| # Copyright (c) 2016 Intel Corporation | |
| # Copyright (c) Zephyproject contributors | |
| # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 | |
| # Kconfig file for userspace configuration options. | |
| # | |
| if USERSPACE | |
| config THREAD_USERSPACE_LOCAL_DATA | |
| bool | |
| default y if ERRNO && !ERRNO_IN_TLS && !LIBC_ERRNO | |
| config USERSPACE_THREAD_MAY_RAISE_PRIORITY | |
| bool "Thread can raise own priority" | |
| depends on TEST # This should only be enabled by tests. | |
| help | |
| Thread can raise its own priority in userspace mode. | |
| config EXECUTE_XOR_WRITE | |
| bool "W^X for memory partitions" | |
| depends on ARCH_HAS_EXECUTABLE_PAGE_BIT | |
| default y | |
| help | |
| When enabled, will enforce that a writable partition isn't executable | |
| and vice versa. This might not be acceptable in all scenarios, | |
| so this option is given for those unafraid of shooting themselves | |
| in the foot. | |
| If unsure, say Y. | |
| config BOUNDS_CHECK_BYPASS_MITIGATION | |
| bool "Bounds check bypass mitigations for speculative execution" | |
| help | |
| Untrusted parameters from user mode may be used in system calls to | |
| index arrays during speculative execution, also known as the Spectre | |
| V1 vulnerability. When enabled, various macros defined in | |
| misc/speculation.h will insert fence instructions or other appropriate | |
| mitigations after bounds checking any array index parameters passed | |
| in from untrusted sources (user mode threads). When disabled, these | |
| macros do nothing. | |
| rsource "Kconfig.mem_domain" | |
| endif |