it only selects a DHE
- ciphersuite if the client offered name FFDH groups; unfortunately
+ (For people who want some algorithmic variety in case ECC collapses, FFDH
+would still be available in TLS 1.3, just not in 1.2.) (Can only be done in
+4.0 or another major version.)
+3. Variant of the precedent: only drop client-side support. Server-side is
+ easy to support in terms of API/protocol, as the server picks the
+parameters: we just need remove the existing `mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_xxx()`
+APIs and tell people to use `mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups()` instead. (Can only be
+done in 4.0 or another major version.)
+4. Implement RFC 7919, support DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK only in conjunction with it
+ when moving to PSA. Server-side would work as above; unfortunately
client-side the only option is to offer named groups and break the handshake
if the server didn't take on our offer. This is not fully satisfying, but is
perhaps the least unsatisfying option in terms of result; it's also probably
the one that requires the most work, but it would deliver value beyond PSA
-migration by implementing RFC 7919.
+migration by implementing RFC 7919. (Implementing RFC 7919 could be done any
+time; making it mandatory can only be done in 4.0 or another major version.)
RSA-PSS parameters
------------------
@@ -294,7 +303,7 @@
Mask Algorithm: mgf1 with sha512
Salt Length: 0x3E
-These CSRss are signed with a 2048-bit key. It appears that they are
+These CSRs are signed with a 2048-bit key. It appears that they are
all using saltlen = keylen - hashlen - 2.
### Possible courses of action
@@ -308,87 +317,13 @@
saltlen happens to match hashlen, and falling back to `ANY_SALT` otherwise.
Same issue as with the previous point, except more contained.
3. Reject all certificates with saltlen != hashlen. This includes all
- certificates generate with OpenSSL using the default parameters, so it's
+ certificates generated with OpenSSL using the default parameters, so it's
probably not acceptable.
4. Request an extension to the PSA Crypto API and use one of the above options
in the meantime. Such an extension seems inconvenient and not motivated by
strong security arguments, so it's unclear whether it would be accepted.
-HKDF: Expand not exposed on its own (TLS 1.3)
----------------------------------------------
-
-The HKDF function uses an Extract-then-Expand approach, that is:
-
- HKDF(x, ...) = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(x, ...), ...)
-
-Only the full HKDF function is safe in general, however there are cases when
-one case safely use the individual Extract and Expand; the TLS 1.3 key
-schedule does so. Specifically, looking at the [hierarchy of secrets][13hs]
-is seems that Expand and Extract are always chained, so that this hierarchy
-can be implemented using only the full HKDF. However, looking at the
-derivation of traffic keys (7.3) and the update mechanism (7.2) it appears
-that calls to HKDF-Expand are iterated without any intermediated call to
-HKDF-Extract : that is, the traffic keys are computed as
-
- HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(...)))
-
-(with possibly more than two Expands in a row with update).
-
-[13hs]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#page-93
-
-In the short term (early 2022), we'll work around that by re-implementing HKDF
-in `ssl_tls13_keys.c` based on the `psa_mac_` APIs (for HMAC).
-
-In the long term, it is desirable to extend the PSA API. See
-https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-crypto-api/issues/539
-
Limitations relevant for G2 (isolation of long-term secrets)
============================================================
-Custom key derivations for mixed-PSK handshake
-----------------------------------------------
-
-Currently, `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` enables the new configuration function
-`mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` which allows a PSA-held key to be used for the
-(pure) `PSK` key exchange in TLS 1.2. This requires that the derivation of the
-Master Secret (MS) be done on the PSA side. To support this, an algorithm
-family `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)` was added to PSA Crypto.
-
-If we want to support key isolation for the "mixed PSK" key exchanges:
-DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK, where the PSK is concatenated with the result of
-a DH key agreement (resp. RSA decryption) to form the pre-master secret (PMS)
-from which the MS is derived. If the value of the PSK is to remain hidden, we
-need the derivation PSK + secondary secret -> MS to be implemented as an
-ad-hoc PSA key derivation algorithm.
-
-Adding this new, TLS-specific, key derivation algorithm to PSA Crypto should
-be no harder than it was to add `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS()` but still requires
-an extension to PSA Crypto.
-
-Note: looking at RFCs 4279 and 5489, it appears that the structure of the PMS
-is always the same: 2-byte length of the secondary secret, secondary secret,
-2-byte length of the PSK, PSK. So, a single key derivation algorithm should be
-able to cover the 3 key exchanges DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK and ECDHE-PSK. (That's a
-minor gain: adding 3 algorithms would not be a blocker anyway.)
-
-Note: if later we want to also isolate short-term secret (G3), the "secondary
-secret" (output of DHE/ECDHE key agreement or RSA decryption) could be a
-candidate. This wouldn't be a problem as the PSA key derivation API always
-allows inputs from key slots. (Tangent: the hard part in isolating the result
-of RSA decryption would be still checking that is has the correct format:
-48 bytes, the first two matching the TLS version - note that this is timing
-sensitive.)
-
-HKDF: Expand not exposed on its own (TLS 1.3)
----------------------------------------------
-
-See the section with the same name in the G1 part above for background.
-
-The work-around mentioned there works well enough just for acceleration, but
-is not sufficient for key isolation or generally proper key management (it
-requires marking keys are usable for HMAC while they should only be used for
-key derivation).
-
-The obvious long-term solution is to make HKDF-Expand available as a new KDF
-(in addition to the full HKDF) in PSA (with appropriate warnings in the
-documentation).
+Currently none.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
index 2bb0284..7bb8247 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
@@ -40,16 +40,14 @@
The reasons why `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is optional and disabled by default
are:
- it's incompatible with `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`;
-- historical: used to be incompatible
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` (fixed early 2022, see
- <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5259>);
- it does not work well with `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` (could compile with
both of them, but then `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` won't have the desired
effect)
- to avoid a hard/default dependency of TLS, X.509 and PK on
`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backward compatibility reasons:
- - when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
- `psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions
+ - When `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
+ `psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions. (This prevents us
+from even enabling the option by default.)
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` has a hard depend on `MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C ||
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG` but it's
currently possible to compilte TLS and X.509 without any of the options.
@@ -65,8 +63,11 @@
cost. The rest of this section explains the reasons for the
incompatibilities mentioned above.
-In the medium term (writing this in early 2020), we're going to look for ways
-to make `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` non-optional (always enabled).
+At the time of writing (early 2022) it is unclear what could be done about the
+backward compatibility issues, and in particular if the cost of implementing
+solutions to these problems would be higher or lower than the cost of
+maintaining dual code paths until the next major version. (Note: these
+solutions would probably also solve other problems at the same time.)
### `MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE`
@@ -84,7 +85,13 @@
Note: it is possible to make the options compatible at build time simply by
deciding that when `USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled, PSA APIs are used except if
restartable behaviour was requested at run-time (in addition to enabling
-`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` in the build).
+`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` in the build). This would require some work to
+dispatch operations as intended, and test.
+
+Currently (early 2022) the mild consensus seems to be that since we'll need to
+implement restartable in PSA anyway, it's probably not worth spending time on
+the compatibility issue while waiting for it to get a more satisfying
+resolution when PSA starts supporting restartable.
### `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG`
@@ -174,9 +181,8 @@
- Downside: tricky to implement if the PSA implementation is currently done on
top of that layer (dependency loop).
-This strategy is currently (late 2021) used for ECDSA signature
-verification in the PK layer, and could be extended to all operations in the
-PK layer.
+This strategy is currently (early 2022) used for all operations in the PK
+layer.
This strategy is not very well suited to the Cipher layer, as the PSA
implementation is currently done on top of that layer.
@@ -184,9 +190,9 @@
This strategy will probably be used for some time for the PK layer, while we
figure out what the future of that layer is: parts of it (parse/write, ECDSA
signatures in the format that X.509 & TLS want) are not covered by PSA, so
-they will need to keep existing in some way. Also the PK layer is also a good
+they will need to keep existing in some way. (Also, the PK layer is a good
place for dispatching to either PSA or `mbedtls_xxx_restartable` while that
-part is not covered by PSA yet.
+part is not covered by PSA yet, if we decide to do that.)
Replace calls for each operation
--------------------------------
@@ -199,10 +205,8 @@
code size.
- Downside: TLS/X.509 code has to be done for each operation.
-This strategy is currently (late 2021) used for the MD layer. (Currently only
-a subset of calling places, but will be extended to all of them.)
-
-In the future (early 2022) we're going to use it for the Cipher layer as well.
+This strategy is currently (early 2022) used for the MD layer and the Cipher
+layer.
Opt-in use of PSA from the abstraction layer
--------------------------------------------
@@ -225,20 +229,16 @@
supporting both G1 and G2 in that area), and one without isolation (the key is
still stored outside of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
-This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (end of 2021) used for ECDSA
-signature generation in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This
+This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (early 2022) used for
+private-key operations in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This
allows use of PSA-held private ECDSA keys in TLS and X.509 with no change to
-the TLS/X.509 code, but a contained change in the application. If could be
-extended to other private key operations in the PK layer, which is the plan as
-of early 2022.
+the TLS/X.509 code, but a contained change in the application.
-This strategy, without key isolation, is also currently used in the Cipher
-layer - see `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()`. This allows use of PSA for cipher
-operations in TLS with no change to the application code, and a
-contained change in TLS code. (It currently only supports a subset of
-ciphers.) However, we'll move to the "Replace calls for each operation"
-strategy (early 2022), in the hope of being able to build without this layer
-in order to save some code size in the future.
+This strategy, without key isolation, was also previously used (until 3.1
+included) in the Cipher layer - see `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()`. This allowed
+use of PSA for cipher operations in TLS with no change to the application
+code, and a contained change in TLS code. (It only supported a subset of
+ciphers.)
Note: for private key operations in the PK layer, both the "silent" and the
"opt-in" strategy can apply, and can complement each other, as one provides
@@ -249,13 +249,11 @@
Summary
-------
-Strategies currently used with each abstraction layer:
+Strategies currently (early 2022) used with each abstraction layer:
- PK (for G1): silently call PSA
- PK (for G2): opt-in use of PSA (new key type)
-- Cipher (G1):
- - late 2021: opt-in use of PSA (new setup function)
- - early 2022: moving to "replace calls at each call site"
+- Cipher (G1): replace calls at each call site
- MD (G1): replace calls at each call site
Migrating away from the legacy API
@@ -281,7 +279,7 @@
runtime, RAM usage or code size penalty), for example just a bunch of
`#define`s, essentially mapping `mbedtls_` APIs to their `psa_` equivalent.
-Unfortunately that's unlikely fully work. For example, the MD layer uses the
+Unfortunately that's unlikely to fully work. For example, the MD layer uses the
same context type for hashes and HMACs, while the PSA API (rightfully) has
distinct operation types. Similarly, the Cipher layer uses the same context
type for unauthenticated and AEAD ciphers, which again the PSA API
@@ -373,5 +371,5 @@
the low-level crypto APIs and making PK, MD and Cipher optional compatibility
layers is to be sure to preserve testing quality. A lot of the existing test
cases use the low level crypto APIs; we would need to either keep using that
-API for tests, or manually migrated test to the PSA Crypto API. Perhaps a
+API for tests, or manually migrate tests to the PSA Crypto API. Perhaps a
combination of both, perhaps evolving gradually over time.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 72bd377..0000000
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/tasks-g2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-This document is temporary; it lists tasks to achieve G2 as described in
-`strategy.md` while the strategy is being reviewed - once that's done,
-corresponding github issues will be created and this document removed.
-
-For all of the tasks here, specific testing (integration and unit test depending
-on the task) is required, see `testing.md`.
-
-RSA Signature operations
-========================
-
-In PK
------
-
-### Modify existing `PK_OPAQUE` type to allow for RSA keys
-
-- the following must work and be tested: `mbedtls_pk_get_type()`,
- `mbedtls_pk_get_name()`, `mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen()`, `mbedtls_pk_get_len()`,
-`mbedtls_pk_can_do()`.
-- most likely adapt `pk_psa_genkey()` in `test_suite_pk.function`.
-- all other function (sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt, check pair, debug) will
- return `MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH` and this will be tested too.
-
-### Modify `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque()` to work with RSA.
-
-- OK to have policy hardcoded on signing with PKCS1v1.5, or allow more if
- available at this time
-
-### Modify `mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der()` to work with RSA-opaque.
-
-- OK to just test that a generated key (with `pk_psa_genkey()`) can be
- written, without checking for correctness of the result - this will be
-tested as part of another task
-
-### Make `mbedtls_pk_sign()` work with RSA-opaque.
-
-- testing may extend `pk_psa_sign()` in `test_suite_pk_function` by adding
- selector for ECDSA/RSA.
-
-In X.509
---------
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for CSR generation
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-
-### Test using opaque keys for Certificate generation
-
-- similar to what's done with testing CSR generation
-- should test both RSA and ECDSA as ECDSA is not tested yet
-- might require slight code adaptations, even if unlikely
-
-
-In TLS
-------
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for TLS client auth
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-
-### Test using RSA-opaque for TLS server auth
-
-- similar to what's already done with ECDSA-opaque
-- key exchanges: ECDHE-RSA and DHE-RSA
-
-RSA decrypt
-===========
-
-### Extend `PK_OPAQUE` to allow RSA decryption (PKCS1 v1.5)
-
-### Test using that in TLS for RSA and RSA-PSK key exchange.
-
-Support opaque PSKs for "mixed-PSK" key exchanges
-=================================================
-
-See `PSA-limitations.md`.
-
-Possible split:
-- one task to extend PSA (see `PSA-limitations.md`)
-- then one task per handshake: DHE-PSK, ECDHE-PSK, RSA-PSK (with tests for
- each)
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
index 70229ce..f205c16 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/testing.md
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
However, when it comes to TLS, we also have the option of using debug messages
to confirm which code path is taken. This is generally unnecessary, except when
a decision is made at run-time about whether to use the PSA or legacy code
-path. For example, for record protection, currently some ciphers are supported
-via PSA while some others aren't, with a run-time fallback. In this case, it's
+path. (For example, for record protection, previously (until 3.1), some ciphers were supported
+via PSA while some others weren't, with a run-time fallback. In this case, it's
good to have a debug message checked by the test case to confirm that the
right decision was made at run-time, i. e. that we didn't use the fallback for
-ciphers that are supposed to be supported.
+ciphers that are supposed to be supported.)
New APIs meant for application use
@@ -54,9 +54,8 @@
(We should have the same server-side.)
- in `test_suite_x509write` we have a new test function
`x509_csr_check_opaque()` checking integration of the new API with the
- existing `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()`.
- (We should have something similar for
- `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`.)
+ existing `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()`. (And also
+ `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()` since #5710.)
For some APIs, for example with `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`, testing in
`test_suite_ssl` was historically not possible, so we only have testing in
@@ -65,8 +64,9 @@
New APIs meant for internal use
-------------------------------
-For example, `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` is meant to be used by the TLS
-layer, but probably not directly by applications.
+For example, `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` (no longer used, soon to be
+deprecated - #5261) was meant to be used by the TLS layer, but probably not
+directly by applications.
In that case, we want:
diff --git a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
index 2cf2a48..10da3c5 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
Overview
--------
-Mbed TLS provides a minimum viable implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol
-defined in the "MVP definition" section below. The TLS 1.3 support enablement
+Mbed TLS provides a partial implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol defined in
+the "Support description" section below. The TLS 1.3 support enablement
is controlled by the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 configuration option.
The development of the TLS 1.3 protocol is based on the TLS 1.3 prototype
@@ -16,38 +16,22 @@
status" below describes what remains to be upstreamed.
-MVP definition
---------------
+Support description
+-------------------
- Overview
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP implements only the client side of the protocol.
+ - Mbed TLS implements both the client and the server side of the TLS 1.3
+ protocol.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports ECDHE key establishment.
+ - Mbed TLS supports ECDHE key establishment.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support DHE key establishment.
+ - Mbed TLS does not support DHE key establishment.
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
+ - Mbed TLS does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
session resumption. This implies that it does not support sending early
data (0-RTT data).
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP supports the authentication of the server by the client
- but does not support authentication of the client by the server. In terms
- of TLS 1.3 authentication messages, this means that the TLS 1.3 MVP
- supports the processing of the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages
- but not of the CertificateRequest message.
-
- - The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support the handling of server HelloRetryRequest
- message. In practice, this means that the handshake will fail if the MVP
- does not provide in its ClientHello the shared secret associated to the
- group selected by the server for key establishement. For more information,
- see the comment associated to the `key_share` extension below.
-
- - If the TLS 1.3 MVP receives a HelloRetryRequest or a CertificateRequest
- message, it aborts the handshake with an handshake_failure closure alert
- and the `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` returns in error with the
- `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE` error code.
-
- Supported cipher suites: depends on the library configuration. Potentially
all of them:
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
@@ -55,94 +39,72 @@
- Supported ClientHello extensions:
- | Extension | MVP | Prototype (1) |
- | ---------------------------- | ------- | ------------- |
- | server_name | YES | YES |
- | max_fragment_length | no | YES |
- | status_request | no | no |
- | supported_groups | YES | YES |
- | signature_algorithms | YES | YES |
- | use_srtp | no | no |
- | heartbeat | no | no |
- | apln | no | YES |
- | signed_certificate_timestamp | no | no |
- | client_certificate_type | no | no |
- | server_certificate_type | no | no |
- | padding | no | no |
- | key_share | YES (2) | YES |
- | pre_shared_key | no | YES |
- | psk_key_exchange_modes | no | YES |
- | early_data | no | YES |
- | cookie | no | YES |
- | supported_versions | YES (3) | YES |
- | certificate_authorities | no | no |
- | post_handshake_auth | no | no |
- | signature_algorithms_cert | no | no |
+ | Extension | Support |
+ | ---------------------------- | ------- |
+ | server_name | YES |
+ | max_fragment_length | no |
+ | status_request | no |
+ | supported_groups | YES |
+ | signature_algorithms | YES |
+ | use_srtp | no |
+ | heartbeat | no |
+ | apln | YES |
+ | signed_certificate_timestamp | no |
+ | client_certificate_type | no |
+ | server_certificate_type | no |
+ | padding | no |
+ | key_share | YES |
+ | pre_shared_key | no |
+ | psk_key_exchange_modes | no |
+ | early_data | no |
+ | cookie | no |
+ | supported_versions | YES |
+ | certificate_authorities | no |
+ | post_handshake_auth | no |
+ | signature_algorithms_cert | no |
- (1) This is just for comparison.
-
- (2) The MVP sends only one shared secret corresponding to the configured
- preferred group. This could end up with connection failure if the
- server does not support our preferred curve, as the MVP does not implement
- HelloRetryRequest. The preferred group is the group of the first curve in
- the list of allowed curves as defined by the configuration. The allowed
- curves are by default ordered as follows: `x25519`, `secp256r1`,
- `secp384r1` and finally `secp521r1`. Note that, in the absence of an
- application profile standard specifying otherwise, section 9.1 of the
- specification rather promotes curve `secp256r1` to be supported over
- curve `x25519`. The MVP would, however, rather keep the preference order
- currently promoted by Mbed TLS as this applies to TLS 1.2 as well, and
- changing the order only for TLS1.3 would be potentially difficult.
- In the unlikely event a server does not support curve `x25519` but does
- support curve `secp256r1`, curve `secp256r1` can be set as the preferred
- curve through the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()` API.
-
- (3) The MVP proposes only TLS 1.3 and does not support version negotiation.
- Out-of-protocol fallback is supported though if the Mbed TLS library
- has been built to support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2: just set the
- maximum of the minor version of the SSL configuration to
- MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 (`mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version()` API) and
- re-initiate a server handshake.
- Supported groups: depends on the library configuration.
- Potentially all ECDHE groups but x448:
- secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1 and secp521r1.
+ Potentially all ECDHE groups:
+ secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1, x448 and secp521r1.
Finite field groups (DHE) are not supported.
- Supported signature algorithms (both for certificates and CertificateVerify):
depends on the library configuration.
Potentially:
- rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
- ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 and ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512.
+ ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pkcs1_sha384, rsa_pkcs1_sha512, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
+ rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 and rsa_pss_rsae_sha512.
Note that in absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise
- the three first ones in the list above are mandatory (see section 9.1 of the
- specification).
+ rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 are
+ mandatory (see section 9.1 of the specification).
- Supported versions:
- - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 but version negotiation is not supported.
+ - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 with version negotiation on the client side, not server
+ side.
- - TLS 1.3 cannot be enabled in the build (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
- configuration option) without TLS 1.2 (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 configuration
- option).
-
- - TLS 1.2 can be enabled in the build independently of TLS 1.3.
+ - TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 can be enabled in the build independently of each
+ other.
- If both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 are enabled at build time, only one of them can
- be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_version`. Otherwise,
- `mbedtls_ssl_setup` will raise `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG` error.
+ be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_tls_version` for a
+ server endpoint. Otherwise, `mbedtls_ssl_setup` will raise
+ `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG` error.
- Compatibility with existing SSL/TLS build options:
- The TLS 1.3 MVP is compatible with all TLS 1.2 configuration options in the
- sense that when enabling the TLS 1.3 MVP in the library there is no need to
- modify the configuration for TLS 1.2. The MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO configuration
- option is an exception though, the TLS 1.3 MVP is not compatible with it.
+ The TLS 1.3 implementation is compatible with nearly all TLS 1.2
+ configuration options in the sense that when enabling TLS 1.3 in the library
+ there is rarely any need to modify the configuration from that used for
+ TLS 1.2. There are two exceptions though: the TLS 1.3 implementation requires
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, so these options
+ must be enabled.
- Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related features are not supported or not applicable to the
- TLS 1.3 MVP:
+ Most of the Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related options are not supported or not
+ applicable to the TLS 1.3 implementation:
| Mbed TLS configuration option | Support |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------- |
@@ -152,13 +114,12 @@
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | n/a |
- | MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE | no |
+ | MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE | no (1) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS | no |
- | MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS | no (1) |
- | MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | no |
+ | MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | yes |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE | no |
@@ -176,35 +137,20 @@
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED | n/a |
| | |
- | MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | no |
+ | MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C | no (1) |
+ | MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | yes |
- (1) Some support has already been upstreamed but it is incomplete.
+ (1) These options must remain in their default state of enabled.
(2) Key exchange configuration options for TLS 1.3 will likely to be
organized around the notion of key exchange mode along the line
of the MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE/PSK/PSK_EPHEMERAL/EPHEMERAL
runtime configuration macros.
-- Quality considerations
- - Standard Mbed TLS review bar
- - Interoperability testing with OpenSSL and GnuTLS. Test with all the
- cipher suites and signature algorithms supported by OpenSSL/GnuTLS server.
- - Negative testing against OpenSSL/GnuTLS servers with which the
- handshake fails due to incompatibility with the capabilities of the
- MVP: TLS 1.2 or 1.1 server, server sending an HelloRetryRequest message in
- response to the MVP ClientHello, server sending a CertificateRequest
- message ...
-
Prototype upstreaming status
----------------------------
-The following summarizes which parts of the TLS 1.3 prototype remain to be
-upstreamed:
-
-- Ephemeral only handshake on client side: client authentication,
- HelloRetryRequest support, version negotiation.
-
-- Ephemeral only handshake server side.
+The following parts of the TLS 1.3 prototype remain to be upstreamed:
- Pre-shared keys, session resumption and 0-RTT data (both client and server
side).
@@ -409,3 +355,101 @@
buf_len );
```
even if it fits.
+
+
+Overview of handshake code organization
+---------------------------------------
+
+The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol is implemented as a state machine. The
+functions `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_{client,server}_step` are the top level
+functions of that implementation. They are implemented as a switch over all the
+possible states of the state machine.
+
+Most of the states are either dedicated to the processing or writing of an
+handshake message.
+
+The implementation does not go systematically through all states as this would
+result in too many checks of whether something needs to be done or not in a
+given state to be duplicated across several state handlers. For example, on
+client side, the states related to certificate parsing and validation are
+bypassed if the handshake is based on a pre-shared key and thus does not
+involve certificates.
+
+On the contrary, the implementation goes systematically though some states
+even if they could be bypassed if it helps in minimizing when and where inbound
+and outbound keys are updated. The `MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` state on
+client side is a example of that.
+
+The names of the handlers processing/writing an handshake message are
+prefixed with `(mbedtls_)ssl_tls13_{process,write}`. To ease the maintenance and
+reduce the risk of bugs, the code of the message processing and writing
+handlers is split into a sequence of stages.
+
+The sending of data to the peer only occurs in `mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step`
+between the calls to the handlers and as a consequence handlers do not have to
+care about the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. Furthermore, all pending
+data are flushed before to call the next handler. That way, handlers do not
+have to worry about pending data when changing outbound keys.
+
+### Message processing handlers
+For message processing handlers, the stages are:
+
+* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
+optional. The check is either purely based on the reading of the value of some
+fields of the SSL context or based on the reading of the type of the next
+message. The latter occurs when it is not known what the next handshake message
+will be, an example of that on client side being if we are going to receive a
+CertificateRequest message or not. The intent is, apart from the next record
+reading to not modify the SSL context as this stage may be repeated if the
+next handshake message has not been received yet.
+
+* fetching stage: at this stage we are sure of the type of the handshake
+message we must receive next and we try to fetch it. If we did not go through
+a coordination stage involving the next record type reading, the next
+handshake message may not have been received yet, the handler returns with
+`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ` without changing the current state and it will be
+called again later.
+
+* pre-processing stage: prepare the SSL context for the message parsing. This
+stage is optional. Any processing that must be done before the parsing of the
+message or that can be done to simplify the parsing code. Some simple and
+partial parsing of the handshake message may append at that stage like in the
+ServerHello message pre-processing.
+
+* parsing stage: parse the message and restrict as much as possible any
+update of the SSL context. The idea of the pre-processing/parsing/post-processing
+organization is to concentrate solely on the parsing in the parsing function to
+reduce the size of its code and to simplify it.
+
+* post-processing stage: following the parsing, further update of the SSL
+context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
+optional. For example, secret and key computations occur at this stage, as well
+as handshake messages checksum update.
+
+* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease the
+navigation of the state machine transitions.
+
+
+### Message writing handlers
+For message writing handlers, the stages are:
+
+* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
+optional. The check is based on the value of some fields of the SSL context.
+
+* preparation stage: prepare for the message writing. This stage is optional.
+Any processing that must be done before the writing of the message or that can
+be done to simplify the writing code.
+
+* writing stage: write the message and restrict as much as possible any update
+of the SSL context. The idea of the preparation/writing/finalization
+organization is to concentrate solely on the writing in the writing function to
+reduce the size of its code and simplify it.
+
+* finalization stage: following the writing, further update of the SSL
+context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
+optional. For example, handshake secret and key computation occur at that
+stage (ServerHello writing finalization), switching to handshake keys for
+outbound message on server side as well.
+
+* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease
+the navigation of the state machine transitions.
diff --git a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
index 9c97b5d..c849221 100644
--- a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
+++ b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
@@ -1,107 +1,80 @@
This document describes the compile-time configuration option
-`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective, more specifically its
-current effects as well as the parts that aren't covered yet.
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective.
-Current effects
-===============
+This option makes the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic
+operations, and enables new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto.
-General limitations
--------------------
+General considerations
+----------------------
-Compile-time: enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires
-`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` and
-`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` to be disabled.
+**Compile-time:** enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires
+`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` to be disabled.
-Effect: `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` has no effect on TLS 1.3 for which PSA
-cryptography is mandatory.
+**Application code:** when this option is enabled, you need to call
+`psa_crypto_init()` before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK
+module.
-Stability: any API that's only available when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is
-defined is considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any
-time. Said otherwise, these APIs are explicitly excluded from the usual API
-stability promises.
+**Scope:** `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` has no effect on the parts of the code that
+are specific to TLS 1.3; those parts always use PSA Crypto. The parts of the
+TLS 1.3 code that are common with TLS 1.2, however, follow this option;
+currently this is the record protection code, computation of the running
+handshake hash, and X.509). You need to enable `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` if you
+want TLS 1.3 to use PSA everywhere.
New APIs / API extensions
-------------------------
-Some of these APIs are meant for the application to use in place of
-pre-existing APIs, in order to get access to the benefits; in the sub-sections
-below these are indicated by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: opt-in", meaning that
-this requires changes to the application code for the (X.509 and) TLS layers
-to pick up the improvements.
-
-Some of these APIs are mostly meant for internal use by the TLS (and X.509)
-layers; they are indicated below by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: automatic",
-meaning that no changes to the application code are required for the TLS (and
-X.509) layers to pick up the improvements.
-
### PSA-held (opaque) keys in the PK layer
-There is a new API function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` that can be used to
-wrap a PSA keypair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key
+**New API function:** `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` - can be used to
+wrap a PSA key pair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key
operations and its public part can be exported.
-Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+**Benefits:** isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-Limitations: only for private keys, only ECC. (That is, only ECDSA signature
-generation. Note: currently this will use randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses
-deterministic ECDSA by default.) The following operations are not supported
+**Limitations:** can only wrap a key pair, can only use it for private key
+operations. (That is, signature generation, and for RSA decryption too.)
+Note: for ECDSA, currently this uses randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses
+deterministic ECDSA by default. The following operations are not supported
with a context set this way, while they would be available with a normal
-`ECKEY` context: `mbedtls_pk_verify()`, `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`,
-`mbedtls_pk_debug()`.
+context: `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`, `mbedtls_pk_debug()`, all public key
+operations.
-Use in X.509 and TLS: opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context
+**Use in X.509 and TLS:** opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context
using the new API in order to get the benefits; it can then pass the
resulting context to the following existing APIs:
- `mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert()` or `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert()` to use the
- key together with a certificate for ECDSA-based key exchanges (note: while
-this is supported on both sides, it's currently only tested client-side);
+ key together with a certificate for certificate-based key exchanges;
- `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()` to generate a CSR (certificate signature
- request).
-
-In the TLS and X.509 API, there's one other function which accepts a keypair
-as a PK context: `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`. Use of opaque
-contexts here probably works but is so far untested.
+ request);
+- `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()` to generate a certificate.
### PSA-held (opaque) keys for TLS pre-shared keys (PSK)
-There are two new API functions `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and
+**New API functions:** `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and
`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`. Call one of these from an application to
register a PSA key for use with a PSK key exchange.
-Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets.
+**Benefits:** isolation of long-term secrets.
-Limitations: the key can only be used with "pure"
-PSK key exchanges (ciphersuites starting with `TLS_PSK_WITH_`), to the
-exclusion of RSA-PSK, DHE-PSK and ECDHE-PSK key exchanges. It is the responsibility of
-the user to make sure that when provisioning an opaque pre-shared key, the
-only PSK ciphersuites that can be negotiated are "pure" PSK; other XXX-PSK key
-exchanges will result in a handshake failure with the handshake function
-returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE`.
+**Limitations:** none.
-Use in TLS: opt-in. The application needs to register the key using the new
-APIs to get the benefits.
+**Use in TLS:** opt-in. The application needs to register the key using one of
+the new APIs to get the benefits.
### PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer
There is a new API function `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` to set up a context
that will call PSA to store the key and perform the operations.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers; partial isolation of short-term secrets
-(still generated outside of PSA, but then held by PSA).
+This function only worked for a small number of ciphers. It is now deprecated
+and it is recommended to use `psa_cipher_xxx()` or `psa_aead_xxx()` functions
+directly instead.
-Limitations: the key is still passed in the clear by the application. The
-multi-part APIs are not supported, only the one-shot APIs. The only modes
-supported are ECB, CBC without padding, GCM and CCM (this excludes stream
-ciphers and ChachaPoly); the only cipher supported is AES (this excludes Aria,
-Camellia, and ChachaPoly). (Note: ECB is currently not tested.) (Note: it is
-possible to perform multiple one-shot operations with the same context;
-however this is not unit-tested, only tested via usage in TLS.)
-
-Use in TLS: automatic. Used when the cipher and mode is supported (with
-gracious fallback to the legacy API otherwise) in all places where a cipher is
-used. There are two such places: in `ssl_tls.c` for record protection, and in
-`ssl_ticket.c` for protecting tickets we issue.
+**Warning:** This function will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS. If
+you are using it and would like us to keep it, please let us know about your
+use case.
Internal changes
----------------
@@ -109,89 +82,34 @@
All of these internal changes are active as soon as `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`
is enabled, no change required on the application side.
-### TLS: cipher operations based on PSA
+### TLS: most crypto operations based on PSA
-See "PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer" above.
+Current exceptions:
-### PK layer: ECDSA verification based on PSA
+- EC J-PAKE (when `MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED` is defined)
+- finite-field (non-EC) Diffie-Hellman (used in key exchanges: DHE-RSA,
+ DHE-PSK)
-Scope: `mbedtls_pk_verify()` will call to PSA for ECDSA signature
-verification.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+### X.509: most crypto operations based on PSA
-Use in TLS and X.509: in all places where an ECDSA signature is verified.
+Current exception:
-### TLS: ECDHE computation based on PSA
+- verification of RSA-PSS signatures with a salt length that is different from
+ the hash length.
-Scope: Client-side, for ECDHE-RSA and ECDHE-ECDSA key exchanges, the
-computation of the ECDHE key exchange is done by PSA.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Limitations: client-side only, ECDHE-PSK not covered
+### PK layer: most crypto operations based on PSA
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
+Current exception:
-### TLS: handshake hashes and PRF computed with PSA
+- verification of RSA-PSS signatures with a salt length that is different from
+ the hash length.
-Scope: with TLS 1.2, the following are computed with PSA:
-- the running handshake hashes;
-- the hash of the ServerKeyExchange part that is signed;
-- the `verify_data` part of the Finished message;
-- the TLS PRF.
+Other than the above exceptions, all crypto operations are based on PSA when
+`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-
-### X.509: some hashes computed with PSA
-
-Scope: the following hashes are computed with PSA:
-- when verifying a certificate chain, hash of the child for verifying the
- parent's signature;
-- when writing a CSR, hash of the request for self-signing the request.
-
-Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers.
-
-Parts that are not covered yet
-==============================
-
-This is only a high-level overview, grouped by theme
-
-TLS: key exchanges / asymmetric crypto
---------------------------------------
-
-The following key exchanges are not covered at all:
-
-- RSA
-- DHE-RSA
-- DHE-PSK
-- RSA-PSK
-- ECDHE-PSK
-- ECDH-RSA
-- ECDH-ECDSA
-- ECJPAKE
-
-The following key exchanges are only partially covered:
-
-- ECDHE-RSA: RSA operations are not covered and, server-side, the ECDHE
- operation isn't either
-- ECDHE-ECDSA: server-side, the ECDHE operation isn't covered. (ECDSA
- signature generation is only covered if using `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`.)
-
-PSK if covered when the application uses `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` or
-`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`.
-
-TLS: symmetric crypto
----------------------
-
-- some ciphers not supported via PSA yet: ARIA, Camellia, ChachaPoly (silent
- fallback to the legacy APIs)
-- the HMAC part of the CBC and NULL ciphersuites
-- the HMAC computation in `ssl_cookie.c`
-
-X.509
------
-
-- most hash operations are still done via the legacy API, except the few that
- are documented above as using PSA
-- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation (from PSA-held keys)
-- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification
-- RSA-PSS signature verification
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 1c3d6ab..5fe9849 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -595,6 +595,14 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@@ -743,6 +751,13 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
+/*
+ * The current implementation of TLS 1.3 requires MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE"
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
index 7718f85..2a6672e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
@@ -121,6 +121,20 @@
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
@@ -592,11 +606,19 @@
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+/* Enable PSA HKDF algorithm if mbedtls HKDF is supported.
+ * PSA HKDF EXTRACT and PSA HKDF EXPAND have minimal cost when
+ * PSA HKDF is enabled, so enable both algorithms together
+ * with PSA HKDF. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index 060973f..1c60ec8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -1185,8 +1185,9 @@
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
- * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed
- * without notice.
+ * \warning This interface is experimental. We intend to maintain backward
+ * compatibility with application code that relies on drivers,
+ * but the driver interfaces may change without notice.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
@@ -1445,6 +1446,8 @@
* still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation,
* for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate.
*
+ * \note This option is required if MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is set.
+ *
* Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate
* after the handshake.
*/
@@ -1503,8 +1506,16 @@
* See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a description of the TLS
* 1.3 support that this option enables.
*
- * Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3.
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
+ * Note: even though TLS 1.3 depends on PSA Crypto, if you want it to only use
+ * PSA for all crypto operations, you need to also enable
+ * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO; otherwise X.509 operations, and functions that are
+ * common with TLS 1.2 (record protection, running handshake hash) will still
+ * use non-PSA crypto.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1759,12 +1770,11 @@
* \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this
* option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far.
*
- * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently
- * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time.
- * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual
- * promises of API stability.
+ * \warning If you enable this option, you need to call `psa_crypto_init()`
+ * before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK modules.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
+ * Conflicts with: MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
*
* Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs.
*/
@@ -2687,11 +2697,11 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
*
- * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture
+ * Enable dynamic secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture
* cryptography API.
*
- * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided
- * for API evaluation and testing purposes only.
+ * \deprecated This feature is deprecated. Please switch to the driver
+ * interface enabled by #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c
*
@@ -2814,9 +2824,9 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
*
- * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm with the
- * Arm A64 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. If not,
- * it will fall back to the C implementation.
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime.
+ * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation.
*
* \note If MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building
* for a non-Aarch64 build it will be silently ignored.
@@ -2839,9 +2849,9 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
*
- * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm with the
- * Arm A64 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime (or
- * an illegal instruction fault will occur).
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime
+ * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur.
*
* \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with
* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
@@ -2897,9 +2907,9 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
*
- * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithm with the
- * Arm A64 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. If not,
- * it will fall back to the C implementation.
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime.
+ * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation.
*
* \note If MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building
* for a non-Aarch64 build it will be silently ignored.
@@ -2924,9 +2934,9 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
*
- * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithm with the
- * Arm A64 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime (or
- * an illegal instruction fault will occur).
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime
+ * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur.
*
* \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with
* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 79d7ddd..b3b5d47 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -647,6 +647,8 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
}
mbedtls_ssl_states;
@@ -1494,6 +1496,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
+#endif
};
struct mbedtls_ssl_context
@@ -3126,6 +3132,26 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken
+ * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain()
+ * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain())
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+static inline
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/**
* \brief Set the trusted certificate callback.
@@ -3650,6 +3676,21 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
/**
* \brief Set authmode for the current handshake.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
index c770528..cd6ccbc 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
@@ -389,6 +389,10 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info );
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
index 3c76fec..213efa0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -267,6 +267,25 @@
int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn );
/**
+ * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name.
+ *
+ * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next
+ * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs.
+ *
+ * \param dn Current node in the X509 name
+ *
+ * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the
+ * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_x509_name * mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next(
+ mbedtls_x509_name * dn )
+{
+ while( dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL )
+ dn = dn->next;
+ return( dn->next );
+}
+
+/**
* \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf;
* no more than size characters will be written.
*
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
index e437750..991be96 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_config.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_config.h
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
index 434554d..957b4c6 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@@ -181,7 +181,9 @@
return( v );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
typedef struct
{
uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info);
@@ -197,7 +199,9 @@
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prk)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
struct psa_mac_operation_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac);
} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF ||
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT ||
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
@@ -254,7 +258,9 @@
{
/* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hkdf);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
index 2cf965d..e619cf5 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_types.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
@@ -70,38 +70,70 @@
*/
/** \brief Encoding of a key type.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t;
/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers.
*
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`.
+ *
* The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the
* PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY()
* macros.
*
* Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
* Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t;
/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers.
*
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`.
+ *
* The group identifier is required to create an Diffie-Hellman key using the
* PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY()
* macros.
*
* Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
* Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t;
/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.
*
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_ALG_xxx`.
+ *
* For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type
* does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers
* based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher
* mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded
* via #psa_key_type_t.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
@@ -143,6 +175,14 @@
* #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is
* available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the
* library configuration.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
@@ -174,6 +214,11 @@
* \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management
* interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
* encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t;
@@ -210,6 +255,11 @@
* \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management
* interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
* encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t;
@@ -221,9 +271,27 @@
* #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX.
* - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier.
* - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful
+ * consideration to allow backward compatibility.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
+/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation.
+ *
+ * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type
+ * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service
+ * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type
+ * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as
+ * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns
+ * the key.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t;
@@ -247,7 +315,16 @@
* @{
*/
-/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. */
+/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros
+ * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
/**@}*/
@@ -376,7 +453,11 @@
* @{
*/
-/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. */
+/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`.
+ */
typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;
/**@}*/
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
index 17d7a9b..b3526ae 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@
* designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
* the library.
*
+ * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in
+ * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage
+ * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage
+ * format version changes).
+ *
* This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
*/
/*
@@ -41,6 +46,18 @@
/* PSA error codes */
+/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage,
+ * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions
+ * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header
+ * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source,
+ * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and
+ * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand
+ * to the same sequence of tokens.
+ *
+ * If you must add a new
+ * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other
+ * domains aren't already using. */
+
/** The action was completed successfully. */
#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
@@ -317,6 +334,12 @@
* @{
*/
+/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are
+ * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a
+ * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version
+ * changes).
+ */
+
/** An invalid key type value.
*
* Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
@@ -719,6 +742,11 @@
1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \
0u)
+/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store,
+ * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed
+ * (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
*
* Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
@@ -1741,6 +1769,12 @@
* You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
* starting to generate output.
*
+ * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
+ * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
+ * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
+ * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
+ * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
+ *
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
@@ -1766,6 +1800,112 @@
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000400)
+/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is
+ * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the
+ * "extract" step.
+ * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
+ * Each input may only be passed once.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF
+ * should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided
+ * as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a
+ * building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization
+ * in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many
+ * different info strings.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
+ * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
+ * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
+ * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
+ * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ *
+ * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
+ * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000500)
+/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is
+ * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.
+ *
+ * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
+ * Each input may only be passed once.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF`
+ * should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as
+ * a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building
+ * block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications
+ * that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
+ * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or
+ * HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \
+ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \
+ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
+
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000200)
/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
*
@@ -2095,6 +2235,11 @@
* @{
*/
+/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
/** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
*
* A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed.
@@ -2210,6 +2355,11 @@
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000)
+/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
/** The null key identifier.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0)
@@ -2321,6 +2471,11 @@
* @{
*/
+/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
/** Whether the key may be exported.
*
* A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
@@ -2447,6 +2602,9 @@
* @{
*/
+/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can
+ * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */
+
/** A secret input for key derivation.
*
* This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
diff --git a/library/asn1write.c b/library/asn1write.c
index 2110052..053dbb6 100644
--- a/library/asn1write.c
+++ b/library/asn1write.c
@@ -133,6 +133,11 @@
//
len = mbedtls_mpi_size( X );
+ /* DER represents 0 with a sign bit (0=nonnegative) and 7 value bits, not
+ * as 0 digits. We need to end up with 020100, not with 0200. */
+ if( len == 0 )
+ len = 1;
+
if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 6b8ff5c..51956cd 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -4737,6 +4737,8 @@
ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp );
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init( grp );
+
grp->id = id;
switch( id )
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 722abd7..73d59a6 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -1457,10 +1457,16 @@
{
p = pem.buf;
if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG );
+ }
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
return( ret );
+ }
if ( ( ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ) ) != 0 )
mbedtls_pk_free( ctx );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index c3af7aa..b0116dd 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@
#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+#define BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF 1
+#endif
+
/****************************************************************/
/* Global data, support functions and library management */
/****************************************************************/
@@ -4235,13 +4241,13 @@
/* Generators */
/****************************************************************/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF
#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(
@@ -4294,14 +4300,14 @@
* nothing to do. */
}
else
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
{
mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.hkdf.info );
status = psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac );
}
else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
@@ -4375,19 +4381,29 @@
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
-/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk
- * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF)
+/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. */
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+ psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg,
uint8_t *output,
size_t output_length )
{
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
size_t hmac_output_length;
psa_status_t status;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ const uint8_t last_block = PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) ? 0 : 0xff;
+#else
+ const uint8_t last_block = 0xff;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
- if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set )
+ if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED ||
+ ( !hkdf->info_set
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ && !PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+ ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT;
@@ -4403,12 +4419,12 @@
hkdf->offset_in_block += n;
if( output_length == 0 )
break;
- /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise
+ /* We can't be wanting more output after the last block, otherwise
* the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have
* prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation
* object was corrupted or if this function is called directly
* inside the library. */
- if( hkdf->block_number == 0xff )
+ if( hkdf->block_number == last_block )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* We need a new block */
@@ -4449,7 +4465,7 @@
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
@@ -4649,15 +4665,14 @@
}
operation->capacity -= output_length;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
{
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
- status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( &operation->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg,
+ status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( &operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg,
output, output_length );
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
@@ -5046,6 +5061,14 @@
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
return( 1 );
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ return( 1 );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) )
+ return( 1 );
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
return( 1 );
@@ -5097,8 +5120,12 @@
{
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
}
-
- operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ operation->capacity = hash_size;
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+ operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
@@ -5152,17 +5179,22 @@
return( status );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF)
static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+ psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg,
psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
psa_status_t status;
switch( step )
{
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
else
@@ -5176,33 +5208,82 @@
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
- /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */
- if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) )
{
- status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac,
- hash_alg,
- NULL, 0 );
+ /* We shouldn't be in different state as HKDF_EXPAND only allows
+ * two inputs: SECRET (this case) and INFO which does not modify
+ * the state. It could happen only if the hkdf
+ * object was corrupted. */
+ if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+ /* Allow only input that fits expected prk size */
+ if( data_length != PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+ memcpy( hkdf->prk, data, data_length );
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+ {
+ /* HKDF: If no salt was provided, use an empty salt.
+ * HKDF-EXTRACT: salt is mandatory. */
+ if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+ status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hash_alg,
+ NULL, 0 );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
+ hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
+ }
+ if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+ status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
+ data, data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
- hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
+ status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac,
+ hkdf->prk,
+ sizeof( hkdf->prk ),
+ &data_length );
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( status );
}
- if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
- status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac,
- data, data_length );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac,
- hkdf->prk,
- sizeof( hkdf->prk ),
- &data_length );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
- hkdf->block_number = 0;
+
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
+ hkdf->block_number = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ {
+ /* The only block of output is the PRK. */
+ memcpy( hkdf->output_block, hkdf->prk, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ) );
+ hkdf->offset_in_block = 0;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+ {
+ /* Block 0 is empty, and the next block will be
+ * generated by psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(). */
+ hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+ }
+
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) &&
+ hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( hkdf->info_set )
@@ -5221,7 +5302,7 @@
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
@@ -5486,15 +5567,14 @@
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
+#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF)
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
{
- status = psa_hkdf_input( &operation->ctx.hkdf,
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
+ status = psa_hkdf_input( &operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg,
step, data, data_length );
}
else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
{
diff --git a/library/ssl_cache.c b/library/ssl_cache.c
index 0288479..6505e11 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cache.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cache.c
@@ -314,7 +314,11 @@
#endif
if( session_serialized != NULL )
+ {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_serialized, session_serialized_len );
+ mbedtls_free( session_serialized );
+ session_serialized = NULL;
+ }
return( ret );
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
index ec2edfa..835159e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
@@ -1922,11 +1922,57 @@
}
}
-mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
{
switch( info->key_exchange )
{
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+ return( PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT );
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
+ mbedtls_psa_translate_md( info->mac ) ) );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( info->mac ) ) );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_ALG_ECDH );
+
+ default:
+ return( PSA_ALG_NONE );
+ }
+}
+
+psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+{
+ switch( info->key_exchange )
+ {
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
+{
+ switch( info->key_exchange )
+ {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index c17fa20..39a47ca 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -398,6 +398,8 @@
void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(
const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need );
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( void );
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args );
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur,
@@ -875,6 +877,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */
size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
+#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
};
@@ -2000,8 +2005,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL )
+ if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
+ ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 &&
+ ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL )
+ {
return( ssl->handshake->sig_algs );
+ }
#endif
return( ssl->conf->sig_algs );
@@ -2047,97 +2056,177 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
{
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( sig_alg & 0xff );
+ *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ( sig_alg >> 8 ) & 0xff );
+
+ if( *pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
+ return( 0 );
switch( sig_alg )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
-
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
- *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
- *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
default:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
return( 0 );
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ switch( sig_alg )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ return( 1 );
+
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ switch( sig_alg )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+ default:
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
+ sig_alg ) );
+ }
+ return( 1 );
+}
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(
+ const uint16_t sig_alg )
+{
+ /* High byte is hash */
+ unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( sig_alg );
+ unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( sig_alg );
+
+ switch( hash )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ switch( sig )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ return( 1 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const uint16_t sig_alg )
@@ -2146,79 +2235,29 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 )
{
- /* High byte is hash */
- unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( sig_alg );
- unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( sig_alg );
-
- switch( hash )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512:
- break;
-#endif
-
- default:
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- switch( sig )
- {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
- break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
- break;
-#endif
-
- default:
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- return( 1 );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( sig_alg ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 )
{
- mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
- return( ! mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
- sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg ) );
+ return( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( sig_alg ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
((void) ssl);
((void) sig_alg);
return( 0 );
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( uint16_t sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *key );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
@@ -2351,6 +2390,27 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end );
+
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *out_len );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 56c1f33..fb0b709 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@
if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
- /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
+ /* The loop goes to its end if the counter is wrapping */
if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 55b7f85..e60b82f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -883,10 +883,9 @@
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
- ssl->handshake->sig_algs = ssl->conf->sig_algs;
ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
@@ -1509,6 +1508,14 @@
ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+ ssl->handshake->dn_hints = crt;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int authmode )
{
@@ -4063,28 +4070,6 @@
memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in
- * x509_crt.c. Here, the order matters. Currently we favor stronger hashes,
- * for no fundamental reason.
- * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise
- * about this list. */
-static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
-};
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
-
/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in
* x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters:
* curves with a lower resource usage come first.
@@ -4126,17 +4111,6 @@
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
-};
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/* NOTICE:
* For ssl_preset_*_sig_algs and ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs, the following
@@ -4145,6 +4119,13 @@
* - But if there is a good reason, do not change the order of the algorithms.
* - ssl_tls12_present* is for TLS 1.2 use only.
* - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes.
+ *
+ * When GnuTLS/Openssl server is configured in TLS 1.2 mode with a certificate
+ * declaring an RSA public key and Mbed TLS is configured in hybrid mode, if
+ * `rsa_pss_rsae_*` algorithms are before `rsa_pkcs1_*` ones in this list then
+ * the GnuTLS/Openssl server chooses an `rsa_pss_rsae_*` signature algorithm
+ * for its signature in the key exchange message. As Mbed TLS 1.2 does not
+ * support them, the handshake fails.
*/
static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = {
@@ -4166,10 +4147,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA384_C &&
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
@@ -4182,6 +4159,18 @@
MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE
};
@@ -4466,9 +4455,6 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( conf ) )
conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs;
@@ -4495,9 +4481,6 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
- conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( conf ) )
conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs;
@@ -4984,13 +4967,20 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, supported_sig_algs_end, 2 );
sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "received signature algorithm: 0x%x",
- sig_alg ) );
-
- if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, sig_alg ) ||
- ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_alg ) )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "received signature algorithm: 0x%x %s",
+ sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( sig_alg ) ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ if( ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+ ( ! ( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, sig_alg ) ) ) )
+ {
continue;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "valid signature algorithm: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( sig_alg ) ) );
if( common_idx + 1 < MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE )
{
@@ -6197,7 +6187,7 @@
ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer has no certificate" ) );
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
@@ -7756,10 +7746,38 @@
for( i = 0; received_sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++ )
{
- if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
- received_sig_algs[i] ) )
- return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
- received_sig_algs[i] ) );
+ unsigned int hash_alg_received =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
+ received_sig_algs[i] );
+ unsigned int sig_alg_received =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(
+ received_sig_algs[i] );
+
+ if( sig_alg == sig_alg_received )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key )
+ {
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg =
+ mbedtls_psa_translate_md( hash_alg_received );
+
+ if( sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( ssl->handshake->key_cert->key,
+ PSA_ALG_ECDSA( psa_hash_alg ),
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) )
+ continue;
+
+ if( sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( ssl->handshake->key_cert->key,
+ PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
+ psa_hash_alg ),
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) )
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ return( hash_alg_received );
+ }
}
return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE );
@@ -8247,12 +8265,17 @@
for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++ )
{
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got signature scheme [%x] %s",
+ *sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, *sig_alg ) )
continue;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, 0 );
p += 2;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "signature scheme [%x]", *sig_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sent signature scheme [%x] %s",
+ *sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
}
/* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */
@@ -8276,4 +8299,202 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+/*
+ * mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext
+ *
+ * Structure of server_name extension:
+ *
+ * enum {
+ * host_name(0), (255)
+ * } NameType;
+ * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * NameType name_type;
+ * select (name_type) {
+ * case host_name: HostName;
+ * } name;
+ * } ServerName;
+ * struct {
+ * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
+ * } ServerNameList;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t server_name_list_len, hostname_len;
+ const unsigned char *server_name_list_end;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+ server_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, server_name_list_len );
+ server_name_list_end = p + server_name_list_len;
+ while( p < server_name_list_end )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, server_name_list_end, 3 );
+ hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 1 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, server_name_list_end,
+ hostname_len + 3 );
+
+ if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME )
+ {
+ /* sni_name is intended to be used only during the parsing of the
+ * ClientHello message (it is reset to NULL before the end of
+ * the message parsing). Thus it is ok to just point to the
+ * reception buffer and not make a copy of it.
