| /* |
| * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may |
| * not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT |
| * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| /* |
| * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation |
| * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm: |
| * |
| * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12 |
| * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/pem.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| #else |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #define mbedtls_printf printf |
| #define mbedtls_calloc calloc |
| #define mbedtls_free free |
| #endif |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) |
| |
| #define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ |
| MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) |
| #define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ |
| MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) |
| |
| /* |
| * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it |
| */ |
| static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, |
| unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret, n; |
| |
| if( end - *p < 2 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; |
| (*p) += 2; |
| |
| if( (int)( end - *p ) < n ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); |
| |
| (*p) += n; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P |
| * |
| * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2 |
| * |
| * This means that we need to return an error if |
| * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2 |
| * |
| * For more information on the attack, see: |
| * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf |
| * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643 |
| */ |
| static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_mpi U; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) ); |
| |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 || |
| mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) |
| { |
| DHM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); |
| memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, |
| unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->GY, p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. |
| */ |
| static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| if( x_size < 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ |
| ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ); |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate GX = G^X mod P |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, |
| &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, |
| unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t n1, n2, n3; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); |
| |
| ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto cleanup; |
| |
| /* |
| * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are |
| * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. |
| */ |
| #define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \ |
| do { \ |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \ |
| p + 2, \ |
| ( n ) ) ); \ |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) >> 8 ); \ |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( n ) ); \ |
| p += ( n ); \ |
| } while( 0 ) |
| |
| n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); |
| n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->G ); |
| n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->GX ); |
| |
| p = output; |
| DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->P , n1 ); |
| DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->G , n2 ); |
| DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->GX, n3 ); |
| |
| *olen = p - output; |
| |
| ctx->len = n1; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set prime modulus and generator |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, |
| const mbedtls_mpi *P, |
| const mbedtls_mpi *G ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); |
| } |
| |
| ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Import the peer's public value G^Y |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); |
| |
| if( ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Create own private value X and export G^X |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, |
| unsigned char *output, size_t olen, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); |
| |
| if( olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto cleanup; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: |
| * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, |
| * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer |
| * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. |
| */ |
| static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| mbedtls_mpi R; |
| |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, |
| * but remember it to use blinding next time. |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->pX ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->pX, &ctx->X ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vf, 1 ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values? |
| * If yes, just update them by squaring them. |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We need to generate blinding values from scratch |
| */ |
| |
| /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); |
| |
| /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P |
| * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), |
| * then elevate to the Xth power. */ |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, |
| unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, |
| int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_rng ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_mpi GYb; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); |
| |
| if( output_size < ctx->len ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb ); |
| |
| /* Blind peer's value */ |
| if( f_rng != NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); |
| } |
| else |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) ); |
| |
| /* Do modular exponentiation */ |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, |
| &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); |
| |
| /* Unblind secret value */ |
| if( f_rng != NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory |
| * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ |
| *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K ); |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) ); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); |
| |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Free the components of a DHM key |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) |
| { |
| if( ctx == NULL ) |
| return; |
| |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Parse DHM parameters |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, |
| size_t dhminlen ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t len; |
| unsigned char *p, *end; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| mbedtls_pem_context pem; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhmin != NULL ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); |
| |
| /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ |
| if( dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0' ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; |
| else |
| ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, |
| "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----", |
| "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----", |
| dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen ); |
| |
| if( ret == 0 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Was PEM encoded |
| */ |
| dhminlen = pem.buflen; |
| } |
| else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| p = ( ret == 0 ) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin; |
| #else |
| p = (unsigned char *) dhmin; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| end = p + dhminlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE { |
| * prime INTEGER, -- P |
| * generator INTEGER, -- g |
| * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL |
| * } |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, |
| MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| end = p + len; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| /* This might be the optional privateValueLength. |
| * If so, we can cleanly discard it */ |
| mbedtls_mpi rec; |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &rec ); |
| ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rec ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); |
| if ( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ( p != end ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, |
| MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P ); |
| |
| exit: |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); |
| #endif |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| mbedtls_dhm_free( dhm ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| /* |
| * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. |
| * |
| * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. |
| * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced |
| * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. |
| */ |
| static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| long size; |
| |
| if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| |
| fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); |
| if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) |
| { |
| fclose( f ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| } |
| fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); |
| |
| *n = (size_t) size; |
| |
| if( *n + 1 == 0 || |
| ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) |
| { |
| fclose( f ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| } |
| |
| if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) |
| { |
| fclose( f ); |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 ); |
| mbedtls_free( *buf ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| fclose( f ); |
| |
| (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; |
| |
| if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) |
| ++*n; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Load and parse DHM parameters |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); |
| DHM_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( dhm, buf, n ); |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); |
| mbedtls_free( buf ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) |
| static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = |
| "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" |
| "MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" |
| "1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" |
| "9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" |
| "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; |
| #else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { |
| 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, |
| 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, |
| 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, |
| 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, |
| 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, |
| 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, |
| 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, |
| 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, |
| 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, |
| 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, |
| 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, |
| 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Checkup routine |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; |
| |
| mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| mbedtls_printf( " DHM parameter load: " ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &dhm, |
| (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params, |
| mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ |