| /* |
| * TLS 1.3 key schedule |
| * |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) |
| |
| #include <stdint.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" |
| #include "debug_internal.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| |
| #include "ssl_misc.h" |
| #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" |
| #include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" |
| |
| #include "psa/crypto.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" |
| |
| /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many |
| * arguments in each translating place. */ |
| static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) |
| { |
| return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, |
| ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), |
| psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); |
| } |
| #define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) |
| |
| #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ |
| .name = string, |
| |
| struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels = |
| { |
| /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one |
| * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST |
| }; |
| |
| #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL |
| |
| /* |
| * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. |
| * |
| * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: |
| * |
| * struct HkdfLabel { |
| * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material |
| * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " |
| * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash |
| * }; |
| * |
| * Parameters: |
| * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material |
| * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to |
| * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than |
| * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most |
| * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by |
| * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. |
| * - (label, label_len): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix |
| * The label length MUST be less than or equal to |
| * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN |
| * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. |
| * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 |
| * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). |
| * - (ctx, ctx_len): context + context length |
| * The context length MUST be less than or equal to |
| * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN |
| * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. |
| * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, |
| * This MUST be a writable buffer of size |
| * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. |
| * - dst_len: Pointer at which to store the actual length of |
| * the HkdfLabel structure on success. |
| */ |
| |
| static const char tls13_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; |
| |
| #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \ |
| (2 /* expansion length */ \ |
| + 1 /* label length */ \ |
| + label_len \ |
| + 1 /* context length */ \ |
| + context_len) |
| |
| #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ |
| SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ |
| sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + \ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) |
| |
| static void ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label( |
| size_t desired_length, |
| const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, |
| const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, |
| unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len) |
| { |
| size_t total_label_len = |
| sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + label_len; |
| size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = |
| SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, ctx_len); |
| |
| unsigned char *p = dst; |
| |
| /* Add the size of the expanded key material. |
| * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use |
| * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ |
| #if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 |
| #error "The implementation of ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ |
| value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" |
| #endif |
| |
| *p++ = 0; |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(desired_length); |
| |
| /* Add label incl. prefix */ |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len); |
| memcpy(p, tls13_label_prefix, sizeof(tls13_label_prefix)); |
| p += sizeof(tls13_label_prefix); |
| memcpy(p, label, label_len); |
| p += label_len; |
| |
| /* Add context value */ |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ctx_len); |
| if (ctx_len != 0) { |
| memcpy(p, ctx, ctx_len); |
| } |
| |
| /* Return total length to the caller. */ |
| *dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, |
| const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, |
| const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, |
| unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) |
| { |
| unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN]; |
| size_t hkdf_label_len = 0; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; |
| |
| if (label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { |
| /* Should never happen since this is an internal |
| * function, and we know statically which labels |
| * are allowed. */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { |
| /* Should not happen, as above. */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { |
| /* Should not happen, as above. */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(buf_len, |
| label, label_len, |
| ctx, ctx_len, |
| hkdf_label, |
| &hkdf_label_len); |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, |
| secret, |
| secret_len); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, |
| hkdf_label, |
| hkdf_label_len); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, |
| buf, |
| buf_len); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); |
| status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len); |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, |
| unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, |
| unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( |
| hash_alg, |
| secret, secret_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), |
| NULL, 0, |
| key, key_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( |
| hash_alg, |
| secret, secret_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), |
| NULL, 0, |
| iv, iv_len); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: |
| * |
| * - One secret value per sender. |
| * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated |
| * - The desired lengths of key and IV. |
| * |
| * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: |
| * |
| * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) |
| * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) |
| * |
| * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided |
| * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side |
| * keys in a single function call. |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| const unsigned char *client_secret, |
| const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, |
| size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( |
| hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len, |
| keys->client_write_key, key_len, |
| keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( |
| hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len, |
| keys->server_write_key, key_len, |
| keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| keys->key_len = key_len; |
| keys->iv_len = iv_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, |
| const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, |
| const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, |
| int ctx_hashed, |
| unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| unsigned char hashed_context[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
| if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, ctx, ctx_len, hashed_context, |
| PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg), &ctx_len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (ctx_len > sizeof(hashed_context)) { |
| /* This should never happen since this function is internal |
| * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. |
| * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk |
| * of getting a stack overflow. */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, ctx_len); |
| } |
| |
| return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, |
| secret, secret_len, |
| label, label_len, |
| hashed_context, ctx_len, |
| dstbuf, dstbuf_len); |
| |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| const unsigned char *secret_old, |
| const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, |
| unsigned char *secret_new) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t hlen; |
| unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; |
| const unsigned char all_zeroes_input[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; |
| const unsigned char *l_input = NULL; |
| size_t l_input_len; |
| |
| psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; |
| |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| hlen = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") |
| * on the old secret. */ |
| if (secret_old != NULL) { |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| secret_old, hlen, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived), |
| NULL, 0, /* context */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, |
| tmp_secret, hlen); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| if (input != NULL && input_len != 0) { |
| l_input = input; |
| l_input_len = input_len; |
| } else { |
| l_input = all_zeroes_input; |
| l_input_len = hlen; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, |
| PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, |
| tmp_secret, |
| hlen); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, |
| PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, |
| l_input, l_input_len); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, |
| secret_new, |
| PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); |
| |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); |
| status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); |
| ret = (ret == 0 ? PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) : ret); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *early_secret, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 |
| * | |
| * v |
| * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) |
| * | = client_early_traffic_secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) |
| * | = early_exporter_master_secret |
| * v |
| */ |
| |
| /* Create client_early_traffic_secret */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| early_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_e_traffic), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->client_early_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Create early exporter */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| early_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(e_exp_master), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->early_exporter_master_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *handshake_secret, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * |
| * Handshake Secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", |
| * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) |
| * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", |
| * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) |
| * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with |
| * Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) |
| */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| handshake_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_hs_traffic), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with |
| * Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) |
| */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| handshake_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_hs_traffic), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *application_secret, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 |
| * |
| * Master Secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", |
| * | ClientHello...server Finished ) |
| * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", |
| * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) |
| * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", |
| * | ClientHello...server Finished) |
| * | = exporter_master_secret |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| application_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_ap_traffic), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| application_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_ap_traffic), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| application_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(exp_master), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->exporter_master_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange. |
| * |
| * This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets() |
| * because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */ |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *application_secret, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| application_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_master), |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, |
| derived->resumption_master_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. |
| * |
| * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine |
| * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and |
| * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition. |
| * |
| * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() |
| * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. |
| * |
| * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule |
| * stage \c Handshake. |
| * |
| * \returns \c 0 on success. |
| * \returns A negative error code on failure. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( |
| (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| |
| /* |
| * Compute MasterSecret |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, |
| NULL, 0, |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( |
| 4, "Master secret", |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *base_key, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, |
| unsigned char *dst, |
| size_t *dst_len) |
| { |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| size_t hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| unsigned char finished_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; |
| int ret; |
| psa_algorithm_t alg; |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS 1.3 Finished message |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; |
| * } Finished; |
| * |
| * verify_data = |
| * HMAC( finished_key, |
| * Hash( Handshake Context + |
| * Certificate* + |
| * CertificateVerify* ) |
| * ) |
| * |
| * finished_key = |
| * HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length ) |
| */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( |
| hash_alg, base_key, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(finished), |
| NULL, 0, |
| finished_key, hash_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg); |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); |
| psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); |
| psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); |
| |
| status = psa_import_key(&attributes, finished_key, hash_len, &key); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_mac_compute(key, alg, transcript, hash_len, |
| dst, hash_len, dst_len); |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| status = psa_destroy_key(key); |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(finished_key, sizeof(finished_key)); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *dst, |
| size_t dst_len, |
| size_t *actual_len, |
| int from) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| |
| unsigned char *base_key = NULL; |
| size_t base_key_len = 0; |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = |
| &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; |
| |
| mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; |
| |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( |
| (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); |
| |
| if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { |
| base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret; |
| base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret); |
| } else { |
| base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret; |
| base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret); |
| } |
| |
| if (dst_len < hash_len) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, |
| transcript, sizeof(transcript), |
| &transcript_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, base_key, |
| transcript, dst, actual_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, hash_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); |
| |
| exit: |
| /* Erase handshake secrets */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(base_key, base_key_len); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, |
| unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, |
| int psk_type, |
| unsigned char const *transcript, |
| unsigned char *result) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| unsigned char binder_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; |
| unsigned char early_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| size_t actual_len; |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) |
| ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ |
| ((void) ssl); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, |
| * but add an assertion anyway. */ |
| if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 |
| * | |
| * v |
| * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret |
| * | |
| * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") |
| * | = binder_key |
| * v |
| */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, |
| NULL, /* Old secret */ |
| psk, psk_len, /* Input */ |
| early_secret); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", |
| early_secret, hash_len); |
| |
| if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| early_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_binder), |
| NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, |
| binder_key, hash_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'")); |
| } else { |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( |
| hash_alg, |
| early_secret, hash_len, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(ext_binder), |
| NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, |
| binder_key, hash_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'")); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret", ret); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message |
| * but with the BaseKey being the binder_key. |
| */ |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, binder_key, transcript, |
| result, &actual_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder", result, actual_len); |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(early_secret, sizeof(early_secret)); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(binder_key, sizeof(binder_key)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( |
| mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, |
| int endpoint, int ciphersuite, |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, |
| mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl /* DEBUG ONLY */) |
| { |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| int ret; |
| mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| unsigned char const *key_enc; |
| unsigned char const *iv_enc; |
| unsigned char const *key_dec; |
| unsigned char const *iv_dec; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_key_type_t key_type; |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; |
| psa_algorithm_t alg; |
| size_t key_bits; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) |
| ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ |
| (void) ssl; |
| #endif |
| |
| ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); |
| if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", |
| ciphersuite)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); |
| if (cipher_info == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", |
| ciphersuite_info->cipher)); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Setup cipher contexts in target transform |
| */ |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, |
| cipher_info)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, |
| cipher_info)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) |
| if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { |
| key_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_key; |
| key_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_key; |
| iv_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; |
| iv_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) |
| if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { |
| key_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_key; |
| key_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_key; |
| iv_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; |
| iv_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; |
| } else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ |
| { |
| /* should not happen */ |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(transform->iv_enc, iv_enc, traffic_keys->iv_len); |
| memcpy(transform->iv_dec, iv_dec, traffic_keys->iv_len); |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, |
| key_enc, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), |
| MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, |
| key_dec, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), |
| MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Setup other fields in SSL transform |
| */ |
| |
| if ((ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) != 0) { |
| transform->taglen = 8; |
| } else { |
| transform->taglen = 16; |
| } |
| |
| transform->ivlen = traffic_keys->iv_len; |
| transform->maclen = 0; |
| transform->fixed_ivlen = transform->ivlen; |
| transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; |
| |
| /* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and |
| * then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the |
| * type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding |
| * granularity. */ |
| transform->minlen = |
| transform->taglen + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| /* |
| * Setup psa keys and alg |
| */ |
| if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, |
| transform->taglen, |
| &alg, |
| &key_type, |
| &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( |
| 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| transform->psa_alg = alg; |
| |
| if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); |
| psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); |
| psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); |
| |
| if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, |
| key_enc, |
| PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), |
| &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( |
| 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); |
| |
| if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, |
| key_dec, |
| PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), |
| &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( |
| 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info, |
| size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len) |
| { |
| psa_key_type_t key_type; |
| psa_algorithm_t alg; |
| size_t taglen; |
| size_t key_bits; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if (ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) { |
| taglen = 8; |
| } else { |
| taglen = 16; |
| } |
| |
| status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen, |
| &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); |
| |
| /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */ |
| *iv_len = 12; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) |
| /* |
| * ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting |
| * the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7 |
| * of RFC 8446. |
| * |
| * NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to |
| * the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus |
| * a key for server early traffic. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| size_t key_len = 0; |
| size_t iv_len = 0; |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; |
| |
| hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, |
| transcript, |
| sizeof(transcript), |
| &transcript_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, |
| "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", |
| ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( |
| hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, |
| transcript, transcript_len, &tls13_early_secrets); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( |
| 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( |
| 4, "Client early traffic secret", |
| tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Export client handshake traffic secret |
| */ |
| if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { |
| ssl->f_export_keys( |
| ssl->p_export_keys, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, |
| tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len, |
| handshake->randbytes, |
| handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( |
| hash_alg, |
| tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len, |
| traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| traffic_keys->key_len = key_len; |
| traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_key", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_key, |
| traffic_keys->key_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_iv", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_iv, |
| traffic_keys->iv_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| /* Erase early secrets and transcript */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( |
| &tls13_early_secrets, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets)); |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; |
| mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and |
| * key material. */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(ssl, &traffic_keys); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key", |
| ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); |
| if (transform_earlydata == NULL) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( |
| transform_earlydata, |
| ssl->conf->endpoint, |
| handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, |
| &traffic_keys, |
| ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_free(transform_earlydata); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| unsigned char *psk = NULL; |
| size_t psk_len = 0; |
| |
| if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher suite info not found")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk", |
| ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, NULL, psk, psk_len, |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| mbedtls_free((void *) psk); |
| #endif |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, |
| PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys. |
| * |
| * ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for |
| * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of |
| * RFC 8446. |
| * |
| * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in |
| * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see |
| * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(). |
| * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic |
| * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. |
| * |
| * \returns \c 0 on success. |
| * \returns A negative error code on failure. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| size_t key_len = 0; |
| size_t iv_len = 0; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| handshake->ciphersuite_info; |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = |
| &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; |
| |
| hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, |
| transcript, |
| sizeof(transcript), |
| &transcript_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, |
| "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", |
| ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( |
| hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, |
| transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets", |
| ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client handshake traffic secret", |
| tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server handshake traffic secret", |
| tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Export client handshake traffic secret |
| */ |
| if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { |
| ssl->f_export_keys( |
| ssl->p_export_keys, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, |
| tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len, |
| handshake->randbytes, |
| handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); |
| |
| ssl->f_export_keys( |
| ssl->p_export_keys, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, |
| tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len, |
| handshake->randbytes, |
| handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( |
| hash_alg, |
| tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, |
| hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_key", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_key, |
| traffic_keys->key_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_key", |
| traffic_keys->server_write_key, |
| traffic_keys->key_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_iv", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_iv, |
| traffic_keys->iv_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_iv", |
| traffic_keys->server_write_iv, |
