| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. |
| * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf |
| * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG context initialization |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) |
| { |
| memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context)); |
| |
| ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *additional, |
| size_t add_len) |
| { |
| size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); |
| unsigned char rounds = (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) ? 2 : 1; |
| unsigned char sep[1]; |
| unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| |
| for (sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++) { |
| /* Step 1 or 4 */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, |
| ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, |
| sep, 1)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if (rounds == 2) { |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, |
| additional, add_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, K)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Step 2 or 5 */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, |
| ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K, sizeof(K)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, |
| const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Set initial working state. |
| * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the |
| * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, |
| mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| memset(ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)); |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. |
| * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 |
| * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. |
| */ |
| static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, |
| int use_nonce) |
| { |
| unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; |
| size_t seedlen = 0; |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| { |
| size_t total_entropy_len; |
| |
| if (use_nonce == 0) { |
| total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; |
| } else { |
| total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; |
| } |
| |
| /* III. Check input length */ |
| if (len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || |
| total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| memset(seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT); |
| |
| /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ |
| if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, |
| seed, ctx->entropy_len)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; |
| } |
| seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; |
| |
| /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated |
| * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ |
| if (use_nonce) { |
| /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order |
| * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() |
| * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not |
| * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which |
| * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own |
| * entropy source implementation can emit in a single |
| * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ |
| if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, |
| seed + seedlen, |
| ctx->entropy_len / 2)) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ |
| if (additional != NULL && len != 0) { |
| memcpy(seed + seedlen, additional, len); |
| seedlen += len; |
| } |
| |
| /* 2. Update state */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ |
| ctx->reseed_counter = 1; |
| |
| exit: |
| /* 4. Done */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seed, seedlen); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2 |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t len) |
| { |
| return hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, additional, len, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) |
| * |
| * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted |
| * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7. |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, |
| int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_entropy, |
| const unsigned char *custom, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t md_size; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); |
| #endif |
| |
| md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set initial working state. |
| * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the |
| * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| memset(ctx->V, 0x01, md_size); |
| |
| ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; |
| ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; |
| |
| if (ctx->entropy_len == 0) { |
| /* |
| * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by |
| * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, |
| * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. |
| * |
| * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) |
| */ |
| ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ |
| md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ |
| 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, custom, len, |
| 1 /* add nonce */)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set prediction resistance |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| int resistance) |
| { |
| ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len) |
| { |
| ctx->entropy_len = len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set reseed interval |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval) |
| { |
| ctx->reseed_interval = interval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data: |
| * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman) |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, |
| unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; |
| size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); |
| size_t left = out_len; |
| unsigned char *out = output; |
| |
| /* II. Check request length */ |
| if (out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG; |
| } |
| |
| /* III. Check input length */ |
| if (add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; |
| } |
| |
| /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ |
| if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ |
| (ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || |
| ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval)) { |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, add_len)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ |
| } |
| |
| /* 2. Use additional data if any */ |
| if (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) { |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, |
| additional, add_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ |
| while (left != 0) { |
| size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, |
| ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(out, ctx->V, use_len); |
| out += use_len; |
| left -= use_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* 6. Update */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, |
| additional, add_len)) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* 7. Update reseed counter */ |
| ctx->reseed_counter++; |
| |
| exit: |
| /* 8. Done */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG random function |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately |
| * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). |
| */ |
| void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) |
| /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ |
| if (ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL) { |
| mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); |
| } |
| #endif |
| mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->md_ctx); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context)); |
| ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| FILE *f; |
| unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; |
| |
| if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ |
| mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if (fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f) != sizeof(buf)) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| exit: |
| fclose(f); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| FILE *f = NULL; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; |
| unsigned char c; |
| |
| if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ |
| mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); |
| |
| n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); |
| if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if (n == 0 || ferror(f)) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| fclose(f); |
| f = NULL; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); |
| if (f != NULL) { |
| fclose(f); |
| } |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(ctx, path); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ |
| |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) |
| /* Dummy checkup routine */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) |
| { |
| (void) verbose; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #else |
| |
| #define OUTPUT_LEN 80 |
| |
| /* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ |
| static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { |
| 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, |
| 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, |
| 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, |
| 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, |
| 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 |
| }; |
| static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { |
| 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, |
| 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, |
| 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, |
| 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, |
| 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, |
| 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, |
| 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 |
| }; |
| |
| /* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ |
| static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { |
| 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, |
| 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, |
| 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, |
| 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf |
| }; |
| static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { |
| 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, |
| 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, |
| 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, |
| 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, |
| 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, |
| 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, |
| 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 |
| }; |
| |
| /* "Entropy" from buffer */ |
| static size_t test_offset; |
| static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy(void *data, |
| unsigned char *buf, size_t len) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = data; |
| memcpy(buf, p + test_offset, len); |
| test_offset += len; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #define CHK(c) if ((c) != 0) \ |
| { \ |
| if (verbose != 0) \ |
| mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \ |
| return 1; \ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1 |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) |
| { |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; |
| unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); |
| |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx); |
| |
| /* |
| * PR = True |
| */ |
| if (verbose != 0) { |
| mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : "); |
| } |
| |
| test_offset = 0; |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info, |
| hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, |
| NULL, 0)); |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(&ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON); |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| CHK(memcmp(buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); |
| |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); |
| |
| if (verbose != 0) { |
| mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * PR = False |
| */ |
| if (verbose != 0) { |
| mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : "); |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx); |
| |
| test_offset = 0; |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info, |
| hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, |
| NULL, 0)); |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(&ctx, NULL, 0)); |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| CHK(memcmp(buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN)); |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); |
| |
| mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); |
| |
| if (verbose != 0) { |
| mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); |
| } |
| |
| if (verbose != 0) { |
| mbedtls_printf("\n"); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ |