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/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Intel Corporation.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
#ifndef ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H
#define ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H
#include <zephyr/types.h>
/**
* Sanitize an array index against bounds check bypass attacks aka the
* Spectre V1 vulnerability.
*
* CPUs with speculative execution may speculate past any size checks and
* leak confidential data due to analysis of micro-architectural properties.
* This will unconditionally truncate any out-of-bounds indexes to
* zero in the speculative execution path using bit twiddling instead of
* any branch instructions.
*
* Example usage:
*
* if (index < size) {
* index = k_array_index_sanitize(index, size);
* data = array[index];
* }
*
* @param index Untrusted array index which has been validated, but not used
* @param array_size Size of the array
* @return The original index value if < size, or 0
*/
static inline uint32_t k_array_index_sanitize(uint32_t index, uint32_t array_size)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BOUNDS_CHECK_BYPASS_MITIGATION
int32_t signed_index = index, signed_array_size = array_size;
/* Take the difference between index and max.
* A proper value will result in a negative result. We also AND in
* the complement of index, so that we automatically reject any large
* indexes which would wrap around the difference calculation.
*
* Sign-extend just the sign bit to produce a mask of all 1s (accept)
* or all 0s (truncate).
*/
uint32_t mask = ((signed_index - signed_array_size) & ~signed_index) >> 31;
return index & mask;
#else
ARG_UNUSED(array_size);
return index;
#endif /* CONFIG_BOUNDS_CHECK_BYPASS_MITIGATION */
}
#endif /* ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H */