| traffic_keys->iv_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); |
| |
| exit: |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. |
| * |
| * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine |
| * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and |
| * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition. |
| * |
| * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() |
| * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. |
| * |
| * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule |
| * stage \c Early. |
| * |
| * \returns \c 0 on success. |
| * \returns A negative error code on failure. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( |
| (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL; |
| size_t shared_secret_len = 0; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) |
| /* |
| * Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which |
| * client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret |
| * are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage. |
| */ |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { |
| if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) || |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(handshake->offered_group_id)) { |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) |
| psa_algorithm_t alg = |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ? |
| PSA_ALG_ECDH : PSA_ALG_FFDH; |
| |
| /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; |
| psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; |
| |
| status = psa_get_key_attributes(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, |
| &key_attributes); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| shared_secret_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( |
| psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); |
| shared_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, shared_secret_len); |
| if (shared_secret == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_raw_key_agreement( |
| alg, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, |
| shared_secret, shared_secret_len, &shared_secret_len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ |
| } else { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Group not supported.")); |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Compute the Handshake Secret |
| */ |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( |
| hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, |
| shared_secret, shared_secret_len, |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Handshake secret", |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, |
| PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| if (shared_secret != NULL) { |
| mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys. |
| * |
| * ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic |
| * keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be |
| * encrypted under the application traffic key. |
| * |
| * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in |
| * key schedule stage \c Application, see |
| * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). |
| * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic |
| * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. |
| * |
| * \returns \c 0 on success. |
| * \returns A negative error code on failure. |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL |
| static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys( |
| mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| /* Address at which to store the application secrets */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets * const app_secrets = |
| &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets; |
| |
| /* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */ |
| unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| |
| /* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */ |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; |
| |
| psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| |
| /* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */ |
| size_t key_len = 0, iv_len = 0; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive application traffic keys")); |
| |
| /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */ |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(handshake->ciphersuite_info, |
| &key_len, &iv_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; |
| |
| hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); |
| hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); |
| |
| /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility |
| * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, |
| transcript, sizeof(transcript), |
| &transcript_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( |
| hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, |
| transcript, transcript_len, app_secrets); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( |
| 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */ |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( |
| hash_alg, |
| app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client application traffic secret", |
| app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| hash_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server application traffic secret", |
| app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, |
| hash_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * Export client/server application traffic secret 0 |
| */ |
| if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { |
| ssl->f_export_keys( |
| ssl->p_export_keys, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, |
| app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, |
| handshake->randbytes, |
| handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by |
| a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); |
| |
| ssl->f_export_keys( |
| ssl->p_export_keys, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, |
| app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, |
| handshake->randbytes, |
| handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by |
| a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application_write_key:", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write key", |
| traffic_keys->server_write_key, key_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application write IV", |
| traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write IV", |
| traffic_keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive application traffic keys")); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| /* randbytes is not used again */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, |
| sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; |
| mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| |
| /* Compute handshake secret */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and |
| * key material. */ |
| ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys", |
| ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); |
| if (transform_handshake == NULL) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( |
| transform_handshake, |
| ssl->conf->endpoint, |
| handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, |
| &traffic_keys, |
| ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_free(transform_handshake); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; |
| unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t transcript_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); |
| |
| md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, |
| transcript, sizeof(transcript), |
| &transcript_len); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( |
| mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type), |
| handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, |
| transcript, transcript_len, |
| &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* Erase master secrets */ |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&handshake->tls13_master_secrets, |
| sizeof(handshake->tls13_master_secrets)); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( |
| 4, "Resumption master secret", |
| ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, |
| PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type))); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( |
| 2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; |
| mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL; |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, |
| "ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, |
| "ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| transform_application = |
| mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); |
| if (transform_application == NULL) { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( |
| transform_application, |
| ssl->conf->endpoint, |
| ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, |
| &traffic_keys, |
| ssl); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->transform_application = transform_application; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| mbedtls_free(transform_application); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) |
| int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char **psk, |
| size_t *psk_len) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) |
| psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| *psk_len = 0; |
| *psk = NULL; |
| |
| if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, &key_attributes); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| |
| *psk_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); |
| *psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, *psk_len); |
| if (*psk == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_export_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, |
| (uint8_t *) *psk, *psk_len, psk_len); |
| if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { |
| mbedtls_free((void *) *psk); |
| *psk = NULL; |
| return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; |
| *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; |
| if (*psk == NULL) { |
| return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ |
