The SSL session cache module (ssl_cache) now also retains peer_cert information (not the entire chain)

The real peer certificate is copied into a x509_buf in the
ssl_cache_entry and reinstated upon cache retrieval. The information
about the rest of the certificate chain is lost in the process.

As the handshake (and certificate verification) has already been
performed, no issue is foreseen.
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8d9d51f..74a5c21 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
      or rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt()
    * Re-added handling for SSLv2 Client Hello when the define
      POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is set
+   * The SSL session cache module (ssl_cache) now also retains peer_cert
+     information (not the entire chain)
 
 Security
    * Removed further timing differences during SSL message decryption in
diff --git a/include/polarssl/ssl_cache.h b/include/polarssl/ssl_cache.h
index 85e0ed1..10cff20 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ssl_cache.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ssl_cache.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 {
     time_t timestamp;           /*!< entry timestamp    */
     ssl_session session;        /*!< entry session      */
+    x509_buf peer_cert;         /*!< entry peer_cert    */
     ssl_cache_entry *next;      /*!< chain pointer      */
 };
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_cache.c b/library/ssl_cache.c
index ab948d6..f5686be 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cache.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cache.c
@@ -71,6 +71,26 @@
             continue;
 
         memcpy( session->master, entry->session.master, 48 );
+
+        /*
+         * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain)
+         */
+        if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL )
+        {
+            session->peer_cert = (x509_cert *) malloc( sizeof(x509_cert) );
+            if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
+                return( 1 );
+
+            memset( session->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(x509_cert) );
+            if( x509parse_crt( session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p,
+                               entry->peer_cert.len ) != 0 )
+            {
+                free( session->peer_cert );
+                session->peer_cert = NULL;
+                return( 1 );
+            }
+        }
+
         return( 0 );
     }
 
@@ -119,15 +139,20 @@
         if( old != NULL && count >= cache->max_entries )
         {
             cur = old;
-            memset( &cur->session, 0, sizeof( ssl_session ) );
+            memset( &cur->session, 0, sizeof(ssl_session) );
+            if( cur->peer_cert.p != NULL )
+            {
+                free( cur->peer_cert.p );
+                memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(x509_buf) );
+            }
         }
         else
         {
-            cur = (ssl_cache_entry *) malloc( sizeof( ssl_cache_entry ) );
+            cur = (ssl_cache_entry *) malloc( sizeof(ssl_cache_entry) );
             if( cur == NULL )
                 return( 1 );
 
-            memset( cur, 0, sizeof( ssl_cache_entry ) );
+            memset( cur, 0, sizeof(ssl_cache_entry) );
 
             if( prv == NULL )
                 cache->chain = cur;
@@ -140,9 +165,21 @@
 
     memcpy( &cur->session, session, sizeof( ssl_session ) );
     
-    // Do not include peer_cert in cache entry
-    //
-    cur->session.peer_cert = NULL;
+    /*
+     * Store peer certificate
+     */
+    if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
+    {
+        cur->peer_cert.p = (unsigned char *) malloc( session->peer_cert->raw.len );
+        if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL )
+            return( 1 );
+
+        memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, session->peer_cert->raw.p,
+                session->peer_cert->raw.len );
+        cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
+
+        cur->session.peer_cert = NULL;
+    }
 
     return( 0 );
 }
@@ -173,6 +210,10 @@
         cur = cur->next;
 
         ssl_session_free( &prv->session );
+
+        if( prv->peer_cert.p != NULL )
+            free( prv->peer_cert.p );
+
         free( prv );
     }
 }