blob: d67f63f3d6f3101c08184ae94f4add6f85ea2859 [file] [log] [blame]
/** \file MacMessage.c
* Contains implementation of the functions related to HCOSE_MAC handle objects.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <memory.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "cose.h"
#include "cose_int.h"
#include "configure.h"
#include "crypto.h"
byte RgbDontUse2[8 * 1024]; // Remove this array when we can compute the size of a cbor serialization without this hack.
COSE * MacRoot = NULL;
/*! \private
* @brief Test if a HCOSE_MAC handle is valid
*
* Internal function to test if a MAC message handle is valid.
* This will start returning invalid results and cause the code to
* crash if handles are not released before the memory that underlies them
* is deallocated. This is an issue of a block allocator is used since
* in that case it is common to allocate memory but never to de-allocate it
* and just do that in a single big block.
*
* @param h handle to be validated
* @returns result of check
*/
bool IsValidMacHandle(HCOSE_MAC h)
{
COSE_MacMessage * p = (COSE_MacMessage *)h;
return _COSE_IsInList(MacRoot, (COSE *) p);
}
HCOSE_MAC COSE_Mac_Init(COSE_INIT_FLAGS flags, CBOR_CONTEXT_COMMA cose_errback * perr)
{
COSE_MacMessage * pobj = NULL;
CHECK_CONDITION(flags == COSE_INIT_FLAGS_NONE, COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
pobj = (COSE_MacMessage *)COSE_CALLOC(1, sizeof(COSE_MacMessage), context);
CHECK_CONDITION(pobj != NULL, COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (!_COSE_Init(flags, &pobj->m_message, COSE_mac_object, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA perr)) {
goto errorReturn;
}
_COSE_InsertInList(&MacRoot, &pobj->m_message);
return (HCOSE_MAC)pobj;
errorReturn:
if (pobj != NULL) {
_COSE_Mac_Release(pobj);
COSE_FREE(pobj, context);
}
return NULL;
}
HCOSE_MAC _COSE_Mac_Init_From_Object(cn_cbor * cbor, COSE_MacMessage * pIn, CBOR_CONTEXT_COMMA cose_errback * perr)
{
COSE_MacMessage * pobj = pIn;
cn_cbor * pRecipients = NULL;
// cn_cbor * tmp;
cose_errback error = { COSE_ERR_NONE };
if (perr == NULL) perr = &error;
if (pobj == NULL) pobj = (COSE_MacMessage *)COSE_CALLOC(1, sizeof(COSE_MacMessage), context);
if (pobj == NULL) {
perr->err = COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
errorReturn:
if (pobj != NULL) {
_COSE_Mac_Release(pobj);
if (pIn == NULL) {
COSE_FREE(pobj, context);
}
}
return NULL;
}
if (!_COSE_Init_From_Object(&pobj->m_message, cbor, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA perr)) {
goto errorReturn;
}
pRecipients = _COSE_arrayget_int(&pobj->m_message, INDEX_MAC_RECIPIENTS);
if (pRecipients != NULL) {
CHECK_CONDITION(pRecipients->type == CN_CBOR_ARRAY, COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
pRecipients = pRecipients->first_child;
while (pRecipients != NULL) {
COSE_RecipientInfo * pInfo = _COSE_Recipient_Init_From_Object(pRecipients, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA perr);
if (pInfo == NULL) goto errorReturn;
pInfo->m_recipientNext = pobj->m_recipientFirst;
pobj->m_recipientFirst = pInfo;
pRecipients = pRecipients->next;
}
}
_COSE_InsertInList(&MacRoot, &pobj->m_message);
return(HCOSE_MAC)pobj;
}
bool COSE_Mac_Free(HCOSE_MAC h)
{
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_cbor_context context;
#endif
COSE_MacMessage * p = (COSE_MacMessage *)h;
if (!IsValidMacHandle(h)) return false;
if (p->m_message.m_refCount > 1) {
p->m_message.m_refCount--;
return true;
}
_COSE_RemoveFromList(&MacRoot, &p->m_message);
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
context = ((COSE_MacMessage *)h)->m_message.m_allocContext;
#endif
_COSE_Mac_Release((COSE_MacMessage *)h);
COSE_FREE((COSE_MacMessage *)h, &context);
return true;
}
bool _COSE_Mac_Release(COSE_MacMessage * p)
{
COSE_RecipientInfo * pRecipient;
COSE_RecipientInfo * pRecipient2;
for (pRecipient = p->m_recipientFirst; pRecipient != NULL; pRecipient = pRecipient2) {
pRecipient2 = pRecipient->m_recipientNext;
_COSE_Recipient_Free(pRecipient);
}
_COSE_Release(&p->m_message);
return true;
}
bool COSE_Mac_SetContent(HCOSE_MAC cose, const byte * rgbContent, size_t cbContent, cose_errback * perr)
{
COSE_MacMessage * p = (COSE_MacMessage *)cose;
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_cbor_context * context = &p->m_message.m_allocContext;
#endif
cn_cbor * ptmp = NULL;
cn_cbor_errback cbor_error;
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidMacHandle(cose), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
ptmp = cn_cbor_data_create(rgbContent, (int) cbContent, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(ptmp != NULL, cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(_COSE_array_replace(&p->m_message, ptmp, INDEX_BODY, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error), cbor_error);
ptmp = NULL;
return true;
errorReturn:
if (ptmp != NULL) CN_CBOR_FREE(ptmp, context);
return false;
}
/*!
* @brief Set the application external data for authentication
*
* MAC data objects support the authentication of external application
* supplied data. This function is provided to supply that data to the library.
*
* The external data is not copied, nor will be it freed when the handle is released.
*
* @param hcose Handle for the COSE MAC data object
* @param pbEternalData point to the external data
* @param cbExternalData size of the external data
* @param perr location to return errors
* @return result of the operation.
*/
bool COSE_Mac_SetExternal(HCOSE_MAC hcose, const byte * pbExternalData, size_t cbExternalData, cose_errback * perr)
{
if (!IsValidMacHandle(hcose)) {
if (perr != NULL) perr->err = COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return false;
}
return _COSE_SetExternal(&((COSE_MacMessage *)hcose)->m_message, pbExternalData, cbExternalData, perr);
}
cn_cbor * COSE_Mac_map_get_int(HCOSE_MAC h, int key, int flags, cose_errback * perror)
{
if (!IsValidMacHandle(h)) {
if (perror != NULL) perror->err = COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return NULL;
}
return _COSE_map_get_int(&((COSE_MacMessage *)h)->m_message, key, flags, perror);
}
bool COSE_Mac_map_put_int(HCOSE_MAC h, int key, cn_cbor * value, int flags, cose_errback * perror)
{
if (!IsValidMacHandle(h) || (value == NULL)) {
if (perror != NULL) perror->err = COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return false;
}
return _COSE_map_put(&((COSE_MacMessage *)h)->m_message, key, value, flags, perror);
}
bool _COSE_Mac_Build_AAD(COSE * pCose, char * szContext, byte ** ppbAuthData, size_t * pcbAuthData, CBOR_CONTEXT_COMMA cose_errback * perr)
{
cn_cbor * pAuthData = NULL;
bool fRet = false;
cn_cbor_errback cbor_error;
cn_cbor * ptmp = NULL;
cn_cbor * pcn;
size_t cbAuthData;
byte * pbAuthData = NULL;
// Build authenticated data
// Protected headers
// external data
// body
pAuthData = cn_cbor_array_create(CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA NULL);
CHECK_CONDITION(pAuthData != NULL, COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
// Add the context string
ptmp = cn_cbor_string_create(szContext, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(ptmp != NULL, cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(cn_cbor_array_append(pAuthData, ptmp, &cbor_error), cbor_error);
ptmp = NULL;
// Add the protected attributes
pcn = _COSE_arrayget_int(pCose, INDEX_PROTECTED);
CHECK_CONDITION((pcn != NULL) && (pcn->type == CN_CBOR_BYTES), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
if ((pcn->length == 1) && (pcn->v.bytes[0] == 0xa0)) {
ptmp = cn_cbor_data_create(NULL, 0, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA NULL);
}
else {
ptmp = cn_cbor_data_create(pcn->v.bytes, (int)pcn->length, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA NULL);
}
CHECK_CONDITION(ptmp != NULL, COSE_ERR_CBOR);
CHECK_CONDITION(cn_cbor_array_append(pAuthData, ptmp, NULL), COSE_ERR_CBOR);
ptmp = NULL;
// Add the external bytes
ptmp = cn_cbor_data_create(pCose->m_pbExternal, (int) pCose->m_cbExternal, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(ptmp != NULL, cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(cn_cbor_array_append(pAuthData, ptmp, &cbor_error), cbor_error);
ptmp = NULL;
// Add the content
pcn = _COSE_arrayget_int(pCose, INDEX_BODY);
ptmp = cn_cbor_data_create(pcn->v.bytes, (int)pcn->length, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(ptmp != NULL, cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(cn_cbor_array_append(pAuthData, ptmp, &cbor_error), cbor_error);
ptmp = NULL;
// Turn it into bytes
cbAuthData = cn_cbor_encoder_write(RgbDontUse2, 0, sizeof(RgbDontUse2), pAuthData);
CHECK_CONDITION(cbAuthData > 0, COSE_ERR_CBOR);
pbAuthData = (byte *)COSE_CALLOC(cbAuthData, 1, context);
CHECK_CONDITION(pbAuthData != NULL, COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
CHECK_CONDITION(cn_cbor_encoder_write(pbAuthData, 0, cbAuthData, pAuthData) == cbAuthData, COSE_ERR_CBOR);
*ppbAuthData = pbAuthData;
*pcbAuthData = cbAuthData;
pbAuthData = NULL;
fRet = true;
errorReturn:
if (pbAuthData != NULL) COSE_FREE(pbAuthData, context);
if (pAuthData != NULL) CN_CBOR_FREE(pAuthData, context);
if (ptmp != NULL) CN_CBOR_FREE(ptmp, context);
return fRet;
}
bool COSE_Mac_encrypt(HCOSE_MAC h, cose_errback * perr)
{
int alg;
int t;
COSE_RecipientInfo * pri;
const cn_cbor * cn_Alg = NULL;
byte * pbAuthData = NULL;
size_t cbitKey;
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_cbor_context * context = NULL;
#endif
COSE_MacMessage * pcose = (COSE_MacMessage *)h;
bool fRet = false;
size_t cbAuthData = 0;
byte * pbKey = NULL;
size_t cbKey = 0;
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidMacHandle(h), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
context = &pcose->m_message.m_allocContext;
#endif // USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_Alg = _COSE_map_get_int(&pcose->m_message, COSE_Header_Algorithm, COSE_BOTH, perr);
if (cn_Alg == NULL) goto errorReturn;
CHECK_CONDITION(cn_Alg->type != CN_CBOR_TEXT, COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
CHECK_CONDITION(((cn_Alg->type == CN_CBOR_UINT || cn_Alg->type == CN_CBOR_INT)), COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
alg = (int) cn_Alg->v.uint;
// Get the key size
switch (alg) {
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_64:
cbitKey = 128;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_128:
cbitKey = 128;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_64:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_128:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_64:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_256
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_256:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_384_384
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_384_384:
cbitKey = 384;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_512_512
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_512_512:
cbitKey = 512;
break;
#endif
default:
FAIL_CONDITION(COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
}
// If we are doing direct encryption - then recipient generates the key
if (pbKey == NULL) {
t = 0;
for (pri = pcose->m_recipientFirst; pri != NULL; pri = pri->m_recipientNext) {
if (pri->m_encrypt.m_message.m_flags & 1) {
t |= 1;
pbKey = _COSE_RecipientInfo_generateKey(pri, alg, cbitKey, perr);
cbKey = cbitKey / 8;
if (pbKey == NULL) goto errorReturn;
}
else {
t |= 2;
}
}
CHECK_CONDITION(t != 3, COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
if (pbKey == NULL) {
pbKey = (byte *)COSE_CALLOC(cbitKey / 8, 1, context);
CHECK_CONDITION(pbKey != NULL, COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
cbKey = cbitKey / 8;
rand_bytes(pbKey, cbKey);
}
// Build protected headers
const cn_cbor * cbProtected = _COSE_encode_protected(&pcose->m_message, perr);
if (cbProtected == NULL) goto errorReturn;
// Build authenticated data
if (!_COSE_Mac_Build_AAD(&pcose->m_message, "MAC", &pbAuthData, &cbAuthData, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA perr)) goto errorReturn;
switch (alg) {
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_64:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Create(pcose, 64, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_64:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Create(pcose, 64, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_128:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Create(pcose, 128, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_128:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Create(pcose, 128, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_64:
if (!HMAC_Create(pcose, 256, 64, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_256
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_256:
if (!HMAC_Create(pcose, 256, 256, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_384_384
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_384_384:
if (!HMAC_Create(pcose, 384, 384, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_512_512
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_512_512:
if (!HMAC_Create(pcose, 512, 512, pbKey, cbKey, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
default:
FAIL_CONDITION(COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
for (pri = pcose->m_recipientFirst; pri != NULL; pri = pri->m_recipientNext) {
if (!_COSE_Recipient_encrypt(pri, pbKey, cbKey, perr)) goto errorReturn;
}
// Figure out the clean up
fRet = true;
errorReturn:
if (pbKey != NULL) {
memset(pbKey, 0, cbKey);
COSE_FREE(pbKey, context);
}
if (pbAuthData != NULL) COSE_FREE(pbAuthData, context);
return fRet;
}
bool COSE_Mac_validate(HCOSE_MAC h, HCOSE_RECIPIENT hRecip, cose_errback * perr)
{
COSE_MacMessage * pcose = (COSE_MacMessage *)h;
COSE_RecipientInfo * pRecip = (COSE_RecipientInfo *)hRecip;
byte * pbAuthData = NULL;
int cbitKey = 0;
bool fRet = false;
int alg;
const cn_cbor * cn = NULL;
byte * pbKey = NULL;
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_cbor_context * context = NULL;
#endif
size_t cbAuthData;
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidMacHandle(h) && IsValidRecipientHandle(hRecip), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
context = &pcose->m_message.m_allocContext;
#endif
cn = _COSE_map_get_int(&pcose->m_message, COSE_Header_Algorithm, COSE_BOTH, perr);
if (cn == NULL) goto errorReturn;
if (cn->type == CN_CBOR_TEXT) {
FAIL_CONDITION(COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
}
else {
CHECK_CONDITION((cn->type == CN_CBOR_UINT || cn->type == CN_CBOR_INT), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
alg = (int)cn->v.uint;
switch (alg) {
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_64:
cbitKey = 128;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_128:
cbitKey = 128;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_64:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_128:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_64:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_256
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_256:
cbitKey = 256;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_384_384
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_384_384:
cbitKey = 384;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_512_512
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_512_512:
cbitKey = 512;
break;
#endif
default:
FAIL_CONDITION(COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
break;
}
}
// Allocate the key if we have not already done so
if (pbKey == NULL) {
pbKey = COSE_CALLOC(cbitKey / 8, 1, context);
CHECK_CONDITION(pbKey != NULL, COSE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
// If there is a recipient - ask it for the key
for (pRecip = pcose->m_recipientFirst; pRecip != NULL; pRecip = pRecip->m_recipientNext) {
if (_COSE_Recipient_decrypt(pRecip, NULL, alg, cbitKey, pbKey, perr)) break;
}
CHECK_CONDITION(pRecip != NULL, COSE_ERR_NO_RECIPIENT_FOUND);
// Build protected headers
cn_cbor * cnProtected = _COSE_arrayget_int(&pcose->m_message, INDEX_PROTECTED);
CHECK_CONDITION((cnProtected != NULL) && (cnProtected->type == CN_CBOR_BYTES), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
// Build authenticated data
if (!_COSE_Mac_Build_AAD(&pcose->m_message, "MAC", &pbAuthData, &cbAuthData, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA perr)) goto errorReturn;
switch (alg) {
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_256
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_256:
if (!HMAC_Validate(pcose, 256, 256, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_256_64:
if (!HMAC_Validate(pcose, 256, 64, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_384_384
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_384_384:
if (!HMAC_Validate(pcose, 384, 384, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_HMAC_512_512
case COSE_Algorithm_HMAC_512_512:
if (!HMAC_Validate(pcose, 512, 512, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_64:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Validate(pcose, 64, pbKey, cbitKey / 8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_64
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_64:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Validate(pcose, 64, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_128_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_128_128:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Validate(pcose, 128, pbKey, cbitKey / 8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
#ifdef USE_AES_CBC_MAC_256_128
case COSE_Algorithm_CBC_MAC_256_128:
if (!AES_CBC_MAC_Validate(pcose, 128, pbKey, cbitKey/8, pbAuthData, cbAuthData, perr)) goto errorReturn;
break;
#endif
default:
FAIL_CONDITION(COSE_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
break;
}
fRet = true;
errorReturn:
if ((pbKey != NULL)) {
memset(pbKey, 0xff, cbitKey / 8);
COSE_FREE(pbKey, context);
}
return fRet;
}
bool COSE_Mac_AddRecipient(HCOSE_MAC hMac, HCOSE_RECIPIENT hRecip, cose_errback * perr)
{
COSE_RecipientInfo * pRecip;
COSE_MacMessage * pMac;
cn_cbor * pRecipients = NULL;
cn_cbor * pRecipientsT = NULL;
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
cn_cbor_context * context = NULL;
#endif
cn_cbor_errback cbor_error;
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidMacHandle(hMac), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidRecipientHandle(hRecip), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
pMac = (COSE_MacMessage *)hMac;
pRecip = (COSE_RecipientInfo *)hRecip;
pRecip->m_recipientNext = pMac->m_recipientFirst;
pMac->m_recipientFirst = pRecip;
#ifdef USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
context = &pMac->m_message.m_allocContext;
#endif // USE_CBOR_CONTEXT
pRecipients = _COSE_arrayget_int(&pMac->m_message, INDEX_MAC_RECIPIENTS);
if (pRecipients == NULL) {
pRecipientsT = cn_cbor_array_create(CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(pRecipientsT != NULL, cbor_error);
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(_COSE_array_replace(&pMac->m_message, pRecipientsT, INDEX_MAC_RECIPIENTS, CBOR_CONTEXT_PARAM_COMMA &cbor_error), cbor_error);
pRecipients = pRecipientsT;
pRecipientsT = NULL;
}
CHECK_CONDITION_CBOR(cn_cbor_array_append(pRecipients, pRecip->m_encrypt.m_message.m_cbor, &cbor_error), cbor_error);
pRecip->m_encrypt.m_message.m_refCount++;
return true;
errorReturn:
if (pRecipientsT == NULL) CN_CBOR_FREE(pRecipientsT, context);
return false;
}
HCOSE_RECIPIENT COSE_Mac_GetRecipient(HCOSE_MAC cose, int iRecipient, cose_errback * perr)
{
int i;
COSE_RecipientInfo * p;
CHECK_CONDITION(IsValidMacHandle(cose), COSE_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
p = ((COSE_MacMessage *)cose)->m_recipientFirst;
for (i = 0; i < iRecipient; i++) {
CHECK_CONDITION(p != NULL, COSE_ERR_NO_RECIPIENT_FOUND);
p = p->m_recipientNext;
}
if (p != NULL) p->m_encrypt.m_message.m_refCount++;
return (HCOSE_RECIPIENT)p;
errorReturn:
return NULL;
}