blob: 00bcff8d47c4bef9e6e5e767ec8c3bb155cbee3e [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
#include <zephyr/spinlock.h>
#include <zephyr/arch/x86/efi.h>
#include <zephyr/sys/mem_manage.h>
#include "../zefi/efi.h" /* ZEFI not on include path */
#include <zephyr/kernel.h>
#include <kernel_arch_func.h>
#define EFI_CON_BUFSZ 128
/* Big stack for the EFI code to use */
static uint64_t __aligned(64) efi_stack[1024];
struct efi_boot_arg *efi;
void *efi_get_acpi_rsdp(void)
{
if (efi == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return efi->acpi_rsdp;
}
void efi_init(struct efi_boot_arg *efi_arg)
{
if (efi_arg == NULL) {
return;
}
z_phys_map((uint8_t **)&efi, (uintptr_t)efi_arg,
sizeof(struct efi_boot_arg), 0);
}
/* EFI thunk. Not a lot of code, but lots of context:
*
* We need to swap in the original EFI page tables for this to work,
* as Zephyr has only mapped memory it uses and IO it knows about. In
* theory we might need to restore more state too (maybe the EFI code
* uses special segment descriptors from its own GDT, maybe it relies
* on interrupts in its own IDT, maybe it twiddles custom MSRs or
* plays with the IO-MMU... the posibilities are endless). But
* experimentally, only the memory state seems to be required on known
* hardware. This is safe because in the existing architecture Zephyr
* has already initialized all its own memory and left the rest of the
* system as-is; we already know it doesn't overlap with the EFI
* environment (because we've always just assumed that's the case,
* heh).
*
* Similarly we need to swap the stack: EFI firmware was written in an
* environment where it would be running on multi-gigabyte systems and
* likes to overflow the tiny stacks Zephyr code uses. (There is also
* the problem of the red zone -- SysV reserves 128 bytes of
* unpreserved data "under" the stack pointer for the use of the
* current function. Our compiler would be free to write things there
* that might be clobbered by the EFI call, which doesn't understand
* that rule. Inspection of generated code shows that we're safe, but
* still, best to swap stacks explicitly.)
*
* And the calling conventions are different: the EFI function uses
* Microsoft's ABI, not SysV. Parameters go in RCX/RDX/R8/R9 (though
* we only pass two here), and return value is in RAX (which we
* multiplex as an input to hold the function pointer). R10 and R11
* are also caller-save. Technically X/YMM0-5 are caller-save too,
* but as long as this (SysV) function was called per its own ABI they
* have already been saved by our own caller. Also note that there is
* a 32 byte region ABOVE the return value that must be allocated by
* the caller as spill space for the 4 register-passed arguments (this
* ABI is so weird...). We also need two call-preserved scratch
* registers (for preserving the stack pointer and page table), those
* are R12/R13.
*
* Finally: note that the firmware on at least one board (an Up
* Squared APL device) will internally ENABLE INTERRUPTS before
* returing from its OutputString method. This is... unfortunate, and
* says poor things about reliability using this code as it will
* implicitly break the spinlock we're using. The OS will be able to
* take an interrupt just fine, but if the resulting ISR tries to log,
* we'll end up in EFI firmware reentrantly! The best we can do is an
* unconditional CLI immediately after returning.
*/
static uint64_t efi_call(void *fn, uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2)
{
void *stack_top = &efi_stack[ARRAY_SIZE(efi_stack) - 4];
/* During the efi_call window the interrupt is enabled, that
* means an interrupt could happen and trigger scheduler at
* end of the interrupt. Try to prevent swap happening.
*/
k_sched_lock();
__asm__ volatile("movq %%cr3, %%r12;" /* save zephyr page table */
"movq %%rsp, %%r13;" /* save stack pointer */
"movq %%rsi, %%rsp;" /* set stack */
"movq %%rdi, %%cr3;" /* set EFI page table */
"callq *%%rax;"
"cli;"
"movq %%r12, %%cr3;" /* reset paging */
"movq %%r13, %%rsp;" /* reset stack */
: "+a"(fn)
: "c"(arg1), "d"(arg2), "S"(stack_top), "D"(efi->efi_cr3)
: "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13");
k_sched_unlock();
return (uint64_t) fn;
}
int efi_console_putchar(int c)
{
static struct k_spinlock lock;
static uint16_t efibuf[EFI_CON_BUFSZ + 1];
static int n;
static void *conout;
static void *output_string_fn;
struct efi_system_table *efist = efi->efi_systab;
/* Limit the printk call in interrupt context for
* EFI cosnsole. This is a workaround that prevents
* the printk call re-entries when an interrupt
* happens during the EFI call window.
*/
if (arch_is_in_isr()) {
return 0;
}
if (c == '\n') {
efi_console_putchar('\r');
}
k_spinlock_key_t key = k_spin_lock(&lock);
/* These structs live in EFI memory and aren't mapped by
* Zephyr. Extract the needed pointers by swapping page
* tables. Do it via lazy evaluation because this code is
* routinely needed much earlier than any feasible init hook.
*/
if (conout == NULL) {
uint64_t cr3;
__asm__ volatile("movq %%cr3, %0" : "=r"(cr3));
__asm__ volatile("movq %0, %%cr3" :: "r"(efi->efi_cr3));
conout = efist->ConOut;
output_string_fn = efist->ConOut->OutputString;
__asm__ volatile("movq %0, %%cr3" :: "r"(cr3));
}
/* Buffer, to reduce trips through the thunking layer.
* Flushes when full and at newlines.
*/
efibuf[n++] = c;
if (c == '\n' || n == EFI_CON_BUFSZ) {
efibuf[n] = 0U;
(void)efi_call(output_string_fn, (uint64_t)conout, (uint64_t)efibuf);
n = 0;
}
k_spin_unlock(&lock, key);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_EFI_CONSOLE
int arch_printk_char_out(int c)
{
return efi_console_putchar(c);
}
#endif