Merge pull request #5199 from AndrzejKurek/fix-getting-started
Fix duplicate variable name in getting_started.md
diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index a63f070..60218b0 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
increase code size for a security fix.)
For contributors, see the [Backwards Compatibility section of
-CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#cackwords-compatibility).
+CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#backwards-compatibility).
## Current Branches
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md
index b3a9547..dcaa360 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@
The list of maintained branches can be found in the [Current Branches section
of BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md#current-branches).
-Currently maintained LTS branches are:
-1. [mbedtls-2.7](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.7)
+The only currently maintained LTS branch is:
1. [mbedtls-2.16](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.16)
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c04c4aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/bugfix-for-gcm-long-iv-size.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix a bug in mbedtls_gcm_starts() when bits of iv are longer than 2^32.
+ * Fix #4884.
+
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt b/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebb0b7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/constant_time_module.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Changes
+ * The mbedcrypto library includes a new source code module constant_time.c,
+ containing various functions meant to resist timing side channel attacks.
+ This module does not have a separate configuration option, and functions
+ from this module will be included in the build as required. Currently
+ most of the interface of this module is private and may change at any
+ time.
+
+Features
+ * Add new API mbedtls_ct_memcmp for constant time buffer comparison.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
index becbfae..e381c11 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aes.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
@@ -511,10 +511,6 @@
* \brief This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption
* operation.
*
- * This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode
- * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer
- * defined in the \p input parameter.
- *
* Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule
* for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you
* must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc()
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c5de57a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be
+ * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param a Pointer to the first buffer.
+ * \param b Pointer to the second buffer.
+ * \param n The number of bytes to compare in the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same,
+ * otherwise non-zero.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
index 9e6f59d..0cbbac1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@
* for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
* \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be
* either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 18aff5a..caac2d5 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
chachapoly.c
cipher.c
cipher_wrap.c
+ constant_time.c
cmac.c
ctr_drbg.c
des.c
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index 15c9a8b..bd116be 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
cipher.o \
cipher_wrap.o \
cmac.o \
+ constant_time.o \
ctr_drbg.o \
des.o \
dhm.o \
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 42ec7ac..fdf8c9a 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "bn_mul.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -268,162 +269,6 @@
memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) );
}
-/**
- * Select between two sign values in constant-time.
- *
- * This is functionally equivalent to second ? a : b but uses only bit
- * operations in order to avoid branches.
- *
- * \param[in] a The first sign; must be either +1 or -1.
- * \param[in] b The second sign; must be either +1 or -1.
- * \param[in] second Must be either 1 (return b) or 0 (return a).
- *
- * \return The selected sign value.
- */
-static int mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( int a, int b, unsigned char second )
-{
- /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonnably assume about
- * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned
- * by taking advantage of the fact that a and b are either +1 or -1. */
- unsigned ua = a + 1;
- unsigned ub = b + 1;
-
- /* second was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are ua and ub */
- const unsigned mask = second << 1;
-
- /* select ua or ub */
- unsigned ur = ( ua & ~mask ) | ( ub & mask );
-
- /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */
- return( (int) ur - 1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally assign dest = src, without leaking information
- * about whether the assignment was made or not.
- * dest and src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
- * assign must be 0 or 1.
- */
-static void mpi_safe_cond_assign( size_t n,
- mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
- const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
- unsigned char assign )
-{
- size_t i;
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
- const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -assign;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
- dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
- * about whether the assignment was made or not.
- * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign )
-{
- int ret = 0;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* make sure assign is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */
- assign = (assign | (unsigned char)-assign) >> (sizeof( assign ) * 8 - 1);
- /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
- limb_mask = -assign;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
-
- X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, assign );
-
- mpi_safe_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
-
- for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
- X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask;
-
-cleanup:
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
- * about whether the swap was made or not.
- * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
- * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap )
-{
- int ret, s;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
- mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
-
- if( X == Y )
- return( 0 );
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* make sure swap is 0 or 1 in a time-constant manner */
- swap = (swap | (unsigned char)-swap) >> (sizeof( swap ) * 8 - 1);
- /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */
- limb_mask = -swap;
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) );
-
- s = X->s;
- X->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( X->s, Y->s, swap );
- Y->s = mpi_safe_cond_select_sign( Y->s, s, swap );
-
-
- for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ )
- {
- tmp = X->p[i];
- X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask );
- Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask );
- }
-
-cleanup:
- return( ret );
-}
-
/*
* Set value from integer
*/
@@ -1246,107 +1091,6 @@
return( 0 );
}
-/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches.
- *
- * \param x First integer.
- * \param y Second integer.
- *
- * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, 0 otherwise
- */
-static unsigned ct_lt_mpi_uint( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
- const mbedtls_mpi_uint y )
-{
- mbedtls_mpi_uint ret;
- mbedtls_mpi_uint cond;
-
- /*
- * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different.
- */
- cond = ( x ^ y );
- /*
- * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and
- * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y.
- */
- ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond;
- /*
- * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the
- * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if
- * the MSB of y is 0.)
- */
- ret |= y & cond;
-
-
- ret = ret >> ( biL - 1 );
-
- return (unsigned) ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare signed values in constant time
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
- unsigned *ret )
-{
- size_t i;
- /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */
- unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative;
-
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL );
-
- if( X->n != Y->n )
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-
- /*
- * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0.
- * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0.
- */
- X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1;
- Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1;
-
- /*
- * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger.
- * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
- * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
- */
- cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative );
- *ret = cond & X_is_negative;
-
- /*
- * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still
- * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already.
- */
- done = cond;
-
- for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- )
- {
- /*
- * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
- * X and Y are negative.
- *
- * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
- * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
- */
- cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
- *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative;
- done |= cond;
-
- /*
- * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
- * X and Y are positive.
- *
- * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
- * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
- */
- cond = ct_lt_mpi_uint( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
- *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative );
- done |= cond;
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
/*
* Compare signed values
*/
@@ -2207,7 +1951,7 @@
* so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction
* which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d.
* This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */
- mpi_safe_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
+ mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] );
}
/*
@@ -2227,42 +1971,6 @@
mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T );
}
-/*
- * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
- * return x == y
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
- const size_t diff = x ^ y;
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
- const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff );
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
-
- return( 1 ^ diff1 );
-}
-
/**
* Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index.
*
@@ -2285,7 +1993,7 @@
for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i],
- (unsigned char) mbedtls_mpi_cf_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
+ (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) );
}
cleanup:
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index ff851ec..0d9d710 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "cipher_wrap.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -74,27 +75,6 @@
#define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-/* Compare the contents of two buffers in constant time.
- * Returns 0 if the contents are bitwise identical, otherwise returns
- * a non-zero value.
- * This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
- */
-static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2,
- size_t len )
-{
- const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1;
- const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2;
- size_t i;
- unsigned char diff;
-
- for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < len; i++ )
- diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i];
-
- return( (int)diff );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
-
static int supported_init = 0;
const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void )
@@ -1214,7 +1194,7 @@
}
/* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
- if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
return( 0 );
@@ -1236,7 +1216,7 @@
}
/* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
- if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
return( 0 );
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bb275c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,742 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those
+ * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n )
+{
+ size_t i;
+ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+ volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+ volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+ {
+ /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
+ * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
+ * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
+ unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
+ diff |= x ^ y;
+ }
+
+ return( (int)diff );
+}
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value )
+{
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
+ * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+ return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value )
+{
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+ return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value )
+{
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
+ * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+ return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
+ * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
+ * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero.
+ */
+static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x,
+ size_t y )
+{
+ /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
+ const size_t sub = x - y;
+
+ /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
+ const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+ /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 );
+
+ return( mask );
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x,
+ size_t y )
+{
+ return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x,
+ size_t y )
+{
+ /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
+ const size_t diff = x ^ y;
+
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
+ const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff );
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
+ const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+ return( 1 ^ diff1 );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison:
+ * return x > y
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x,
+ size_t y )
+{
+ /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */
+ return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint y )
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint ret;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint cond;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different.
+ */
+ cond = ( x ^ y );
+ /*
+ * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and
+ * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y.
+ */
+ ret = ( x - y ) & ~cond;
+ /*
+ * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the
+ * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if
+ * the MSB of y is 0.)
+ */
+ ret |= y & cond;
+
+
+ ret = ret >> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 );
+
+ return (unsigned) ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition,
+ unsigned if1,
+ unsigned if0 )
+{
+ unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition );
+ return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Select between two sign values without branches.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit
+ * operations in order to avoid branches.
+ *
+ * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result
+ * is undefined.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 The first sign; must be either +1 or -1.
+ * \param if0 The second sign; must be either +1 or -1.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
+ * */
+static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition,
+ int if1,
+ int if0 )
+{
+ /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about
+ * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned
+ * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */
+ unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1;
+ unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1;
+
+ /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */
+ const unsigned mask = condition << 1;
+
+ /* select uif1 or uif0 */
+ unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask );
+
+ /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */
+ return( (int) ur - 1 );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
+ unsigned char condition )
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
+ * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+ /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition;
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+ dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer.
+ *
+ * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally
+ * equivalent to
+ * ```
+ * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
+ * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
+ * ```
+ * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing)
+ * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at
+ * the expense of performance.
+ *
+ * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer.
+ * \param total Total size of the buffer.
+ * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
+ */
+static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start,
+ size_t total,
+ size_t offset )
+{
+ volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
+ size_t i, n;
+ if( total == 0 )
+ return;
+ for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
+ {
+ unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i );
+ /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
+ * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
+ * zero out the last byte. */
+ for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
+ {
+ unsigned char current = buf[n];
+ unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
+ buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next );
+ }
+ buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t c1,
+ size_t c2 )
+{
+ /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
+ const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal );
+
+ /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */
+ for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
+ dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t offset,
+ size_t offset_min,
+ size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len )
+{
+ size_t offsetval;
+
+ for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ )
+ {
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len,
+ offsetval, offset );
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add_data,
+ size_t add_data_len,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_len_secret,
+ size_t min_data_len,
+ size_t max_data_len,
+ unsigned char *output )
+{
+ /*
+ * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
+ * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
+ *
+ * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
+ * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
+ * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
+ *
+ * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
+ * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
+ * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
+ *
+ * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
+ */
+ const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
+ /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
+ * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
+ const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
+ const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
+ const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
+ const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
+
+ unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
+ size_t offset;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
+
+#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
+ do { \
+ ret = (func_call); \
+ if( ret != 0 ) \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ } while( 0 )
+
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
+
+ /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
+ * so we can start directly with the message */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
+
+ /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
+ for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
+ {
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
+ /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
+ offset, data_len_secret );
+
+ if( offset < max_data_len )
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
+ }
+
+ /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
+
+ /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
+
+ /* Done, get ready for next time */
+ MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
+
+#undef MD_CHK
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
+ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the assignment was made or not.
+ * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned char assign )
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+
+ /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */
+ limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
+
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s );
+
+ mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign );
+
+ for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ )
+ X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask;
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the swap was made or not.
+ * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
+ * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned char swap )
+{
+ int ret, s;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+
+ if( X == Y )
+ return( 0 );
+
+ /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */
+ limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap );
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) );
+
+ s = X->s;
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s );
+ Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s );
+
+
+ for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ )
+ {
+ tmp = X->p[i];
+ X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask );
+ Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask );
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare signed values in constant time
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned *ret )
+{
+ size_t i;
+ /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */
+ unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative;
+
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL );
+ MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL );
+
+ if( X->n != Y->n )
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ /*
+ * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0.
+ * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0.
+ */
+ X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1;
+ Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger.
+ * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
+ * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
+ */
+ cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative );
+ *ret = cond & X_is_negative;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still
+ * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already.
+ */
+ done = cond;
+
+ for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- )
+ {
+ /*
+ * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
+ * X and Y are negative.
+ *
+ * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+ * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+ */
+ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] );
+ *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative;
+ done |= cond;
+
+ /*
+ * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both
+ * X and Y are positive.
+ *
+ * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+ * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+ */
+ cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] );
+ *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative );
+ done |= cond;
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len,
+ size_t *olen )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
+
+ /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
+ * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
+ * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
+ * this would open the execution of the function to
+ * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+ * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
+ * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
+ * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
+ * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
+ * branch predictor). */
+ size_t pad_count = 0;
+ unsigned bad = 0;
+ unsigned char pad_done = 0;
+ size_t plaintext_size = 0;
+ unsigned output_too_large;
+
+ plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11
+ : output_max_len;
+
+ /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
+ * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
+ bad |= input[0];
+
+
+ /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
+ * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+ bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
+
+ /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
+ * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+ for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
+ {
+ pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+ pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
+ }
+
+
+ /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
+ bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+
+ /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
+ bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count );
+
+ /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
+ * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
+ * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
+ * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
+ * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
+ * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
+ * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+ bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
+
+ /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
+ * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
+ output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size,
+ plaintext_max_size );
+
+ /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
+ * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
+ * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
+ * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
+ * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
+ ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+ bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large,
+ - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
+ 0 ) );
+
+ /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
+ * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
+ * We need to copy the same amount of data
+ * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
+ * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
+ * through memory or cache access patterns. */
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large );
+ for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
+ input[i] &= ~bad;
+
+ /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
+ * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
+ * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
+ * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large,
+ (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+ (unsigned) plaintext_size );
+
+ /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
+ * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
+ * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
+ * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
+ * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
+ * information. */
+ mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+ plaintext_max_size,
+ plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
+
+ /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
+ * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
+ * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
+ * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
+ * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
+ * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
+ * secrets. */
+ if( output_max_len != 0 )
+ memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+
+ /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
+ * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
+ * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
+ * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
+ *olen = plaintext_size;
+
+ return( ret );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac18b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Turn a value into a mask:
+ * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
+ * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param value The value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
+ * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
+ * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y,
+ * otherwise zero.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x,
+ size_t y );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
+ * return x == y
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x,
+ size_t y );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint y );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+/** Choose between two integer values without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled
+ * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition,
+ unsigned if1,
+ unsigned if0 );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Conditionally assign a value without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely
+ * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n.
+ * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point
+ * to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src,
+ unsigned char condition );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
+
+/** Conditional memcpy without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely
+ * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
+ *
+ * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to.
+ * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest.
+ * \param len The number of bytes to copy.
+ * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition.
+ * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t c1, size_t c2 );
+
+/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
+ * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
+ * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
+ * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`.
+ *
+ * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
+ * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest.
+ * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
+ * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
+ * than \p offset_max.
+ * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset.
+ * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset.
+ * \param len The number of bytes to copy.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t offset,
+ size_t offset_min,
+ size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len );
+
+/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
+ *
+ * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
+ * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
+ * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
+ * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
+ * max_data_len bytes from \p data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured
+ * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the
+ * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
+ * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after
+ * the computation is complete to prepare for the
+ * next computation.
+ * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being
+ * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer
+ * of \p add_data_len bytes.
+ * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes.
+ * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the
+ * message. This must point to a readable buffer
+ * of \p max_data_len bytes.
+ * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data.
+ * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
+ * greater than \p max_data_len.
+ * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the
+ * message, read from \p data.
+ * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the
+ * message, read from \p data.
+ * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
+ * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
+ * HMAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval 0 on success.
+ * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
+ * The hardware accelerator failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add_data,
+ size_t add_data_len,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_len_secret,
+ size_t min_data_len,
+ size_t max_data_len,
+ unsigned char *output );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
+ * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
+ *
+ * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
+ * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
+ * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
+ * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
+ *
+ * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
+ * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
+ * by the terminology.
+ * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
+ * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
+ * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
+ * length \p output_max_len bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
+ * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len,
+ size_t *olen );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index 6d62564..8505cf4 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@
size_t i;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len, olen = 0;
+ uint64_t iv_bits;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
@@ -278,7 +279,8 @@
else
{
memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 );
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( iv_len * 8, work_buf, 12 );
+ iv_bits = (uint64_t)iv_len * 8;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 );
p = iv;
while( iv_len > 0 )
diff --git a/library/nist_kw.c b/library/nist_kw.c
index e2ab256..1aea0b6 100644
--- a/library/nist_kw.c
+++ b/library/nist_kw.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -52,26 +53,6 @@
#define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8
#define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline unsigned char mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
- size_t i;
- volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
- volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
- volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
-
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
- {
- /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
- * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
- * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
- unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
- diff |= x ^ y;
- }
-
- return( diff );
-}
-
/*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */
static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = {0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6};
/*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */
@@ -398,7 +379,7 @@
goto cleanup;
/* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
- diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
if( diff != 0 )
{
@@ -447,7 +428,7 @@
}
/* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
- diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
if( diff != 0 )
{
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index e818e6d..e3ec056 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -72,22 +74,6 @@
#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
- size_t i;
- const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
- const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
- unsigned char diff = 0;
-
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
- diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
-
- return( diff );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *N,
const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
@@ -1473,97 +1459,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
- *
- * \param value The value to analyze.
- * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
- */
-static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
-{
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
- * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
- return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-}
-
-/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches.
- *
- * This is equivalent to `size > max`, but is likely to be compiled to
- * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
- *
- * \param size Size to check.
- * \param max Maximum desired value for \p size.
- * \return \c 0 if `size <= max`.
- * \return \c 1 if `size > max`.
- */
-static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
-{
- /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
- return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
-}
-
-/** Choose between two integer values, without branches.
- *
- * This is equivalent to `cond ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled
- * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
- *
- * \param cond Condition to test.
- * \param if1 Value to use if \p cond is nonzero.
- * \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero.
- * \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
- */
-static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
-{
- unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
- return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
-}
-
-/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
- * the length of the data through side channels.
- *
- * `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to
- * ```
- * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
- * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
- * ```
- * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing)
- * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at
- * the expense of performance.
- *
- * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer.
- * \param total Total size of the buffer.
- * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
- */
-static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
- size_t total,
- size_t offset )
-{
- volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
- size_t i, n;
- if( total == 0 )
- return;
- for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
- {
- unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
- /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
- * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
- * zero out the last byte. */
- for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
- {
- unsigned char current = buf[n];
- unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
- buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
- }
- buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
- }
-}
-
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
*/
@@ -1576,23 +1471,8 @@
size_t output_max_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size;
+ size_t ilen;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
- /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
- * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
- * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
- * this would open the execution of the function to
- * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
- * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
- * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
- * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
- * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
- * branch predictor). */
- size_t pad_count = 0;
- unsigned bad = 0;
- unsigned char pad_done = 0;
- size_t plaintext_size = 0;
- unsigned output_too_large;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
@@ -1600,9 +1480,6 @@
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
ilen = ctx->len;
- plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ?
- ilen - 11 :
- output_max_len );
if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -1615,98 +1492,8 @@
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
- /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
- * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
- bad |= buf[0];
-
-
- /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
- * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
- bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
-
- /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
- * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
- for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
- {
- pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
- pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
- }
-
-
- /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
- bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
-
- /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
- bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
-
- /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
- * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
- * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
- * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
- * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
- * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
- * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
-
- /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
- * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
- output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
- plaintext_max_size );
-
- /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
- * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
- * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
- * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
- * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
- ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
- if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
- 0 ) );
-
- /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
- * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
- * We need to copy the same amount of data
- * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
- * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
- * through memory or cache access patterns. */
- bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
- for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
- buf[i] &= ~bad;
-
- /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
- * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
- * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
- * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
- plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
- (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
- (unsigned) plaintext_size );
-
- /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
- * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
- * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
- * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
- * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
- * information. */
- mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size,
- plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
-
- /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
- * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
- * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
- * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
- * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
- * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
- * secrets. */
- if( output_max_len != 0 )
- memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
-
- /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
- * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
- * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
- * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
- *olen = plaintext_size;
+ ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( buf, ilen,
+ output, output_max_len, olen );
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
@@ -2100,7 +1887,7 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
- if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
@@ -2372,8 +2159,8 @@
* Compare
*/
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
- sig_len ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
+ sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 8c5c024..68d3033 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
@@ -1356,9 +1357,9 @@
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
- mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1,
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1,
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
- mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c
index 986b141..7516786 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cookie.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
diff --git a/library/ssl_invasive.h b/library/ssl_invasive.h
deleted file mode 100644
index babbc27..0000000
--- a/library/ssl_invasive.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * \file ssl_invasive.h
- *
- * \brief SSL module: interfaces for invasive testing only.
- *
- * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
- * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when
- * building the library for testing.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
- * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
- * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H
-
-#include "common.h"
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
-/** \brief Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
- *
- * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
- * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
- * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
- * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
- * max_data_len bytes from \p data.
- *
- * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured
- * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the
- * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
- * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after
- * the computation is complete to prepare for the
- * next computation.
- * \param add_data The additional data prepended to \p data. This
- * must point to a readable buffer of \p add_data_len
- * bytes.
- * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes.
- * \param data The data appended to \p add_data. This must point
- * to a readable buffer of \p max_data_len bytes.
- * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data.
- * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
- * greater than \p max_data_len.
- * \param min_data_len The minimal length of \p data in bytes.
- * \param max_data_len The maximal length of \p data in bytes.
- * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
- * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
- * HMAC value.
- *
- * \retval 0
- * Success.
- * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
- * The hardware accelerator failed.
- */
-int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
- mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
- size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
- unsigned char *output );
-
-/** \brief Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
- *
- * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
- * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
- * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
- *
- * \param dst The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
- * buffer of at least \p len bytes.
- * \param src_base The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
- * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
- * bytes.
- * \param offset_secret The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
- * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
- * than \p offset_max.
- * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset_secret.
- * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset_secret.
- * \param len The number of bytes to copy.
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
- size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
- size_t len );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 6eec644..36a0712 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -1369,26 +1369,6 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
-{
- size_t i;
- volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
- volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
- volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
-
- for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
- {
- /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
- * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
- * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
- unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
- diff |= x ^ y;
- }
-
- return( diff );
-}
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 3c7700b..286294f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/version.h"
-
-#include "ssl_invasive.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -961,242 +961,6 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
-/*
- * Turn a bit into a mask:
- * - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
- * - if bit == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
-{
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
- return -bit;
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
- * - if x < y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
- const size_t sub = x - y;
-
- /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
-
- /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
-
- return( mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
- * - if x >= y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
- * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations using masks.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
- * return x == y
- *
- * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
- * with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
- * mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
-{
- /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
- const size_t diff = x ^ y;
-
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
- * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-
- /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
- const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
-
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
-
- /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
- const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
-
- return( 1 ^ diff1 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow conditional memcpy:
- * - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len),
- * - otherwise, a no-op,
- * but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2.
- *
- * This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
- * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
- */
-static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src,
- size_t len,
- size_t c1, size_t c2 )
-{
- /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
- const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
-
- /* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
- for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
- dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask );
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
- *
- * Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
- * (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
- mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
- size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
- unsigned char *output )
-{
- /*
- * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
- * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
- *
- * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
- * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
- * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
- *
- * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
- * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
- * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
- *
- * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
- */
- const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
- /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
- * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
- const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
- const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
- const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
- const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
-
- unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
- mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
- size_t offset;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
-
-#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
- do { \
- ret = (func_call); \
- if( ret != 0 ) \
- goto cleanup; \
- } while( 0 )
-
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
-
- /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
- * so we can start directly with the message */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
-
- /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
- for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
- {
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
- /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
- offset, data_len_secret );
-
- if( offset < max_data_len )
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
- }
-
- /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
-
- /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
-
- /* Done, get ready for next time */
- MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
-
-#undef MD_CHK
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
- return( ret );
-}
-
-/*
- * Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
- * - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
- * - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
- */
-MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
- unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
- size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
- size_t len )
-{
- size_t offset;
-
- for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
- {
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
- offset, offset_secret );
- }
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
-
int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec )
@@ -1434,7 +1198,7 @@
*
* Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
* least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
- * mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below.
+ * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below.
*
* Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
@@ -1458,8 +1222,8 @@
transform->maclen );
/* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1520,7 +1284,7 @@
if( auth_done == 1 )
{
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1540,7 +1304,7 @@
}
#endif
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
@@ -1574,18 +1338,18 @@
/* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
* (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
*/
- const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
- const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
- padlen - 1 );
+ const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
+ const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx],
+ padlen - 1 );
pad_count += mask & equal;
}
- correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
+ correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
#endif
- padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
+ padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
@@ -1649,20 +1413,20 @@
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
- add_data, add_data_len,
- data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
- mac_expect );
+ ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
+ add_data, add_data_len,
+ data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
+ mac_expect );
if( ret != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret );
return( ret );
}
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
- rec->data_len,
- min_len, max_len,
- transform->maclen );
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
+ rec->data_len,
+ min_len, max_len,
+ transform->maclen );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
@@ -1670,8 +1434,8 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
#endif
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
- transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
+ transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 881b1fd..5e2d152 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
- mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@@ -3569,16 +3571,7 @@
diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
- /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
- * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
- mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+ mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff );
/*
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
@@ -3661,7 +3654,7 @@
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
- mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 48a6369..b07d07a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/version.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -2885,7 +2886,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
buf, hash_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
@@ -6370,6 +6371,12 @@
MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+ /* RSA algorithms */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif
+
MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE
};
@@ -6383,6 +6390,12 @@
MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+ /* RSA algorithms */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
+#endif
+
MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 12ef4d5..2dd5c50 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
#include "ssl_misc.h"
@@ -320,6 +321,11 @@
unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_hash_len;
+ void const *opts_ptr = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options opts;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+
/*
* struct {
* SignatureScheme algorithm;
@@ -368,6 +374,13 @@
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
break;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "Certificate Verify: using RSA" ) );
+ md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+ sig_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Certificate Verify: Unknown signature algorithm." ) );
goto error;
@@ -426,8 +439,21 @@
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+ if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
+ {
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t* md_info;
+ opts.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
+ if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
+ }
+ opts.expected_salt_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+ opts_ptr = (const void*) &opts;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, NULL,
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, opts_ptr,
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
p, signature_len ) ) == 0 )
@@ -903,9 +929,9 @@
expected_verify_data_len );
/* Semantic validation */
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf,
- expected_verify_data,
- expected_verify_data_len ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf,
+ expected_verify_data,
+ expected_verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index cb299b1..204b975 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -1534,6 +1534,10 @@
{
sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
}
+ else if( strcmp( q, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" ) == 0 )
+ {
+ sig_alg_list[i++] = MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256;
+ }
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "unknown signature algorithm %s\n", q );
@@ -1541,6 +1545,7 @@
mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 " );
mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 " );
mbedtls_printf( "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 " );
+ mbedtls_printf( "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 " );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 1ac34da..d43d662 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -79,16 +79,20 @@
if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then
O_NEXT_SRV="$OPENSSL_NEXT s_server -www -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key"
+ O_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$OPENSSL_NEXT s_server -www -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key"
O_NEXT_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $OPENSSL_NEXT s_client"
else
O_NEXT_SRV=false
+ O_NEXT_SRV_RSA=false
O_NEXT_CLI=false
fi
if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then
G_NEXT_SRV="$GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key"
+ G_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key"
else
G_NEXT_SRV=false
+ G_NEXT_SRV_RSA=false
fi
if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then
@@ -264,7 +268,7 @@
# Space-separated list of ciphersuites supported by this build of
# Mbed TLS.
P_CIPHERSUITES=" $($P_CLI --help 2>/dev/null |
- grep TLS- |
+ grep 'TLS-\|TLS1-3' |
tr -s ' \n' ' ')"
requires_ciphersuite_enabled() {
case $P_CIPHERSUITES in
@@ -1416,11 +1420,13 @@
if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then
O_NEXT_SRV="$O_NEXT_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT"
+ O_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$O_NEXT_SRV_RSA -accept $SRV_PORT"
O_NEXT_CLI="$O_NEXT_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT"
fi
if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then
G_NEXT_SRV="$G_NEXT_SRV -p $SRV_PORT"
+ G_NEXT_SRV_RSA="$G_NEXT_SRV_RSA -p $SRV_PORT"
fi
if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then
@@ -8835,6 +8841,22 @@
-c "<= parse finished message" \
-c "HTTP/1.0 200 ok"
+requires_openssl_tls1_3
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O AES_128_GCM_SHA256 , RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256" \
+ "$O_NEXT_SRV_RSA -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -tls1_3 -msg -no_middlebox -num_tickets 0" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls1_3 server_name=localhost force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 allow_sha1=0" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "ECDH curve: x25519" \
+ -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+ -c "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( 0804 )" \
+ -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 ok"
+
requires_gnutls_tls1_3
requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
@@ -8867,6 +8889,23 @@
-c "<= parse finished message" \
-c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
+requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket
+requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+requires_gnutls_next
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G AES_128_GCM_SHA256 , RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256" \
+ "$G_NEXT_SRV_RSA --disable-client-cert --priority=NORMAL:+CIPHER-ALL:+SHA256:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls1_3 server_name=localhost force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 allow_sha1=0" \
+ 0 \
+ -c "ECDH curve: x25519" \
+ -c "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( 1301 ) - TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
+ -c "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( 0804 )" \
+ -c "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify() returned 0" \
+ -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
# Test heap memory usage after handshake
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 75eda1d..3f79035 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
#include <psa/crypto.h>
-#include <ssl_invasive.h>
+#include <constant_time_internal.h>
#include <test/constant_flow.h>
@@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@
void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
{
/*
- * Test the function mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac() against a reference
+ * Test the function mbedtls_ct_hmac() against a reference
* implementation.
*/
mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
@@ -4712,10 +4712,10 @@
/* Get the function's result */
TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
- TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
- data, in_len,
- min_in_len, max_in_len,
- out ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+ data, in_len,
+ min_in_len, max_in_len,
+ out ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
@@ -4762,8 +4762,8 @@
mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret );
TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
- mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
- offset_min, offset_max, len );
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
+ offset_min, offset_max, len );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );