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/*
* Copyright (c) 2016 Jean-Paul Etienne <fractalclone@gmail.com>
* Contributors: 2018 Antmicro <www.antmicro.com>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
/**
* @file
* @brief RISCV specific kernel interface header
* This header contains the RISCV specific kernel interface. It is
* included by the generic kernel interface header (arch/cpu.h)
*/
#ifndef ZEPHYR_INCLUDE_ARCH_RISCV_ARCH_H_
#define ZEPHYR_INCLUDE_ARCH_RISCV_ARCH_H_
#include <arch/riscv/thread.h>
#include <arch/riscv/exp.h>
#include <arch/common/sys_bitops.h>
#include <arch/common/sys_io.h>
#include <arch/common/ffs.h>
#if defined(CONFIG_USERSPACE)
#include <arch/riscv/syscall.h>
#endif /* CONFIG_USERSPACE */
#include <irq.h>
#include <sw_isr_table.h>
#include <soc.h>
#include <devicetree.h>
#include <arch/riscv/csr.h>
/* stacks, for RISCV architecture stack should be 16byte-aligned */
#define ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN 16
#ifdef CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD
#define Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD_MIN_SIZE
#define Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN
#else
#define Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN 4
#define Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE 0
#endif
/* Kernel-only stacks have the following layout if a stack guard is enabled:
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
* | Guard | } Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start
* | Kernel |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD
#define ARCH_KERNEL_STACK_RESERVED Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
#define ARCH_KERNEL_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN \
MAX(Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN, ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_USERSPACE
/* Any thread running In user mode will have full access to the region denoted
* by thread.stack_info.
*
* Thread-local storage is at the very highest memory locations of this area.
* Memory for TLS and any initial random stack pointer offset is captured
* in thread.stack_info.delta.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD
#ifdef CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT
/* Use defaults for everything. The privilege elevation stack is located
* in another area of memory generated at build time by gen_kobject_list.py
*
* +------------+ <- thread.arch.priv_stack_start
* | Guard | } Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
* +------------+
* | Priv Stack | } CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE - Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.arch.priv_stack_start +
* CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj = thread.stack_info.start
* | Thread |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size) \
Z_POW2_CEIL(ROUND_UP((size), Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN))
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN(size) \
ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size)
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED 0
#else /* !CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT */
/* The stack object will contain the PMP guard, the privilege stack, and then
* the stack buffer in that order:
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
* | Guard | } Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.arch.priv_stack_start
* | Priv Stack | } CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start
* | Thread |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED (Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE + \
CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE)
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN(size) Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN
/* We need to be able to exactly cover the stack buffer with an PMP region,
* so round its size up to the required granularity of the PMP
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size) \
(ROUND_UP((size), Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN))
#endif /* CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT */
#else /* !CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD */
#ifdef CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT
/* Use defaults for everything. The privilege elevation stack is located
* in another area of memory generated at build time by gen_kobject_list.py
*
* +------------+ <- thread.arch.priv_stack_start
* | Priv Stack | } Z_KERNEL_STACK_LEN(CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE)
* +------------+
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj = thread.stack_info.start
* | Thread |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size) \
Z_POW2_CEIL(ROUND_UP((size), Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN))
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN(size) \
ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size)
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED 0
#else /* !CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT */
/* Userspace enabled, but supervisor stack guards are not in use */
/* Reserved area of the thread object just contains the privilege stack:
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj = thread.arch.priv_stack_start
* | Priv Stack | } CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start
* | Thread |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST(size) \
(ROUND_UP((size), Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN))
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN(size) Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN
#endif /* CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT */
#endif /* CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD */
#else /* !CONFIG_USERSPACE */
#ifdef CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD
/* Reserve some memory for the stack guard.
* This is just a minimally-sized region at the beginning of the stack
* object, which is programmed to produce an exception if written to.
*
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
* | Guard | } Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start
* | Thread |
* | stack |
* | |
* +............|
* | TLS | } thread.stack_info.delta
* +------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size
*/
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED Z_RISCV_STACK_GUARD_SIZE
#define ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN(size) Z_RISCV_PMP_ALIGN
/* Default for ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST */
#else /* !CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD */
/* No stack guard, no userspace, Use defaults for everything. */
#endif /* CONFIG_PMP_STACK_GUARD */
#endif /* CONFIG_USERSPACE */
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
#define RV_OP_LOADREG ld
#define RV_OP_STOREREG sd
#define RV_REGSIZE 8
#define RV_REGSHIFT 3
#else
#define RV_OP_LOADREG lw
#define RV_OP_STOREREG sw
#define RV_REGSIZE 4
#define RV_REGSHIFT 2
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_FPU_DOUBLE_PRECISION
#define RV_OP_LOADFPREG fld
#define RV_OP_STOREFPREG fsd
#else
#define RV_OP_LOADFPREG flw
#define RV_OP_STOREFPREG fsw
#endif
/* Common mstatus bits. All supported cores today have the same
* layouts.
*/
#define MSTATUS_IEN (1UL << 3)
#define MSTATUS_MPP_M (3UL << 11)
#define MSTATUS_MPIE_EN (1UL << 7)
#define MSTATUS_FS_INIT (1UL << 13)
#define MSTATUS_FS_MASK ((1UL << 13) | (1UL << 14))
/* This comes from openisa_rv32m1, but doesn't seem to hurt on other
* platforms:
* - Preserve machine privileges in MPP. If you see any documentation
* telling you that MPP is read-only on this SoC, don't believe its
* lies.
* - Enable interrupts when exiting from exception into a new thread
* by setting MPIE now, so it will be copied into IE on mret.
*/
#define MSTATUS_DEF_RESTORE (MSTATUS_MPP_M | MSTATUS_MPIE_EN)
#ifndef _ASMLANGUAGE
#include <sys/util.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#define STACK_ROUND_UP(x) ROUND_UP(x, ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN)
/* macros convert value of its argument to a string */
#define DO_TOSTR(s) #s
#define TOSTR(s) DO_TOSTR(s)
/* concatenate the values of the arguments into one */
#define DO_CONCAT(x, y) x ## y
#define CONCAT(x, y) DO_CONCAT(x, y)
/* Kernel macros for memory attribution
* (access permissions and cache-ability).
*
* The macros are to be stored in k_mem_partition_attr_t
* objects. The format of a k_mem_partition_attr_t object
* is an uint8_t composed by configuration register flags
* located in arch/riscv/include/core_pmp.h
*/
/* Read-Write access permission attributes */
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RW ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{PMP_R | PMP_W})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RO ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{PMP_R})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_NA ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{0})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RO_U_RO ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{PMP_R})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RO_U_NA ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{0})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_NA_U_NA ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{0})
/* Execution-allowed attributes */
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RWX_U_RWX ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{PMP_R | PMP_W | PMP_X})
#define K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RX_U_RX ((k_mem_partition_attr_t) \
{PMP_R | PMP_X})
/* Typedef for the k_mem_partition attribute */
typedef struct {
uint8_t pmp_attr;
} k_mem_partition_attr_t;
void arch_irq_enable(unsigned int irq);
void arch_irq_disable(unsigned int irq);
int arch_irq_is_enabled(unsigned int irq);
void arch_irq_priority_set(unsigned int irq, unsigned int prio);
void z_irq_spurious(const void *unused);
#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_HAS_PLIC)
#define ARCH_IRQ_CONNECT(irq_p, priority_p, isr_p, isr_param_p, flags_p) \
{ \
Z_ISR_DECLARE(irq_p, 0, isr_p, isr_param_p); \
arch_irq_priority_set(irq_p, priority_p); \
}
#else
#define ARCH_IRQ_CONNECT(irq_p, priority_p, isr_p, isr_param_p, flags_p) \
{ \
Z_ISR_DECLARE(irq_p, 0, isr_p, isr_param_p); \
}
#endif
/*
* use atomic instruction csrrc to lock global irq
* csrrc: atomic read and clear bits in CSR register
*/
static ALWAYS_INLINE unsigned int arch_irq_lock(void)
{
unsigned int key;
ulong_t mstatus;
__asm__ volatile ("csrrc %0, mstatus, %1"
: "=r" (mstatus)
: "r" (MSTATUS_IEN)
: "memory");
key = (mstatus & MSTATUS_IEN);
return key;
}
/*
* use atomic instruction csrrs to unlock global irq
* csrrs: atomic read and set bits in CSR register
*/
static ALWAYS_INLINE void arch_irq_unlock(unsigned int key)
{
ulong_t mstatus;
__asm__ volatile ("csrrs %0, mstatus, %1"
: "=r" (mstatus)
: "r" (key & MSTATUS_IEN)
: "memory");
}
static ALWAYS_INLINE bool arch_irq_unlocked(unsigned int key)
{
/* FIXME: looking at arch_irq_lock, this should be reducable
* to just testing that key is nonzero (because it should only
* have the single bit set). But there is a mask applied to
* the argument in arch_irq_unlock() that has me worried
* that something elseswhere might try to set a bit? Do it
* the safe way for now.
*/
return (key & MSTATUS_IEN) == MSTATUS_IEN;
}
static ALWAYS_INLINE void arch_nop(void)
{
__asm__ volatile("nop");
}
extern uint32_t sys_clock_cycle_get_32(void);
static inline uint32_t arch_k_cycle_get_32(void)
{
return sys_clock_cycle_get_32();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_USERSPACE
#include <arch/riscv/error.h>
#endif /* CONFIG_USERSPACE */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /*_ASMLANGUAGE */
#if defined(CONFIG_SOC_FAMILY_RISCV_PRIVILEGE)
#include <arch/riscv/riscv-privilege/asm_inline.h>
#endif
#endif