| /* |
| * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto |
| */ |
| /* |
| * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may |
| * not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT |
| * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) |
| #include "check_crypto_config.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "psa/crypto.h" |
| #include "psa/crypto_values.h" |
| |
| #include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_core.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_hash.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_mac.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" |
| #include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| #include "psa_crypto_se.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" |
| /* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently |
| * stored keys. */ |
| #include "psa_crypto_storage.h" |
| |
| #include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) |
| #define mbedtls_calloc calloc |
| #define mbedtls_free free |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/aes.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/des.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/md5.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/md.h" |
| #include "md_wrap.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/pk.h" |
| #include "pk_wrap.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/error.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" |
| |
| #define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) |
| #define BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF 1 |
| #endif |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* Global data, support functions and library management */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| static int key_type_is_raw_bytes( psa_key_type_t type ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ |
| #define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 |
| #define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 |
| #define RNG_SEEDED 2 |
| |
| typedef struct |
| { |
| unsigned initialized : 1; |
| unsigned rng_state : 2; |
| mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; |
| } psa_global_data_t; |
| |
| static psa_global_data_t global_data; |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) |
| mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state = |
| &global_data.rng.drbg; |
| #endif |
| |
| #define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ |
| if( global_data.initialized == 0 ) \ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); |
| |
| psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ) |
| { |
| /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a |
| * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the |
| * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ |
| int low_level_ret = - ( -ret & 0x007f ); |
| switch( low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret ) |
| { |
| case 0: |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| #endif |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); |
| |
| #if !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) ) |
| /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx |
| * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| #endif |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) |
| /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx |
| * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| #endif |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); |
| |
| default: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* Key management */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, |
| size_t bits, |
| int bits_is_sloppy ) |
| { |
| switch( curve ) |
| { |
| case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: |
| switch( bits ) |
| { |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) |
| case 192: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) |
| case 224: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) |
| case 256: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) |
| case 384: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) |
| case 521: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); |
| case 528: |
| if( bits_is_sloppy ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: |
| switch( bits ) |
| { |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) |
| case 256: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) |
| case 384: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) |
| case 512: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ); |
| #endif |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: |
| switch( bits ) |
| { |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) |
| case 255: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); |
| case 256: |
| if( bits_is_sloppy ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) |
| case 448: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ); |
| #endif |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: |
| switch( bits ) |
| { |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) |
| case 192: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) |
| case 224: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 ); |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) |
| case 256: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ); |
| #endif |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| (void) bits_is_sloppy; |
| return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ); |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type, |
| size_t bits ) |
| { |
| /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ |
| switch( type ) |
| { |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: |
| break; |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: |
| if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: |
| if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: |
| if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: |
| if( bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: |
| if( bits != 256 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| default: |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| if( bits % 8 != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm |
| * |
| * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH |
| * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. |
| * |
| * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). |
| * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the |
| * \p algorithm. |
| * |
| * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS |
| * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT |
| * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( |
| psa_algorithm_t algorithm, |
| psa_key_type_t key_type ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( algorithm ) ) |
| { |
| if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC( algorithm ) ) |
| { |
| /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher |
| * key. */ |
| if( ( key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ) == |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ) |
| { |
| /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and |
| * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ |
| if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) > 1 ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, |
| size_t buffer_length ) |
| { |
| if( slot->key.data != NULL ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); |
| |
| slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_length ); |
| if( slot->key.data == NULL ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); |
| |
| slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, |
| const uint8_t* data, |
| size_t data_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, |
| data_length ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| memcpy( slot->key.data, data, data_length ); |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, |
| uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, |
| size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; |
| |
| /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ |
| if( data_length == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) |
| { |
| *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); |
| |
| status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( attributes->core.type, |
| *bits ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| /* Copy the key material. */ |
| memcpy( key_buffer, data, data_length ); |
| *key_buffer_length = data_length; |
| (void)key_buffer_size; |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) |
| { |
| return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( attributes, |
| data, data_length, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| key_buffer_length, |
| bits ) ); |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) |
| { |
| return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( attributes, |
| data, data_length, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| key_buffer_length, |
| bits ) ); |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. |
| * |
| * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. |
| */ |
| static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( |
| psa_key_type_t key_type, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg1, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg2 ) |
| { |
| /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ |
| if( alg1 == alg2 ) |
| return( alg1 ); |
| /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check |
| * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg1 ) && |
| PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg2 ) && |
| ( alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg1 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) |
| return( alg2 ); |
| if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg2 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) |
| return( alg1 ); |
| } |
| /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether |
| * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most |
| * restrictive tag length. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg2 ) && |
| ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg1, 0 ) == |
| PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg2, 0 ) ) ) |
| { |
| size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg1 ); |
| size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg2 ); |
| size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; |
| |
| /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ |
| if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && |
| ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( |
| alg1, restricted_len ) ); |
| } |
| /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ |
| if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && |
| ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ) |
| { |
| return( alg2 ); |
| } |
| if( ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && |
| ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ) |
| { |
| return( alg1 ); |
| } |
| } |
| /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one |
| * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most |
| * restrictive tag length. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg2 ) && |
| ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg1 ) == |
| PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg2 ) ) ) |
| { |
| /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base |
| * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ |
| if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( alg1, key_type ) ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the |
| * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms |
| * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it |
| * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. |
| * |
| * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output |
| * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to |
| * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ |
| size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg1 ); |
| size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg2 ); |
| size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; |
| |
| /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ |
| if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && |
| ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg1, restricted_len ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would |
| * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is |
| * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ |
| if( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ? alg2 : 0 ); |
| } |
| if( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ? alg1 : 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag |
| * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and |
| * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the |
| * specific-length version for the intersection. */ |
| if( alg1_len == alg2_len ) |
| return( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg1, alg1_len ) ); |
| } |
| /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_key_type_t key_type, |
| psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, |
| psa_algorithm_t requested_alg ) |
| { |
| /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ |
| if( requested_alg == policy_alg ) |
| return( 1 ); |
| /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, |
| * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, |
| * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( requested_alg ) && |
| PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( policy_alg ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) |
| { |
| return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == |
| ( requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ); |
| } |
| /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as |
| * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be |
| * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( policy_alg ) && |
| PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( requested_alg ) && |
| ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, 0 ) == |
| PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( requested_alg, 0 ) ) && |
| ( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= |
| PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( requested_alg ) ); |
| } |
| /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested |
| * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( policy_alg ) && |
| PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( requested_alg ) && |
| ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ) == |
| PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ) ) |
| { |
| /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy |
| * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ |
| if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( policy_alg, key_type ) ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be |
| * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. |
| * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output |
| * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value |
| * of 0 is currently OK. */ |
| size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( |
| key_type, 0, requested_alg ); |
| size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( |
| key_type, 0, |
| PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ); |
| |
| /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with |
| * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ |
| if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == 0 ) |
| return( requested_output_length == default_output_length ); |
| |
| /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy |
| * length exactly matches the default length. */ |
| if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( requested_alg ) == 0 && |
| PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == default_output_length ) |
| { |
| return( 1 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, |
| * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the |
| * minimum allowed length. */ |
| if( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= |
| requested_output_length ); |
| } |
| } |
| /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for |
| * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This |
| * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( policy_alg ) && |
| PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( requested_alg ) ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( requested_alg ) == |
| policy_alg ); |
| } |
| /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. |
| * |
| * The caller must test usage flags separately. |
| * |
| * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is |
| * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) |
| * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is |
| * combined with. |
| * |
| * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm |
| * allowed by the \p policy. |
| * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm |
| * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but |
| * the \p policy does not allow it. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, |
| psa_key_type_t key_type, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ |
| if( alg == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| if( psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg, alg ) || |
| psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg2, alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| else |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. |
| * |
| * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is |
| * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) |
| * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is |
| * combined with. |
| * |
| * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy |
| * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. |
| * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. |
| * |
| * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS |
| * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of |
| * \c *policy and \c *constraint. |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT |
| * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. |
| * \c *policy is unchanged. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( |
| psa_key_type_t key_type, |
| psa_key_policy_t *policy, |
| const psa_key_policy_t *constraint ) |
| { |
| psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = |
| psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg, |
| constraint->alg ); |
| psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = |
| psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg2, |
| constraint->alg2 ); |
| if( intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| if( intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| policy->usage &= constraint->usage; |
| policy->alg = intersection_alg; |
| policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints |
| * and lock it. |
| * |
| * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is |
| * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is |
| * zero, the algorithm is not checked. |
| * |
| * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key |
| * into a key slot if not already done. |
| * |
| * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of |
| * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, |
| psa_key_usage_t usage, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, p_slot ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| slot = *p_slot; |
| |
| /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags |
| * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public |
| * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as |
| * if they had the export flag. */ |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) ) |
| usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; |
| |
| if( ( slot->attr.policy.usage & usage ) != usage ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */ |
| if( alg != 0 ) |
| { |
| status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, |
| slot->attr.type, |
| alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| error: |
| *p_slot = NULL; |
| psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. |
| * |
| * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly |
| * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element and/or to be used |
| * by a secure element. |
| * |
| * This is a temporary function that may be used instead of |
| * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support |
| * for a cryptographic operation. |
| * |
| * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the |
| * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, |
| psa_key_usage_t usage, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, |
| usage, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| psa_unlock_key_slot( *p_slot ); |
| *p_slot = NULL; |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) |
| { |
| /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an |
| * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */ |
| if( slot->key.data != NULL ) |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); |
| |
| mbedtls_free( slot->key.data ); |
| slot->key.data = NULL; |
| slot->key.bytes = 0; |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. |
| * Persistent storage is not affected. */ |
| psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); |
| |
| /* |
| * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, |
| * do our best to report an unexpected lock counter. Assert with |
| * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is equal to one: |
| * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the |
| * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the |
| * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. |
| */ |
| if( slot->lock_count != 1 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT( slot->lock_count == 1 ); |
| status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| } |
| |
| /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe |
| * because all multipart operation objects are independent from |
| * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup |
| * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that |
| * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ |
| /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has |
| * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not |
| * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ |
| memset( slot, 0, sizeof( *slot ) ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_destroy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) |
| { |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ |
| psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent |
| * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not |
| * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if |
| * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by |
| * the current implementation. |
| */ |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| /* |
| * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the |
| * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed |
| * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be |
| * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have |
| * stopped. |
| */ |
| if( slot->lock_count > 1 ) |
| { |
| psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work |
| * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only |
| * by policy or actually physically read-only). |
| * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory |
| * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ |
| overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ); |
| if( driver != NULL ) |
| { |
| /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: |
| * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the |
| * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's |
| * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these |
| * three actions. */ |
| psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ); |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ); |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; |
| status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); |
| /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure |
| * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially |
| * important if the error is that the storage is full. |
| * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent |
| * state after a reset? |
| * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 |
| */ |
| overall_status = status; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_destroy_se_key( driver, |
| psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); |
| if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| overall_status = status; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| status = psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); |
| if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| overall_status = status; |
| |
| /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should |
| * invalidate them. |
| * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 |
| */ |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| if( driver != NULL ) |
| { |
| status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); |
| if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| overall_status = status; |
| status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); |
| if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| overall_status = status; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| exit: |
| status = psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); |
| /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| overall_status = status; |
| return( overall_status ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| static psa_status_t psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( |
| const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, |
| psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_mpi mpi; |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| uint8_t *buffer = NULL; |
| size_t buflen; |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &mpi ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto exit; |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &mpi, 65537 ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| /* It's the default value, which is reported as an empty string, |
| * so there's nothing to do. */ |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &mpi ); |
| buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); |
| if( buffer == NULL ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &mpi, buffer, buflen ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto exit; |
| attributes->domain_parameters = buffer; |
| attributes->domain_parameters_size = buflen; |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| mbedtls_free( buffer ); |
| return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| |
| /** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. |
| */ |
| psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| attributes->core = slot->attr; |
| attributes->core.flags &= ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | |
| MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| if( psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ) != NULL ) |
| psa_set_key_slot_number( attributes, |
| psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| switch( slot->attr.type ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: |
| case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| /* TODO: reporting the public exponent for opaque keys |
| * is not yet implemented. |
| * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/216 |
| */ |
| if( ! psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; |
| |
| status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( |
| slot->attr.type, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| &rsa ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| break; |
| |
| status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( rsa, |
| attributes ); |
| mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); |
| mbedtls_free( rsa ); |
| } |
| break; |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| default: |
| /* Nothing else to do. */ |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) |
| { |
| if( attributes->core.flags & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER ) |
| { |
| *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| else |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, |
| size_t key_buffer_size, |
| uint8_t *data, |
| size_t data_size, |
| size_t *data_length ) |
| { |
| if( key_buffer_size > data_size ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| memcpy( data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); |
| memset( data + key_buffer_size, 0, |
| data_size - key_buffer_size ); |
| *data_length = key_buffer_size; |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, |
| uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) |
| { |
| psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; |
| |
| if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) || |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) |
| { |
| return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| data, data_size, data_length ) ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but |
| it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit |
| support for exporting certain key types. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_export_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| uint8_t *data, |
| size_t data_size, |
| size_t *data_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a |
| * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid |
| * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ |
| if( data_size == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| |
| /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always |
| * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting |
| * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is |
| * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ |
| *data_length = 0; |
| |
| /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, |
| * which don't require any flag, but |
| * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. |
| */ |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0 ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| data, data_size, data_length ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, |
| size_t key_buffer_size, |
| uint8_t *data, |
| size_t data_size, |
| size_t *data_length ) |
| { |
| psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; |
| |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) |
| { |
| /* Exporting public -> public */ |
| return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| data, data_size, data_length ) ); |
| } |
| |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( attributes, |
| key_buffer, |
| key_buffer_size, |
| data, |
| data_size, |
| data_length ) ); |
| #else |
| /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( attributes, |
| key_buffer, |
| key_buffer_size, |
| data, |
| data_size, |
| data_length ) ); |
| #else |
| /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but |
| it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit |
| support for exporting certain key types. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| uint8_t *data, |
| size_t data_size, |
| size_t *data_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a |
| * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid |
| * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ |
| if( data_size == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| |
| /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always |
| * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting |
| * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is |
| * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ |
| *data_length = 0; |
| |
| /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( slot->attr.type ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| data, data_size, data_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(static_assert) |
| static_assert( ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, |
| "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both external-only and dual-use" ); |
| static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, |
| "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and dual-use" ); |
| static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ) == 0, |
| "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and external-only" ); |
| #endif |
| |
| /** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. |
| * |
| * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the |
| * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key |
| * such as the key type. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy ) |
| { |
| if( ( policy->usage & ~( PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. |
| * |
| * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not |
| * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may |
| * be involved in the creation of the key. |
| * |
| * Call this function early in the key creation process. |
| * |
| * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. |
| * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. |
| * NULL for a transparent key. |
| * |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ); |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id( attributes ); |
| |
| status = psa_validate_key_location( lifetime, p_drv ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| status = psa_validate_key_persistence( lifetime ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if( !psa_is_valid_key_id( psa_get_key_id( attributes ), 0 ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_validate_key_policy( &attributes->core.policy ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| /* Refuse to create overly large keys. |
| * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't |
| * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so |
| * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ |
| if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| /* Reject invalid flags. These should not be reachable through the API. */ |
| if( attributes->core.flags & ~ ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | |
| MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. |
| * |
| * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. |
| * |
| * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). |
| * |
| * This function is intended to be used as follows: |
| * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare |
| * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it |
| * a volatile key identifier. |
| * -# Populate the slot with the key material. |
| * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. |
| * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call |
| * psa_fail_key_creation(). |
| * |
| * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller |
| * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. |
| * |
| * \param method An identification of the calling function. |
| * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. |
| * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. |
| * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. |
| * NULL for a transparent key. |
| * |
| * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS |
| * The key slot is ready to receive key material. |
| * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. |
| * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( |
| psa_key_creation_method_t method, |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status; |
| psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| (void) method; |
| *p_drv = NULL; |
| |
| status = psa_validate_key_attributes( attributes, p_drv ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| slot = *p_slot; |
| |
| /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each |
| * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. |
| * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as |
| * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size |
| * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the |
| * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its |
| * definition. */ |
| |
| slot->attr = attributes->core; |
| if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) |
| slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; |
| #else |
| slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access |
| * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check |
| * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use |
| * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() |
| * may have set. */ |
| slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things |
| * when creating or registering a persistent key: |
| * create the key file in internal storage, create the |
| * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's |
| * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will |
| * encompass these three actions. |
| * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate |
| * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating |
| * a transaction is not required. */ |
| /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. |
| * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the |
| * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power |
| * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure |
| * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the |
| * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet |
| * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, |
| * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ |
| if( *p_drv != NULL ) |
| { |
| psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; |
| status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key( attributes, method, *p_drv, |
| &slot_number ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( attributes->core.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ); |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; |
| psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; |
| status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( |
| slot, (uint8_t *)( &slot_number ), sizeof( slot_number ) ); |
| } |
| |
| if( *p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) |
| { |
| /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. |
| * |
| * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. |
| * |
| * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). |
| * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use |
| * of this function. |
| * |
| * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was |
| * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed |
| * anymore as part of the key creation process. |
| * |
| * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. |
| * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, |
| * or NULL for a transparent key. |
| * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the |
| * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. |
| * |
| * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS |
| * The key was successfully created. |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT |
| * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE |
| * |
| * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. |
| * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot, |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; |
| (void) slot; |
| (void) driver; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| if( driver != NULL ) |
| { |
| psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; |
| psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = |
| psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ; |
| |
| #if defined(static_assert) |
| static_assert( sizeof( slot_number ) == |
| sizeof( data.slot_number ), |
| "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t" ); |
| #endif |
| memcpy( &data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof( slot_number ) ); |
| status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, |
| (uint8_t*) &data, |
| sizeof( data ) ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| { |
| /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so |
| * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ |
| status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes ); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not |
| * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case |
| * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual |
| * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, |
| * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ |
| if( driver != NULL && |
| psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ) |
| { |
| status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| *key = slot->attr.id; |
| status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| } |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Abort the creation of a key. |
| * |
| * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), |
| * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this |
| * function may not clean up persistent storage. |
| * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use |
| * of this function. |
| * |
| * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. |
| * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, |
| * or NULL for a transparent key. |
| */ |
| static void psa_fail_key_creation( psa_key_slot_t *slot, |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) |
| { |
| (void) driver; |
| |
| if( slot == NULL ) |
| return; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure |
| * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata |
| * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure |
| * element. |
| * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 |
| */ |
| |
| /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if |
| * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the |
| * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). |
| * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any |
| * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data |
| * itself. */ |
| (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); |
| } |
| |
| /** Validate optional attributes during key creation. |
| * |
| * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are |
| * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent |
| * with the data in the slot. |
| * |
| * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after |
| * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. |
| */ |
| static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( |
| const psa_key_slot_t *slot, |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) |
| { |
| if( attributes->core.type != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( attributes->core.type != slot->attr.type ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; |
| mbedtls_mpi actual, required; |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( |
| slot->attr.type, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| &rsa ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_init( &required ); |
| ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual ); |
| mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); |
| mbedtls_free( rsa ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto rsa_exit; |
| ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &required, |
| attributes->domain_parameters, |
| attributes->domain_parameters_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| goto rsa_exit; |
| if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &actual, &required ) != 0 ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; |
| rsa_exit: |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual ); |
| mbedtls_mpi_free( &required ); |
| if( ret != 0) |
| return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( attributes->core.bits != 0 ) |
| { |
| if( attributes->core.bits != slot->attr.bits ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *data, |
| size_t data_length, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; |
| size_t bits; |
| size_t storage_size = data_length; |
| |
| *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| |
| /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). |
| * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, |
| * which is never valid. */ |
| if( data_length == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion cannot overflow. */ |
| if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, |
| &slot, &driver ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local |
| * storage ( thus not in the case of importing a key in a secure element |
| * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a |
| * buffer to hold the imported key material. */ |
| if( slot->key.data == NULL ) |
| { |
| if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( attributes->core.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( |
| attributes, data, data_length, &storage_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, storage_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| bits = slot->attr.bits; |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( attributes, |
| data, data_length, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( slot->attr.bits == 0 ) |
| slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; |
| else if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit |
| * size fits in its representation type.*/ |
| if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( slot, attributes ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) |
| psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| |
| /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. |
| * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the |
| * secure element, but not all secure elements support this |
| * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ |
| if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| |
| status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, |
| &slot, &driver ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, &key ); |
| |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); |
| |
| /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ |
| psa_close_key( key ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; |
| psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; |
| psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; |
| psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; |
| size_t storage_size = 0; |
| |
| *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0 ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( source_slot, |
| specified_attributes ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| /* The target key type and number of bits have been validated by |
| * psa_validate_optional_attributes() to be either equal to zero or |
| * equal to the ones of the source key. So it is safe to inherit |
| * them from the source key now." |
| * */ |
| actual_attributes.core.bits = source_slot->attr.bits; |
| actual_attributes.core.type = source_slot->attr.type; |
| |
| |
| status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type, |
| &actual_attributes.core.policy, |
| &source_slot->attr.policy ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, |
| &target_slot, &driver ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( target_slot->attr.lifetime ) != |
| PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( source_slot->attr.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * If the source and target keys are stored in different locations, |
| * the source key would need to be exported as plaintext and re-imported |
| * in the other location. This has security implications which have not |
| * been fully mapped. For now, this can be achieved through |
| * appropriate API invocations from the application, if needed. |
| * */ |
| status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| /* |
| * When the source and target keys are within the same location, |
| * - For transparent keys it is a blind copy without any driver invocation, |
| * - For opaque keys this translates to an invocation of the drivers' |
| * copy_key entry point through the dispatch layer. |
| * */ |
| if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( actual_attributes.core.lifetime ) ) |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &actual_attributes, |
| &storage_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( target_slot, storage_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key( &actual_attributes, |
| source_slot->key.data, |
| source_slot->key.bytes, |
| target_slot->key.data, |
| target_slot->key.bytes, |
| &target_slot->key.bytes ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target_slot, |
| source_slot->key.data, |
| source_slot->key.bytes ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| status = psa_finish_key_creation( target_slot, driver, target_key ); |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_fail_key_creation( target_slot, driver ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( source_slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* Message digests */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_abort( psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) |
| { |
| /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( operation ); |
| operation->id = 0; |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ |
| if( operation->id != 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only |
| * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ |
| memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( operation, alg ); |
| |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_hash_abort( operation ); |
| |
| return status; |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_update( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a |
| * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ |
| if( input_length == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( operation, input, input_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_hash_abort( operation ); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_finish( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, |
| uint8_t *hash, |
| size_t hash_size, |
| size_t *hash_length ) |
| { |
| *hash_length = 0; |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( |
| operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); |
| psa_hash_abort( operation ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_verify( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, |
| const uint8_t *hash, |
| size_t hash_length ) |
| { |
| uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t actual_hash_length; |
| psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish( |
| operation, |
| actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), |
| &actual_hash_length ); |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_hash_abort(operation); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_compute( psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, |
| size_t *hash_length ) |
| { |
| *hash_length = 0; |
| if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| return( psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, |
| hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_compare( psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) |
| { |
| uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t actual_hash_length; |
| |
| if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( |
| alg, input, input_length, |
| actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), |
| &actual_hash_length ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_hash_clone( const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, |
| psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) |
| { |
| if( source_operation->id == 0 || |
| target_operation->id != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( source_operation, |
| target_operation ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_hash_abort( target_operation ); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* MAC */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) |
| { |
| /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( operation ); |
| operation->mac_size = 0; |
| operation->is_sign = 0; |
| operation->id = 0; |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| uint8_t *mac_size ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); |
| size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( attributes ); |
| |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ |
| status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ |
| *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ); |
| |
| if( *mac_size < 4 ) |
| { |
| /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be |
| * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, |
| * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still |
| * too small for security. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, |
| PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) ) |
| { |
| /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length |
| * of the algorithm. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ) |
| { |
| /* PSA_MAC_LENGTH returns the correct length even for a MAC algorithm |
| * that is disabled in the compile-time configuration. The result can |
| * therefore be larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which does take the |
| * configuration into account. In this case, force a return of |
| * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED here. Otherwise psa_mac_verify(), or |
| * psa_mac_compute(mac_size=PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE), would return |
| * PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for an unsupported algorithm whose MAC size |
| * is larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which is misleading and which breaks |
| * systematically generated tests. */ |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| int is_sign ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; |
| |
| /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ |
| if( operation->id != 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, |
| &slot, |
| is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, |
| alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, |
| &operation->mac_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| operation->is_sign = is_sign; |
| /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ |
| if( is_sign ) |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, |
| &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| alg ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( operation, |
| &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| alg ); |
| } |
| |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_mac_abort( operation ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 1 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 0 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length ) |
| { |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); |
| |
| /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a |
| * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ |
| if( input_length == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| |
| psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( operation, |
| input, input_length ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_mac_abort( operation ); |
| |
| return( status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| uint8_t *mac, |
| size_t mac_size, |
| size_t *mac_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( ! operation->is_sign ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) |
| * once all the error checks are done. */ |
| if( operation->mac_size == 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( mac_size < operation->mac_size ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( operation, |
| mac, operation->mac_size, |
| mac_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer |
| * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. |
| * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, |
| * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be |
| * an unachievable MAC. |
| */ |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| *mac_length = mac_size; |
| operation->mac_size = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if( mac_size > operation->mac_size ) |
| memset( &mac[operation->mac_size], '!', |
| mac_size - operation->mac_size ); |
| |
| abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); |
| |
| return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, |
| const uint8_t *mac, |
| size_t mac_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if( operation->id == 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( operation->is_sign ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( operation->mac_size != mac_length ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( operation, |
| mac, mac_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); |
| |
| return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t *mac, |
| size_t mac_size, |
| size_t *mac_length, |
| int is_sign ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, |
| &slot, |
| is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, |
| alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, |
| &operation_mac_size ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( mac_size < operation_mac_size ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( |
| &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, |
| input, input_length, |
| mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer |
| * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. |
| * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, |
| * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be |
| * an unachievable MAC. |
| */ |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| { |
| *mac_length = mac_size; |
| operation_mac_size = 0; |
| } |
| if( mac_size > operation_mac_size ) |
| memset( &mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_compute( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t *mac, |
| size_t mac_size, |
| size_t *mac_length) |
| { |
| return( psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, |
| input, input_length, |
| mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_mac_verify( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t *mac, |
| size_t mac_length) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; |
| size_t actual_mac_length; |
| |
| status = psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, |
| input, input_length, |
| actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ), |
| &actual_mac_length, 0 ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( mac_length != actual_mac_length ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| exit: |
| mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); |
| |
| return ( status ); |
| } |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* Asymmetric cryptography */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| if( input_is_message ) |
| { |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) |
| { |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_SUCCESS ); |
| } |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| int input_is_message, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t * input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t * signature, |
| size_t signature_size, |
| size_t * signature_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| *signature_length = 0; |
| |
| status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return status; |
| |
| /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees |
| * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input |
| * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have |
| * to be a hash.) */ |
| if( signature_size == 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, &slot, |
| input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, |
| alg ); |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| if( input_is_message ) |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| exit: |
| /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error, |
| * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature |
| * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input), |
| * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ |
| if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| memset( signature + *signature_length, '!', |
| signature_size - *signature_length ); |
| else |
| memset( signature, '!', signature_size ); |
| /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call |
| * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */ |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| int input_is_message, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t * input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t * signature, |
| size_t signature_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return status; |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, &slot, |
| input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, |
| alg ); |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| if( input_is_message ) |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_length ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, |
| size_t key_buffer_size, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t *signature, |
| size_t signature_size, |
| size_t *signature_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) |
| { |
| size_t hash_length; |
| uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( |
| PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), |
| input, input_length, |
| hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return status; |
| |
| return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( |
| attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t * input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| uint8_t * signature, |
| size_t signature_size, |
| size_t * signature_length ) |
| { |
| return psa_sign_internal( |
| key, 1, alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, |
| size_t key_buffer_size, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t *signature, |
| size_t signature_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| |
| if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) |
| { |
| size_t hash_length; |
| uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( |
| PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), |
| input, input_length, |
| hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); |
| |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return status; |
| |
| return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( |
| attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t * input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t * signature, |
| size_t signature_length ) |
| { |
| return psa_verify_internal( |
| key, 1, alg, input, input_length, |
| signature, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, |
| uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) |
| { |
| if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || |
| PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( |
| attributes, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( |
| attributes, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| (void)key_buffer; |
| (void)key_buffer_size; |
| (void)hash; |
| (void)hash_length; |
| (void)signature; |
| (void)signature_size; |
| (void)signature_length; |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *hash, |
| size_t hash_length, |
| uint8_t *signature, |
| size_t signature_size, |
| size_t *signature_length ) |
| { |
| return psa_sign_internal( |
| key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_size, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( |
| const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, |
| const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, |
| const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || |
| PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( |
| attributes, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_length ) ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) |
| { |
| if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) |
| return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( |
| attributes, |
| key_buffer, key_buffer_size, |
| alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_length ) ); |
| #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || |
| * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| (void)key_buffer; |
| (void)key_buffer_size; |
| (void)hash; |
| (void)hash_length; |
| (void)signature; |
| (void)signature_length; |
| |
| return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *hash, |
| size_t hash_length, |
| const uint8_t *signature, |
| size_t signature_length ) |
| { |
| return psa_verify_internal( |
| key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, |
| signature, signature_length ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t *salt, |
| size_t salt_length, |
| uint8_t *output, |
| size_t output_size, |
| size_t *output_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| (void) input; |
| (void) input_length; |
| (void) salt; |
| (void) output; |
| (void) output_size; |
| |
| *output_length = 0; |
| |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| if( ! ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) || |
| PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, |
| output, output_size, output_length ); |
| exit: |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| const uint8_t *input, |
| size_t input_length, |
| const uint8_t *salt, |
| size_t salt_length, |
| uint8_t *output, |
| size_t output_size, |
| size_t *output_length ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot; |
| |
| (void) input; |
| (void) input_length; |
| (void) salt; |
| (void) output; |
| (void) output_size; |
| |
| *output_length = 0; |
| |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) |
| return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( |
| key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| return( status ); |
| if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( |
| &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, |
| alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, |
| output, output_size, output_length ); |
| |
| exit: |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| /* Symmetric cryptography */ |
| /****************************************************************/ |
| |
| static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg, |
| mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) |
| { |
| psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; |
| psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; |
| psa_key_usage_t usage = ( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : |
| PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); |
| |
| /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ |
| if( operation->id != 0 ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) |
| { |
| status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, usage, alg ); |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member |
| * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, |
| * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been |
| * allocated/initialized. */ |
| operation->iv_set = 0; |
| if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) |
| operation->iv_required = 0; |
| else |
| operation->iv_required = 1; |
| operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); |
| |
| psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { |
| .core = slot->attr |
| }; |
| |
| /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ |
| if( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, |
| &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| alg ); |
| else |
| status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( operation, |
| &attributes, |
| slot->key.data, |
| slot->key.bytes, |
| alg ); |
| |
| exit: |
| if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) |
| psa_cipher_abort( operation ); |
| |
| unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); |
| |
| return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); |
| } |
| |
| psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, |
| mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, |
| psa_algorithm_t alg ) |
| { |
| return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); |
| } |
| |
| |