+ */
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3;
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len;
+ if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL )
+ return( 0 );
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni,
+ ssl, p + 3, hostname_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
+ }
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ p += hostname_len + 3;
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end )
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t protocol_name_list_len;
+ const unsigned char *protocol_name_list;
+ const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end;
+ size_t protocol_name_len;
+
+ /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */
+ if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ /*
+ * RFC7301, section 3.1
+ * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
+ * } ProtocolNameList;
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * protocol_name_list_len 2 bytes
+ * protocol_name_len 1 bytes
+ * protocol_name >=1 byte
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 4 );
+
+ protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+ p += 2;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, protocol_name_list_len );
+ protocol_name_list = p;
+ protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len;
+
+ /* Validate peer's list (lengths) */
+ while( p < protocol_name_list_end )
+ {
+ protocol_name_len = *p++;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, protocol_name_list_end,
+ protocol_name_len );
+ if( protocol_name_len == 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+ }
+
+ p += protocol_name_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Use our order of preference */
+ for( const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++ )
+ {
+ size_t const alpn_len = strlen( *alpn );
+ p = protocol_name_list;
+ while( p < protocol_name_list_end )
+ {
+ protocol_name_len = *p++;
+ if( protocol_name_len == alpn_len &&
+ memcmp( p, *alpn, alpn_len ) == 0 )
+ {
+ ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ p += protocol_name_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we get here, no match was found */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *out_len )
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t protocol_name_len;
+ *out_len = 0;
+
+ if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
+ {
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+ protocol_name_len = strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 7 + protocol_name_len );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server side, adding alpn extension" ) );
+ /*
+ * 0 . 1 ext identifier
+ * 2 . 3 ext length
+ * 4 . 5 protocol list length
+ * 6 . 6 protocol name length
+ * 7 . 7+n protocol name
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0 );
+
+ *out_len = 7 + protocol_name_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( protocol_name_len + 3, p, 2 );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( protocol_name_len + 1, p, 4 );
+ /* Note: the length of the chosen protocol has been checked to be less
+ * than 255 bytes in `mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols`.
+ */
+ p[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( protocol_name_len );
+
+ memcpy( p + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, protocol_name_len );
+ return ( 0 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index a0b0bfc..7fa6443 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -1430,16 +1430,6 @@
else
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
- ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- return( ret );
- }
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
@@ -1676,6 +1666,24 @@
}
/*
+ * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the
+ * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in
+ * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension.
+ */
+ if( ssl->handshake->resume )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
* Renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
@@ -2568,6 +2576,7 @@
size_t sig_alg_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
unsigned char *sig_alg;
+ unsigned char *dn;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
@@ -2715,6 +2724,43 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+ dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n - dn_len;
+ for( size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len )
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2;
+ mbedtls_x509_name name;
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur, *name_prv;
+ size_t asn1_len;
+ char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
+ memset( &name, 0, sizeof( name ) );
+ dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( dn + i, 0 );
+ if( dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 ||
+ mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + asn1_len, &name ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "DN hint: %.*s",
+ mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( s, sizeof(s), &name ), s ) );
+ name_cur = name.next;
+ while( name_cur != NULL )
+ {
+ name_prv = name_cur;
+ name_cur = name_cur->next;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
+ mbedtls_free( name_prv );
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 7e1e772..bfe3e8e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -77,81 +77,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) );
-
- if( len < 2 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
- servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) );
- if( servername_list_size + 2 != len )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- p = buf + 2;
- while( servername_list_size > 2 )
- {
- hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] );
- if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME )
- {
- ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3;
- ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len;
- if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni,
- ssl, p + 3, hostname_len );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME );
- }
- return( 0 );
- }
-
- servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3;
- p += hostname_len + 3;
- }
-
- if( servername_list_size != 0 )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
@@ -613,95 +538,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
-{
- size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len;
- const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end;
- const char **ours;
-
- /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */
- if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
- return( 0 );
-
- /*
- * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
- *
- * struct {
- * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
- * } ProtocolNameList;
- */
-
- /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
- if( len < 4 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
- if( list_len != len - 2 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- /*
- * Validate peer's list (lengths)
- */
- start = buf + 2;
- end = buf + len;
- for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
- {
- cur_len = *theirs++;
-
- /* Current identifier must fit in list */
- if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- }
-
- /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
- if( cur_len == 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Use our order of preference
- */
- for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
- {
- ours_len = strlen( *ours );
- for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
- {
- cur_len = *theirs++;
-
- if( cur_len == ours_len &&
- memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
- {
- ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
- return( 0 );
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* If we get there, no match was found */
- mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -859,8 +695,15 @@
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info )
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_algorithm_t pk_alg =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg( ciphersuite_info );
+ psa_key_usage_t pk_usage =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage( ciphersuite_info );
+#else
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
uint32_t flags;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
@@ -870,7 +713,11 @@
#endif
list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE )
+#else
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) );
@@ -887,7 +734,18 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
cur->cert );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if( ( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start == NULL &&
+ ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start == NULL &&
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage ) ) ||
+ ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage ) )
+#else
+ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext( cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage ) )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+#else
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) );
continue;
@@ -999,21 +857,6 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
- /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
- * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
- sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
- if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
- mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
- ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_type ) ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
- "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
- return( 0 );
- }
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
@@ -1030,6 +873,21 @@
}
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
+ * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
+ sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info );
+ if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+ ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_type ) ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
+ "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
*ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
return( 0 );
}
@@ -1521,7 +1379,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) );
- ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext( ssl, ext + 4,
+ ext + 4 + ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
@@ -1635,7 +1494,8 @@
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
- ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4,
+ ext + 4 + ext_size );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
@@ -2151,39 +2011,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN )
-static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
-{
- if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL )
- {
- *olen = 0;
- return;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
-
- /*
- * 0 . 1 ext identifier
- * 2 . 3 ext length
- * 4 . 5 protocol list length
- * 6 . 6 protocol name length
- * 7 . 7+n protocol name
- */
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0);
-
- *olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen );
-
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 );
-
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 );
-
- buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 7 );
-
- memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
@@ -2559,7 +2386,8 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
- ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
+ unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4;
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
@@ -2723,6 +2551,16 @@
* `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
* CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL )
+ crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints;
+ else
+#endif
+ if( ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL )
+ crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints;
+ else
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index b298184..2b68306 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -124,11 +124,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
- size_t list_len, name_len;
const unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+ size_t protocol_name_list_len, protocol_name_len;
+ const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end;
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
@@ -144,21 +145,22 @@
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
*/
- /* Min length is 2 ( list_len ) + 1 ( name_len ) + 1 ( name ) */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 4 );
-
- list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+ protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, list_len );
- name_len = *p++;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, list_len - 1 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, protocol_name_list_len );
+ protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, protocol_name_list_end, 1 );
+ protocol_name_len = *p++;
/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
- for ( const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++ )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, protocol_name_list_end, protocol_name_len );
+ for( const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++ )
{
- if( name_len == strlen( *alpn ) &&
- memcmp( buf + 3, *alpn, name_len ) == 0 )
+ if( protocol_name_len == strlen( *alpn ) &&
+ memcmp( p, *alpn, protocol_name_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn;
return( 0 );
@@ -678,6 +680,7 @@
* - cipher_suite 2 bytes
* - legacy_compression_method 1 byte
*/
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4 );
p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4;
/* Case of no extension */
@@ -752,12 +755,12 @@
}
/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
- * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or
- * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR
* to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next.
*/
-#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO 0
-#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR 1
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO 0
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR 1
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
@@ -785,38 +788,33 @@
if( memcmp( buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic,
sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic ) ) == 0 )
{
- return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR );
+ return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR );
}
- return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO );
+ return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO );
}
-/* Fetch and preprocess
+/*
* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
- * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO or
- * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR or
- * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2
*/
-#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 2
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 2
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned char **buf,
- size_t *buf_len )
+static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- const unsigned char *end;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
- buf, buf_len ) );
- end = *buf + *buf_len;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present(
- ssl, *buf, end ) );
+ ssl, buf, end ) );
if( ret == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(
- ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation( ssl, *buf, end ) );
+ ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation( ssl, buf, end ) );
/* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and:
* . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or
@@ -824,7 +822,7 @@
* version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack
* abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert.
*/
- if( ssl->handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret )
+ if( handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
@@ -834,7 +832,7 @@
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
- *buf, *buf_len );
+ buf, (size_t)(end - buf) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( ssl ) )
{
@@ -843,23 +841,25 @@
return( ret );
}
- return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 );
+ return( SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 );
}
- ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( ssl, *buf, end );
+ handshake->extensions_present = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE;
+
+ ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr( ssl, buf, end );
switch( ret )
{
- case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HELLO:
+ case SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received ServerHello message" ) );
break;
- case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR:
+ case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received HelloRetryRequest message" ) );
/* If a client receives a second
* HelloRetryRequest in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello
* was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the
* handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.
*/
- if( ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0 )
+ if( handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Multiple HRRs received" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
- ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count++;
+ handshake->hello_retry_request_count++;
break;
}
@@ -1264,11 +1264,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" ) );
ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
- /*
- * State machine update
- */
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS );
-
cleanup:
if( ret != 0 )
{
@@ -1285,17 +1280,6 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
- /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record
- * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before
- * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight.
- */
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO );
-#else
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
-
mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer( ssl, 0 );
/*
@@ -1325,20 +1309,17 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> %s", __func__ ) );
- /* Coordination step
- * - Fetch record
- * - Make sure it's either a ServerHello or a HRR.
- * - Switch processing routine in case of HRR
- */
- ssl->handshake->extensions_present = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ &buf, &buf_len ) );
- ret = ssl_tls13_server_hello_coordinate( ssl, &buf, &buf_len );
+ ret = ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len );
if( ret < 0 )
goto cleanup;
else
- is_hrr = ( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_HRR );
+ is_hrr = ( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR );
- if( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_COORDINATE_TLS1_2 )
+ if( ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 )
{
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
@@ -1354,9 +1335,24 @@
buf, buf_len );
if( is_hrr )
+ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr( ssl ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+ /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record
+ * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before
+ * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO );
+#else
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+ }
else
+ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello( ssl ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS );
+ }
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= %s ( %s )", __func__,
@@ -1366,60 +1362,13 @@
/*
*
- * EncryptedExtensions message
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
*
* The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which
* should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish
* the cryptographic context.
*/
-/*
- * Overview
- */
-
-/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- const unsigned char *end );
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-/*
- * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char *buf;
- size_t buf_len;
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse encrypted extensions" ) );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- &buf, &buf_len ) );
-
- /* Process the message contents */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
- ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
-
- mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- buf, buf_len );
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( ssl ) );
-
-cleanup:
-
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse encrypted extensions" ) );
- return( ret );
-
-}
-
/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message
* struct {
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
@@ -1440,8 +1389,8 @@
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len );
- extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, extensions_len );
+ extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
while( p < extensions_end )
{
@@ -1508,8 +1457,25 @@
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t buf_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse encrypted extensions" ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ &buf, &buf_len ) );
+
+ /* Process the message contents */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+ ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ buf, buf_len );
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_some_psk_enabled( ssl ) )
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED );
@@ -1519,12 +1485,16 @@
((void) ssl);
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED );
#endif
- return( 0 );
+
+cleanup:
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse encrypted extensions" ) );
+ return( ret );
+
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
- *
* STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest
*
*/
@@ -1558,9 +1528,12 @@
if( ( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) &&
( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ) )
{
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got a certificate request" ) );
return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST );
}
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got no certificate request" ) );
+
return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP );
}
@@ -1715,7 +1688,6 @@
}
else if( ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
ret = 0;
}
else
@@ -1725,9 +1697,6 @@
goto cleanup;
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
- ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
-
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE );
cleanup:
@@ -1825,7 +1794,7 @@
}
else
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "No certificate message to send." ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "skip write certificate" ) );
}
#endif
@@ -1835,7 +1804,10 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "skip write certificate verify" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED );
+ }
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 7d0559b..265d6d3 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -258,13 +258,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
{
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* md_info;
rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
- if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
- {
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
- }
- rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+
+ rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
options = (const void*) &rsassa_pss_options;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
@@ -558,7 +554,14 @@
* from the configuration. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
- authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
+ authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
+ else
+#endif
+ authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
+ }
#endif
/*
@@ -570,7 +573,7 @@
*/
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer has not sent a certificate" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer has no certificate" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
@@ -831,7 +834,7 @@
/* Currently, we don't have any certificate extensions defined.
* Hence, we are sending an empty extension with length zero.
*/
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( 0, p, 0 );
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( 0, p, 0 );
p += 2;
}
@@ -873,121 +876,84 @@
/*
* STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify
*/
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_pk_context *own_key,
- uint16_t *algorithm )
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( uint16_t sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *key )
{
- mbedtls_pk_type_t sig = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( own_key );
- /* Determine the size of the key */
- size_t own_key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( own_key );
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE;
- ((void) own_key_size);
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( key );
+ size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( key );
- switch( sig )
+ switch( pk_type )
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
- switch( own_key_size )
+ switch( key_size )
{
case 256:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 );
+
case 384:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 );
+
case 521:
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
+ return(
+ sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 );
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "unknown key size: %"
- MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bits",
- own_key_size ) );
break;
}
break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 2048 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 ) )
+ switch( sig_alg )
{
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 3072 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 4096 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 2048 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 3072 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
- if( own_key_size <= 4096 &&
- mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl,
- MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 ) )
- {
- *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
- return( 0 );
- }
- else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
- ( "unknown key size: %"
- MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bits",
- own_key_size ) );
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+ return( key_size <= 3072 );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
+ return( key_size <= 7680 );
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
+ return( 1 );
+
+ default:
+ break;
}
break;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
default:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "unknown signature type : %u", sig ) );
break;
}
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *own_key,
+ uint16_t *algorithm )
+{
+ uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
+
+ *algorithm = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE;
+ for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE ; sig_alg++ )
+ {
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, *sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( *sig_alg ) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( *sig_alg, own_key ) )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:"
+ "selected signature algorithm %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
+ *algorithm = *sig_alg;
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
+ ( "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:"
+ "no suitable signature algorithm found" ) );
return( -1 );
}
@@ -1045,8 +1011,9 @@
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateVerify;
*/
- ret = ssl_tls13_get_sig_alg_from_pk( ssl, own_key, &algorithm );
- if( ret != 0 || ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received( ssl, algorithm ) )
+ ret = ssl_tls13_select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify( ssl, own_key,
+ &algorithm );
+ if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "signature algorithm not in received or offered list." ) );
@@ -1059,6 +1026,9 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CertificateVerify with %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( algorithm )) );
+
if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
algorithm, &pk_type, &md_alg ) != 0 )
{
@@ -1463,12 +1433,12 @@
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Get size of the TLS opaque key_exchange field of the KeyShareEntry struct. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
uint16_t peerkey_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
/* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, peerkey_len );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, peerkey_len );
/* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h b/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h
index 55fc958..5470200 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h
@@ -25,62 +25,6 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
-
-/**
- * \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a
- * fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk.
- *
- * \param hash_alg Hash algorithm to use.
- * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
- * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros
- * of the length of the hash provided by \p alg is used
- * as the salt.
- * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt.
- * \param ikm The input keying material.
- * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm.
- * \param[out] prk A pseudorandom key of \p prk_len bytes.
- * \param prk_size Size of the \p prk buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] prk_len On success, the length in bytes of the
- * pseudorandom key in \p prk.
- *
- * \return 0 on success.
- * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT when the parameters are invalid.
- * \return An PSA_ERROR_* error for errors returned from the underlying
- * PSA layer.
- */
-psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract( psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_size,
- size_t *prk_len );
-
-/**
- * \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom
- * keys, which is the output of the HKDF.
- *
- * \param hash_alg Hash algorithm to use.
- * \param prk A pseudorandom key of \p prk_len bytes. \p prk is
- * usually the output from the HKDF extract step.
- * \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk.
- * \param info An optional context and application specific information
- * string. This can be a zero-length string.
- * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes.
- * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes.
- * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This
- * must be less than or equal to
- * 255 * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH( \p alg ) bytes.
- *
- * \return 0 on success.
- * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT when the parameters are invalid.
- * \return An PSA_ERROR_* error for errors returned from the underlying
- * PSA layer.
- */
-psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand( psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len );
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index 8303cda..51743bb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -137,182 +137,6 @@
*dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len;
}
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
-psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract( psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_size,
- size_t *prk_len )
-{
- unsigned char null_salt[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { '\0' };
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t destroy_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg );
-
- if( salt == NULL || salt_len == 0 )
- {
- size_t hash_len;
-
- if( salt_len != 0 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg );
-
- if( hash_len == 0 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- /* salt_len <= sizeof( salt ) because
- PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE. */
- salt = null_salt;
- salt_len = hash_len;
- }
-
- psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
- psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
- psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
-
- status = psa_import_key( &attributes, salt, salt_len, &key );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_mac_compute( key, alg, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_size, prk_len );
-
-cleanup:
- destroy_status = psa_destroy_key( key );
-
- return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? destroy_status : status );
-}
-
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
-psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand( psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len )
-{
- size_t hash_len;
- size_t where = 0;
- size_t n;
- size_t t_len = 0;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
- psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_status_t destroy_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned char t[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
- psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg );
-
- if( okm == NULL )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg );
-
- if( prk_len < hash_len || hash_len == 0 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- if( info == NULL )
- {
- info = (const unsigned char *) "";
- info_len = 0;
- }
-
- n = okm_len / hash_len;
-
- if( okm_len % hash_len != 0 )
- {
- n++;
- }
-
- /*
- * Per RFC 5869 Section 2.3, okm_len must not exceed
- * 255 times the hash length
- */
- if( n > 255 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
- }
-
- psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
- psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
- psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
-
- status = psa_import_key( &attributes, prk, prk_len, &key );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- memset( t, 0, hash_len );
-
- /*
- * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
- * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3
- */
- for( i = 1; i <= n; i++ )
- {
- size_t num_to_copy;
- unsigned char c = i & 0xff;
- size_t len;
-
- status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_mac_update( &operation, t, t_len );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_mac_update( &operation, info, info_len );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* The constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single octet. */
- status = psa_mac_update( &operation, &c, 1 );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, t, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, &len );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- num_to_copy = i != n ? hash_len : okm_len - where;
- memcpy( okm + where, t, num_to_copy );
- where += hash_len;
- t_len = hash_len;
- }
-
-cleanup:
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- psa_mac_abort( &operation );
- destroy_status = psa_destroy_key( key );
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( t, sizeof( t ) );
-
- return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? destroy_status : status );
-}
-
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
@@ -321,7 +145,11 @@
unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len )
{
unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ];
- size_t hkdf_label_len;
+ size_t hkdf_label_len = 0;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation =
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
if( label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN )
{
@@ -352,11 +180,39 @@
hkdf_label,
&hkdf_label_len );
- return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(
- mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand( hash_alg,
- secret, secret_len,
- hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len,
- buf, buf_len ) ) );
+ status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND( hash_alg ) );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
+ secret,
+ secret_len );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
+ hkdf_label,
+ hkdf_label_len );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation,
+ buf,
+ buf_len );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation );
+ status = ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len );
+ return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls ( status ) );
}
/*
@@ -473,10 +329,13 @@
unsigned char *secret_new )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t hlen, ilen;
unsigned char tmp_secret[ PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ] = { 0 };
- size_t secret_len;
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation =
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( hash_alg ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -498,6 +357,8 @@
goto cleanup;
}
+ ret = 0;
+
if( input != NULL )
{
memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len );
@@ -508,17 +369,39 @@
ilen = hlen;
}
- /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material.
- * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material
- * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */
- ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(
- mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract( hash_alg,
- tmp_secret, hlen,
- tmp_input, ilen,
- secret_new, hlen, &secret_len ) );
+ status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation,
+ PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT( hash_alg ) );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
+ tmp_secret,
+ hlen );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation,
+ PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
+ tmp_input,
+ ilen );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation,
+ secret_new,
+ PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ) );
+
+ if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto cleanup;
cleanup:
-
+ abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation );
+ status = ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status );
+ ret = ( ret == 0 ? psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls ( status ) : ret );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) );
return( ret );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 4ac822f..7d99433 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -306,6 +306,13 @@
& MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERVERNAME ) > 0 ) ?
"TRUE" : "FALSE" ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+#if defined ( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "- ALPN_EXTENSION ( %s )",
+ ( ( ssl->handshake->extensions_present
+ & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ALPN ) > 0 ) ?
+ "TRUE" : "FALSE" ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
@@ -341,6 +348,84 @@
return( 1 );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Pick best ( private key, certificate chain ) pair based on the signature
+ * algorithms supported by the client.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert, *key_cert_list;
+ const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL )
+ key_cert_list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
+ else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+ key_cert_list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
+
+ if( key_cert_list == NULL )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) );
+ return( -1 );
+ }
+
+ for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++ )
+ {
+ for( key_cert = key_cert_list; key_cert != NULL;
+ key_cert = key_cert->next )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "certificate (chain) candidate",
+ key_cert->cert );
+
+ /*
+ * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
+ * keyUsage or other extensions.
+ */
+ if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(
+ key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE ) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(
+ key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH,
+ MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: "
+ "(extended) key usage extension" ) );
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "check signature algorithm %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(
+ *sig_alg, &key_cert->cert->pk ) )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->key_cert = key_cert;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
+ ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "selected signature algorithm"
+ " %s [%04x]",
+ mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ),
+ *sig_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(
+ 3, "selected certificate (chain)",
+ ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert );
+ return( 0 );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:"
+ "no suitable certificate found" ) );
+ return( -1 );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C &&
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: ClientHello
@@ -587,6 +672,21 @@
switch( extension_type )
{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext( ssl, p,
+ extension_data_end );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_servername_ext", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERVERNAME;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported group extension" ) );
@@ -654,6 +754,21 @@
ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS;
break;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, p, extension_data_end );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext" ), ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ ssl->handshake->extensions_present |= MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ALPN;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) );
@@ -692,10 +807,19 @@
ssl_tls13_debug_print_client_hello_exts( ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+ return( hrr_required ? SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED : SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK );
+}
+
+/* Update the handshake state machine */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context* ssl )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
/*
* Here we only support the ephemeral or (EC)DHE key echange mode
*/
-
if( !ssl_tls13_check_ephemeral_key_exchange( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
@@ -706,15 +830,18 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
- return( hrr_required ? SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED : SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK );
-}
-
-/* Update the handshake state machine */
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context* ssl )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ /*
+ * Server certificate selection
+ */
+ if( ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb( ssl ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cert_cb", ret );
+ return( ret );
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL;
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
@@ -991,7 +1118,7 @@
* - extension_data_length (2 bytes)
* - selected_group (2 bytes)
*/
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( buf, end, 6 );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 6 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( 2, buf, 2 );
@@ -1159,11 +1286,6 @@
return( ret );
}
- mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl,
- ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
- 3, ( "switching to handshake transform for outbound data" ) );
-
return( ret );
}
@@ -1194,7 +1316,16 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_finalize_write_server_hello( ssl ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+ /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately
+ * after its first handshake message. This may either be after
+ * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO );
+#else
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
cleanup:
@@ -1207,8 +1338,7 @@
* Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request_coordinate(
- mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+static int ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0 )
@@ -1243,7 +1373,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello retry request" ) );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request_coordinate( ssl ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request( ssl ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
@@ -1262,7 +1392,16 @@
ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count++;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+ /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately
+ * after its first handshake message. This may either be after
+ * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST );
+#else
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello retry request" ) );
@@ -1285,9 +1424,11 @@
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len )
{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t extensions_len = 0;
unsigned char *p_extensions_len;
+ size_t output_len;
*out_len = 0;
@@ -1296,6 +1437,15 @@
p += 2;
((void) ssl);
+ ((void) ret);
+ ((void) output_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+ p += output_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
extensions_len = ( p - p_extensions_len ) - 2;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0 );
@@ -1314,6 +1464,11 @@
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len, msg_len;
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl,
+ ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ( "switching to handshake transform for outbound data" ) );
+
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write encrypted extensions" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl,
@@ -1359,6 +1514,11 @@
{
int authmode;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
+ authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
+ else
+#endif
authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
@@ -1475,13 +1635,17 @@
static int ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ if( ( ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert( ssl ) != 0 ) ||
+ mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "No certificate available." ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
@@ -1525,15 +1689,18 @@
return( ret );
}
- if( ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
- }
+ if( ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent )
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "skip parse certificate" ) );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "skip parse certificate verify" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED );
+ }
+
return( 0 );
}
@@ -1545,12 +1712,6 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- if( ! ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent )
- {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
- ( "Switch to handshake traffic keys for inbound traffic" ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
- }
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -1643,6 +1804,23 @@
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+ /*
+ * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO );
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
+ if( ret == 0 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS );
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_finished( ssl );
break;
@@ -1665,8 +1843,11 @@
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
else
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "skip parse certificate verify" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED );
+ }
}
break;
diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c
index 2e11c7f..249034b 100644
--- a/library/x509.c
+++ b/library/x509.c
@@ -131,6 +131,48 @@
return( 0 );
}
+/*
+ * Convert md type to string
+ */
+static inline const char* md_type_to_string( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+{
+ switch( md_alg )
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return( "MD5" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return( "SHA1" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return( "SHA224" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return( "SHA256" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return( "SHA384" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return( "SHA512" );
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return( "RIPEMD160" );
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:
+ return( NULL );
+ default:
+ return( NULL );
+ }
+}
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
/*
* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
@@ -741,7 +783,7 @@
int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t i, n;
+ size_t i, j, n;
unsigned char c, merge = 0;
const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
const char *short_name = NULL;
@@ -775,17 +817,24 @@
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\?\?=" );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- for( i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++ )
+ for( i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++ )
{
- if( i >= sizeof( s ) - 1 )
- break;
+ if( j >= sizeof( s ) - 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
c = name->val.p[i];
+ // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779
+ if( c && strchr( ",=+<>#;\"\\", c ) )
+ {
+ if( j + 1 >= sizeof( s ) - 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+ s[j++] = '\\';
+ }
if( c < 32 || c >= 127 )
- s[i] = '?';
- else s[i] = c;
+ s[j] = '?';
+ else s[j] = c;
}
- s[i] = '\0';
+ s[j] = '\0';
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", s );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
@@ -855,16 +904,15 @@
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
{
const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, *mgf_md_info;
pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts;
- md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
- mgf_md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id );
+ const char *name = md_type_to_string( md_alg );
+ const char *mgf_name = md_type_to_string( pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id );
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)",
- md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) : "???",
- mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( mgf_md_info ) : "???",
+ name ? name : "???",
+ mgf_name ? mgf_name : "???",
(unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
}
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 97b786a..d6724df 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -1534,7 +1534,19 @@
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
- if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
}
@@ -1558,22 +1570,39 @@
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
}
- else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed25519" ) == 0 )
{
- sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed448" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1;
}
else
{
- mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
- mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms: " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pkcs1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+ ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm \"%s\"\n", q );
+ mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs();
goto exit;
}
}
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index 4251817..8e432bd 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL
#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1
#define DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED
+#define DFL_CERT_REQ_DN_HINT 0
#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE
#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1
#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
@@ -506,6 +507,7 @@
" options: none, optional, required\n" \
" cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list)\n" \
" options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send)\n" \
+ " 2 (send conf dn hint), 3 (send hs dn hint)\n" \
USAGE_IO \
USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
"\n" \
@@ -629,6 +631,7 @@
int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */
int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */
int cert_req_ca_list; /* should we send the CA list? */
+ int cert_req_dn_hint; /* mode to set DN hints for CA list to send */
unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */
int trunc_hmac; /* accept truncated hmac? */
int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */
@@ -1597,6 +1600,7 @@
opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1;
opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
opt.cert_req_ca_list = DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST;
+ opt.cert_req_dn_hint = DFL_CERT_REQ_DN_HINT;
opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE;
opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC;
opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS;
@@ -1923,8 +1927,13 @@
else if( strcmp( p, "cert_req_ca_list" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cert_req_ca_list = atoi( q );
- if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 )
+ if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 3 )
goto usage;
+ if( opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 )
+ {
+ opt.cert_req_dn_hint = opt.cert_req_ca_list;
+ opt.cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED;
+ }
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 )
{
@@ -2370,7 +2379,19 @@
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
- if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" ) == 0 )
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
}
@@ -2394,22 +2415,39 @@
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
}
- else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed25519" ) == 0 )
{
- sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ed448" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+ }
+ else if( strcmp( q, "ecdsa_sha1" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1;
}
else
{
- mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
- mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms: " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pkcs1_sha256 " );
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+ ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm \"%s\"\n", q );
+ mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs();
goto exit;
}
}
@@ -2732,6 +2770,16 @@
if( opt.cert_req_ca_list != DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( &conf, opt.cert_req_ca_list );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ /* exercise setting DN hints for server certificate request
+ * (Intended for use where the client cert expected has been signed by
+ * a specific CA which is an intermediate in a CA chain, not the root) */
+ if( opt.cert_req_dn_hint == 2 && key_cert_init2 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints( &conf, &srvcert2 );
+#endif
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( &conf, opt.hs_to_min, opt.hs_to_max );
@@ -3332,6 +3380,20 @@
}
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ /* exercise setting DN hints for server certificate request
+ * (Intended for use where the client cert expected has been signed by
+ * a specific CA which is an intermediate in a CA chain, not the root)
+ * (Additionally, the CA choice would typically be influenced by SNI
+ * if being set per-handshake using mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints()) */
+ if( opt.cert_req_dn_hint == 3 && key_cert_init2 )
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints( &ssl, &srvcert2 );
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
index 24e1f3e..8c35fab 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c
@@ -267,12 +267,32 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/*
+ * When GnuTLS/Openssl server is configured in TLS 1.2 mode with a certificate
+ * declaring an RSA public key and Mbed TLS is configured in hybrid mode, if
+ * `rsa_pss_rsae_*` algorithms are before `rsa_pkcs1_*` ones in this list then
+ * the GnuTLS/Openssl server chooses an `rsa_pss_rsae_*` signature algorithm
+ * for its signature in the key exchange message. As Mbed TLS 1.2 does not
+ * support them, the handshake fails.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA), \
+ (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA), \
+ ( 0x800 | hash ),
+#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA), \
(( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA),
+#endif
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA),
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/* See above */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA), \
+ ( 0x800 | hash ),
+#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash ) (( hash << 8 ) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA),
+#endif
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ALG( hash )
#endif
@@ -337,3 +357,25 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+void mbedtls_print_supported_sig_algs( void )
+{
+ mbedtls_printf( "supported signature algorithms:\n" );
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pkcs1_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\tecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pss_rsae_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_rsae_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\trsa_pss_pss_sha256 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_pss_sha384 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pss_pss_sha512\n");
+ mbedtls_printf("\ted25519 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ed448 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("rsa_pkcs1_sha1 ");
+ mbedtls_printf("ecdsa_sha1\n");
+ mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+}
diff --git a/programs/test/selftest.c b/programs/test/selftest.c
index a314bd2..ab337a2 100644
--- a/programs/test/selftest.c
+++ b/programs/test/selftest.c
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@
void *empty2 = mbedtls_calloc( 0, 1 );
void *buffer1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 );
void *buffer2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 );
- uintptr_t old_buffer1;
if( empty1 == NULL && empty2 == NULL )
{
@@ -126,7 +125,6 @@
mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1): passed\n" );
}
- old_buffer1 = (uintptr_t) buffer1;
mbedtls_free( buffer1 );
buffer1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 );
if( buffer1 == NULL )
@@ -138,9 +136,7 @@
else
{
if( verbose )
- mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1 again): passed (%s address)\n",
- (uintptr_t) old_buffer1 == (uintptr_t) buffer1 ?
- "same" : "different" );
+ mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1 again): passed\n" );
}
if( verbose )
diff --git a/scripts/abi_check.py b/scripts/abi_check.py
index f11cdf2..c228843 100755
--- a/scripts/abi_check.py
+++ b/scripts/abi_check.py
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""
-This script compares the interfaces of two versions of Mbed TLS, looking
+"""This script compares the interfaces of two versions of Mbed TLS, looking
for backward incompatibilities between two different Git revisions within
an Mbed TLS repository. It must be run from the root of a Git working tree.
+### How the script works ###
+
For the source (API) and runtime (ABI) interface compatibility, this script
is a small wrapper around the abi-compliance-checker and abi-dumper tools,
applying them to compare the header and library files.
@@ -20,7 +21,66 @@
Returns 0 on success, 1 on non-compliance, and 2 if there is an error
while running the script.
-You must run this test from an Mbed TLS root.
+### How to interpret non-compliance ###
+
+This script has relatively common false positives. In many scenarios, it only
+reports a pass if there is a strict textual match between the old version and
+the new version, and it reports problems where there is a sufficient semantic
+match but not a textual match. This section lists some common false positives.
+This is not an exhaustive list: in the end what matters is whether we are
+breaking a backward compatibility goal.
+
+**API**: the goal is that if an application works with the old version of the
+library, it can be recompiled against the new version and will still work.
+This is normally validated by comparing the declarations in `include/*/*.h`.
+A failure is a declaration that has disappeared or that now has a different
+type.
+
+ * It's ok to change or remove macros and functions that are documented as
+ for internal use only or as experimental.
+ * It's ok to rename function or macro parameters as long as the semantics
+ has not changed.
+ * It's ok to change or remove structure fields that are documented as
+ private.
+ * It's ok to add fields to a structure that already had private fields
+ or was documented as extensible.
+
+**ABI**: the goal is that if an application was built against the old version
+of the library, the same binary will work when linked against the new version.
+This is normally validated by comparing the symbols exported by `libmbed*.so`.
+A failure is a symbol that is no longer exported by the same library or that
+now has a different type.
+
+ * All ABI changes are acceptable if the library version is bumped
+ (see `scripts/bump_version.sh`).
+ * ABI changes that concern functions which are declared only inside the
+ library directory, and not in `include/*/*.h`, are acceptable only if
+ the function was only ever used inside the same library (libmbedcrypto,
+ libmbedx509, libmbedtls). As a counter example, if the old version
+ of libmbedtls calls mbedtls_foo() from libmbedcrypto, and the new version
+ of libmbedcrypto no longer has a compatible mbedtls_foo(), this does
+ require a version bump for libmbedcrypto.
+
+**Storage format**: the goal is to check that persistent keys stored by the
+old version can be read by the new version. This is normally validated by
+comparing the `*read*` test cases in `test_suite*storage_format*.data`.
+A failure is a storage read test case that is no longer present with the same
+function name and parameter list.
+
+ * It's ok if the same test data is present, but its presentation has changed,
+ for example if a test function is renamed or has different parameters.
+ * It's ok if redundant tests are removed.
+
+**Generated test coverage**: the goal is to check that automatically
+generated tests have as much coverage as before. This is normally validated
+by comparing the test cases that are automatically generated by a script.
+A failure is a generated test case that is no longer present with the same
+function name and parameter list.
+
+ * It's ok if the same test data is present, but its presentation has changed,
+ for example if a test function is renamed or has different parameters.
+ * It's ok if redundant tests are removed.
+
"""
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
diff --git a/scripts/config.py b/scripts/config.py
index 356b998..f045f98 100755
--- a/scripts/config.py
+++ b/scripts/config.py
@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@
return adapter(name, active, section)
return continuation
+DEPRECATED = frozenset([
+ 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C',
+])
def no_deprecated_adapter(adapter):
"""Modify an adapter to disable deprecated symbols.
@@ -334,6 +337,8 @@
def continuation(name, active, section):
if name == 'MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED':
return True
+ if name in DEPRECATED:
+ return False
if adapter is None:
return active
return adapter(name, active, section)
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py
index 45f0380..a06dce1 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
"""Knowledge about the PSA key store as implemented in Mbed TLS.
+
+Note that if you need to make a change that affects how keys are
+stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a
+backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility
+before changing how test data is constructed or validated.
"""
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
@@ -146,6 +151,11 @@
This is the content of the PSA storage file. When PSA storage is
implemented over stdio files, this does not include any wrapping made
by the PSA-storage-over-stdio-file implementation.
+
+ Note that if you need to make a change in this function,
+ this may indicate that the key store is changing in a
+ backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward
+ compatibility before making any change here.
"""
header = self.MAGIC + self.pack('L', self.version)
if self.version == 0:
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index c0ad9b0..6187d17 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -909,6 +909,10 @@
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 force_ns_cert_type=1
all_final += server1.req.cert_type_empty
+server1.req.commas.sha256: server1.key
+ $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL\, Commas,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA256
+all_final += server1.req.commas.sha256
+
# server2*
server2_pwd_ec = PolarSSLTest
@@ -966,7 +970,9 @@
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@
server1.der: server1.crt
$(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@
-all_final += server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.der
+server1.commas.crt: server1.key server1.req.commas.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
+ $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.commas.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@
+all_final += server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.der server1.commas.crt
server1.key_usage.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation,key_encipherment version=3 output_file=$@
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt b/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5acd255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.req.commas.sha256 b/tests/data_files/server1.req.commas.sha256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0287a31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.req.commas.sha256
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
index 927009a..8052a85 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
@@ -190,6 +190,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
index d1650f1..3705bc5 100644
--- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
+++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c
@@ -623,10 +623,11 @@
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
- unsigned char input[1];
+ unsigned char input[1] = { 0 };
unsigned char output[1];
int ok = 0;
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg );
+ psa_status_t expected_key_agreement_status = PSA_SUCCESS;
if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE )
{
@@ -641,7 +642,32 @@
input, sizeof( input ) ) );
}
- PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( &operation, key ) );
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT( kdf_alg ) )
+ {
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
+ &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
+ input, sizeof( input ) ) );
+ }
+
+ /* For HKDF_EXPAND input secret may fail as secret size may not match
+ to expected PRK size. In practice it means that key bits must match
+ hash length. Otherwise test should fail with INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
+ if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) )
+ {
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+ size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
+
+ if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits ) != PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ) )
+ expected_key_agreement_status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( &operation, key ),
+ expected_key_agreement_status );
+
+ if( expected_key_agreement_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ return( 1 );
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
@@ -650,7 +676,7 @@
&operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL,
input, sizeof( input ) ) );
}
- else if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
+ else if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND( kdf_alg ) )
{
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
&operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 41d69a3..80b7806 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -1702,11 +1702,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
@@ -1722,11 +1722,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
@@ -1740,11 +1740,12 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for client authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client authentication: DHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
+ key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
@@ -1753,47 +1754,16 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-run_test "RSA opaque key on server configured for decryption" \
- "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none" \
- "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \
- 0 \
- -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
- -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
- -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
- -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
- -S "error" \
- -C "error"
-
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-run_test "RSA-PSK opaque key on server configured for decryption" \
- "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
- psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
- "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
- 0 \
- -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
- -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
- -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
- -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
- -S "error" \
- -C "error"
-
# Test using an EC opaque private key for server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
@@ -1807,10 +1777,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "Opaque key for server authentication (ECDH-)" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDH-" \
"$P_SRV force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required key_opaque=1\
crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt\
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none" \
"$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1820,6 +1790,120 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: decrypt with ECC key" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: ecdh with RSA key" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: invalid alg: ECDHE-ECDSA with ecdh" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC keys with different algs, force ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server7.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key key_opaque_algs=ecdh,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server5.crt key_file2=data_files/server5.key \
+ key_opaque_algs2=ecdsa-sign,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC keys with different algs, force ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server7.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server7.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server5.crt key_file2=data_files/server5.key \
+ key_opaque_algs2=ecdh,none debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC + RSA, force ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
# Test using a RSA opaque private key for server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
@@ -1827,11 +1911,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
@@ -1846,11 +1929,10 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for server authentication" \
- "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
- "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: DHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
0 \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
@@ -1859,17 +1941,113 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: RSA-PSK" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none \
+ psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
+ psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-PSK-" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: RSA-" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 key_opaque=1 key_opaque_algs=rsa-decrypt,none " \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+run_test "Opaque key for server authentication: DHE-RSA, PSS instead of PKCS1" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pss,none debug_level=1" \
+ "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, none" \
+ -s "got ciphersuites in common, but none of them usable" \
+ -s "error" \
+ -c "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: RSA keys with different algs" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pss,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server4.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server4.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+run_test "Opaque keys for server authentication: EC + RSA, force DHE-RSA" \
+ "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server4.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server4.key key_opaque_algs2=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+ -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
+ -c "CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \
+ -s "key types: Opaque, Opaque" \
+ -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-DHE-RSA" \
+ -S "error" \
+ -C "error"
+
# Test using an EC opaque private key for client/server authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: ECDHE-ECDSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server5.key key_opaque_algs=ecdsa-sign,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1887,11 +2065,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-ECDHE-RSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: ECDHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1908,11 +2086,12 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-run_test "TLS-DHE-RSA Opaque key for client/server authentication" \
+run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication: DHE-RSA" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt \
- key_file=data_files/server2.key force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
+ key_file=data_files/server2.key key_opaque_algs=rsa-sign-pkcs1,none \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
@@ -1923,6 +2102,7 @@
-S "error" \
-C "error"
+
# Test ciphersuites which we expect to be fully supported by PSA Crypto
# and check that we don't fall back to Mbed TLS' internal crypto primitives.
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM
@@ -3656,6 +3836,29 @@
-C "parse new session ticket" \
-c "a session has been resumed"
+# Tests for Session resume and extensions
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+run_test "Session resume and connection ID" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 cid=1 cid_val=dead dtls=1 tickets=0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 cid=1 cid_val=beef dtls=1 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Enable use of CID extension." \
+ -s "Enable use of CID extension." \
+ -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \
+ -s "found CID extension" \
+ -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \
+ -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \
+ -c "found CID extension" \
+ -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \
+ -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \
+ -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \
+ -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \
+ -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \
+ -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \
+ -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated"
+
# Tests for Session Resume based on session-ID and cache, DTLS
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
@@ -4747,7 +4950,6 @@
# Tests for auth_mode, there are duplicated tests using ca callback for authentication
# When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: server badcert, client required" \
"$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \
key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
@@ -4781,7 +4983,6 @@
-C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
-C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \
"$P_SRV" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
@@ -4852,7 +5053,6 @@
-c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \
-c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client has no cert, server required (TLS)" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none \
@@ -4864,12 +5064,10 @@
-c "= write certificate$" \
-C "skip write certificate$" \
-S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
- -s "client has no certificate" \
+ -s "peer has no certificate" \
-s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
- -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server required" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -4885,13 +5083,11 @@
-s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "send alert level=2 message=48" \
- -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
# We don't check that the client receives the alert because it might
# detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
# before reading the alert message.
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client cert self-signed and trusted, server required" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \
@@ -4907,7 +5103,6 @@
-S "! The certificate is not correctly signed" \
-S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client cert not trusted, server required" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \
@@ -4922,10 +5117,8 @@
-s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
-s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
- -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server optional" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -4943,7 +5136,6 @@
-C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server none" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \
@@ -4961,7 +5153,6 @@
-C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-S "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client no cert, server optional" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none" \
@@ -5023,7 +5214,6 @@
# are in place so that the semantics are consistent with the test description.
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: server max_int chain, client default" \
"$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/09.key" \
@@ -5033,7 +5223,6 @@
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client default" \
"$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
@@ -5065,7 +5254,6 @@
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server default" \
"$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
"$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
@@ -5075,7 +5263,6 @@
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server optional" \
"$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \
"$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
@@ -5085,7 +5272,6 @@
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server required" \
"$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
@@ -5095,7 +5281,6 @@
requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
requires_full_size_output_buffer
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Authentication: client max_int chain, server required" \
"$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
@@ -5134,6 +5319,39 @@
-c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt conf DN hints in CertificateRequest" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=2 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server1.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server1.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt conf DN hints in CertificateRequest (2)" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=2 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server2.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test "Authentication: send alt hs DN hints in CertificateRequest" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional cert_req_ca_list=3 \
+ crt_file2=data_files/server1.crt \
+ key_file2=data_files/server1.key" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
+ crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \
+ key_file=data_files/server6.key" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "DN hint: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
# Tests for auth_mode, using CA callback, these are duplicated from the authentication tests
# When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly
@@ -5373,7 +5591,6 @@
# tests for SNI
requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: no SNI callback" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
@@ -5383,7 +5600,6 @@
-c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: matching cert 1" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5395,7 +5611,6 @@
-c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost"
requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: matching cert 2" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5407,7 +5622,6 @@
-c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=polarssl.example"
requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: no matching cert" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5420,7 +5634,6 @@
-c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-c "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: client auth no override: optional" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5434,7 +5647,6 @@
-C "skip write certificate verify" \
-S "skip parse certificate verify"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: client auth override: none -> optional" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5448,7 +5660,6 @@
-C "skip write certificate verify" \
-S "skip parse certificate verify"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: client auth override: optional -> none" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5458,11 +5669,8 @@
-s "skip write certificate request" \
-C "skip parse certificate request" \
-c "got no certificate request" \
- -c "skip write certificate" \
- -c "skip write certificate verify" \
- -s "skip parse certificate verify"
+ -c "skip write certificate"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: CA no override" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5481,7 +5689,6 @@
-s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: CA override" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5500,7 +5707,6 @@
-S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "SNI: CA override with CRL" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
@@ -5669,7 +5875,6 @@
# Tests for non-blocking I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Non-blocking I/O: basic handshake" \
"$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \
"$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \
@@ -5678,7 +5883,6 @@
-C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Non-blocking I/O: client auth" \
"$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \
@@ -5734,7 +5938,6 @@
# Tests for event-driven I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Event-driven I/O: basic handshake" \
"$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \
"$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \
@@ -5743,7 +5946,6 @@
-C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-c "Read from server: .* bytes read"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "Event-driven I/O: client auth" \
"$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \
@@ -5913,7 +6115,6 @@
# Tests for ALPN extension
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: none" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
@@ -5921,12 +6122,11 @@
-C "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-S "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -S "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-C "found alpn extension " \
-C "Application Layer Protocol is" \
-S "Application Layer Protocol is"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: client only" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
@@ -5934,12 +6134,11 @@
-c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-s "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -S "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-C "found alpn extension " \
-c "Application Layer Protocol is (none)" \
-S "Application Layer Protocol is"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: server only" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
@@ -5947,12 +6146,11 @@
-C "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-S "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -S "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-C "found alpn extension " \
-C "Application Layer Protocol is" \
-s "Application Layer Protocol is (none)"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv1" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
@@ -5960,12 +6158,11 @@
-c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-s "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -s "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-c "found alpn extension" \
-c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \
-s "Application Layer Protocol is abc"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: both, common cli2-srv1" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abc" \
@@ -5973,12 +6170,11 @@
-c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-s "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -s "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-c "found alpn extension" \
-c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \
-s "Application Layer Protocol is abc"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv2" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \
@@ -5986,12 +6182,11 @@
-c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-s "found alpn extension" \
-C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -s "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-c "found alpn extension" \
-c "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" \
-s "Application Layer Protocol is 1234"
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
run_test "ALPN: both, no common" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,123" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \
@@ -5999,7 +6194,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \
-s "found alpn extension" \
-c "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \
- -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \
+ -S "server side, adding alpn extension" \
-C "found alpn extension" \
-C "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" \
-S "Application Layer Protocol is 1234"
@@ -7585,6 +7780,20 @@
0 \
-s "Read from client: 1 bytes read"
+run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.3 AEAD" \
+ "$P_SRV force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI request_size=1 \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read"
+
+run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.3 AEAD shorter tag" \
+ "$P_SRV force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI request_size=1 \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read"
+
# Tests for small client packets in DTLS
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
@@ -7635,6 +7844,18 @@
0 \
-c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"
+run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.3 AEAD" \
+ "$P_SRV response_size=1 force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"
+
+run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.3 AEAD shorter tag" \
+ "$P_SRV response_size=1 force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"
+
# Tests for small server packets in DTLS
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
@@ -7699,6 +7920,22 @@
-c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \
-s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read"
+run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.3 AEAD" \
+ "$P_SRV force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI request_size=16384 \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \
+ -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read"
+
+run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.3 AEAD shorter tag" \
+ "$P_SRV force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI request_size=16384 \
+ force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \
+ -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read"
+
# The tests below fail when the server's OUT_CONTENT_LEN is less than 16384.
run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher" \
"$P_SRV response_size=16384 force_version=tls12" \
@@ -7738,6 +7975,18 @@
0 \
-c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read"
+run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.3 AEAD" \
+ "$P_SRV response_size=16384 force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read"
+
+run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.3 AEAD shorter tag" \
+ "$P_SRV response_size=16384 force_version=tls13" \
+ "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read"
+
# Tests for restartable ECC
# Force the use of a curve that supports restartable ECC (secp256r1).
@@ -10740,6 +10989,36 @@
-c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \
-c "Application Layer Protocol is h2"
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
+run_test "TLS 1.3: server alpn - openssl" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 alpn=h2" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -tls1_3 -no_middlebox -alpn h2" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "found alpn extension" \
+ -s "server side, adding alpn extension" \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \
+ -s "Application Layer Protocol is h2"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
+run_test "TLS 1.3: server alpn - gnutls" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 alpn=h2" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost -d 4 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V --alpn h2" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "found alpn extension" \
+ -s "server side, adding alpn extension" \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \
+ -s "Application Layer Protocol is h2"
+
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
@@ -11619,6 +11898,46 @@
-s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE" \
-s "No certificate available."
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Server side check - openssl with sni" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0 \
+ sni=localhost,data_files/server5.crt,data_files/server5.key,data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -servername localhost -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key -tls1_3" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "parse ServerName extension" \
+ -s "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Server side check - gnutls with sni" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0 \
+ sni=localhost,data_files/server5.crt,data_files/server5.key,data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost -d 4 --sni-hostname=localhost --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "parse ServerName extension" \
+ -s "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Server side check - mbedtls with sni" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0 \
+ sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 server_name=localhost crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ force_version=tls13" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "parse ServerName extension" \
+ -s "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+
for i in opt-testcases/*.sh
do
TEST_SUITE_NAME=${i##*/}
@@ -11627,6 +11946,35 @@
done
unset TEST_SUITE_NAME
+# Test 1.3 compatibility mode
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
requires_openssl_tls1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
@@ -11634,10 +11982,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
"$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -no_middlebox -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \
- "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
0 \
-c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
- -c "HTTP/1.0 200 ok"
+ -C "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
requires_openssl_tls1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -11646,10 +11995,22 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
"$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \
- "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
1 \
-c "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode"
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
requires_gnutls_tls1_3
requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
@@ -11659,10 +12020,11 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
"$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert" \
- "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
0 \
-c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
- -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+ -C "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
requires_gnutls_tls1_3
requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
@@ -11672,10 +12034,524 @@
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
"$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS --disable-client-cert" \
- "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
1 \
-c "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode"
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS --disable-client-cert" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -no_middlebox" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -C "14 03 03 00 01"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -no_middlebox" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -c "14 03 03 00 01"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -C "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --debug=10 --priority=NORMAL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -c "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received" \
+ -c "discarding change cipher spec in TLS1.3"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --debug=10 --priority=NORMAL:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO" \
+ -c "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m HRR both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m HRR both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O HRR both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -groups P-384 -no_middlebox -num_tickets 0 -no_cache" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "received HelloRetryRequest message" \
+ -C "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O HRR server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -groups P-384 -num_tickets 0 -no_cache" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "received HelloRetryRequest message" \
+ -c "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O HRR both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV -msg -tls1_3 -groups P-384 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G HRR both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP384R1:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "received HelloRetryRequest message" \
+ -C "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode" \
+ -C "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G HRR server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP384R1:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS --disable-client-cert" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "received HelloRetryRequest message" \
+ -c "ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G HRR both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP384R1:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS --disable-client-cert" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 curves=secp256r1,secp384r1" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m HRR both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -groups P-256:P-384 -no_middlebox" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -C "14 03 03 00 01"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m HRR server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -groups P-256:P-384 -no_middlebox" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m HRR both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -groups P-256:P-384" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -c "14 03 03 00 01"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m HRR both peers do not support middlebox compatibility" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -S "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -C "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m HRR server with middlebox compat support, not client" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --debug=10 --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -c "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received" \
+ -c "discarding change cipher spec in TLS1.3"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m HRR both with middlebox compat support" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key force_version=tls13 curves=secp384r1 tickets=0" \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --debug=10 --priority=NORMAL:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE -V" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "tls13 server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST" \
+ -c "SSL 3.3 ChangeCipherSpec packet received"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->O" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key
+ -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache
+ -Verify 10 -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->G" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key
+ -d 4
+ --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Protocol is TLSv1.3" \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key \
+ -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "TLSv1.3" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check signature algorithm order, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "Negotiated version: 3.4" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key \
+ -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable signature algorithm, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI allow_sha1=0 debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:selected signature algorithm rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" \
+ -s "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, G->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$G_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT localhost -d 4 --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ --priority=NORMAL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, O->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -msg -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt \
+ -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check server no suitable certificate, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13
+ crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " \
+ "$P_CLI allow_sha1=0 debug_level=4 \
+ sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -s "ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:no suitable certificate found"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->O" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key
+ -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache
+ -Verify 10 -sigalgs rsa_pkcs1_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_gnutls_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->G" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key
+ -d 4
+ --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:-SIGN-ALL:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA384:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%NO_TICKETS " \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+run_test "TLS 1.3: Check client no signature algorithm, m->m" \
+ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required
+ crt_file2=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file2=data_files/server2.key
+ crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \
+ sig_algs=rsa_pkcs1_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \
+ 1 \
+ -c "select_sig_alg_for_certificate_verify:no suitable signature algorithm found"
+
# Test heap memory usage after handshake
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data
index f844d48..725cbc2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data
@@ -91,8 +91,11 @@
ASN.1 Write enum 2147483647
mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x7fffffff:"0A047fffffff"
-#ASN.1 Write mpi 0
-#mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"00":"020100"
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0 (null)
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"":"020100"
+
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0 (1 limb)
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"00":"020100"
ASN.1 Write mpi 1
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"01":"020101"
@@ -100,11 +103,17 @@
ASN.1 Write mpi 0x7f
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f":"02017f"
-#ASN.1 Write mpi 0x80
-#mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f":"02020080"
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0x7f with leading 0 limb
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"00000000000000007f":"02017f"
-#ASN.1 Write mpi 0xff
-#mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f":"020200ff"
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0x80
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"80":"02020080"
+
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0x80 with leading 0 limb
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"000000000000000080":"02020080"
+
+ASN.1 Write mpi 0xff
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"ff":"020200ff"
ASN.1 Write mpi 0x100
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"0100":"02020100"
@@ -112,17 +121,17 @@
ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8-1 bits
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f7b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8":"027f7f7b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8"
-#ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8 bits
-#mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8":"028180e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8"
+ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8 bits
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8":"02818000e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8"
ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8+1 bits
-mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"108446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c":"028180108446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c"
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"018446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c":"028180018446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c"
ASN.1 Write mpi, 255*8-1 bits
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"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"
-#ASN.1 Write mpi, 255*8 bits
-#mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"fbd1913fcfb652896209ad3e62f5d04a8dfc71eb1698543c52200bd7bbf3c11dd9ff57c299a2f4da172b3d5bd7e29affddf8859be7d50a45537a0df15b17af603d18803fd17134847cba78d83e64bf9fee58364d6124add0541da7bad331cd35fb48186a74bc502ddb967602401c0db02b19e5d38f09e8618fa7f6a1a3f738629baffdc63d9d70d396007d943fd64ae696e5b7e88f2c6d6ec322b461dbddd36efa91d990343b66419cf4832a22dc9ad13021185a1bf007989a50ba3bfd1152b8db899482d3ed498d1b9fae243a3cdae9530d8b29fdb684f70cdc0c9b8527265312603b405e67d59d4b1d654ddc3b7fd5515acb32440dc80903c8474a2c136c":"0282010000fbd1913fcfb652896209ad3e62f5d04a8dfc71eb1698543c52200bd7bbf3c11dd9ff57c299a2f4da172b3d5bd7e29affddf8859be7d50a45537a0df15b17af603d18803fd17134847cba78d83e64bf9fee58364d6124add0541da7bad331cd35fb48186a74bc502ddb967602401c0db02b19e5d38f09e8618fa7f6a1a3f738629baffdc63d9d70d396007d943fd64ae696e5b7e88f2c6d6ec322b461dbddd36efa91d990343b66419cf4832a22dc9ad13021185a1bf007989a50ba3bfd1152b8db899482d3ed498d1b9fae243a3cdae9530d8b29fdb684f70cdc0c9b8527265312603b405e67d59d4b1d654ddc3b7fd5515acb32440dc80903c8474a2c136c"
+ASN.1 Write mpi, 255*8 bits
+mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"0282010000fbd1913fcfb652896209ad3e62f5d04a8dfc71eb1698543c52200bd7bbf3c11dd9ff57c299a2f4da172b3d5bd7e29affddf8859be7d50a45537a0df15b17af603d18803fd17134847cba78d83e64bf9fee58364d6124add0541da7bad331cd35fb48186a74bc502ddb967602401c0db02b19e5d38f09e8618fa7f6a1a3f738629baffdc63d9d70d396007d943fd64ae696e5b7e88f2c6d6ec322b461dbddd36efa91d990343b66419cf4832a22dc9ad13021185a1bf007989a50ba3bfd1152b8db899482d3ed498d1b9fae243a3cdae9530d8b29fdb684f70cdc0c9b8527265312603b405e67d59d4b1d654ddc3b7fd5515acb32440dc80903c8474a2c136c"
ASN.1 Write mpi, 256*8-1 bits
mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"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"
@@ -191,7 +200,7 @@
mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID:"41":"060141"
ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, null parameters
-mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":8:"300d06034f4944"
+mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0:"300706034f49440500"
ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, parameters (8 bytes)
mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":8:"300d06034f4944"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function
index 8d5579d..4ed8644 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
int generic_write_start_step( generic_write_data_t *data )
{
mbedtls_test_set_step( data->size );
+ mbedtls_free( data->output );
+ data->output = NULL;
ASSERT_ALLOC( data->output, data->size == 0 ? 1 : data->size );
data->end = data->output + data->size;
data->p = data->end;
@@ -45,8 +47,6 @@
ok = 1;
exit:
- mbedtls_free( data->output );
- data->output = NULL;
return( ok );
}
@@ -63,13 +63,14 @@
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_null( &data.p, data.start );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+ /* There's no parsing function for NULL. */
}
exit:
@@ -83,13 +84,21 @@
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( &data.p, data.start, val );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ if( ret >= 0 )
+ {
+ int read = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( val, read );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
exit:
@@ -103,13 +112,21 @@
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &data.p, data.start, val );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ if( ret >= 0 )
+ {
+ int read = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( val, read );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
exit:
@@ -124,13 +141,21 @@
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( &data.p, data.start, val );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ if( ret >= 0 )
+ {
+ int read = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( val, read );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
exit:
@@ -142,25 +167,35 @@
void mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( data_t *val, data_t *expected )
{
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
- mbedtls_mpi mpi;
+ mbedtls_mpi mpi, read;
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &read );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &mpi, val->x, val->len ) == 0 );
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &data.p, data.start, &mpi );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ if( ret >= 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &mpi, &read ) );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+ /* Skip some intermediate lengths, they're boring. */
if( expected->len > 10 && data.size == 8 )
data.size = expected->len - 2;
}
exit:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &read );
mbedtls_free( data.output );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -171,7 +206,7 @@
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
@@ -208,6 +243,8 @@
}
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+ /* There's no parsing function for octet or character strings. */
+ /* Skip some intermediate lengths, they're boring. */
if( expected->len > 10 && data.size == 8 )
data.size = expected->len - 2;
}
@@ -224,8 +261,11 @@
{
generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 };
int ret;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ unsigned char *buf_complete = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
@@ -240,10 +280,69 @@
ret -= par_len;
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ /* Only do a parse-back test if the parameters aren't too large for
+ * a small-heap environment. The boundary is somewhat arbitrary. */
+ if( ret >= 0 && par_len <= 1234 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf alg = {0, 0, NULL};
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf params = {0, 0, NULL};
+ /* The writing function doesn't write the parameters unless
+ * they're null: it only takes their length as input. But the
+ * parsing function requires the parameters to be present.
+ * Thus make up parameters. */
+ size_t data_len = data.end - data.p;
+ size_t len_complete = data_len + par_len;
+ unsigned char expected_params_tag;
+ size_t expected_params_len;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( buf_complete, len_complete );
+ unsigned char *end_complete = buf_complete + len_complete;
+ memcpy( buf_complete, data.p, data_len );
+ if( par_len == 0 )
+ {
+ /* mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier() wrote a NULL */
+ expected_params_tag = 0x05;
+ expected_params_len = 0;
+ }
+ else if( par_len >= 2 && par_len < 2 + 128 )
+ {
+ /* Write an OCTET STRING with a short length encoding */
+ expected_params_tag = buf_complete[data_len] = 0x04;
+ expected_params_len = par_len - 2;
+ buf_complete[data_len + 1] = (unsigned char) expected_params_len;
+ }
+ else if( par_len >= 4 + 128 && par_len < 3 + 256 * 256 )
+ {
+ /* Write an OCTET STRING with a two-byte length encoding */
+ expected_params_tag = buf_complete[data_len] = 0x04;
+ expected_params_len = par_len - 4;
+ buf_complete[data_len + 1] = 0x82;
+ buf_complete[data_len + 2] = (unsigned char) ( expected_params_len >> 8 );
+ buf_complete[data_len + 3] = (unsigned char) ( expected_params_len );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( ! "Bad test data: invalid length of ASN.1 element" );
+ }
+ unsigned char *p = buf_complete;
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end_complete,
+ &alg, ¶ms ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( alg.tag, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( alg.p, alg.len, oid->x, oid->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( params.tag, expected_params_tag );
+ TEST_EQUAL( params.len, expected_params_len );
+ mbedtls_free( buf_complete );
+ buf_complete = NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
exit:
mbedtls_free( data.output );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_free( buf_complete );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -308,18 +407,63 @@
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) =
( is_named ? mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring :
mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ unsigned char *masked_bitstring = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
- for( data.size = 0; data.size < expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
+ /* The API expects `bitstring->x` to contain `bits` bits. */
+ size_t byte_length = ( bits + 7 ) / 8;
+ TEST_ASSERT( bitstring->len >= byte_length );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( masked_bitstring, byte_length );
+ if( byte_length != 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy( masked_bitstring, bitstring->x, byte_length );
+ if( bits % 8 != 0 )
+ masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1] &= ~( 0xff >> ( bits % 8 ) );
+ }
+ size_t value_bits = bits;
+ if( is_named )
+ {
+ /* In a named bit string, all trailing 0 bits are removed. */
+ while( byte_length > 0 && masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1] == 0 )
+ --byte_length;
+ value_bits = 8 * byte_length;
+ if( byte_length > 0 )
+ {
+ unsigned char last_byte = masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1];
+ for( unsigned b = 1; b < 0xff && ( last_byte & b ) == 0; b <<= 1 )
+ --value_bits;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+
+ for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ )
{
if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) )
goto exit;
ret = ( *func )( &data.p, data.start, bitstring->x, bits );
if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) )
goto exit;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ if( ret >= 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring read = {0, 0, NULL};
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( &data.p, data.end,
+ &read ), 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( read.p, read.len,
+ masked_bitstring, byte_length );
+ TEST_EQUAL( read.unused_bits, 8 * byte_length - value_bits );
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
exit:
mbedtls_free( data.output );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_free( masked_bitstring );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
}
/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
index 2eb8c2d..4ea4d3b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
@@ -890,3 +890,56 @@
ECP export key parameters #2 (invalid group)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
ecp_export:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:1
+
+ECP check order for SECP192R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831"
+
+ECP check order for SECP224R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D"
+
+ECP check order for SECP256R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551"
+
+ECP check order for SECP384R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973"
+
+ECP check order for SECP521R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"01FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386409"
+
+ECP check order for BP256R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7"
+
+ECP check order for BP384R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:"8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565"
+
+ECP check order for BP512R1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:"AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA70330870553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D381085DDADDB58796829CA90069"
+
+ECP check order for CURVE25519
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed"
+
+ECP check order for SECP192K1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:"fffffffffffffffffffffffe26f2fc170f69466a74defd8d"
+
+ECP check order for SECP224K1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:"10000000000000000000000000001dce8d2ec6184caf0a971769fb1f7"
+
+ECP check order for SECP256K1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141"
+
+ECP check order for CURVE448
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7cca23e9c44edb49aed63690216cc2728dc58f552378c292ab5844f3"
+
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index c3e6b05..1b77f1d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -1063,3 +1063,27 @@
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &export_Q );
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ecp_check_order( int id, char * expected_order_hex )
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ mbedtls_mpi expected_n;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &expected_n );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &expected_n, 16, expected_order_hex ) == 0);
+
+ // check sign bits are well-formed (i.e. 1 or -1) - see #5810
+ TEST_ASSERT( grp.N.s == -1 || grp.N.s == 1);
+ TEST_ASSERT( expected_n.s == -1 || expected_n.s == 1);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp.N, &expected_n ) == 0 );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &expected_n );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index 7250753..1182c00 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -5135,6 +5135,281 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"":0:1:0
+# HKDF-Extract tests: out - output, k - secret provided as key, b - secret provided as bytes
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 32+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 22+10 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f":"9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 0+32 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+31 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"07":"7709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 31+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+30 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"07":"7709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #2, out 32+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #3, out 32+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #4, out 20+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #5, out 20+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #6, out 20+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #7, out 20+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, k derive key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"":0:1:1
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 32+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 22+10 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f":"9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 0+32 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+31 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"07":"7709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 31+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+30 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"07":"7709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #2, out 32+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #3, out 32+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #4, out 20+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #5, out 20+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #6, out 20+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, RFC5869 #7, out 20+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":20:"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract info before secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract info after secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract input other secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract input label
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract input password
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract input seed
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"0123456789":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract input cost
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST:"0123456789":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, b derive key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"":0:0:1
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 32+1 (over capacity)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"00":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, no salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":32:"":"":0:0:0
+
+# HKDF-Expand tests: out - output, k - secret provided as key, b - secret provided as bytes
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 42+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 32+10 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf":"34007208d5b887185865":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 0+42 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+41 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 41+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+40 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #2, out 82+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":82:"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #3, out 42+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #4, out 42+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #5, out 82+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":82:"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #6, out 42+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #7, out 42+0 k
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 42+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 32+10 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf":"34007208d5b887185865":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 0+42 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+41 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 41+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 1+40 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #2, out 82+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":82:"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #3, out 42+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #4, out 42+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #5, out 82+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":82:"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #6, out 42+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, RFC5869 #7, out 42+0 b
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"":0:0:0
+
+# HKDF-Expand tests: Invalid test cases
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input other secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input label
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input password
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input seed
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"0123456789":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand input cost
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST:"0123456789":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, out 42+1 (over capacity)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"00":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand Invalid secret length
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e500":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"":"":0:0:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand, Info before secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"":0:0:0
+
# Test vectors taken from https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03416.html
PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 100+0
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
@@ -5470,6 +5745,14 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"":0:1:0
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, request maximum capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"":0:1:0
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, request maximum capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896":"":0:1:0
+
PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, request too much capacity
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
@@ -5478,6 +5761,22 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, request too much capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-1, request too much capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, request too much capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, request too much capacity
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
+derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"ff":0:1:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 0bfabb1..7d368cf 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -7005,9 +7005,13 @@
switch( key_input_type )
{
case 0: // input bytes
- PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
&operation, steps[i],
- inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ) );
+ inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ),
+ statuses[i] );
+
+ if( statuses[i] != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
break;
case 1: // input key
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes1, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
@@ -7087,9 +7091,12 @@
goto exit;
break;
default:
- PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
+ TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
&operation, steps[i],
- inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ) );
+ inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ), statuses[i] );
+
+ if( statuses[i] != PSA_SUCCESS )
+ goto exit;
break;
}
}
@@ -7111,7 +7118,7 @@
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes4, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes4, alg );
psa_set_key_type( &attributes4, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
- psa_set_key_bits( &attributes4, 48 );
+ psa_set_key_bits( &attributes4, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( requested_capacity ) );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes4, &operation,
&derived_key ), expected_status );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
index 83763c5..bf5f04e 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
@@ -270,6 +270,22 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384
key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_HKDF
+Key derivation: HKDF-Extract using SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT
+
+Key derivation: HKDF-Extract using SHA-384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384
+key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT
+
+Key derivation: HKDF-Expand using SHA-256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND
+
+Key derivation: HKDF-Expand using SHA-384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384
+key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND
+
Key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF using SHA-256
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
index 092780c..643a92f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
@@ -37,14 +37,16 @@
#define ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN ( 1u << 18 )
#define ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP ( 1u << 19 )
#define ALG_IS_HKDF ( 1u << 20 )
-#define ALG_IS_FFDH ( 1u << 21 )
-#define ALG_IS_ECDH ( 1u << 22 )
-#define ALG_IS_WILDCARD ( 1u << 23 )
-#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT ( 1u << 24 )
-#define ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER ( 1u << 25 )
-#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF ( 1u << 26 )
-#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS ( 1u << 27 )
-#define ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 28 ) /* must be last! */
+#define ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT ( 1u << 21 )
+#define ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND ( 1u << 22 )
+#define ALG_IS_FFDH ( 1u << 23 )
+#define ALG_IS_ECDH ( 1u << 24 )
+#define ALG_IS_WILDCARD ( 1u << 25 )
+#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT ( 1u << 26 )
+#define ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER ( 1u << 27 )
+#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF ( 1u << 28 )
+#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS ( 1u << 29 )
+#define ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 30 ) /* must be last! */
/* Flags for key type classification macros. There is a flag for every
* key type classification macro PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx except for some that
@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags );
+ TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT, alg, flags );
+ TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_WILDCARD, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_ECDH, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_FFDH, alg, flags );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
index b250634..6d208e9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+# Note that if you need to make a change that affects how keys are
+# stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a
+# backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility
+# before changing how test data is constructed or validated.
+
Format for storage: RSA private key
format_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
index bd9b9c9..08db34a 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
* on the the storage format. On the other hand, these tests treat the storage
* subsystem as a black box, and in particular have no reliance on the
* internals of the ITS implementation.
+ *
+ * Note that if you need to make a change that affects how files are
+ * stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a
+ * backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility
+ * before changing how test data is constructed or validated.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
index e16c050..12878b5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function
@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
/* This test file is specific to the ITS implementation in PSA Crypto
* on top of stdio. It expects to know what the stdio name of a file is
* based on its keystore name.
+ *
+ * Note that if you need to make a change that affects how files are
+ * stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a
+ * backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility
+ * before changing how test data is constructed or validated.
*/
#include "../library/psa_crypto_its.h"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index 8ce81d0..19a1ae6 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2
Handshake, tls1_3
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3
Handshake, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
@@ -317,6 +317,146 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, no psk
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, invalid alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing alg
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
+Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing usage
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA384_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
+
Sending app data via TLS, MFL=512 without fragmentation
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:400:512:1:1
@@ -2792,83 +2932,6 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
ssl_tls13_key_evolution:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"fb9fc80689b3a5d02c33243bf69a1b1b20705588a794304a6e7120155edf149a":"":"7f2882bb9b9a46265941653e9c2f19067118151e21d12e57a7b6aca1f8150c8d"
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #1 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #2 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #3 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #4 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #5 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #6 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #7 Extract
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_extract:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"":"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF extract fails with wrong hash alg
-psa_hkdf_extract_ret:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #1 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #2 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #3 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #4 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #5 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #6 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"":"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #7 Expand
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1
-psa_hkdf_expand:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"":"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48"
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF expand fails with NULL okm
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand_ret:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:32:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF expand fails with invalid alg
-psa_hkdf_expand_ret:0:32:32:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF expand fails with prk_len < hash_len
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand_ret:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:16:32:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF expand fails with okm_len / hash_len > 255
-psa_hkdf_expand_ret:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:32:8192:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
-SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF expand fails with key import
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-psa_hkdf_expand_ret:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:32:32:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
-
SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #1
# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/)
# Server handshake traffic secret -> Server traffic key
@@ -3364,6 +3427,9 @@
Raw key agreement: bad server key
raw_key_agreement_fail:1
+Force a bad session id length
+force_bad_session_id_len
+
Cookie parsing: nominal run
cookie_parsing:"16fefd0000000000000000002F010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727d00200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 59c69c6..a84f743 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
#include <ssl_tls13_invasive.h>
#include "test/certs.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h"
+#endif
+
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include <constant_time_internal.h>
@@ -60,7 +64,12 @@
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version server_min_version;
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version server_max_version;
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version expected_negotiated_version;
+ int expected_handshake_result;
+ int expected_ciphersuite;
int pk_alg;
+ int opaque_alg;
+ int opaque_alg2;
+ int opaque_usage;
data_t *psk_str;
int dtls;
int srv_auth_mode;
@@ -77,33 +86,58 @@
void (*srv_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
void (*cli_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
int resize_buffers;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache;
+#endif
} handshake_test_options;
void init_handshake_options( handshake_test_options *opts )
{
- opts->cipher = "";
- opts->client_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
- opts->client_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
- opts->server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
- opts->server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
- opts->expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
- opts->pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- opts->psk_str = NULL;
- opts->dtls = 0;
- opts->srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
- opts->serialize = 0;
- opts->mfl = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE;
- opts->cli_msg_len = 100;
- opts->srv_msg_len = 100;
- opts->expected_cli_fragments = 1;
- opts->expected_srv_fragments = 1;
- opts->renegotiate = 0;
- opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
- opts->srv_log_obj = NULL;
- opts->srv_log_obj = NULL;
- opts->srv_log_fun = NULL;
- opts->cli_log_fun = NULL;
- opts->resize_buffers = 1;
+ opts->cipher = "";
+ opts->client_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
+ opts->client_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
+ opts->server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
+ opts->server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN;
+ opts->expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
+ opts->expected_handshake_result = 0;
+ opts->expected_ciphersuite = 0;
+ opts->pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
+ opts->opaque_alg = 0;
+ opts->opaque_alg2 = 0;
+ opts->opaque_usage = 0;
+ opts->psk_str = NULL;
+ opts->dtls = 0;
+ opts->srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ opts->serialize = 0;
+ opts->mfl = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE;
+ opts->cli_msg_len = 100;
+ opts->srv_msg_len = 100;
+ opts->expected_cli_fragments = 1;
+ opts->expected_srv_fragments = 1;
+ opts->renegotiate = 0;
+ opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+ opts->srv_log_obj = NULL;
+ opts->srv_log_obj = NULL;
+ opts->srv_log_fun = NULL;
+ opts->cli_log_fun = NULL;
+ opts->resize_buffers = 1;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
+ opts->cache = NULL;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( opts->cache, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context ) );
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( opts->cache );
+exit:
+ return;
+#endif
+}
+
+void free_handshake_options( handshake_test_options *opts )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( opts->cache );
+ mbedtls_free( opts->cache );
+#else
+ (void) opts;
+#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
@@ -776,11 +810,16 @@
*
* \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code.
*/
-int mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int pk_alg )
+int mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int pk_alg,
+ int opaque_alg, int opaque_alg2,
+ int opaque_usage )
{
int i = 0;
int ret = -1;
mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_slot = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#endif
if( ep == NULL )
{
@@ -863,6 +902,19 @@
}
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( opaque_alg != 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &( cert->pkey ), &key_slot,
+ opaque_alg, opaque_usage,
+ opaque_alg2 ), 0 );
+ }
+#else
+ (void) opaque_alg;
+ (void) opaque_alg2;
+ (void) opaque_usage;
+#endif
+
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->ca_cert ), NULL );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->cert ),
@@ -883,6 +935,10 @@
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( opaque_alg != 0 )
+ psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) );
}
@@ -903,8 +959,8 @@
*
* \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code.
*/
-
-int mbedtls_endpoint_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int endpoint_type, int pk_alg,
+int mbedtls_endpoint_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int endpoint_type,
+ handshake_test_options *options,
mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *dtls_context,
mbedtls_test_message_queue *input_queue,
mbedtls_test_message_queue *output_queue,
@@ -986,6 +1042,15 @@
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &( ep->conf ), MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && options->cache != NULL )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &( ep->conf ), options->cache,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_get,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_set );
+ }
+#endif
+
ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &( ep->ssl ), &( ep->conf ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -994,7 +1059,10 @@
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &( ep->conf ), NULL, NULL, NULL );
#endif
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( ep, pk_alg );
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( ep, options->pk_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg,
+ options->opaque_alg2,
+ options->opaque_usage );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n( &ep->conf ), user_data_n );
@@ -1014,6 +1082,14 @@
mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert = &( ep->cert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &( cert->pkey ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
+ {
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_slot = cert->pkey.pk_ctx;
+
+ psa_destroy_key( *key_slot );
+ }
+#endif
mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) );
}
@@ -1927,7 +2003,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-void perform_handshake( handshake_test_options* options )
+void perform_handshake( handshake_test_options *options )
{
/* forced_ciphersuite needs to last until the end of the handshake */
int forced_ciphersuite[2];
@@ -1946,7 +2022,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int ret = -1;
#endif
- int expected_handshake_result = 0;
+ int expected_handshake_result = options->expected_handshake_result;
USE_PSA_INIT( );
@@ -1959,7 +2035,7 @@
if( options->dtls != 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- options->pk_alg, &client_context,
+ options, &client_context,
&client_queue,
&server_queue, NULL ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
@@ -1971,7 +2047,7 @@
else
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL,
+ options, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
}
@@ -2005,7 +2081,7 @@
if( options->dtls != 0 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- options->pk_alg, &server_context,
+ options, &server_context,
&server_queue,
&client_queue, NULL ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
@@ -2017,8 +2093,8 @@
else
{
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ options, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL ) == 0 );
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &server.conf, options->srv_auth_mode );
@@ -2118,17 +2194,11 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( &client.ssl ) == 1 );
/* Make sure server state is moved to HANDSHAKE_OVER also. */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(server.ssl),
- &(client.ssl),
- MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
- == expected_handshake_result );
- if( expected_handshake_result != 0 )
- {
- goto exit;
- }
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(server.ssl),
+ &(client.ssl),
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ), 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( &server.ssl ) == 1 );
-
/* Check that both sides have negotiated the expected version. */
mbedtls_test_set_step( 0 );
if( ! check_ssl_version( options->expected_negotiated_version,
@@ -2140,6 +2210,12 @@
&server.ssl ) )
goto exit;
+ if( options->expected_ciphersuite != 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( server.ssl.session->ciphersuite,
+ options->expected_ciphersuite );
+ }
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
if( options->resize_buffers != 0 )
{
@@ -4094,157 +4170,6 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-void psa_hkdf_extract( int alg,
- data_t *ikm,
- data_t *salt,
- data_t *prk )
-{
- unsigned char *output_prk = NULL;
- size_t output_prk_size, output_prk_len;
-
- PSA_INIT( );
-
- output_prk_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg );
- ASSERT_ALLOC( output_prk, output_prk_size );
-
- PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract( alg, salt->x, salt->len,
- ikm->x, ikm->len,
- output_prk, output_prk_size,
- &output_prk_len ) );
-
- ASSERT_COMPARE( output_prk, output_prk_len, prk->x, prk->len );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_free( output_prk );
-
- PSA_DONE( );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-void psa_hkdf_extract_ret( int alg, int ret )
-{
- int output_ret;
- unsigned char *salt = NULL;
- unsigned char *ikm = NULL;
- unsigned char *prk = NULL;
- size_t salt_len, ikm_len, prk_len;
-
- PSA_INIT( );
-
- ASSERT_ALLOC( prk, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE);
- salt_len = 0;
- ikm_len = 0;
- prk_len = 0;
-
- output_ret = mbedtls_psa_hkdf_extract( alg, salt, salt_len,
- ikm, ikm_len,
- prk, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, &prk_len );
- TEST_ASSERT( output_ret == ret );
- TEST_ASSERT( prk_len == 0 );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_free( prk );
-
- PSA_DONE( );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-void psa_hkdf_expand( int alg,
- data_t *info,
- data_t *prk,
- data_t *okm )
-{
- enum { OKM_LEN = 1024 };
- unsigned char *output_okm = NULL;
-
- PSA_INIT( );
-
- ASSERT_ALLOC( output_okm, OKM_LEN );
- TEST_ASSERT( prk->len == PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) );
- TEST_ASSERT( okm->len < OKM_LEN );
-
- PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand( alg, prk->x, prk->len,
- info->x, info->len,
- output_okm, OKM_LEN ) );
-
- ASSERT_COMPARE( output_okm, okm->len, okm->x, okm->len );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_free( output_okm );
-
- PSA_DONE( );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-void psa_hkdf_expand_ret( int alg, int prk_len, int okm_len, int ret )
-{
- int output_ret;
- unsigned char *info = NULL;
- unsigned char *prk = NULL;
- unsigned char *okm = NULL;
- size_t info_len;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *keys = NULL;
-
- PSA_INIT( );
-
- info_len = 0;
-
- if( prk_len > 0 )
- ASSERT_ALLOC( prk, prk_len );
-
- if( okm_len > 0 )
- ASSERT_ALLOC( okm, okm_len );
-
- if( ret == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY )
- {
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-
- /* Reserve all key slot to make the key import fail. */
- psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE );
- psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
- psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
-
- ASSERT_ALLOC( keys, MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT );
-
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; i++ )
- {
- /* Do not use the 0 value because it will be passed to
- mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand */
- prk[0] = i + 1;
- keys[i] = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_import_key( &attributes, prk, prk_len, &keys[i] );
- }
-
- /* reset prk buffer */
- prk[0] = 0;
- }
-
- output_ret = mbedtls_psa_hkdf_expand( alg, prk, prk_len,
- info, info_len,
- okm, okm_len );
- TEST_ASSERT( output_ret == ret );
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_free( prk );
- mbedtls_free( okm );
-
- if( ret == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY )
- {
- for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; i++ )
- psa_destroy_key( keys[i] );
-
- mbedtls_free( keys );
- }
-
- PSA_DONE( );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
void ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( int hash_alg,
data_t *secret,
@@ -4994,20 +4919,24 @@
enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 };
mbedtls_endpoint ep;
int ret = -1;
+ handshake_test_options options;
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+ options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( NULL, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( NULL, endpoint_type, &options,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret );
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( NULL, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( NULL, options.pk_alg, 0, 0, 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret );
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &ep, endpoint_type, &options,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_endpoint_free( &ep, NULL );
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5017,17 +4946,21 @@
enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 };
mbedtls_endpoint base_ep, second_ep;
int ret = -1;
+ handshake_test_options options;
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+ options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
USE_PSA_INIT( );
- ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &base_ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &base_ep, endpoint_type, &options,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &second_ep,
( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ &options, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
ret = mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(base_ep.socket),
@@ -5054,6 +4987,7 @@
}
exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
mbedtls_endpoint_free( &base_ep, NULL );
mbedtls_endpoint_free( &second_ep, NULL );
USE_PSA_DONE( );
@@ -5079,6 +5013,9 @@
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5097,6 +5034,9 @@
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5110,7 +5050,34 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+void handshake_ciphersuite_select( char* cipher, int pk_alg, data_t *psk_str,
+ int psa_alg, int psa_alg2, int psa_usage,
+ int expected_handshake_result,
+ int expected_ciphersuite )
+{
+ handshake_test_options options;
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+
+ options.cipher = cipher;
+ options.psk_str = psk_str;
+ options.pk_alg = pk_alg;
+ options.opaque_alg = psa_alg;
+ options.opaque_alg2 = psa_alg2;
+ options.opaque_usage = psa_usage;
+ options.expected_handshake_result = expected_handshake_result;
+ options.expected_ciphersuite = expected_ciphersuite;
+ perform_handshake( &options );
+
+ /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
+ goto exit;
+
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
void app_data( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len,
int expected_cli_fragments,
int expected_srv_fragments, int dtls )
@@ -5124,14 +5091,21 @@
options.expected_cli_fragments = expected_cli_fragments;
options.expected_srv_fragments = expected_srv_fragments;
options.dtls = dtls;
+#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ options.expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
+#endif
perform_handshake( &options );
+
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
void app_data_tls( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len,
int expected_cli_fragments,
int expected_srv_fragments )
@@ -5166,6 +5140,8 @@
perform_handshake( &options );
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5202,6 +5178,9 @@
{
TEST_ASSERT( cli_pattern.counter >= 1 );
}
+
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5216,8 +5195,11 @@
options.dtls = 1;
perform_handshake( &options );
+
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5237,8 +5219,11 @@
options.resize_buffers = 1;
perform_handshake( &options );
+
/* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/
goto exit;
+exit:
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -5654,6 +5639,71 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+void force_bad_session_id_len( )
+{
+ enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 };
+ handshake_test_options options;
+ mbedtls_endpoint client, server;
+ log_pattern srv_pattern, cli_pattern;
+ mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context;
+
+ srv_pattern.pattern = cli_pattern.pattern = "cache did not store session";
+ srv_pattern.counter = 0;
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+
+ options.srv_log_obj = &srv_pattern;
+ options.srv_log_fun = log_analyzer;
+
+ USE_PSA_INIT( );
+
+ mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context );
+ mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ &options, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
+ &options, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL ) == 0 );
+
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( 1 );
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &server.conf, options.srv_log_fun,
+ options.srv_log_obj );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(client.socket),
+ &(server.socket),
+ BUFFSIZE ) == 0 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(client.ssl),
+ &(server.ssl),
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP )
+ == 0 );
+ /* Force a bad session_id_len that will be read by the server in
+ * mbedtls_ssl_cache_set. */
+ server.ssl.session_negotiate->id_len = 33;
+ if( options.cli_msg_len != 0 || options.srv_msg_len != 0 )
+ {
+ /* Start data exchanging test */
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_exchange_data( &(client.ssl), options.cli_msg_len,
+ options.expected_cli_fragments,
+ &(server.ssl), options.srv_msg_len,
+ options.expected_srv_fragments )
+ == 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that the cache did not store the session */
+ TEST_EQUAL( srv_pattern.counter, 1 );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_endpoint_free( &client, NULL );
+ mbedtls_endpoint_free( &server, NULL );
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( 0 );
+ USE_PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
void cookie_parsing( data_t *cookie, int exp_ret )
{
@@ -5781,21 +5831,25 @@
mbedtls_endpoint client, server;
mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats;
size_t free_slots_before = -1;
+ handshake_test_options options;
uint16_t iana_tls_group_list[] = { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE };
USE_PSA_INIT( );
+ init_handshake_options( &options );
+ options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+
/* Client side, force SECP256R1 to make one key bitflip fail
* the raw key agreement. Flipping the first byte makes the
* required 0x04 identifier invalid. */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL,
+ &options, NULL, NULL,
NULL, iana_tls_group_list ), 0 );
/* Server side */
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
- MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL,
+ &options, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL ), 0 );
TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(client.socket),
@@ -5834,6 +5888,7 @@
exit:
mbedtls_endpoint_free( &client, NULL );
mbedtls_endpoint_free( &server, NULL );
+ free_handshake_options( &options );
USE_PSA_DONE( );
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index d04b7d8..eb9e9aa 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -294,6 +294,10 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-512\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n"
+X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA-256, containing commas
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTS_X509_INFO
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.commas.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL\, Commas, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n"
+
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
@@ -375,6 +379,42 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server2.crt":"issuer":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA"
+X509 Get Distinguished Name #5
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server1.commas.crt":"subject":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL\, Commas, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+X509 Get Modified DN #1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"Modified":"C=NL, O=Modified, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0
+
+X509 Get Modified DN #2 Name exactly 255 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345":"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0
+
+X509 Get Modified DN #3 Name exceeds 255 bytes
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+X509 Get Modified DN #4 Name exactly 255 bytes, with comma requiring escaping
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"1234567890,1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+X509 Get Modified DN #5 Name exactly 255 bytes, ending with comma requiring escaping
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234,":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+X509 Get Next DN #1 No Multivalue RDNs
+mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next:"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0:"C O CN":3:"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+X509 Get Next DN #2 Initial Multivalue RDN
+mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next:"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0x01:"C CN":2:"C=NL + O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+X509 Get Next DN #3 Single Multivalue RDN
+mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next:"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0x03:"C":1:"C=NL + O=PolarSSL + CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
+X509 Get Next DN #4 Consecutive Multivalue RDNs
+mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next:"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, title=Example, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0x05:"C title":2:"C=NL + O=PolarSSL, title=Example + CN=PolarSSL Server 1"
+
X509 Time Expired #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/server1.crt":"valid_from":1
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index 1d06fe3..3bb68d9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -758,6 +758,37 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+void mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace( char * crt_file, char * new_subject_ou, char * result_str, int ret )
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_crt crt;
+ char buf[2000];
+ int res = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt );
+ memset( buf, 0, 2000 );
+
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 );
+ crt.subject.next->val.p = (unsigned char *) new_subject_ou;
+ crt.subject.next->val.len = strlen( new_subject_ou );
+
+ res = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( buf, 2000, &crt.subject );
+
+ if ( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( res == ret );
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 );
+ }
+exit:
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
void mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char * crt_file, char * entity, char * result_str )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt crt;
@@ -785,6 +816,77 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+void mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( char * name_str, int next_merged, char * expected_oids, int exp_count, char * exp_dn_gets )
+{
+ int ret = 0, i;
+ size_t len = 0, out_size;
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *names = NULL;
+ mbedtls_x509_name parsed, *parsed_cur, *parsed_prv;
+ // Size of buf is maximum required for test cases
+ unsigned char buf[80], *out = NULL, *c;
+ const char *short_name;
+
+ memset( &parsed, 0, sizeof( parsed ) );
+ memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
+ c = buf + sizeof( buf );
+ // Additional size required for trailing space
+ out_size = strlen( expected_oids ) + 2;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( out, out_size );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &names, name_str ), 0 );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, names );
+ TEST_LE_S( 0, ret );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &c, buf + sizeof( buf ), &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_x509_get_name( &c, buf + sizeof( buf ), &parsed ), 0 );
+
+ // Iterate over names and set next_merged nodes
+ parsed_cur = &parsed;
+ for( ; next_merged != 0 && parsed_cur != NULL; next_merged = next_merged >> 1 )
+ {
+ parsed_cur->next_merged = next_merged & 0x01;
+ parsed_cur = parsed_cur->next;
+ }
+
+ // Iterate over RDN nodes and print OID of first element to buffer
+ parsed_cur = &parsed;
+ len = 0;
+ for( i = 0; parsed_cur != NULL; i++ )
+ {
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( &parsed_cur->oid,
+ &short_name ), 0 );
+ len += mbedtls_snprintf( (char*) out + len, out_size - len, "%s ", short_name );
+ parsed_cur = mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( parsed_cur );
+ }
+ out[len-1] = 0;
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( exp_count, i );
+ TEST_EQUAL( strcmp( (char *) out, expected_oids ), 0 );
+ mbedtls_free( out );
+ out = NULL;
+
+ out_size = strlen( exp_dn_gets ) + 1;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( out, out_size );
+
+ TEST_LE_S( 0, mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( (char *) out, out_size, &parsed ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( strcmp( (char *) out, exp_dn_gets ), 0 );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( out );
+ mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &names );
+
+ parsed_cur = parsed.next;
+ while( parsed_cur != 0 )
+ {
+ parsed_prv = parsed_cur;
+ parsed_cur = parsed_cur->next;
+ mbedtls_free( parsed_prv );
+ }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
void mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( char * crt_file, char * entity, int result )
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
index 8d9a11a..91fdd86 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
x509_crt_check:"data_files/server5.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca2.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"":2:0:"data_files/test-ca2.crt"
X509 String to Names #1
-mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0
+mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0
X509 String to Names #2
mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID
