crypto/ec_extra/hash_to_curve.c - third_party/boringssl/boringssl - Git at Google

 /* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
  * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
  * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

 #include <openssl/ec.h>

 #include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/type_check.h>

 #include <assert.h>

 #include "internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
 #include "../internal.h"


 // This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in
 // draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
 //
 // This hash-to-curve implementation is written generically with the
 // expectation that we will eventually wish to support other curves. If it
 // becomes a performance bottleneck, some possible optimizations by
 // specializing it to the curve:
 //
 // - Rather than using a generic |felem_exp|, specialize the exponentation to
 //   c2 with a faster addition chain.
 //
 // - |felem_mul| and |felem_sqr| are indirect calls to generic Montgomery
 //   code. Given the few curves, we could specialize
 //   |map_to_curve_simple_swu|. But doing this reasonably without duplicating
 //   code in C is difficult. (C++ templates would be useful here.)
 //
 // - P-521's Z and c2 have small power-of-two absolute values. We could save
 //   two multiplications in SSWU. (Other curves have reasonable values of Z
 //   and inconvenient c2.) This is unlikely to be worthwhile without C++
 //   templates to make specializing more convenient.

 // expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
 // draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07. It returns one on success and zero on
 // allocation failure or if |out_len| was too large.
 static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
                               const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
                               const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len) {
   int ret = 0;
   const size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
   const size_t md_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
   EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
   EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);

   // Long DSTs are hashed down to size. See section 5.3.3.
   OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, "hashed DST still too large");
   uint8_t dst_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   if (dst_len >= 256) {
     static const char kPrefix[] = "H2C-OVERSIZE-DST-";
     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kPrefix, sizeof(kPrefix) - 1) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
         !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, dst_buf, NULL)) {
       goto err;
     }
     dst = dst_buf;
     dst_len = md_size;
   }
   uint8_t dst_len_u8 = (uint8_t)dst_len;

   // Compute b_0.
   static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
   // If |out_len| exceeds 16 bits then |i| will wrap below causing an error to
   // be returned. This depends on the static assert above.
   uint8_t l_i_b_str_zero[3] = {out_len >> 8, out_len, 0};
   uint8_t b_0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
       !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
     goto err;
   }

   uint8_t b_i[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   uint8_t i = 1;
   while (out_len > 0) {
     if (i == 0) {
       // Input was too large.
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       goto err;
     }
     if (i > 1) {
       for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
         b_i[j] ^= b_0[j];
       }
     } else {
       OPENSSL_memcpy(b_i, b_0, md_size);
     }

     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
         !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
       goto err;
     }

     size_t todo = out_len >= md_size ? md_size : out_len;
     OPENSSL_memcpy(out, b_i, todo);
     out += todo;
     out_len -= todo;
     i++;
   }

   ret = 1;

 err:
   EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
   return ret;
 }

 // num_bytes_to_derive determines the number of bytes to derive when hashing to
 // a number modulo |modulus|. See the hash_to_field operation defined in
 // section 5.2 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
 static int num_bytes_to_derive(size_t *out, const BIGNUM *modulus, unsigned k) {
   size_t bits = BN_num_bits(modulus);
   size_t L = (bits + k + 7) / 8;
   // We require 2^(8*L) < 2^(2*bits - 2) <= n^2 so to fit in bounds for
   // |felem_reduce| and |ec_scalar_reduce|. All defined hash-to-curve suites
   // define |k| to be well under this bound. (|k| is usually around half of
   // |p_bits|.)
   if (L * 8 >= 2 * bits - 2 ||
       L > 2 * EC_MAX_BYTES) {
     assert(0);
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
   }

   *out = L;
   return 1;
 }

 // big_endian_to_words decodes |in| as a big-endian integer and writes the
 // result to |out|. |num_words| must be large enough to contain the output.
 static void big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num_words,
                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
   assert(len <= num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
   // Ensure any excess bytes are zeroed.
   OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
   uint8_t *out_u8 = (uint8_t *)out;
   for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
     out_u8[len - 1 - i] = in[i];
   }
 }

 // hash_to_field implements the operation described in section 5.2
 // of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07, with count = 2. |k| is the security
 // factor.
 static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
                           EC_FELEM *out1, EC_FELEM *out2, const uint8_t *dst,
                           size_t dst_len, unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg,
                           size_t msg_len) {
   size_t L;
   uint8_t buf[4 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
   if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field, k) ||
       !expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
   BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
   size_t num_words = 2 * group->field.width;
   big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf, L);
   group->meth->felem_reduce(group, out1, words, num_words);
   big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf + L, L);
   group->meth->felem_reduce(group, out2, words, num_words);
   return 1;
 }

 // hash_to_scalar behaves like |hash_to_field2| but returns a value modulo the
 // group order rather than a field element. |k| is the security factor.
 static int hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
                           EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
                           unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   size_t L;
   uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES * 2];
   if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->order, k) ||
       !expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
     return 0;
   }

   BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
   size_t num_words = 2 * group->order.width;
   big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf, L);
   ec_scalar_reduce(group, out, words, num_words);
   return 1;
 }

 static inline void mul_A(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
                          const EC_FELEM *in) {
   assert(group->a_is_minus3);
   EC_FELEM tmp;
   ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, in, in);      // tmp = 2*in
   ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp);  // tmp = 4*in
   ec_felem_sub(group, out, in, &tmp);     // out = -3*in
 }

 static inline void mul_minus_A(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
                                const EC_FELEM *in) {
   assert(group->a_is_minus3);
   EC_FELEM tmp;
   ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, in, in);   // tmp = 2*in
   ec_felem_add(group, out, &tmp, in);  // out = 3*in
 }

 // sgn0_le implements the operation described in section 4.1.2 of
 // draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
 static BN_ULONG sgn0_le(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a) {
   uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES];
   size_t len;
   ec_felem_to_bytes(group, buf, &len, a);
   return buf[len - 1] & 1;
 }

 // map_to_curve_simple_swu implements the operation described in section 6.6.2
 // of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07, using the optimization in appendix
 // D.2.1. It returns one on success and zero on error.
 static int map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *Z,
                                    const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1,
                                    const EC_FELEM *c2, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
                                    const EC_FELEM *u) {
   void (*const felem_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a,
                           const EC_FELEM *b) = group->meth->felem_mul;
   void (*const felem_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a) =
       group->meth->felem_sqr;

   // This function requires the prime be 3 mod 4, and that A = -3.
   if (group->field.width == 0 || (group->field.d[0] & 3) != 3 ||
       !group->a_is_minus3) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
   }

   EC_FELEM tv1, tv2, tv3, tv4, xd, x1n, x2n, tmp, gxd, gx1, y1, y2;
   felem_sqr(group, &tv1, u);                         // tv1 = u^2
   felem_mul(group, &tv3, Z, &tv1);                   // tv3 = Z * tv1
   felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &tv3);                      // tv2 = tv3^2
   ec_felem_add(group, &xd, &tv2, &tv3);              // xd = tv2 + tv3
   ec_felem_add(group, &x1n, &xd, &group->one);       // x1n = xd + 1
   felem_mul(group, &x1n, &x1n, &group->b);           // x1n = x1n * B
   mul_minus_A(group, &xd, &xd);                      // xd = -A * xd
   BN_ULONG e1 = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &xd);  // e1 = xd == 0 [flipped]
   mul_A(group, &tmp, Z);
   ec_felem_select(group, &xd, e1, &xd, &tmp);  // xd = CMOV(xd, Z * A, e1)
   felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &xd);                 // tv2 = xd^2
   felem_mul(group, &gxd, &tv2, &xd);           // gxd = tv2 * xd = xd^3
   mul_A(group, &tv2, &tv2);                    // tv2 = A * tv2
   felem_sqr(group, &gx1, &x1n);                // gx1 = x1n^2
   ec_felem_add(group, &gx1, &gx1, &tv2);       // gx1 = gx1 + tv2
   felem_mul(group, &gx1, &gx1, &x1n);          // gx1 = gx1 * x1n
   felem_mul(group, &tv2, &group->b, &gxd);     // tv2 = B * gxd
   ec_felem_add(group, &gx1, &gx1, &tv2);       // gx1 = gx1 + tv2
   felem_sqr(group, &tv4, &gxd);                // tv4 = gxd^2
   felem_mul(group, &tv2, &gx1, &gxd);          // tv2 = gx1 * gxd
   felem_mul(group, &tv4, &tv4, &tv2);          // tv4 = tv4 * tv2
   group->meth->felem_exp(group, &y1, &tv4, c1, num_c1);  // y1 = tv4^c1
   felem_mul(group, &y1, &y1, &tv2);                      // y1 = y1 * tv2
   felem_mul(group, &x2n, &tv3, &x1n);                    // x2n = tv3 * x1n
   felem_mul(group, &y2, &y1, c2);                        // y2 = y1 * c2
   felem_mul(group, &y2, &y2, &tv1);                      // y2 = y2 * tv1
   felem_mul(group, &y2, &y2, u);                         // y2 = y2 * u
   felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &y1);                           // tv2 = y1^2
   felem_mul(group, &tv2, &tv2, &gxd);                    // tv2 = tv2 * gxd
   ec_felem_sub(group, &tv3, &tv2, &gx1);
   BN_ULONG e2 =
       ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tv3);       // e2 = tv2 == gx1 [flipped]
   ec_felem_select(group, &x1n, e2, &x2n, &x1n);  // xn = CMOV(x2n, x1n, e2)
   ec_felem_select(group, &y1, e2, &y2, &y1);     // y = CMOV(y2, y1, e2)
   BN_ULONG sgn0_u = sgn0_le(group, u);
   BN_ULONG sgn0_y = sgn0_le(group, &y1);
   BN_ULONG e3 = sgn0_u ^ sgn0_y;
   e3 = ((BN_ULONG)0) - e3;  // e3 = sgn0(u) == sgn0(y) [flipped]
   ec_felem_neg(group, &y2, &y1);
   ec_felem_select(group, &y1, e3, &y2, &y1);  // y = CMOV(-y, y, e3)

   // Appendix D.1 describes how to convert (x1n, xd, y1, 1) to Jacobian
   // coordinates. Note yd = 1. Also note that gxd computed above is xd^3.
   felem_mul(group, &out->X, &x1n, &xd);     // X = xn * xd
   felem_mul(group, &out->Y, &y1, &gxd);     // Y = yn * gxd = yn * xd^3
   out->Z = xd;                              // Z = xd
   return 1;
 }

 static int hash_to_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EVP_MD *md,
                          const EC_FELEM *Z, const EC_FELEM *c2, unsigned k,
                          EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
                          const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   EC_FELEM u0, u1;
   if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len)) {
     return 0;
   }

   // Compute |c1| = (p - 3) / 4.
   BN_ULONG c1[EC_MAX_WORDS];
   size_t num_c1 = group->field.width;
   if (!bn_copy_words(c1, num_c1, &group->field)) {
     return 0;
   }
   bn_rshift_words(c1, c1, /*shift=*/2, /*num=*/num_c1);

   EC_RAW_POINT Q0, Q1;
   if (!map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q0, &u0) ||
       !map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q1, &u1)) {
     return 0;
   }

   group->meth->add(group, out, &Q0, &Q1);  // R = Q0 + Q1
   // All our curves have cofactor one, so |clear_cofactor| is a no-op.
   return 1;
 }

 static int felem_from_u8(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, uint8_t a) {
   uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES] = {0};
   size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
   bytes[len - 1] = a;
   return ec_felem_from_bytes(group, out, bytes, len);
 }

 int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
     const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, const uint8_t *dst,
     size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   // See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
   if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
     return 0;
   }

   // kSqrt1728 was computed as follows in python3:
   //
   // p = 2**384 - 2**128 - 2**96 + 2**32 - 1
   // z3 = 12**3
   // c2 = pow(z3, (p+1)//4, p)
   // assert z3 == pow(c2, 2, p)
   // ", ".join("0x%02x" % b for b in c2.to_bytes(384//8, 'big')

   static const uint8_t kSqrt1728[] = {
       0x01, 0x98, 0x77, 0xcc, 0x10, 0x41, 0xb7, 0x55, 0x57, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xae,
       0x2e, 0x3a, 0x3e, 0x61, 0xfb, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0x0e, 0x87, 0xea, 0x55,
       0x7a, 0x56, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x59, 0x8a, 0x09, 0x40, 0xd0, 0xa6, 0x97, 0xa9,
       0xe0, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x2c, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0x14, 0xf5, 0x83, 0xc9, 0xd0, 0x66
   };

   // Z = -12, c2 = sqrt(1728)
   EC_FELEM Z, c2;
   if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 12) ||
       !ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kSqrt1728, sizeof(kSqrt1728))) {
     return 0;
   }
   ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);

   return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /*k=*/192, out, dst,
                        dst_len, msg, msg_len);
 }

 int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
     const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
     const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
     return 0;
   }

   return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /*k=*/192, msg,
                         msg_len);
 }
	/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
	*
	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
	*
	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
	* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
	* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
	* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

	#include <openssl/ec.h>

	#include <openssl/digest.h>
	#include <openssl/err.h>
	#include <openssl/nid.h>
	#include <openssl/type_check.h>

	#include <assert.h>

	#include "internal.h"
	#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
	#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
	#include "../internal.h"


	// This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in
	// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
	//
	// This hash-to-curve implementation is written generically with the
	// expectation that we will eventually wish to support other curves. If it
	// becomes a performance bottleneck, some possible optimizations by
	// specializing it to the curve:
	//
	// - Rather than using a generic \|felem_exp\|, specialize the exponentation to
	// c2 with a faster addition chain.
	//
	// - \|felem_mul\| and \|felem_sqr\| are indirect calls to generic Montgomery
	// code. Given the few curves, we could specialize
	// \|map_to_curve_simple_swu\|. But doing this reasonably without duplicating
	// code in C is difficult. (C++ templates would be useful here.)
	//
	// - P-521's Z and c2 have small power-of-two absolute values. We could save
	// two multiplications in SSWU. (Other curves have reasonable values of Z
	// and inconvenient c2.) This is unlikely to be worthwhile without C++
	// templates to make specializing more convenient.

	// expand_message_xmd implements the operation described in section 5.3.1 of
	// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07. It returns one on success and zero on
	// allocation failure or if \|out_len\| was too large.
	static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD md, uint8_t out, size_t out_len,
	const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
	const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len) {
	int ret = 0;
	const size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
	const size_t md_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);

	// Long DSTs are hashed down to size. See section 5.3.3.
	OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, "hashed DST still too large");
	uint8_t dst_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	if (dst_len >= 256) {
	static const char kPrefix[] = "H2C-OVERSIZE-DST-";
	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kPrefix, sizeof(kPrefix) - 1) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, dst_buf, NULL)) {
	goto err;
	}
	dst = dst_buf;
	dst_len = md_size;
	}
	uint8_t dst_len_u8 = (uint8_t)dst_len;

	// Compute b_0.
	static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
	// If \|out_len\| exceeds 16 bits then \|i\| will wrap below causing an error to
	// be returned. This depends on the static assert above.
	uint8_t l_i_b_str_zero[3] = {out_len >> 8, out_len, 0};
	uint8_t b_0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
	goto err;
	}

	uint8_t b_i[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	uint8_t i = 1;
	while (out_len > 0) {
	if (i == 0) {
	// Input was too large.
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	goto err;
	}
	if (i > 1) {
	for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
	b_i[j] ^= b_0[j];
	}
	} else {
	OPENSSL_memcpy(b_i, b_0, md_size);
	}

	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) \|\|
	!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
	goto err;
	}

	size_t todo = out_len >= md_size ? md_size : out_len;
	OPENSSL_memcpy(out, b_i, todo);
	out += todo;
	out_len -= todo;
	i++;
	}

	ret = 1;

	err:
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
	return ret;
	}

	// num_bytes_to_derive determines the number of bytes to derive when hashing to
	// a number modulo \|modulus\|. See the hash_to_field operation defined in
	// section 5.2 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
	static int num_bytes_to_derive(size_t out, const BIGNUM modulus, unsigned k) {
	size_t bits = BN_num_bits(modulus);
	size_t L = (bits + k + 7) / 8;
	// We require 2^(8L) < 2^(2bits - 2) <= n^2 so to fit in bounds for
	// \|felem_reduce\| and \|ec_scalar_reduce\|. All defined hash-to-curve suites
	// define \|k\| to be well under this bound. (\|k\| is usually around half of
	// \|p_bits\|.)
	if (L * 8 >= 2 * bits - 2 \|\|
	L > 2 * EC_MAX_BYTES) {
	assert(0);
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return 0;
	}

	*out = L;
	return 1;
	}

	// big_endian_to_words decodes \|in\| as a big-endian integer and writes the
	// result to \|out\|. \|num_words\| must be large enough to contain the output.
	static void big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num_words,
	const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
	assert(len <= num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
	// Ensure any excess bytes are zeroed.
	OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
	uint8_t out_u8 = (uint8_t )out;
	for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
	out_u8[len - 1 - i] = in[i];
	}
	}

	// hash_to_field implements the operation described in section 5.2
	// of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07, with count = 2. \|k\| is the security
	// factor.
	static int hash_to_field2(const EC_GROUP group, const EVP_MD md,
	EC_FELEM out1, EC_FELEM out2, const uint8_t *dst,
	size_t dst_len, unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg,
	size_t msg_len) {
	size_t L;
	uint8_t buf[4 * EC_MAX_BYTES];
	if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->field, k) \|\|
	!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, 2 * L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
	return 0;
	}
	BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
	size_t num_words = 2 * group->field.width;
	big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf, L);
	group->meth->felem_reduce(group, out1, words, num_words);
	big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf + L, L);
	group->meth->felem_reduce(group, out2, words, num_words);
	return 1;
	}

	// hash_to_scalar behaves like \|hash_to_field2\| but returns a value modulo the
	// group order rather than a field element. \|k\| is the security factor.
	static int hash_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP group, const EVP_MD md,
	EC_SCALAR out, const uint8_t dst, size_t dst_len,
	unsigned k, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
	size_t L;
	uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES * 2];
	if (!num_bytes_to_derive(&L, &group->order, k) \|\|
	!expand_message_xmd(md, buf, L, msg, msg_len, dst, dst_len)) {
	return 0;
	}

	BN_ULONG words[2 * EC_MAX_WORDS];
	size_t num_words = 2 * group->order.width;
	big_endian_to_words(words, num_words, buf, L);
	ec_scalar_reduce(group, out, words, num_words);
	return 1;
	}

	static inline void mul_A(const EC_GROUP group, EC_FELEM out,
	const EC_FELEM *in) {
	assert(group->a_is_minus3);
	EC_FELEM tmp;
	ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, in, in); // tmp = 2*in
	ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp); // tmp = 4*in
	ec_felem_sub(group, out, in, &tmp); // out = -3*in
	}

	static inline void mul_minus_A(const EC_GROUP group, EC_FELEM out,
	const EC_FELEM *in) {
	assert(group->a_is_minus3);
	EC_FELEM tmp;
	ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, in, in); // tmp = 2*in
	ec_felem_add(group, out, &tmp, in); // out = 3*in
	}

	// sgn0_le implements the operation described in section 4.1.2 of
	// draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
	static BN_ULONG sgn0_le(const EC_GROUP group, const EC_FELEM a) {
	uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES];
	size_t len;
	ec_felem_to_bytes(group, buf, &len, a);
	return buf[len - 1] & 1;
	}

	// map_to_curve_simple_swu implements the operation described in section 6.6.2
	// of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07, using the optimization in appendix
	// D.2.1. It returns one on success and zero on error.
	static int map_to_curve_simple_swu(const EC_GROUP group, const EC_FELEM Z,
	const BN_ULONG *c1, size_t num_c1,
	const EC_FELEM c2, EC_RAW_POINT out,
	const EC_FELEM *u) {
	void (const felem_mul)(const EC_GROUP , EC_FELEM r, const EC_FELEM a,
	const EC_FELEM *b) = group->meth->felem_mul;
	void (const felem_sqr)(const EC_GROUP , EC_FELEM r, const EC_FELEM a) =
	group->meth->felem_sqr;

	// This function requires the prime be 3 mod 4, and that A = -3.
	if (group->field.width == 0 \|\| (group->field.d[0] & 3) != 3 \|\|
	!group->a_is_minus3) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return 0;
	}

	EC_FELEM tv1, tv2, tv3, tv4, xd, x1n, x2n, tmp, gxd, gx1, y1, y2;
	felem_sqr(group, &tv1, u); // tv1 = u^2
	felem_mul(group, &tv3, Z, &tv1); // tv3 = Z * tv1
	felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &tv3); // tv2 = tv3^2
	ec_felem_add(group, &xd, &tv2, &tv3); // xd = tv2 + tv3
	ec_felem_add(group, &x1n, &xd, &group->one); // x1n = xd + 1
	felem_mul(group, &x1n, &x1n, &group->b); // x1n = x1n * B
	mul_minus_A(group, &xd, &xd); // xd = -A * xd
	BN_ULONG e1 = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &xd); // e1 = xd == 0 [flipped]
	mul_A(group, &tmp, Z);
	ec_felem_select(group, &xd, e1, &xd, &tmp); // xd = CMOV(xd, Z * A, e1)
	felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &xd); // tv2 = xd^2
	felem_mul(group, &gxd, &tv2, &xd); // gxd = tv2 * xd = xd^3
	mul_A(group, &tv2, &tv2); // tv2 = A * tv2
	felem_sqr(group, &gx1, &x1n); // gx1 = x1n^2
	ec_felem_add(group, &gx1, &gx1, &tv2); // gx1 = gx1 + tv2
	felem_mul(group, &gx1, &gx1, &x1n); // gx1 = gx1 * x1n
	felem_mul(group, &tv2, &group->b, &gxd); // tv2 = B * gxd
	ec_felem_add(group, &gx1, &gx1, &tv2); // gx1 = gx1 + tv2
	felem_sqr(group, &tv4, &gxd); // tv4 = gxd^2
	felem_mul(group, &tv2, &gx1, &gxd); // tv2 = gx1 * gxd
	felem_mul(group, &tv4, &tv4, &tv2); // tv4 = tv4 * tv2
	group->meth->felem_exp(group, &y1, &tv4, c1, num_c1); // y1 = tv4^c1
	felem_mul(group, &y1, &y1, &tv2); // y1 = y1 * tv2
	felem_mul(group, &x2n, &tv3, &x1n); // x2n = tv3 * x1n
	felem_mul(group, &y2, &y1, c2); // y2 = y1 * c2
	felem_mul(group, &y2, &y2, &tv1); // y2 = y2 * tv1
	felem_mul(group, &y2, &y2, u); // y2 = y2 * u
	felem_sqr(group, &tv2, &y1); // tv2 = y1^2
	felem_mul(group, &tv2, &tv2, &gxd); // tv2 = tv2 * gxd
	ec_felem_sub(group, &tv3, &tv2, &gx1);
	BN_ULONG e2 =
	ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tv3); // e2 = tv2 == gx1 [flipped]
	ec_felem_select(group, &x1n, e2, &x2n, &x1n); // xn = CMOV(x2n, x1n, e2)
	ec_felem_select(group, &y1, e2, &y2, &y1); // y = CMOV(y2, y1, e2)
	BN_ULONG sgn0_u = sgn0_le(group, u);
	BN_ULONG sgn0_y = sgn0_le(group, &y1);
	BN_ULONG e3 = sgn0_u ^ sgn0_y;
	e3 = ((BN_ULONG)0) - e3; // e3 = sgn0(u) == sgn0(y) [flipped]
	ec_felem_neg(group, &y2, &y1);
	ec_felem_select(group, &y1, e3, &y2, &y1); // y = CMOV(-y, y, e3)

	// Appendix D.1 describes how to convert (x1n, xd, y1, 1) to Jacobian
	// coordinates. Note yd = 1. Also note that gxd computed above is xd^3.
	felem_mul(group, &out->X, &x1n, &xd); // X = xn * xd
	felem_mul(group, &out->Y, &y1, &gxd); // Y = yn * gxd = yn * xd^3
	out->Z = xd; // Z = xd
	return 1;
	}

	static int hash_to_curve(const EC_GROUP group, const EVP_MD md,
	const EC_FELEM Z, const EC_FELEM c2, unsigned k,
	EC_RAW_POINT out, const uint8_t dst, size_t dst_len,
	const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
	EC_FELEM u0, u1;
	if (!hash_to_field2(group, md, &u0, &u1, dst, dst_len, k, msg, msg_len)) {
	return 0;
	}

	// Compute \|c1\| = (p - 3) / 4.
	BN_ULONG c1[EC_MAX_WORDS];
	size_t num_c1 = group->field.width;
	if (!bn_copy_words(c1, num_c1, &group->field)) {
	return 0;
	}
	bn_rshift_words(c1, c1, /shift=/2, /num=/num_c1);

	EC_RAW_POINT Q0, Q1;
	if (!map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q0, &u0) \|\|
	!map_to_curve_simple_swu(group, Z, c1, num_c1, c2, &Q1, &u1)) {
	return 0;
	}

	group->meth->add(group, out, &Q0, &Q1); // R = Q0 + Q1
	// All our curves have cofactor one, so \|clear_cofactor\| is a no-op.
	return 1;
	}

	static int felem_from_u8(const EC_GROUP group, EC_FELEM out, uint8_t a) {
	uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES] = {0};
	size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
	bytes[len - 1] = a;
	return ec_felem_from_bytes(group, out, bytes, len);
	}

	int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
	const EC_GROUP group, EC_RAW_POINT out, const uint8_t *dst,
	size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
	// See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
	if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
	return 0;
	}

	// kSqrt1728 was computed as follows in python3:
	//
	// p = 2384 - 2128 - 296 + 232 - 1
	// z3 = 12**3
	// c2 = pow(z3, (p+1)//4, p)
	// assert z3 == pow(c2, 2, p)
	// ", ".join("0x%02x" % b for b in c2.to_bytes(384//8, 'big')

	static const uint8_t kSqrt1728[] = {
	0x01, 0x98, 0x77, 0xcc, 0x10, 0x41, 0xb7, 0x55, 0x57, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xae,
	0x2e, 0x3a, 0x3e, 0x61, 0xfb, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0x0e, 0x87, 0xea, 0x55,
	0x7a, 0x56, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x59, 0x8a, 0x09, 0x40, 0xd0, 0xa6, 0x97, 0xa9,
	0xe0, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x2c, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0x14, 0xf5, 0x83, 0xc9, 0xd0, 0x66
	};

	// Z = -12, c2 = sqrt(1728)
	EC_FELEM Z, c2;
	if (!felem_from_u8(group, &Z, 12) \|\|
	!ec_felem_from_bytes(group, &c2, kSqrt1728, sizeof(kSqrt1728))) {
	return 0;
	}
	ec_felem_neg(group, &Z, &Z);

	return hash_to_curve(group, EVP_sha512(), &Z, &c2, /k=/192, out, dst,
	dst_len, msg, msg_len);
	}

	int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha512_draft07(
	const EC_GROUP group, EC_SCALAR out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
	const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
	if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
	return 0;
	}

	return hash_to_scalar(group, EVP_sha512(), out, dst, dst_len, /k=/192, msg,
	msg_len);
	}